**1. Introduction**

Common property resource (CPR) researchers have argued that local communities can successfully manage natural resources, such as the commons [1,2]. These scholars have criticized the assumption that the commons are open-access contexts that inevitably lead to resource depletion. Within certain conditions, such as existing local institutions, local communities can appropriately manage resources. This claim also undermines the assumption that privatization is the sole method of successful resource management [3].

Recently, CPRs in developed industrialized countries have gained a focus [4,5]. Unlike designing institutions that govern natural resources in overuse contexts in developing countries, research on CPR management in developed countries after industrialization and urbanization should address underuse conditions. Appropriate human interventions concerning CPRs are disappearing, due to the declining population or aging of farmers, forest owners, and fishermen,—i.e., producers and bearers of ecosystem services—as well as changing institutional and market conditions around CPRs. Mitsumata [6] categorized external impacts on the commons—as non-settlement trends, commodification of commons, private corporation-led development, public works projects, legal system development and revisions, administration/policies, and court decisions—and presented typical positive and negative influences of each impact. Of these, non-settlement trends and commodification of the commons are important in the context of developed countries. With regard to non-settlement trends, an exodus may have the positive effect of the improvement of

**Citation:** Ota, M. Current Status and Challenges for Forest Commons (*Iriai* Forest) Management in Japan: A Focus on Forest Producers' Cooperatives and Authorized Neighborhood Associations. *Forests* **2023**, *14*, 572. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/f14030572

Academic Editor: Andrej Ficko

Received: 22 January 2023 Revised: 10 March 2023 Accepted: 11 March 2023 Published: 13 March 2023

**Copyright:** © 2023 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

resource conditions in places where overexploitation has been evident, while it may have the negative effect of underuse of resources, resulting in the absence of proper management inputs. The commodification of the commons may have the positive effect of providing opportunities to sustain and strengthen the commons, while it may have the negative effect of monoculture, resulting in resource underuse and neglect once market value is lost.

Traditional common (*iriai*) forests in Japan are a well known example of successful CPR management [7,8]. These forest management systems emerged in the 17th century. *Iriai* forests are forests and semi-natural grasslands that can be collectively accessed by residents in a specific area with specific rights. The resources procured typically include timber, forage, and firewood. Right-holders develop local rules and regulations to sustainably utilize limited resources, including methods, periods, and quantities of harvest.

Local institutions governing *iriai* forests have never been static and external environments surrounding *iriai* forests have changed over time. In particular, *iriai* forests cannot be explored in isolation from national policy developments [9–16]. Since the start of the modern Meiji period in 1868, successive governments have been averse to the existence of the common sphere, including *iriai* forests, because principles of long-standing CPR management are not likely to fit into the top-down control of state agencies nor into the pursuit of efficiency and maximization of monetary profits by private entities. Thus, since the late 19th century, *iriai* forests have been subject to various institutional changes that abrogate *iriai* forests and replace them with other forms of management.

Several studies have emphasized the changes in *iriai* forests as a result of external conditions. Shimada [14] pointed out that local communities can adapt *iriai* institutions to external influences, such as social and demographic conditions. However, communities have been unable to effectively cope with low timber prices, which have been manifested all over Japan since the 1980s; Shimada mentions this has been an influence that works outside the control of local communities. Saito [10] analyzed how municipality mergers in the 2000s in Japan affected forest management by property wards (*zaisanku*). Property wards play a role that enables local community members to hold and maintain rights to *iriai* resources; this institution has been in place since the late 19th century. Saito reported that new municipalities may not fully understand local historical contexts, and thus the autonomy of property wards could be threatened.

Matsushita [11] overviewed the management problems faced by forest producers' cooperatives (*seisan shinrin kumiai*: hereafter FPC). FPCs are cooperatives established to manage *iriai* forests, generally replacing broad-leaved forests with coniferous forests for more intensive forestry production. The Japanese government strongly promoted the establishment of FPCs for forests managed by *iriai* institutions after the late 1960s. The problems among FPCs identified by Matsushita include a lack of sufficient income due to uneven distribution of tree age structure and low timber prices, aging of FPC members as a labor force, and a lack of forestry experts among FPC members. He also denoted the burden of taxes; FPCs are cooperatives and hence, are subject to paying several taxes, including corporate tax, corporate inhabitant tax, and fixed asset tax. As a result, it is difficult for members to find a clear reason to continue their FPCs and so, the number of dissolutions of FPCs is increasing. At the same time, he presented several FPC cases where innovative activities had been taken.

Yamashita et al. [9] compared institutional characteristics of conventional *iriai* organizations, FPCs, and authorized neighborhood organizations (*ninka chien dantai*: hereafter ANA) against the backdrop of an increasing number of FPCs that had been dissolving themselves and changing their status to ANAs. ANAs are local neighborhood associations (such as wards) that have obtained the status of legal entity and can officially register fixed assets, such as *iriai* forests. ANAs have been a significant alternative after the dissolution of FPCs. Specifically with regard to the status change from FPCs to ANAs, the researchers pointed out that the reduction of transaction costs and the exemption from corporate taxes were the primary reasons motivating the change.

The present study aims to examine the management situations of FPCs and ANAs as contemporary forms of *iriai* forest management. There is little doubt that FPCs and ANAs are the two most important forms of contemporary *iriai* forest management. However, except for a few studies [9,11], FPCs and ANAs rarely appear in English literature, despite their importance; thus, more information and insights are needed. In particular, few studies provide detailed case information on kinds of forest management operations, forestry and non-forestry income sources, and locals' perceptions regarding the future of their *iriai* forests; the present study tries to fill this information gap.

An examination of FPCs facing management difficulties and ANAs as an alternative will facilitate understanding of how external legal, market, and social environments affect CPR management in developed industrialized countries. The cases of FPCs and ANAs can also highlight the pitfalls that policies related to administration and forestry in Japan have run into, along with the will of local communities to go along with their forest commons despite difficulties.

In terms of Japanese studies on FPCs and ANAs, Yamashita [17] presented a comprehensive review of the progress and current status of FPCs, drawing on official statistics. Handa [18] indicated that even though the policy intention of FPCs was the aim of more efficient timber production, most FPCs had continued with conventional *iriai*-type management. Several studies [19,20] reported problems and difficulties faced by FPCs, similar to those that Yamashita et al. [9] and Matsushita [11] presented. Although studies on FPCs are likely to be critical of the present situation, a couple of studies indicated the potential of FPCs, because the forest areas that FPCs own are likely to be greater than individual private forests; hence, they may hold advantages in making management plans and obtaining forest certificates [21,22].
