*Article* **Modernity, Its Impact on Muslim World and General Characteristics of 19–20th-Century Revivalist–Reformists' Re-Reading of the Qur'an**

**Ismail Albayrak**

School of Theology, Faculty of Theology and Philosophy, Australia Catholic University, Melbourne 3002, Australia; ismail.albayrak@acu.edu.au

**Abstract:** The 19th and 20th centuries were times of great change and transformation for the Muslim world. The salvation of the ummah—which is getting politically, militarily, and economically more backward against the West, terms such as revival (*ihya*), renewal (*tajdid*) and reform and reconstruction (*islah*)—have occupied almost all intellectuals and ulama. Many prescriptions have been proposed on this subject, the most vivid examples of which are mainly related to new approaches to the Qur'an and its interpretation. This article deals with the innovations put forward by reformist–revivalist leaders in different Muslim geographies regarding the interpretation of the Qur'an under the influence of modernism. We see that these approaches, which are basically based on the assumption of the inadequacy of classical methods and understandings, open up to questions and discussions for many hermeneutical devices that have become entrenched in the classical period and even argue that they are now unnecessary. Contrary to classical Qur'anic exegesis, reformist *tajdid*-centered suggestions of polyphonic modern Qur'an interpretations, the theological reflections of these suggestions, and most importantly their effect (or ineffectiveness) on Muslim societies are among the main topics of the article. In the beginning, the pressure of modernity, which should not be ignored in the perception and interpretation of the Qur'an, has become an indispensable element in the course of time. This new phenomenon and changing conditions have forced many Muslim intellectuals to compromise on principles that have become norms. The result, instead of a healthy reform, consisted of eclectic innovations and only saved the day and could not find a serious ground for itself in the grassroots.

**Keywords:** the Qur'an; exegesis; *ijtihad*; revival; renewal; modernity

#### **1. Introduction**

One of the most important common features of the contemporary reformist–revival scholars and movements under their influence manifested in different Islamic geographies is the need for a new way of re-reading the Qur'an. Almost all of them have taken the Qur'an as a basis for the *tajdid* (renewal) and improvement to be realized. In this article, firstly the developments that came with the Renaissance and enlightenment in the West and their impact on the Islamic world will be discussed. Then, general discussions about the perception of modernism in the Muslim world will be summarized. Finally, the reflections of the reformist and revivalist perception on the re-reading of the Qur'an, which is the main dynamic in various renewalist and revivalist movements, will be covered. In doing so, besides Qur'an and exegesis, approaches to the other major sources and related disciplines will also be discussed. It should be noted at the outset that we use terms such as reformist, modernist, revivalist or renawalist in a very general sense because of the transitions and intersections between them. It is also important to note that we will not be discussing the revivalist movements in which traditional Qur'an readings are continued. We will not focus on those who show new approaches by dressing classical instruments in modern clothes. The main approaches we will concentrate on are how changing conditions of modern periods have forced many Muslim intellectuals to compromise on principles that

**Citation:** Albayrak, Ismail. 2022. Modernity, Its Impact on Muslim World and General Characteristics of 19–20th-Century Revivalist– Reformists' Re-Reading of the Qur'an. *Religions* 13: 424. https:// doi.org/10.3390/rel13050424

Academic Editor: Jan A. Ali

Received: 7 February 2022 Accepted: 4 May 2022 Published: 7 May 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

have become norms. The result was that, instead of a healthy reform, eclectic innovations only saved the day, and could not find serious ground for itself in the grassroots.

#### **2. Modernism in the West**

At the beginning, it should be emphasized that modernism is not a concept which has had its boundaries drawn in a very clearly defined manner. In fact, it is a term which is defined in different ways by different people—both in terms of etymology and as a technical term. It is possible to summarize a special yet comprehensive definition of modernism, which is the development of a new point of view, as opposed to classical, traditional and ancient beliefs, as follows: 'the ideology and way of life brought to light by the mental transformation of the West which came with the Age of Enlightenment' (Demir and Acar 1992, p. 251). According to another description, modernism is both a philosophical and an art movement that refers to a global transformation in Western society and culture that from the early decades of the 19th and 20th centuries sought a new alignment with the experience and values of modern industrial life. It is an anthropocentric world view which is based on the foundations of humanism, secularism, and democracy, which gives supremacy and freedom to humankind, and seeks salvation in science rather than religion (Demir and Acar 1992). This, together with the fact that the comparison of all types of new things with the traditional, old, or ancient evokes modernism, modernity is presented to us as a never-ending process (Soyan 1993). In other words, modernism appears to us as a notion which is permanently constructing itself, in opposition to its old self. For this reason, post-modernism or post-post-modernism and the following processes are inevitable phenomena.

When we go back to the above definition, it does not evade our attention that enlightenment is a notification of modernism. The most radical change in this process is made to the traditional understanding of religion,—in particular, pietism, which views individual morals as the fundamental element of religion, and rationalism, which refutes all forms of orthodoxy have cracked the dogmatic structure of Protestantism (Erkilet 2001) and gives it a more liberal character (Sarıbay 1995). An important result of the emphasis on extreme rationalism, which we can call the corner stone of enlightenment, is its noteworthy variance from the status (authority) of the Bible. First, a limited God acting according to the laws of nature, and then many so called irrational Old and New Testament passages describing the transgression of these limits were tried to be presented in a more reasonable framework. In short, Christianity becomes historical and then history itself is given a more secular structure. According to A. Davuto ˘glu this is a revolution which allows the West to move from mythology to history (Davuto ˘glu 2001). However, it should not be forgotten that it is religion and faith which have been damaged the most from this revolution. That is because at the start of the Age of Enlightenment certain liberal thinkers, such as Baron d'Holbach, proposed that religion should be completely abandoned in order to be able to reach a full accord with nature, and this is extremely important in terms of how it exhibits the approach of the messengers of modernism. Even though they refuse to accept the authenticity of the religions, and despite the existence of certain pragmatists, such as Voltaire (Outram 1997),<sup>1</sup> who stated that the existence of religion should not be ignored as it ensures social order, it had almost become fashionable to associate the cause of all types of negative factors with God.2

On the one hand, religion seems to have lost its privilege and old value within the community—or, to put it in more cautious terms, the existence of religion simply became a vehicle—while on the other hand ,the rationalization of society, which is acknowledged as the most important gift of modernism, has especially tested the incidents surrounding modern human, and then presented it in a dominant way. This shows the degression of metaphysics and an uptrend in positivism. Mind shows that knowledge is power. Within this process secularization carries the role of a catalyst in the ever-decreasing religious practice. Meanwhile, the separation of public and private areas by Weber played an important role in religion being seen as something which is personal or to do with one's own conscience, or, at the very least to be considered separate from the state and communal life. Clearly, whatever exists that is not in accord with the rational knowledge standards that come with the Age of Enlightenment, or, indeed, in conflict with them, now belongs in the individual area (Poole 1993). In a mentality where reason (intelligibility) is the sole measure of everything, it should be natural not giving the necessary place to religion. In a world where people possess the self-confidence, and unlimited right to criticize, for these people to exist and act constantly in accordance with their own subjectivity, God needed to die (Soyan 1993).

Further, the contemporary trinity (humanism, secularism, and democracy) upon which modernism is seated continuously evolves and transforms everything and makes it obligatory to move forward. Indeed, the fundamental reason underlying the emergence of many of the sciences in the West during the 19th century, such as historical philosophy, sociology, anthropology, the history of civilization, religious history, etc., is known to be the attempts to verify the correctness of the beliefs of progress, development, and modernization (Bulaç 1996). However, the essentiality of this change should not be limited just to religion. It is possible to observe changes in every area of social life, especially in sciences, politics, technology, architecture, morals, arts, aesthetics, etc. Additionally, the difference between economic (technological) and social (political, cultural, legal, artistic) modernism shows the intellectual transformation of modernism within a more categorical framework. With modernization, which has been shaped by the fundamental propositions of the philosophy of enlightenment, the West has achieved economic welfare on the one hand, through the industrial revolution, and on the other hand the democratic administrative structure which is present in the political arena. Further, being protected from social and political instability, avoiding the tyranny of an all-powerful state, and guaranteeing peace and ensuring the balance of power, which they achieved after the Vienna Congress in 1815 (Altun 2002), which had met for that very purpose, has led Westerners to obtain self-confidence and made them believe that the developments they would achieve in the commercial and industrial arenas via their well-organized states, and the financial development which resulted from this would be irrevocable. Further, both the administrative imperialism and the commercial dominance (colonialism) (O'Leary 1995) the West achieved over the rest of the world meant that they were placed in the very center of history and led them to view history through a one-sided perspective.

The clearest traces of this multi-sided development were felt much more within the social and cultural life. The progressive and evolutionary understanding which continued in a straight line forced some (such as August Comte) to see this process (theological, metaphysical, positive) as something that all communities must experience, and that otherwise they would disappear (Bulaç 1996). Therefore, the West has seen modernism as the peak point which could be achieved by any community. Indeed, some have even evaluated the attempts of other communities to undertake the Western-centered modernization as a national conversion into becoming civilized without hesitation (Davuto ˘glu 2001).

Scientific and technological developments are also important motives which led to a speedier transformation. The father of the atom bomb, Julius Robert Oppenheimer, argued that 'the technical progress made by mankind in the last 40 years is greater than the developments achieved in the 40 centuries' (Izzetbegovic 1989, p. 61); this is an important evaluation in that it shows the extent of the mentioned transformation. As well as creating communities which produce more and consume more, this speedy transformation caused serious damage to traditional views of religion and of the world. Modernism incited the individualistic and egotistical characteristics of humankind and broke their ties with the traditional community. Modernization caused individuals to act as if they were each some sort of small God, and as well as not refraining from devouring and obliterating natural resources in order to meet the economic demands of some societies led to unfair competition and exploitation through the cooperation of centralized state power and bureaucracy (Dallmayr 2001). Many critics of modernism state that it has not met every

need of humankind, and that, indeed, it has led to a more materialistic world, and a world which has become a commodity with human being at its center (ibid.).

Together with this, the problems faced on this matter by the West who experienced modernism considerably earlier than the Islamic world, are somewhat more. The emphasis on extreme positivism, the attempts to find the absolute universal truth based on experimentation and experience, causing the engineering of artificial communities by ignoring the existence of many factors which shape human life, by implementing scientific symptoms similar to those lost in the physical arena to social sciences and humanities, the continuous attempts to evaluate others in line with their own value measurements, and the acceptance of Western based communal, political, cultural and legal developments as the only measure has caused modernization to arrive at various impasses. Furthermore, the two important World Wars (I and II) caused by the West, and the serious economic crisis caused by the free market in America in 1929, together with this scientific and economic development, has led various philosophers to seriously question whether rational Western people possess the qualifications required to oversee science and its data (Davuto ˘glu 2001).

Added to this is the fact that contrary to Newtonian understanding of physics, Einstein's theory of relativity draws attention to the presence of more than one framework of time, etc., and these developments can also be seen as among the important factors disproving the accent on only one truth (Murphy 1995). This new era can be called postmodernism, or it can be referred to as ultra, neo or post-industrial or digital periods, but the fact is that the assumption that a different time is being experienced can be very clearly seen. However, this does not mean the arguments for modernism have disappeared completely. While post-modernism is, in contrast to modernism, carries a more relativistic, pluralistic truth claims, and allows for God in the life of the individual and of the community,3 its many meta-statements, on the other hand have also been able to carry subjectivity and distinctiveness.

#### **3. Muslim Perception of Modernism/Modernity**

It will be beneficial to touch on the Muslim world and its experience of modernism, which is more important in terms of our subject matter discussion. The Muslim geography has spent the last three centuries in a very deep political, ideological, social, and commercial crisis. It cannot be said that they have come out of this crisis, even today. In particular, the intervention of Western powers has caused Muslim states to weaken, and even for much of the established and cultural heritage to be turned upside down. While on the one hand Western nations used their economic supremacy to control local industry in various regions such as the Ottoman lands, Iran, Indian Subcontinent, Egypt, North Africa, Southeast Asia, the Caucasus, etc., on the other hand they have succeeded in entering into local culture through the schools they have established in these regions (Lapidus 1996).

In Subcontinent, the Westerners, who were employed in the political and military arena by the weakening Moghul governments established schools in the region where they ensured that children grew up into intellectuals who could translate their own views. The Muslims, who had been the dominant class in the region, lost this distinction, especially after English became the only language used in state authorities and schools. The truth is that Hindus found more openings for themselves within the new structure of the region, in place of Muslims who lost their importance, both in the financial sense, and in their social status (Ahmed 1990).

The situation is no different in other regions either. Westerners established a school in Lebanon as early as 1728, and this school was followed by Maronite colleges established in 1735 and 1795 (Lapidus 1996). The intellectuals who became a sort of volunteer ambassadors of the new Western values played an important role in the cultivating nationalism and secularism in the lands where they lived. The effects of these individuals are not limited to just modern Western education either. This new elite who ensured that goods from the West were sold in the local markets, also published numerous newspapers and magazines to try to affect the structure of thought of local people in favour of the liberal Western thought. If we look in particular at the media sector in various different Muslim regions, it is seen that the effective activities of the non-Muslim minorities in this sector were not a coincidence (ibid.). An interesting point about the economy is that all Muslim countries became completely dependent on the West in the second half of the 19th century. The Ottomans were in a state where they were unable to pay even the interest of the loans they took from Western countries in 1882. In 1875, Egypt was under the complete control of public debt (ibid.). The situation in Iran and India was no different to that of the Ottomans and Egypt.

The Muslim civilization, which had been continuously dominant against non-Muslim nations in both the East and the West for centuries entered into such a defeated relationship with the dominant West that this has led Muslim intellectuals to try to find ways out of this situation. During this period, when the defeated were forced to imitate the victorious, it was observed that the first reforms were in the field of the defense industry, due to the fact that military insufficiencies were given as the reasons for lost battles. In Ottoman case, Selim III. employed Swedish, French, British and Hungarian engineers and established military and naval schools, and those similar structures were implemented in the Egypt of Mehmet Ali Pasha and in Tunisia where a large number of Italian engineers were employed (Hüseyin 1986). As well as reforms concerning defense, many reforms followed in various fields, in these regions. The reform movements initially carried the idea that they could take the scientific techniques of the West and combine these with Islamic morals, but as the speedy decline of the Muslim world continued and spread even further, it is observed that Western civilization, which was at first seen as an unavoidable evil, became transformed into an indispensable good (Kara 1986). The following comment made by Ö. Çaha, shows the status of the attempts of the Ottoman State, which was in very close contact with the West, to modernize, very clearly: 'The laws enacted during the period between 1840 and the declaration of the 2nd Constitution (1908) were more numerous and more comprehensive than the laws cited during the Republican period' (Çaha 2001, p. 273). These new laws, in some instances a more eclectic and radical reform, rather than a more European or more traditional Islamic understanding of law, were aimed for in different areas (social, political, administrative, family law, penal law, citizenship, etc.).

In the meantime, an important point that needs reminding is that, contrary to the West, modernization and revivalist movements in Muslim countries appeared, and continued as a sort of religious movement (Kara 2001). That is why the role played by the traditional scholars (*ulama*) during this process is extremely important in terms of our subject. While it is not possible to define a single attitude amongst the ulama, in general their relationship with the modernist experience of Muslims presents a tragi-comic structure. It is true that the Ottoman ulama supported the reform movements to a certain extent. However, on the one hand the ulama were accused of being short-sighted when they supported innovation and Western style new laws in the country, and on the other hand, when they did not support it, they were accused of being against the reform. Religious foundations and trustees (*awqaf* lands and properties) are very good illustrations in this regard. Colonial powers could not intervene the *awqaf* because Ottoman lands and very important real estates were in *awqaf* status. The elimination of the ruling in these religious foundations and institutions would mean the removing of a serious obstacle in front of the colonization. While some revivalist scholars were aware of the danger, many liberal and reformists considered this in the context of personal liberties, property ownership, freedom, etc. This situation resulted in the cancellation of this feature of foundation properties and lands. Turkish exegete Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, who worked as a minister of religious foundation during late Ottoman government, described the situation by saying that eastern table (*maide-i ¸sark*) has been made ready to be to be eaten by the colonial powers (Öztürk 1993, p. 196).

It is possible to see a similar attitude in other Muslim regions too. Further, the more active role played by intellectuals, who had been brought up in the West, in the social and political life of the countries. They caused the existing status of the ulama to weaken and a new elite, apart from the traditional ulama, about to be born. While one group aimed to modernize Islam from within by taking fundamental religious principles as their basis in the reform movements, another group was proposing a modernization where secular and nationalist sentiments were at the forefront, at European political and economic forums (Lapidus 1996). Further, while the thoughts of some on change were within the framework of ethical and religious reforms, others were hoping to make the socio-cultural structures of Muslims in the communal area fit in with the requirements of the modern era (Merad n.d.). As a result, the reform and revivalist movements undertaken by the seemingly more conservative attitude and those whose approach was more liberal, in the face of the West, caused semantic changes in many of the key terms of Islam (Bulaç 1996; Kara 1986). For instance, the identifying of Islamic Law with the rules of logic on which Western civil laws are based, or the attachment of Muslims to their religion with that of the attachment Westerners felt for the love of their countries by the Egyptian scholar Rifaa Tahtawi, who lived in Paris between 1826–1836 are good examples of this semantic change (Hüseyin 1986). Additionally, this required the Qur'an being interpreted in a new way, and its meanings being developed using modern approaches.

The return to the Qur'an and attempts to have it stated in a way that can be perceived in the modern century, which was supported by all religious, secular, and even atheist individuals living on Muslim soil, came about in the same way everywhere. We now want to touch on, albeit briefly, the conspicuous differences amongst Muslim intellectuals on Qur'anic readings, in this critical process of modernization. In order for it to be a systematic presentation, it is possible to list the mentioned differences under principal headings, and within the framework of some examples (Merto ˘glu 2001, 2010). However, together with this, the inference must be made that the fundamental characteristics in modern revivalist Qur'anic readings are the shared characteristics of many reform-minded Muslim intellectuals (Merto ˘glu 2001, 2010). That is because, as we will see later, the Muslim intellectuals in the 19th and 20th centuries exhibited a point of view, which, rather than being a single type of approach to interpretation, was at times even contradictory to its own systematic or inconsistent in its commentary. That is why it would be beneficial to perceive the fundamental characteristics of modern Qur'anic readings as the more frequent approaches to interpretation rather than as generally valid or as indispensable. It is possible to summarise these distinctive characteristics and renewal spirit in modernist Qur'anic exegesis as follows.

#### 1. Qur'an centric reading of the Qur'an in modernity

One of the most fundamental characteristics of modern Qur'anic readings is that they are centered on the Qur'an. As an extension of the emphasis on the Qur'an which came with Shah Wali Allah, modern Muslim intellectuals say that because Muslims have been occupied with many Islamic disciplines the turn of the Qur'an did not arrive, and that an important amount of time has been spent on studying in other areas, and that is why not enough accent has been placed on the Qur'an. They further state that the Qur'an is not limited to just being in the monopoly of the ulama, experts and the jurists, but that it is the natural right of everyone (even non-Muslims) to give consideration to its meanings. Therefore, the modern Muslim reformer does not accept an approach such as the obliqueness of the Qur'an. The Qur'an is the clearest text; it can be understood without the need for external sources. Within this context re-reading and interpretations of the Qur'an are valued highly. The reader should be faced directly with the Qur'an, and should deliberate, reflect, discuss, and contemplate on it. Indeed, some intellectuals believe that even the *mutashabihat* (ambiguous or verses with multiple meanings) in the Qur'an possess the characteristic of being easy to understand which exceeds the classical understanding of them (Saeed 2005; Koç 2012; Kayacan 2013; Gökkır 2014). For instance, while Parwiz interprets *muhkam* as reality (*haqiqat*) and *mutashabih* as research (*tahqiqat*), we witness that Ahmad Khan interprets the former as fundamental principles and the latter as symbolic verses. Egyptian scholar Jawhari, however, possesses a more interesting point of view; the former points to existing species, while the latter refers to evolution (Baljon 1961).

A natural conclusion of this method of reading which is centered heavily on the Qur'an is that the sceptic approach among modern thinkers towards hadiths has become more prevalent. Even though the observed effects of the classical orientalist criticisms, such as the delayed codification of the hadiths, the insufficiency of the *isnad* (chain of transmitters) system(!), and sometimes the presence of some reports which are difficult to compile with the content of the Qur'an, cannot be denied, it is also true that modern Muslim revivalists have been giving direction to each other on the matter too. The most interesting attitude on this matter is the use of Qur'anic verses to disregard or ignore the hadiths. Scholars such as Ahmaduddin, Cheragh Ali, Parwiz, Chakralawi, Mashriqi, etc., are the first to display negative views on the prophetic traditions (Birı¸sık 2001). Mashriqi, for instance, associates the interpretation of the Qur'an in the light of the prophetic tradition as a sign of seeing the Qur'an with the insufficient perception (Birı¸sık 2001).

#### 2. Critical evaluations of the traditional schools of thought

They do not accept traditional juristic schools and consensus. Their opposition to innovation and imitation are somewhat dominant in their writings. Additionally, their emphasis on new judicial opinion or reasoning is almost like an indispensable characteristic of all modern intellectuals. The opinions of past scholars are not valid today, because these opinions are historical, and they have been based on the time and situation which existed in the past. Islam, on the other hand, is a religion of logic and has structured itself on top of *ijtihad*. Hence, opinion has been seen as the essential condition of this great religion. However, as stated by many individuals, it should not be the duty of individual religious scholar to form *ijtihads* (new judicial opinion or reasoning), but of committees made up of experts in different fields (Jansen 1993; Siddiqi 1982). The door to *ijtihad* must be reopened. Some argue that this *ijtihad* will be realised through new Islamic legal studies which are centered on the Qur'an, rather than through traditional Islamic schools' methodologies such as the way of *mutakallimun* (theologians) or *fuqaha* (jurists). However, in such a project all Islamic legal sources other than the Qur'an may be ignored. Another point that needs to be reminded here is that contemporary scholars who are attempting to realise a new legal understanding centered on the Qur'an contradict even each other. Two important examples on the matter are Ahmaduddin's statement of the ritual prayer being performed to be three times a day, while Chakralawi says that there is nothing in the Qur'an about the call to prayer and concludes that it is tantamount to blasphemy (Albayrak 2004).

#### 3. Criticism of Qur'anic sciences and sub-disciplines

The insufficiency of the Qur'anic sciences is another of the important subjects paid attention to by modern reformist scholars. According to them, the existing material should be evaluated in a systematic and critical manner, and a new method of interpretation should be developed. The most striking approach on the matter is displayed by Mashriqi and Fazlurrahman, who argue that the traditional Qur'anic sciences are pushing people away from the Qur'an (Rahman 1990; Çoruh 2019).

They do not in general accept the existence of *naskh* within the Qur'an (Rahbar 1956; Çoruh 2019; Sim¸ ¸ sek n.d.). The subject of *naskh* is defined as one of the most difficult areas of exegesis in chapter three of *al-Fawd al-Kabir* of Shah Wali Allah (al-Dihlawi n.d.). Wali Allah argues that because of disagreement about exact scope of the notion of the *naskh*, some people increased the number of abrogated verses up to five hundred. Suyuti, in line with the exegete Abu Bakr b. al-Arabi, reduced this number from five hundred to twenty, and states that he himself has issues with this figure, namely twenty, before proceeding to look into the subject matter verses one by one, and reducing the number of abrogated verses to five (al-Dihlawi n.d.). This approach displayed by Dihlawi has encouraged his successors to evaluate the notion of *naskh* as a matter of *ijtihadi* (based on analogy and rational reasoning) issue, and even some to completely deny its existence within the Qur'an. For these many modern intellectuals and reformers, the Word of God is so great that it cannot be abrogated based on the views of people. Together with this, and there are also many modern Muslim

thinkers who do not deny *naskh*, there are also those whose approach is that it is the abrogation of the books of former religious traditions (Albayrak 2004; Sim¸ ¸ sek n.d.).

Due to the providence concerning the hadiths, the reports of the occasion of revelations cannot be accepted when trying to understand the verses. In general, these modern scholars try to obtain the historical background of the Qur'anic passage from their textual context. Further, by frequently referring to certain issues in daily life, they have attempted to apply the verses to events that occurred during post-revelation period despite the existence of various subjectivity and ungrounded claims. Nevertheless, together in particular with the insistent emphasis of pro-historical hermeneutical readings of the Qur'an, the importance of the reports of the occasion of revelations have begun to re-emerge and increase in recent times (Albayrak 2004).

Another important point in the writings of the reformist scholars in Qur'anic exegesis is the notion of *tanasub/munasabat* (thematic and textual unity). The classical exegetes acknowledge *tanasub* (thematic unity) to be the most honourable of Qur'anic sub-disciplines, but which has not been able to achieve the necessary level of recognition in the commentaries of the Qur'an. Even though it is said that their recent insistence on *tanasub* is due to the fact that they are trying to establish an anti-thesis to the argument of some Western scholars that the Qur'anic verses, passages, and chapters were brought together in a disorganised way, there are other reasons too. The most significant one is that , as opposed to the approach of classical interpreters, who viewed the verses and passages separately and interpreted them part by part, the approach by modern intellectuals, where they looked into the Qur'an as a whole, has resulted in observing a large number of elegant and deep meanings in this unity (Albayrak 2004; Çoruh 2019).

There is a serious reaction against the *isra'iliyyat* reports (Biblical materials) in Qur'anic exegesis. The knowledge among some modern exegetes of the Qur'an of foreign languages or their grasp of the content of the sacred texts in the Hebrew or Syriac languages makes them different from classical counterparts. For example, Charagh Ali and Farahi used to know Hebrew as well as some other Western languages (Ahmed 1990; Albayrak 2001). Due to this, they have been able to read the Bible in its original or translated versions. Baljon states that modern Muslim intellectuals concentrated more on the Bible than extra-Biblical materials, such as the Talmud (Baljon 1961), or non-canonical writings of Christians. The most important pillar of the modern period of Muslim enlightenment is the total rejection of these exegetical narrations (Albayrak 2004). Sometimes, while criticizing the narrators who transmitted such reports with a heavy language, they sometimes make diachronic comments: 'this *ummah* cannot compete with or struggle against the state of Israel without fighting the reports of *israiliyyat*.' (˙ Islamo ˘glu 2017a; Metin 2021). Some go further and uses some provacative expression to mix *israiliyyat* reports with modern state of Israel: 'Coca Cola belongs to Israel, to whom do *israiliyyat* reports belong?' or '*israiliyyat* is a state of Israel that fled into the Muslim communities' (˙ Islamo ˘glu 2017b). These tragi-comic comments consider *israiliyyat* reports as an under-cover Mossad agent. This is an interesting anomaly in modern times.

The classical emphasis on the lofty rhetorical nature and literal dispensation of the Qur'an has been ignored in a considerable way in modern times. According to modern reformist, there is no difference between the Arabic spoken by a fluent Arab who lived during that time and the language used by the Qur'an. They openly expressed their dissatisfaction with prioritizing of the Qur'anic Arabic to other languages. As stated by Mashriqi, the rhetoric of the Qur'an is not to be sought in the composition of the text or the literary style, but in the manner in which it is seeking the right path. Importance should not be paid to the linguistic analyses of the Qur'an based on its wording. The message is more important than the literal imitability of the meaning of the words (Baljon 1961; Albayrak 2004). The Qur'an has explained many events by using different words and statements. In relation to this, it is also seen that modern intellectuals either have not made particular use of classical Arabic dictionaries or have frequently stated their inadequacies (Baljon

1961; Çoruh 2019; Albayrak 2004). Similarly, they also disregard various other linguistic apparatus of classical scholarship.

4. Reading the Qur'an in the light of modern sciences

The interpretation of the Qur'an is based on intelligence and the data contained within modern science. The Qur'anic expression *furqân* (the capability of human being to tell right from wrong) in the 4th verse of the chapter Al Imran, the importance of which is stated by Muhammad Abduh, is well-known to be also defined as intelligence (Jansen 1993). Karamat Ali states that the Qur'an contains numerous passages about physics and mathematics, and even that it discusses the old systems of philosophy from all their angles (Ahmed 1990). Interestingly, for him, this is an important piece of evidence as to how much importance has been attached to scientific rhetoric rather than literary rhetoric of the Qur'an. It is argued that reason cannot contradict the revelations, and that therefore many Qur'anic explanations are presented within the framework of intelligent definitions. Should any disaccord between modern science and the verses of the Qur'an be noticed, this must have resulted from a misunderstanding of the scientific data or from scientific opinions which have yet to be completely proven (Siddiqi 1982). As a result of these obsessions with the modern science and radically positivistic attempts to read the Qur'an, it is observed that with many scientific remarks where the text of the Qur'an suffers great difficulties because many new meanings produced from the Qur'an are foreign to the text of the Qur'an itself.

Some of the examples in which the miracles of the Qur'an are rationalized and presented in a scientific context are as follows:, Qur'anic *jinn*s (unseen beings or spirits) being defined as savage or Bedouin groups of people rather than invisible beings, the *Iblis* (Satan) being defined as an internal force within human representing his or her evil side, the parting of the sea at the time of the Prophet Moses' leaving Egypt as the tide, the Prophet Solomon's corpse not rotting after his death due to it being kept in candle wax. Similarly in the chapter Naml (27:18) the statement by one ant to the others 'go to your homes so that Solomon and his armies do not notice you and crush you', as showing ants to be germ bugs which spread bacteria, and the statement in the chapter al-Baqara (2:195) ' ... do not lead yourselves into danger by your own hands.' as related to hygiene or preventative medicine) (Baljon 1961; Ahmed 1990; Albayrak 2004). The scientific explanations concerning the theory of evolution and the use of the Qur'anic material do not escape notice either.

At a time when the extremely rationalist point of view developed by the West after the Age of Enlightenment has been replaced by questioning positivistic nature of the science and its absolute truth claim together with that science has not clarified everything, the absolute confidence and reliance shown by Muslim intellectuals on the power of science and intellect forms an interesting irony (Baljon 1961). Further, the famous motto of Ahmad Khan, where 'The Word of God and the Works of God cannot contradict each other' (Rahbar 1956) identifies revelations with events in nature, and as a natural result of this many modernist readers of the Qur'an display a negative attitude towards traditionally accepted miracles. Baljon explains that there are three approaches on the matter: i. the complete refusal of the miracles; ii. showing that the miracles are in accord with the laws of nature by using rational explanations and iii. accepting the miracles but only affording them the minimum of importance (Baljon 1961). For instance, some refute the prophetic traditions on the heavenly journey (*isra* and *mi'raj*) because they find it contrary to the laws of nature, while some have perceived it as a mystical inner experience of the Prophet. As for those who accept the miracles, it is said that they do not afford it the highest significance in terms of proof of the status of the Prophet, because the Qur'an is addressing the intelligence of people, and encouraging them to think in a sensible way (Merto ˘glu 2001). In fact, many modernist thinkers consider the most important miracles to be the Qur'an and the Prophet themselves, and that there is no need to chase after external signs in order to appreciate Islam. For instance, Muhammed Husayin Haykal states that there is no miracle within the Qur'an to prove the status of the Prophet Muhammed, and that the only miracle sent to him was the Qur'an itself (Siddiqi 1982).

Another important feature of modern reformist reading of the Qur'an is to metaphorize and allegorize the meaning of the various verses in connection with the above point. It has been seen that these types of explanations, which are somewhat relative and arbitrary, are attempting to empty some verses about the unseen and hereafter. Parwiz perceives the verses which are to do with heaven and hell as being about the peace and problems on earth, or as stated in the verse 2:36 'However, Satan caused them to slip out of it and removed them from that [condition] in which they had been. Additionally, We said, "Go down, [all of you], as enemies to one another, and you will have upon the earth a place of settlement and provision for a time." Parwiz interprets this *ihbitu* (go down) as the immature (*ghayr mukallaf*) becoming liable (*mukallaf*) is a good illustration of it (Ahmed 1990; Albayrak 2004). These are some of the important examples of symbolic readings of some Qur'anic words.

Debates concerning the historical authenticity of the narratives of the Qur'an: The most important representative of this approach is the Egyptian scholar Muhammed Khalaf Allah. He sees the events experienced by the previous Prophets and described in the Qur'an as a series of tales reflected in the heart of the Prophet and says that these parables gave comfort to the Prophet. He also states that these parables are not obliged to be based on the truth (Baljon 1961; Sim¸ ¸ sek n.d.). Although this is a marginal approach for many reformists, it can easily be said that this view is supported by a certain group of Muslim scholars. What kind of contribution this understanding made to contemporary Qur'an readings is another matter of discussion? However, it offers very important clues in order to learn the general perception of the Qur'an by those who adopt such approaches.

#### 5. Trials of new hermeneutic approaches

One of the important approaches is the adoption of the historical hermeneutical interpretation of the Qur'an by some Muslim intellectuals, especially influenced by the works of the Biblical hermeneutical studies. Traces of the debates on historicist readings of the Qur'an, which we see more frequently in recent times, are evident in earlier times as well. The matter which is debated concerns in particular the Muslims' point of view of the nature of Qur'an and its binding status. The Shi'ite author Amir Ali states that 'the assumption that all Qur'anic propositions are forced not to change is an unjust intervention both on history and on the development of human intellect' (Ahmed 1990, p. 109), and, in this way, points to the difference between the unchangeable (fixed) provisions of the Qur'an, and those which are changeable (open to new interpretation). Asaf Ali has a clearer approach and goes into making difference between legal order and moral order (Albayrak 2004). There are also some authors, who, while not displaying a systematic approach, use an atomic approach from time to time in order to imply that some Qur'anic verses are no longer valid in the modern world. Halim Sabit defines the law of natural disposition in creation (*qanun al-fitrah*) as changing judgements in the face of time, place and status' (Merto ˘glu 2001). Bashir Ahmad Dar observes the verse on the people who are warming towards Islam as a provision or those whose hearts have been reconciled (*mu'allafa al-qulub*) which later loses its meaning (Baljon 1961, p. 61). This type of approach is seen too in Parwiz's explanations about the necessity for men and women to receive equal shares of inheritance (Baljon 1961). Further, some modern reformist evaluated the fact that Arab culture at the time of the revelation was included in Qur'anic narratives within the framework of the relationship of the Qur'an with the past events (occasion of revelations). Thus, for them, this indicates not universality but the locality of some Qur'anic commandments.

#### 6. Taking social realities and contemporary situation into account

In contrast to classical interpretation, there is more attention paid to social, political and actual fields. This is one of the most important aspects of the revivalist reading of the Qur'an. The education of Muslims, the status of women within the community (divorce, family planning, polygyny, the right to inheritance, equality, etc.), types of government for Muslims (many debate the advantages of democracy over monarchy or the separation of the affairs of state from religious affairs), the economy, and in particular the matter of interest

have been dealt with very frequently. It is necessary for the ayahs of the Qur'an to be interpreted again in the light of new socio-political context. For instance, verse 42:38 about the administrative responsibilities of public, where the statement: ' ... those who deal with matters among themselves in council ... ' is said to be pointing to the parliamentary system (Jansen 1993). Further, many believe that modern economic life makes financial interest necessary. Redefinition of the meaning of interest inevitable. Of course, this new conceptualisation brings many other anomalies together. For instance, as regards the interest, the basis for its legitimacy is shown in the verse 2:185, where it says, 'God wants to make things easier for you, not harder ... '. This is somewhat interesting (Baljon 1961; Jansen 1993; Albayrak 2004). Moreover, the modern thinkers can comfortably use numerous verses to validate their own opinions. Within this context, one of the important areas of emphasis of modern scholars is their attempt to actively include Muslims within history. The argument that those that are not of the earth or worldly cannot be present in the hereafter either is repeated frequently. The Qur'an does not prescribe just the ritual prayer, fasting or almsgiving, it also prescribes progress. Additionally, progress is only realised when Muslims become wealthier and more advanced. It is possible to sense progressive and revivalist state of mind in the comment by late Ottoman Sheikh al-Islam Musa Kazım that, ' ... money is something that enables life to be lived; it is necessary for salvation, in fact it is life itself (*ma bihi'l-hayattır*);; and it is necessary to be wealthy ... ' (Kazım 1909, p. 52; Merto ˘glu 2001, p. 137; Albayrak 2004). Further, playing with semantic definitions of some key terms and concepts, they prioritise the world over the hereafter. For the interpretation of the expression *atqakum* (most devoted, God-conscious) as *as'âkum* (the most hard working one and the new meanings gained by the word *kasb* (earning) (Merto ˘glu 2001). The explanations of Parwiz concerning the word *muddathir* (the cloaked one) shed light on the matter too. *Disru'l-mâl* is seen as 'a revenues officer' (Baljon 1961). Thus, Parwiz presents the Prophet not only as the founder of a new religion, but also as the leader of material means, which is the key to worldly prosperity (Baljon 1961, pp. 99–100). He takes out the word in question not only from the textual context, but also from the socio-historical framework and gives it a new meaning. Even if we cannot define this as being totally secularised in the modern sense, these types of approaches are important in a way that they vary from the line taken by very well-established classical scholarship.

The serious criticism of mystic approaches: Especially in classical interpretations, these mystical interpretations are mentioned after the linguistic, historical, and rhetorical interpretation as a richness of the meanings. However, in reformist mind, these comments, as well as the mysticism which they feed off are rejected as causing slackness among Muslims (Albayrak 2004). Disaccord in religion is not a hurdle to equality. There are attempts amongst citizens, and therefore also within the framework of brotherhood to evaluate the subject in some way (Merto ˘glu 2001). In other words, Mystics do not fit the active Muslim perception in the minds of reformer scholars.

The modern revivalist interpretation is very selective. That is the reason they have paid great attention to the verses which discuss the provision of social justice, equality (Merto ˘glu 2001; Albayrak 2004) friendship, brotherhood/sisterhood, unity, etc.

Another area where the effect of modernism is very clearly (and perhaps over abundantly) seen on modern reformists is the more moderate or humanist approach to the interpretations of the concept of *jihad* (struggle and fighting) within the Qur'an, or the verses where the punishment handed out by God to the unbelievers is discussed. *Jihad* is only to be used as a form of defense; God is not a Creator to be frightened of, He is a creator to befriend. His Grace comes before everything, even Justice. These and other similar types of approaches are emphasized very frequently (Baljon 1961; Ahmed 1990; Albayrak 2004). As an extension of this the distances between the religions have sometimes been decreased, and that shared values (the universality of fundamental moral principles) have been paid attention to, increasing the explanations that these values are the same in every religion, and separating religion and *shariah*.

It displays approaches which are centered on man, which attach a great deal of importance to the free will of human and evaluates him as an individual who is aware of his responsibilities. It will be beneficial here to remember in particular their active approach to the concepts of fate and destiny.

The wealth of meanings of the text in the Qur'an has been widened with psychological comments as well in many revivalist scholars' writing. Sayid Qutub's exegesis is full of this kind of examples which is alien to its classical counterparts (Düven 2020).

#### **4. Discussion and Conclusions**

So far, we have tried to summarize the process of modernization in the Islamic world and the attempts of Muslims, who live this process in a more passive structure compared to the West, to get rid of the current situation and crises with special references to the Qur'an. Before discussing the general structure of reformist–revivalist Qur'an readings in the light of the articles about the main paradigms of modern Qur'an reading, it is useful to clarify a few issues. First of all, it should be noted that expressions such as reformist–revivalist and renewal(ist) can be deceptive due to the breadth of their content and application areas. When we take into account not only such statements, but also their fellows (modernist, restorationist, renovationist, liberalist, progressive, rationalist, moderate(ist), secularists, reawaken(ist), revitalization(ist), constructivists etc.), we can witness intersections and divergences in many *tajdid* and reform movements (Haddad 1986; Ali and Orofino 2018, p. 27; Ali 2011). While an individual scholar may exhibit a very traditional attitude on one subject, he may adopt a liberal attitude that goes beyond the text of the Qur'an on another subject. On another issue, it is seen that he prefers to be renewed within the tradition. For this reason, as stated at the beginning of the article, we tried to use the aforementioned expressions in a very general sense. The 'revivalist-reformist' in the title of the article also refers to the dichotomy that expresses these intersections.

The article, which summarizes the views put forward about the new Qur'an readings and exegetical methods in the contemporary period, in the context of modernity, draws attention to the differences between the old and new hermeneutical perceptions, and from time to time pointed to the specific scholars who hold certain opinion. However, since the main target is the search for new methods rather than the commentators, the individual views of revivalist–reformist commentators and scholars have not been systematically analyzed with all their features. Because the aim of the article is the critical re-evaluations of the mindset and thought that reduces the experience of modernism and the social, economic and political problems of Muslims to the problem of understanding the Qur'an. However, it is a fact that the individuals in question also affected some of the masses that came after them. Abduh and the modern Salafi approaches or Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh school and many educated Muslim elites are typical examples of this. It should be noted that this interaction was not specifically mentioned in the article. In summary, when we say reformist–renewalist or revivalist, we do not mean groups such as *Tablighi Jamaat* or *Ikhwan Muslimin* that emerged in the contemporary period. As Ali Jan said, the main purpose of these groups is to inculcate Islamic orthodoxy in the masses in the Muslim world as well as in diaspora communities through institutional developments, socio-political activities, missionary preaching, and propagation. Rather, we mean those who seek to get rid of intellectual stagnation, put an end to transmission and narration of the predecessors and develop a new methodology of interpretation of the Qur'an at the hermeneutic level. In other words, we target the group that wants to realize the renewal at the epistemic level first. However, it should not be forgotten that some of the searches for the methods of understanding the Qur'an mentioned in the article are also seen in the conservative or more traditional revivalist movements.

Revivalist–reformist Qur'an readings aim at adapting the verses of the Qur'an to changing conditions and ensuring renewal (*tajdid*). There is no doubt that such Qur'an readings and understanding of exegesis bring a dynamism to Muslims' relationship with the Qur'anic text. However, the most important difference from traditional revivalist approaches is how much autonomy the unchanging Qur'an expressions are applied to changing conditions. As the article draws attention to the approaches of reformist–revivalists with some extreme examples, it is seen that open-ended and uncontrolled interpretations force the imagination of the classical perception (the Qur'an, sunnah, ijma and qiyas are accepted as the criteria and the Qur'an is the eternal word of Allah and it is always contemporary). In other words, a change in *tajdid* (renewals) is normally a gradual, brings a new perspective to the assimilation of the main Islamic sources (Qur'an, hadith) whereas in reformist–revivalist, it can be fast and sometimes top-down and radical. Revivalistreformist thinkers include a wide spectrum and although some of them have traditional revivalist reflexes (only rejecting the taqlid, imitation), mostly with the influence of modernity, their conclusions go beyond the borders of the Qur'anic text. This new approach, in which the mind is prioritized, and the human being is put in the center, contains many different colors and tones.

We have observed that there are endless suggestions and practices in the context of progress, modernization and understanding the Qur'an in accordance with the contemporary modern life, of very important concepts such as *tajdid* (renewal) and *islah* (restitution and reconstruction). It is an indisputable fact that the Islamic civilization, which is a fiqh civilization (Jabiri 1997) <sup>4</sup> in the traditional sense. By the civilization of fiqh, we mean the more practical aspect, and from one's individual life to social and political life, a Muslim responds to everything s/he encounters in his daily life with an Islamic 'judicial mind', that is, a fiqh coding. Everything he encounters is either halal (lawful) or haram (unlawful) (Aktay 2008, p. 46). However, this understanding has gradually moved away from the classical method in the contemporary period. It can be observed in this context that the hierarchy of evidence in the methodology of jurisprudence is overturned. For example, while the basic evidence of the methodology of jurisprudence such as Sunnah, ijma and qiyas are pushed into the background, controversial secondary evidences among the juristic schools such as maslahat, custom, istihsan, etc., has been brought to the fore (Kavak 2011, p. 161). More interestingly, it is the clearest evidence of paradigmatic shift that the main works within the traditional juristic schools, which are accepted by everyone, have been replaced by names such as Ibn Hazm, Shatibi, Tufi, Ibn Qayyim and Shawqani (Kavak 2011). As stated in the article, while the juristic schools and their views were completely evaporated, a new trend of ijtihad centered on the Qur'an but with uncertain methods and open-ended borders began. This new perception of *ijtihad* limited to the Qur'an, on the other hand, is a significant issue in that it shows the profound influence of modernity on the contemporary scholars and reformist–revivalist thoughts. For this perception, which accepts every interpretation of the Qur'an as a contemporary ijtihad, sects lose their meaning. We can easily see in some of the leading scholars of this reformist–revivalist an approach that attributes the bill of backwardness to the wrong religious education and perception of religion and sees it as the main obstacle to progress instead of updating classical methodologies. In the search for alternatives, it was first started as the inadequacy of classical Islamic disciplines and resulted in the making of Qur'anic exegesis, which is a secondary discipline compared to Islamic jurisprudence and theology (*fiqh* and *kalam*) as the primary and only discipline. Paçacı explains it eloquently 'As a result of modernity, the relationship among Islamic disciplines in question has deteriorated, and exegesis (*tafsir*), for example, has gained a prescriptive feature, as opposed to its descriptive character in the classical period, under the influence of Protestant scriptualism and textualism. In addition, theology (*kalam*) and especially jurisprudence (*fiqh*), which were the rule-making binding disciplines of the classical period, have largely lost their functions in the contemporary period' (Paçacı 2003, p. 85). In summary, the last two centuries of Muslim renewal and revivalist thoughts and some movements carried out the alleged reforms through the interpretation of the Qur'an. Of course, there are exceptions, but many reformists from Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan to Abduh (Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism is also included although he did not write a complete commentary) have made exegesis an indispensable part of reform movements. The efforts of these reformist approaches are admirable, as they have been

instrumental in the study of the main source (the Qur'an), which has been neglected for many centuries. In addition, efforts to appropriate the main resource in question should not be overlooked. Perhaps this is the first time in the history of Islam (post-prophetic period) that such a close relationship with the Qur'an is encountered. On the other hand, the fast and cheap spending of 12–13 centuries of Islamic knowledge and intellectual accumulation is an interesting development seen in some of the reform and renewalist movements of the last two centuries.

In this new understanding, where the methodology of the jurisprudence and similar disciplines and their methodologies have almost lost their meaning, the revivalists have mainly concentrated on the Qur'an and exegesis. Representatives of the Qur'an-centered renewal movements reduced all the problems of the Muslim world to the methodology of understanding the Qur'an in particular and Islam in general. It should be also noted that they, as individuals, have high self-confidence on themselves and their new approaches. Some even become obsessed with their methodologies in their re-reading of the Qur'an. Therefore, for a new reform and renewal, the main text, the Qur'an, should be understood with modern methods and new and constant *ijtihad*s that take into account the needs of the contemporary world, independent of traditional knowledge. According to them, it is impossible for a substantial reform or renewal to take place without independent *ijtihad* or more correctly interpretation. However, it is a fact that there are nuances among the modern reformers who embarked on a new *tajdid* and *ijtihad* on the basis of the Qur'an. The tension between the contemporary issues, developments and challenges and classical Muslim intellectual traditions and accumulation, and sometimes the anachcronism observed in classical sources seem to have forced these modernist scholars to gradually change their methods in understanding the main sources of Islam while preserving their Islamic identity. For many cautious and traditionally trained scholars and thinkers, the biggest risk here focuses on the degree to which the fine line between the changeable and unchangeable Islamic principles and Qur'anic rulings will be preserved. While the aforementioned reformist–revivalist leaders sometimes exhibited conservative reflexes, sometimes they undermined almost all the unchangeable normative rules in the Qur'an with very advanced liberal proposals. This, on the other hand, was perceived by conservative circles as the secularization of Islam and its contamination. Maybe they helped people get rid of imitation, but at the same time, they could not bring those people to strong faith and strong understanding (*tahqiq*) with the new way of reading they developed. To put it more clearly, while the traditional disciplines, the hierarchy among them and the classical methods they developed were destroyed, a specific and robust methodology could not be developed to be replaced with them. This has left the contemporary Muslim in a purgatory or limbo where countless views are displayed.

Subjectivities, eclecticism, and individualities have affected the bindingness of the revivalist movements specific to the Qur'an in adapting the unchanging provisions to the changing time and space. Although almost all reformists consider common good of the contemporary Muslim (*maslaha*), it is one of the indisputable facts that many subconsciously believe that classical literature is outdated. For this reason, it is clearly seen in the above-discussed features in all articles that an attempt is made to develop a new theology, jurisprudence, and even a mystical imagination by centering discussion on the Qur'an. In addition, as can be seen in the above items and articles, it has become a common view that every single Muslim will contribute to this vision in contemporary reform movements. In other words, every Muslim with a simple education will be able to contribute to these revival movements specific to the Qur'an. In summary, contrary to the classical perception, in this new understanding, which observes everyone as a potential *mujtahid* (authoritative interpreter of the religious law of Islam), every Muslim has a say on various issues with the exception of the rulings regarding creed and worship. In this new understanding of reading the Qur'an and *tajdid*, people are freed from all kinds of traditional juristic or theological school attachment. Of course, in this perception, the important mission given to the reformist–revivalist modern Muslim in order to read the conditions of the day (since they are the imams of their own madhhab now-juristic schools) does not escape the attention

that the distance between the sacred and profane is gradually narrowing. The notion of sacredness, which was the dominant perception in giving judgments in the classical period, turns into daily intellectual exercises in the modern period. In some of these extreme approaches, we observe the prioritizing of worldliness and heavily human-centered Qur'an readings and exegesis. One of the major side effects of such an approach is to witness the evaporation of unchangeable religious rules in the Qur'an. The best examples in this regard are the legal verses and the notion of miracles in the Qur'an in the reading of Amir Ali and Sir Seyyid Ahmed Khan.

This understanding of reformist–revival, which is to abandon imitation in modern Qur'an readings and build a more dynamic Qur'an perception, includes the danger of ignoring all Islamic discipline and hermeneutical tools created by the classical scholars and live long up until the contemporary period. Thus, the text of the Qur'an, which has become passive with the resetting memory, is transformed into a secondary structure that is forced to keep up with the age rather than giving direction to the age. As it is pointed out from time to time, such an approach undermined the classical notion of consensus (*ijma*) and caused polyphony in the modern period. In our opinion, the modern period shows a dialogue of discord and incoherence (individualistic) in contrast to the classical (even if it contains different sounds) symphony and harmony. In Egypt, the Indian subcontinent, and elsewhere, countless views and approaches with independent and divergent priorities have been put forward in the name of re-reading of the Qur'an in modern context and religious renewal, some negating others, while others almost completely ignoring distinctively Islamic identity. Similarly, they have also imposed their non-Qur'anic proposals and approaches on the Qur'an while ignoring the explicit ruling (*hukm*) of the Qur'an. To do so, they sometimes manipulate Qur'anic evidence.<sup>5</sup> This is the main dilemma of the modernist and reformist–revivalist reading of the Qur'anic text. Most interestingly, as with the Christian reformation, the longing for a Muslim version of Martin Luther is one of the prominent phenomena in many *tajdid* movements, *Sola Qur'anicus*.

While the inadequacy of the classical Islamic disciplines that have been created in the contemporary perception of *tajdid* and *ijtihad* has been highly emphasized, the issue of how these authors will carry out the reforms that concern everyone in the modern period has remained rather obscure. In the contemporary period, many classical hermeneutical devices such as abrogation, reports of occasion of revelations, clear and ambiguous verses, *israiliyyat* reports (Biblical materials in the Qur'anic exegesis), the notion of inimitability (*I'jaz alqur'an*), disciplines such as *usul al-fiqh* (methodology of jurisprudence), *hadith* (prophetic traditions), etc., are almost completely ignored. This kind of methodical blindness has caused not only the shallowness of the reforms but also the sterilization of the rich Islamic intellectual tradition. Thus, in modern times, the rich tradition of exegesis has seriously lost blood in terms of content. However, while the reformists' emphasis on modern science and reason brings dynamism to the new approaches to some extent, it is seen that the balance is lost from time to time and the scripture that God sent as a guide has been transformed into a science book or manual for political constitution. While there are those who balance this issue in the reformist–revivalist scholars, there are also those who go to the extreme and draw attention with very absurd comments.

Finally, a more peaceful perception of religion is observed among the reformist thinkers of the Islamic world, which was defeated and withdrawn against the West in the last two centuries. We also witness interesting socio-psychological analyzes in these approaches that are more inclusive, world-peace-centered, environmentally friendly and human-wellbeing-prioritizing. Such Qur'an readings, which we do not see in classical *tafsir* (exegesis), increase gradually in the modern period are important issues in terms of showing that the reformists take the conditions of the day very seriously. In addition, it is worthy of attention that it carries not only exegesis, but also the Islamic belief to daily events in order to raise practical and responsible individuals. As a result, many reformist–revivalists, who sought a way out under the intense pressure of modernity, tried to bring dynamism to the current situation of Muslims by putting the Qur'an in the center. Sometimes, even

with good intentions, they might be destructive, and sometimes they breathe new life into believing people. Especially, the reformist–revivalist scholars of the 20th century to some extent preferred to ignore the rich Islamic disciplines' knowledge rather than revise it.

In the real sense, revival and renewal should be a phenomenon to be built on Muslim intellectual accumulation. Otherwise, it is certain that the renewal to be conducted by demolishing or denying the major devices of the exegetical traditions (such as occasion of revelations, the notion of abrogation, importance of the Qur'anic inimitability, etc.) will come with different problems. We are of the opinion that the reformist–revivalist scholars' renewal to be carried out with interdisciplinary revision of Islamic intellectual tradition rather than only imported phenomena might be more acceptable and longer lasting than mere intellectual exercises. The last two centuries of reforms among Muslims are the best witnesses of this.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **Notes**


#### **References**


Albayrak, ˙ Ismail. 2004. *Klasik Modernizmde Kur'an'a Yakla¸sımlar [Approaches to the Qur'an in Classic Modernism]*. ˙ Istanbul: Ensâr Pub.


Hüseyin, Muhammed M. 1986. *Modernizmin ˙Islam Dünyasına Giri¸si*. Translated by Sezai Özel. ˙ Istanbul: ˙ Insan Pub.


Jabiri, M. Abid. 1997. *Arap Aklının Olu¸sumu [Formation of Arab Mind]*. Translated by ˙ Ibrahim Akbaba. ˙ Istanbul: ˙ Iz Pub.


Merto ˘glu, Suvat. 2001. Osmanlı'da II. Me¸srutiyet Sonrası Modern Tefsir Anlayı¸sı (Sırat-I Müstakim/Sebilürre¸sâd Dergisi 1908–1914) [Modern Understanding of Interpretation in The Ottoman Era Post the 2nd Constitution (Sırat-ı Mustaqim/Sabil al-Ra¸sad Journal 1908–1914)]. Ph.D. thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey.


Outram, Dorinda. 1997. *The Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Poole, Ross. 1993. *Ahlak ve Modernlik [Ethics and Modernism]*. Translated by Mehmet Küçük. Istanbul: Ayrıntı Pub.


Soyan, Ömer Naci. 1993. *Türkiye'den Felsefe Manzaraları [Philosophical Landscapes from Turkey]*. Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Pub. Sim¸ ¸ sek, Said. n.d. *Günümüz Tefsir Problemleri [Modern Day Exegetical Problems]*. Konya: Kitap Dünyası Pub. Zeka, Necmi. 1994. Yolları Çatallanan Bahçe, Aynalı Gökdelenler, Dil Oyunları ve Robespiere [The Garden With The Forked Road, High Rises With Mirrors, Language Games and Robespiere]. In *Postmodernism*. Edited by Necmi Zeka. ˙

Istanbul: Kıyı Pub.

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### *Article* **Islamic Revivalism and Muslim Consumer Ethics**

**Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir**

School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798, Singapore; kamaludeen@ntu.edu.sg

**Abstract:** Although scholars have examined the link between religiosity and consumer ethics, the idea of Muslim consumer ethics has not received much traction within academia. The idea of Muslim consumer ethics is a manifestation of religious revivalism. Yet, its discussion must consider the critical roles played by Muslim youth and their consumption of new media because the latter has a profound effect on shaping and directing popular Muslim youth cultures. Muslim consumer ethics encompass the moral and humanistic dimension of living in a globalized world as an extension of an individual's religious practice. This phenomenon of ethical consumption has also been commoditized in a lucrative halal industry that fosters a Muslim identity market.

**Keywords:** Muslim consumer ethics; youth; media; digital age

#### **1. Introduction**

A growing number of Muslims live in urban cities the world over, either as majority or minority populations—the latter owing to intense migrations that are both forced and by choice. This increase in the population densities of Muslims in urban cities, coupled with its rising middle class observed in many parts of the world (Nasr 2009; Jones 2012; Morris 2020), as well as a rather youthful demography who are the most connected generation to date having borne to a digitalized era, has ushered a new phase in Muslim consumption patterns. Within this context, the study of Muslim consumer culture is integral because "consumer culture represents one of the primary arenas in which elements of social change are played out in everyday life" (Miles 2015). For Muslims the world over, and especially for its youth, these changes have been more pronounced since the turn of the millennium. The patterns of Muslim consumption that have emerged have either been met with opposition due to perceptions of threat, or with opportunistic overtures that are eager to capitalize on a youthful, affluent market. However, beyond these polarized responses, how does one systematically make sense of the emerging behaviors in Muslim consumption?

The idea of Muslim consumer ethics needs to be deliberated in scholarly terms. Cesari (2004, p. 47) puts forth the concept of *ethical Islam*, an amalgamation that maximizes "individual autonomy with belief in a higher power" and "an adherence to the moral and humanistic values that underlie religious practice—without, however, adhering to the practice itself". Following Cesari, this paper argues that we should closely examine the intimate relationship between values and practices. Muslim consumer ethics encompass the moral and humanistic dimensions of living in a globalized world as an extension of an individual's religious practice. These refer to a set of considerations that Muslim consumers apply when making their decisions. As Muslims are not a monolithic group, the application of Muslim consumer ethics would necessarily lead to differential outcomes.

The link between piety and consumer ethics (Vitell and Paolillo 2003; Vitell et al. 2005; Vitell 2009) has gained currency in academia of late but the idea of a "Muslim consumer ethics", while having a long tradition in Islamic literature, has not been adequately discussed in Western academia (Hamzah et al. 2018). The practical reason for this lacuna is probably due to the diversity of opinions within the Muslim community, which inevitably prevents any homogenous "Muslim" approach to consumption. In this paper, I outline

**Citation:** Mohamed Nasir, Kamaludeen. 2022. Islamic Revivalism and Muslim Consumer Ethics. *Religions* 13: 747. https:// doi.org/10.3390/rel13080747

Academic Editor: Jan A. Ali

Received: 25 May 2022 Accepted: 5 August 2022 Published: 16 August 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

some of the influencing factors and considerations in conceptualizing Muslim consumer ethics. Before going further, however, we would need to look at the relationship between consumption and Islam.

#### **2. Consumption and Islam**

The basis of what is *halal* (permissible) is revealed in the *Qur'an* (the divine book) from God (the Creator) to Muhammad (the Prophet) for all people. In turn, these laws are brought to life through the *Sunnah* (the life, actions and teachings of Muhammad) as recorded in the *Hadith* (the compilation of the traditions of Muhammad). As a rule, everything is sanctioned for the benefit of mankind, and nothing is forbidden save for what is categorically proscribed either by a *Qur'anic* verse or an authentic *Sunnah* of the Prophet. Understood sociologically, Islamic law necessitates social action for a believing and practicing Muslim. After all, religiosity is derived from the term Religare, which refers to the "daily disciplines" (Turner 2008). Hence, to be a Muslim is to navigate one's life in a generally *halal* manner. It is only logical then, when it comes to consumption, that the Muslim is obligated to only engage with *halal* products (Fischer 2016a).

Although the term *halal* has become somewhat synonymous with *halal* cuisines, food is just one of the objects of consumption. Conventional notions of *halal* consumption of food have also evolved. In principle, cuisines and beverages deemed as *halal* must not only be permissible, but they should also be 'pure,' free from any contamination of any *haram* (prohibited) elements. For Muslims living as minorities, ensuring a steady supply of *halal* food sources often becomes a consideration that affects major life decisions such as one's choice of dwelling. Many places have implemented systems of *halal* certification and accreditation to aid Muslim consumption. Although the primary focus has been on food, the Muslim consumer market and "*halal product*" businesses have grown drastically particularly with the extension of the "*halal* requirement" to include products like nonalcoholic toiletries and *halal* cosmetics, for example. Fischer argues that against the backdrop of Islamic revivalism, *halal* markets have thrived on the international scene, with global cities such as Kuala Lumpur and London emerging as key players in the production and trade of *halal* products—even as the notion of what is *halal* is being questioned and shaped. Going further, he contends that events such as the Halal Exhibition, which are now common in both majority and minority Muslim countries, demonstrate "how the proliferation of *halal* sits uneasily between Islamic revivalism, commercialization and secularism as political doctrine and 'the secular' as an epistemic category in everyday life" (Fischer 2016b, p. 143).

Beyond individual products, a *halal* consciousness and assertion for a *shari'ah*-compliant lifestyle have led to the aspiration and evolution of Islamic-based systems. For example, Islamic financial institutions and banking instruments institutionalized theological principles around usury, fair trade and equitable transactions. This paper is not the place to discuss these issues as they warrant highly specialized attention.

The larger issue that I would like to examine is how there have been various attempts to discuss and promulgate a consolidated notion of consumption ethics based on Islamic tenets. For example, Mustafar and Borhan (2013) argue that six variables need to be considered when we broach the issue of ethical consumption in Islam, especially within the context of a developed country. These are the priority of needs, the preservation of the *maqasid al-shari'ah* (objectives of *shari'ah*), abiding by the regulations of *halal* and *haram*, quality consumption, an appreciation of individual and social *maslahah* (interest) and the practice of moderation. The first category of the priority of needs is deconstructed into three categories, *daruriyyat*, *hajiyyat* and *tahsiniyyat,* depending on their relation to the concept of need. *Daruriyyat* refers to the necessities and is critical for survivability. Its deprivation will cause harm to an individual's life. The second order, *hajiyyat*, is not a basic human need but life might be harder without it. The last, *tahsiniyyat*, refers to the luxuries, and complements life on this earth, leading to its so-called perfection.

Islam is often described as an orthopraxy, where the right actions are as important as religious faith. For example, considering social *maslahah* or public interest is a call for social action. It allows for sociological analyses and theorizing as it calls for an inquiry beyond individual concerns of *halal* and *haram*. It is a dynamic concept dependent on factors that are both internal and external to conventional theological debates.

When we turn our gaze upon the young, urban, middle-class Muslims who have overcome the first order of needs and for whom the consumption of *halal* options is readily available, issues of quality consumption and considerations of what might be the social and public interest become increasingly important. As a result, what might begin with the more traditional concern for purity that revolves around the permissibility of ingredients and the manufacturing processes has transcended to a more sophisticated conception of *halal*-ness in contemporary times, which in turn, is intricately woven in the formation of a unique Muslim identity.

Undeniably, the Muslim identity market is a lucrative industry. The State of the Global Islamic Economy Report by Thomson Reuters and DinarStandard projects that the global halal economy will pass USD 3 trillion by 2023. The "*halal* industry" now includes Islamic finance, pitched as a more ethical alternative to mainstream financial institutions (Rudnyckyj 2019), which is estimated at between USD 1 trillion, with a healthy annual growth rate forecast for the next 10 years. Halal food forms the largest market, with consumer spending in the realm of USD 1.3 trillion and comprises a significant portion of the world's food industry. All these have ensured more nuanced debates on what constitutes *halal*-ness, which include discussions on who is funding these products and where the profits are channeled. Part of these conversations has spawned a series of "Islamic" products targeted at influencing the consumerist culture of young Muslims and the new Muslim middle class. The Internet hence becomes the space where the Muslim identity market aimed at the youth is often flouted.

In our attempts to understand the governing principles of consumption of Muslims today, we need to realize that its manifestations cannot be static. Despite being grounded on precepts of 'Islamic' ethics in consumption, Muslim consumer ethics are necessarily evolving. In the following sections, I outline some of the influencing factors and considerations.

#### **3. Islamic Revivalism and Ethical Consumption**

Much scholarly work on Islamic revivalism has focused on the study of social movements. Books have been written on Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood (Wickham 2013; Mellor 2018), Nadhlatul Ulama (Bush 2009), Muhammadiyah (Nakamura 2012), Gulen (Yavuz 2013; Hendrick 2013; El-Banna 2014), Tablighi Jamaat (Ali 2012; Siddiqi 2018) and so on, charting their impacts on the national, regional and global scene. These social movements are often portrayed as subversive and contrary to the modern and secular way of life by insisting on a re/introduction of Islam into the public sphere. As a corollary to this, and as an offshoot of this emphasis on a social movement perspective, academics have also charted the jostling for power among different schools of thought within and across these social movements.

In depicting Islamic social movements as confrontational to the ruling regime, these works tend to miss portraying the alignment of many of these movements with modern nation-state bureaucracies. Aljunied (2016), in examining the largest Muslim youth movement in Malaysia called the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), demonstrates how members of the Islamic movement have worked within the ambits of the state apparatus to uphold the developmentalist visions of the modern regime. What is even less studied is the link between religious revivalism and a form of Muslim consciousness that cuts across social movements and national boundaries. This paper broaches the topic of Muslim ethical consumption—a form of religious revivalism that influences the collective consciousness of the *ummah* that does not subscribe to rigid social outfits or theological classifications but is more tied to the sensitivities and proclivities of the relatively young, urban middle-class.

#### **4. A Youth-Driven Muslim Identity Market**

An understanding of the consumption practices of Muslims cannot ignore the dispositions of the youth. In studies of religious identities and Islamic revivalism, there is a burgeoning interest to understand "how youth cultures intersect with global processes such as commodification and consumerism, media use, cultural politics, and identity" (Williams and Mohamed Nasir 2017, p. 200). There are several trends from which we can discern and abstract, which impact the demography and influence their practices. Some of these social and global processes are not exclusive to the young Muslim demography while others are more specific to the social group. As Hasan (2016, p. 167) puts it,

Youth are important transmitters of the Islamic revival's ideas, and they creatively translate those messages into lifestyles, fashion, art, music, novels, institutions, and organizations. The messages, in turn, influence multiple social and political fields and encourage a collective identity.

Ostensibly, not unlike that of other youth, the consumption practices of young Muslim youth are a manifestation of global cultural flows. Media observers have portrayed young people as mere vassals that can be manipulated to fit current trends and shifts in the market. This sentiment is even more prominent in the capitalist industry where the "cult of the youth" is promoted. Backed by a plethora of consumer products, society is taught that the focus is not only on being young but on learning to be one. This narrative, which is backed by the media machinery with its persistent emphasis on acting and looking young, has made youth and youthfulness the order of the day. Globally, companies have tailored their marketing campaigns to explicitly focus on the youth demography and tap into their increasing spending power. However, research has shown that beyond the influences of the mass media, these choices that are made by the youth are often more complex than one might think (Chan 2010; Gbadamosi 2018).

Youth consumption patterns are influenced by several factors such as social class, cultural differences, as well as gender. There have been reports that show that although young people tend to splurge across a whole range of products, they are not just concerned with the consumption of leisure activities. This representation of the carefree youth can be deceiving as young people also strive to augment the family's household income by making steady contributions to their parents, settling personal and familial loans, and saving up for their present and future education (Shanahan et al. 1996). As a case in point, millennials make up almost a quarter of the population in Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world. The 2019 Millennial Indonesia report, which surveys young people across twelve of the countries' major cities, found that the top three aspirations of the young are to please their parents, own a house and be good parents.

Trends in youth consumption also often reflect the symbols and predicament of their generation. "Islamic" streetwear fronted by Muslim hip-hop artists, sodas like the *Mecca Cola* and *Zam Zam Cola*, and other "accessories for the fans" enable young people to flaunt their Muslim and western identities simultaneously. Urban middle-class Muslim youth embracing this New Awakening and partaking in this conspicuous consumption and identity politics are not only "good for business". Mushaben (2008) and Mueller (2014) point to the development of *Pop-Islam* over the last few decades, citing as evidence, the growing prominence of charismatic *imams* and the impact of popular culture in creating entertainment celebrities and icons for the Muslim community. As a result, in Europe, a 'young, chic and cool' Islam has emerged among marginalized second-generation Muslim youth who are denied their fundamental rights of citizenship and access to social goods in their countries of birth. Mushaben noted that these trends were exacerbated especially in the aftermath of September 11 although tensions owing to generational gaps within the Muslim community were already evident way before that.

Seen in another way, this capitalistic trend is an example of the commodification of Islam. Skeptics are quick to point out, where is "Islam" in all this consumption? For example, Shirazi (2016) argues in her illuminative book, *Brand Islam: The Marketing and* *Commodification of Piety*, that many of the products marketed as *halal* or Islamic have got nothing to do with religious practice or theology. Instead, it serves as a clever marketing strategy that exploits the overt piety of the middle class and a generation of Muslim minorities that yearns for a sense of belonging to a larger Islamic laity.

#### **5. From Critical Consumers to Active Producers of Media**

There have been many studies that demonstrate the necessary relationship between an ethical consumer and a critical consumer (Schifani and Migliore 2011; Gjerris et al. 2016). Being an ethical consumer compels one to be critical one. McGregor (2008, pp. 273–74), for example, argues that being an ethical or critical consumer is a sign of a good citizenship, for "the true objective of being a citizen is to strive to make decisions that err on the side of moral and ethical consumption as the dominant way of life". One prevalent aspect of contemporary ethical consumption in the digital age, especially in the era of what has been characterized as a post-truth society, has been the desire for content producers, not just individuals and groups on social media but also traditional mainstream media giants, to act ethically.

Muslim consumption patterns must be appreciated against the backdrop of the youth's ability to sustain a heavy dose of apprehension towards the mainstream media. Established literature on youth culture and consumerism often neglects the role of youth as conscientious consumers. Yet, they often form the social group that is generally dissatisfied and critical of mainstream media for its depictions of Islam and Muslims in general, and its portrayals of young Muslims in particular (Richardson 2004; Ahmed 2012; Alizai 2021; Jiwani and Al-Rawi 2021; Weng and Mansouri 2021). Scholars have also captured the pervasive view of Muslims who feel that the mainstream media's caricaturing of their identities is rendering them voiceless, and how the moral panic that is engineered by the mainstream media has sensationalized and demonized the young Muslim subject (Richardson 2004; Kabir 2010, 2013).

This growing discontent heightened in the aftermath of September 11 and the global war on terrorism as the securitization of Muslims was felt across the world. Pejorative depictions of their community and faith in mainstream media drove Muslims to seek alternatives through the Internet. They then appropriated the Internet as a platform to create social networks with other Muslims and express their opinions in online forums and chat groups. Undoubtedly, the Internet offers an important platform to examine identity formation for any social group, but it is even more significant for a generation of Muslims who largely feel misrepresented by mainstream media.

One recurring point of contention is the characterization of a "Muslim crime" in the mainstream media when other acts of criminality are hardly depicted as "Christian" or "Buddhist". This has made many young Muslims feel particularly targeted for their identity (Mohamed Nasir 2016a, p. 171). There are also reports (Bayrakli and Hafez 2021) that link a culture of fear with sustained unfavorable depictions in the public arena. To be sure, these portrayals affect not only how non-Muslims view the Muslim community but also how Muslims view other Muslims as well. The negative portrayal of Muslims in the media has also colored the judgment of Muslims, leading some of them to shun other Muslims.

The pejorative representation of Muslims is also evidenced in movies, advertisements and other forms of popular content. This has been the subject of scholarly discussion for some time now. Jack Shaheen's book, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (Shaheen 2001), is perhaps the most celebrated. Of late, Muslim artists have been taking a strong stance against this trend. Beyond rejecting offers to play stereotypical "Muslim roles", such as that of a terrorist, they are taking matters into their own hands by producing content to represent Muslim life on their terms. Hip-hop music is one of the most compelling examples here. Harnessing the potency of the most dominant popular culture of this age, hip-hop presents a powerful platform for Muslims, especially its youth, to offer their interpretation of social reality and engage in a dynamic form of identity formation (Abdul Khabeer 2016; Mohamed Nasir 2020). Furthermore, in Hollywood and especially within the independent productions industry, Muslim artistes have churned out a corpus of work ranging from films to stand-up comedies, depicting a more nuanced view of Muslim life.

The youth's critical consumption of the media is also set against an unprecedented time where social media platforms like Instagram, Twitter and Tik Tok enable them not only to be selective consumers but more significantly, content creators. This is where the younger generation has been most successful in stamping their viewpoints, with scholars of social movements documenting the role of social media in mobilizing social revolutions like the Arab Spring (Howard and Hussain 2013; Bunt 2019). Granted that there is much of what Shirazi will call *Brand Islam* produced in the new media. However, a study of Muslim consumer ethics cannot neglect these attempts by Muslims to speak truth to power.

#### **6. Autonomy versus Authority**

These attempts at critical consumption have been aided by a crisis in institutionalized authority and their conventional platforms for legitimacy building. As ideological battles are increasingly fought on the Internet, the digital world has enfeebled the effectiveness of the state to control the dissemination of information, which it has traditionally enjoyed during the era of television and printed media. This volatility of the Internet, combined with its potentially widespread influence, makes the state vulnerable to challenges to its authority and legitimacy. This has convinced many ruling regimes to attempt at regulating the Internet. Nonetheless, any attempt at curtailing the autonomy of their citizens is even more problematic as the Internet traverse national boundaries.

The discourse of *Islamic radicalization* in the post-September 11 era has caused a struggle for autonomy amongst Muslims—both where they live as minorities and in Muslim majority countries where ruling regimes use the Islamic radicalization narrative as a pretext to entrench their hegemony. For the former, Muslims utilize social media platforms to rally support for issues of concern like the *hijab* and whistle-blow against discriminatory or oppressive practices against Muslims. For the latter, we have seen similar activism against reigning regimes that culminated in the sequence of events we know as the Arab Spring.

The democratization and liberalization of knowledge, which have been a marker of the digital age, have inevitably brought about a crisis of religious authority (Turner 2011). The diversification of Muslim consumption of information and knowledge ultimately poses a challenge to conventional institutions. Multiple sources of authority function and jostle for influence in a competitive environment. As a case in point, in Sydney, the *Australia Federation of Islamic Councils*, *Halal Certification Authority Australia*, *Halal Australia, Australian Halal Food Services* and *Islamic Co-ordinating Council of Australia Inc.* are some of the stakeholders in Australia's huge *halal* market, which also includes exports of its products across the region. Inadvertently, such a rich tapestry of industrial players ensures a more dynamic discourse on what constitutes *halal*.

This critical consumption and Islamic revivalism among young Muslims, is intertwined with the twin phenomena of *online religion* and *religion online*, that I have discussed extensively in my book, *Digital Culture and Religion in Asia* (Han and Mohamed Nasir 2016). The exceptional levels at which young Muslims are seeking religious direction on the Internet are in line with Bunt's observation of the generation of *iMuslims* and the digital *ummah* who gravitate to cyberspace where "Important new issues, with no immediate basis in traditional sources can be discussed. Opinions can be disseminated rapidly, but are not necessarily observed or followed by readers, who may visit another site to solicit an opinion more in line with their personal requirements" (Bunt 2009, p. 136). They are then able to adjust the consumption of religious content according to what Bunt has called "personal requirements", which "include anything from which branch of Islam s/he identifies with, to language, geographic location, level of education, social class, gender, personality, and previous life experiences" (Akou 2010, pp. 336–37). In the same vein, Mahmood's (2004) seminal study of Egyptian society shows that Islamic revivalism has taken a more personalized mode focusing on values of agency and freedom, instead of being centered

on the policies of the state. This very much aligns with Hirschkind (2001) who argues that, although a contingent component, the concerns and practices of Islamic revivalism have peripheralized the nation-state as an integral component determining religious piety.

Beyond seeking personal autonomy, contemporary Muslim consumption choices also transcend a "*halal* consciousness" (Mohamed Nasir et al. 2010) paradigm to include a global geopolitical mapping of events affecting the Muslim *ummah*. The following section on boycotts demonstrates this particularly well. In countries where Muslims live as minorities, this opportunity to connect with a wider Muslim fraternity reflects the global cultural flows that are accentuated in the digital age. The digital revolution also brings fresh ideas or old ideas packaged in new ways to the attention of religious adherents. Muslim consumption trends are equally affected by contemporary causes and global social movements such as environmental awareness, which has in turn spawned off into what has been termed *Green Islam* (Ibrahim 2010; Gade 2019).

The decision to purchase a particular product is very much a rational choice that prompts Muslims to reconcile their piety with popular consumption trends. The factors mentioned above relating to identity, autonomy, authority and a growing aspiration to be producers and not mere consumers that I have outlined above, cannot be more veraciously played out than in the case of Muslim boycotts.

#### **7. Boycotts as Moral Protest**

A powerful example of contemporary Muslim consumer ethics would be to examine the boycott movements over the last few decades. Although these protest movements are essentially global, they manifest themselves differently based on local socio-political conditions (Mohamed Nasir 2016b). Even among soft authoritarian Southeast Asian neighbors like Malaysia and Singapore, endorsements and participation of these movements depend on many variables such as ethnic majority-minority dynamics and state-society relations.

Assertions of Muslim identity have given rise to the practice of boycotts in consumption choices. Many websites were established for this purpose and the lively discourse within the Muslim community about boycotting is a testament to this. The protest culture of a particular locality profoundly affects the dispositions of Muslim resistance. Boycotting and protest culture are not foreign to mainstream Western societies. Groups and events that support "Muslim causes" such as the Palestinian issue and public campaigns against Islamophobia are also well-represented by non-Muslim individuals (Barghouti 2011). Besides boycotting national products, one of the most popular forms of boycotts is those extended to local franchises of global corporations which are perceived to be contributing to the oppression of Muslims overseas.

Consumer boycotts can also display a local element. In some instances, besides making the case for boycotts, Muslims have also promoted buying local products as a substitute and a strategy to aid the local economy. Thus, boycotts afford a chance for second-generation migrants, for example, to flaunt their "national pride" by supporting local produce and initiatives. Back's conceptualization of a "neighborhood nationalism", which simultaneously engages both local and national discourses on race and nation, would be instructive here. This concept of an ethnically inclusive localism or "neighborhood nationalism" in the community is reminiscent of discourses among Muslims who, in their choice to consume indigenous goods, regard the nation as a multicultural space where a sense of belonging is not confined to race or religion, but by a commitment to a particular area (Back 1996, p. 239). To this end, buying local produce can alleviate the moral dilemma in at least a couple of ways. Firstly, Muslims would have fulfilled their obligations to the global *ummah* by partaking in the boycott movements that they feel strongly for. Secondly, they would contribute to the coffers of the local economy and be perceived as patriotic countrymen by buying indigenous products. The act of supporting local products can be seen as a practice of their cultural citizenship.

Muslim boycotts are also sometimes promulgated at national levels and even supported by international Muslim bodies. For example, Muslim countries boycotted Danish

products in 2005 to protest the publication of unflattering cartoons of the Prophet that was released along with an article called *The Face of Muhammed* (Veninga 2014). A particular image of the Prophet with a bomb lodged in his turban proved emblematic of the resistance movement. When the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) convened in Mecca later that year, the representatives roundly condemned what they felt was the "desecration of the Holy Prophet Mohammad in the media of certain countries" calling on "all governments to ensure full respect of all religions and religious symbols" (Tiryakian 2009, p. 240).

My book *Globalized Muslim Youth in the Asia Pacific* (Mohamed Nasir 2016a) discussed how young Muslims in the global cities of Sydney and Singapore are also wary as to whether they are directly or inadvertently contributing to the finances of other religious movements in their country. In this aspect, it can be argued that the plurality of the "religious marketplace" leads to a form of competitiveness among faith communities. The reason for this hesitance comes from their discomfort in making financial contributions to the evangelical efforts of other religious groups. Therefore, economic boycotts are not solely triggered when the makers of the products are seen to be outrightly discriminating against Muslims but also when they are identified as advancing religious causes. Whether living in Muslim majority countries or as minorities in multicultural societies, Muslim communities do not possess any means to exact punitive measures to discipline those who do not conform. Instead, the "punishment" often manifests itself in the form of stigma and social pressure may it be from close-knit groups such as the family and friendship circles, or larger society.

Inescapably, the boycott movement has also influenced popular youth culture. This can be exemplified by a trend that Campbell (2010) calls Islamogaming. For instance, a British software company called *Innovative Minds* campaigns for the boycott of Israel. This initiative is operationalized through the production of multimedia and video games, which the company contends is "the best way to attract the youth to Islam". One of the games, called *The Resistance*, however, has attracted some controversy. Among the features of the game is that a player can take on the role of a farmer in the south of Lebanon who has to protect his family and land from the colonizing Zionist forces (Campbell 2010, p. 65). The series of Islamically themed games on its *Islamic Fun CD* include *Happy Hijab,* where a player helps a Muslim character locate her missing hijab, and *Building Blocks*, where players answer questions to earn blocks for the construction of a mosque.

Be that as it may, there are ongoing ethical debates within the Muslim youth fraternity on the practicality and justification for embracing boycotting as a form of resistance. Even among those who eventually decide not to partake in the boycotting movement, a large proportion of young Muslims have either entertained the idea or debated the concept of boycotting with others or within themselves. A segment of the community believes that the boycotting will end up hurting the smaller businesses more than the actual target, which is the huge multinational corporations. Therefore, in order not to affect "innocent bystanders", some Muslims have refrained from deploying boycotting as a strategy of resistance. Some even go further and dismiss the claims of piety among those who advocate for Muslim boycotts. Among other reasons, they allege that these boycotts can be abused and instead used as a ploy to destabilize business competitors. Compounding these debates on whether one should participate in boycott activities, is the efficacy and sustainability of boycotts as a disciplining tool. Detractors allude to the reactive nature of consumer boycotts and point to how sentiments tend to wane with time as a particular emotive event fade from social memory, leading to similar boycotting efforts being short-lived in the past. Nonetheless, Muslims are cognizant of the past successes of such collective action as a peaceful way of resistance. Among the oft-cited examples were the successes of the boycotting of British goods during the Indian struggle for independence, and the South African struggle against apartheid rule. In 2002, angered by the Israeli military offensive in the West Bank, millions of Arab consumers boycotted US-branded goods causing some companies to suffer up to 50 per cent losses in sales (Suhaimi 2009).

As is evident in this paper, although the Muslim approach to boycotting is not monolithic, the debates persist in the consciousness of Muslim consumers as its cyber presence develops over time. Several significant strands about boycotting can be gleaned from these observations. The first is cultural. Undeniably, contemporary boycotting movements are heavily intertwined with global popular youth culture. The second takes a more economic perspective, recognizing the minority status of Muslims both in numerical terms, and sociologically, in terms of power relationships. Given the small percentage of Muslims in minority countries and the weak economies of Muslim majority ones, some remain skeptical that their efforts would have any significant impact even if each one of them were to participate in the movement. The third argument takes a more social perspective given how boycotting may produce the unintended impact of harming those who are not the subjected targets of the movement. The final strand takes a theological perspective asking the fundamental question of whether boycotting is even permitted in Islam. Of this, some think that the Prophet does not endorse utilizing economic boycotting as a form of resistance.

An investigation of Muslim consumer ethics also must contend with the inherent tension between the concepts of the *ummah* and the state. The tension exists between the particular and the universal. The state is an inherently limiting concept, one that pivots on the concept of sovereignty. It imposes the idea of difference to make itself distinctive from the Other. On the contrary, the *ummah* is a concept that spans national boundaries, binding the Muslims of the world into an unbreakable chain. It is *sui generis*, an external that a Muslim is born into. It is a global fraternity of brotherhood that ignites social action and, occasionally, social change. The *ummah* traverses borders and requires a transcendantelization of the individual consciousness.

#### **8. Conclusions**

Muslim consumer ethics offer the lens through which contemporary pious Muslims navigate moral and humanistic quandaries in a globalized, interconnected world. Factors such as identity, autonomy, authority, as well as a growing aspiration to be producers and not mere consumers, collectively shape the consumption practices of Muslims who are driven not only by theological considerations but by national and global affairs. This paper demonstrates that these concerns might not be mutually exclusive, as Islam also promotes a wider conception of ethical consumption that is governed beyond *halal* concerns. The variegated ways that piety plays out in Muslim consumption patterns are, in large part, driven by the rise of Muslim religious consciousness.

Muslim ethical consumption is a manifestation of religious revivalism. Just as any study on the subject has necessitated scrutiny of the youth, this paper also highlights the unique practices of young, urban middle-class Muslims who are the main drivers of this resurgence. This revivalism is aided by the information revolution in the digital age that creates networked societies among urban Muslim youth, paving their way to access alternative sources and views, even where religious guidance and knowledge are concerned while providing a space to reconcile their religiosity with their consumption behaviours. As seen in the case of boycotting campaigns, although these movements are characterized by intense mobilization at the communal level, they are also marked by dynamic and complex debates within the Muslim community.

This paper has placed into sharp relief the phenomenon of Muslim consumer ethics through the blending of insights from various scholarly fields, such as Islamic studies, globalization, popular culture and studies on consumer culture. It has resisted looking at Muslims from a sectarian perspective in favor of placing a finger on larger trends that transcend geographies and intra-religious orientations. Such a reflection would hopefully provide a basis for the development of new methodologies and serve as an invitation for future scholars to indulge in the study of Muslim consumer behavior.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

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### *Article* **Modernity, Its Crisis and Islamic Revivalism**

**Jan A. Ali**

School of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney University, Penrith, NSW 2751, Australia; jan.ali@westernsydney.edu.au

**Abstract:** Modernity is a global condition of an ongoing socio-cultural, economic, and political transformation of human experience, with tradition or religion having no significant role to play. It is the gradual decline of the role of religion in modernity through the implementation of the principles of secularism which has, according to Islamic revivalists, plunged the world into crisis or *jahiliyya* (unGodliness). Revivalists and sociologists such as Anthony Giddens (1991) call it the "crisis of modernity". In response, many Islamic revivalist movements have emerged to address this condition. The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 gave a boost to many existing Islamic revivalist movements and inspired many to appear anew. The phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism is a religious transformative response to the crisis of modernity—i.e., the inability of secularism and the process of secularization to fulfill the promise of delivering a model of perfect global order. Contemporary Islamic revivalism is not anti-modernity but against secularism and is thus an attempt to steer modernity out of its crisis through a comprehensive and robust process of Islamization—the widespread introduction of Islamic rituals, practices, socio-cultural and economic processes, and institutional developments to the pattern of modern everyday living—and transforming modernity from *dar al-harb* (abode of war) to *dar al-Islam* (abode of peace). The paper argues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is a complex heterogeneous global phenomenon seeking to steer modernity out of its prevailing crisis through finding in Islam the universal blueprint of life. It further argues that Islamic revivalism is not anti-modernity but is a religious based reaction against the negative consequences of modernity, particularly against secularism, and carving out a space for itself in modernity.

**Keywords:** crisis of modernity; Islamic revivalism; Islamization of modernity; modernity; rationality; revivalism; secularism

#### **1. Introduction**

The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 was a milestone event in our recent history that inspired a new Islamic activism across the globe as a response to the ongoing socio-religious, economic, and political predicaments in many parts of the Muslim world. Islamic activism or Islamic revivalism is not a new phenomenon and "The past history of Islamic societies contains many examples of reform and revival movements that developed as a response to changing political and economic conditions" (Lapidus 1997, p. 1). The trends of Islamic revivalism can be traced back all the way to one of the greatest Muslim caliphs—Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (680–720)—a "pious and respected caliph who attempted to preserve the integrity of the Muslim Umayyad caliphate (661–750) by emphasizing religion and a return to the original principles of the Islamic faith" (The Editors of *Encyclopaedia Britannica* 2022). Of course, the Revolution did not solve the problems within the Muslim world, however, it re-energized the prevailing Islamic revivalist movements (Aqababaee and Razaghi 2022) and paved the way for many new ones to emerge around the world, producing the phenomenon which came to be known as the contemporary Islamic revivalism (Ali 2012a). It is a religiously motivated transformative response to what is usually called, particularly in sociology, the crisis of modernity (Beck 1992; Giddens 1991; Bauman and Bordoni 2014; Ali and Sahib 2022) or what Lapidus explains as a collection of Islamic revival movements

**Citation:** Ali, Jan A.. 2023. Modernity, Its Crisis and Islamic Revivalism. *Religions* 14: 15. https://doi.org/10.3390/ rel14010015

Academic Editor: Enzo Pace

Received: 4 November 2022 Revised: 12 December 2022 Accepted: 13 December 2022 Published: 22 December 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

who must "be understood as a reaction against modernity" (Lapidus 1997, p. 1) or what Minardi sees as Islamic movements which are "generally dissatisfied with the ongoing conditions . . . [who want] to make radical changes in the system of government and society" (Minardi 2018, p. 250). From the perspective of Islamic revivalists, the crisis of modernity is global but its impact on the Muslim world, particularly since colonialism which dismantled the Muslim world and plunged it into what Haddad (1986) calls the socio-economic and political crisis of the Muslim world, is ongoing. Thus, Islamic revivalism is a response to the decline of the Muslim world as well as the crisis that plagues the world. Drawing largely on Islamic scriptures—Qur'an and *hadith*s (compilation of books of Prophetic Traditions) and the *shari'ah* (Islamic law)—contemporary Islamic revivalism seeks to transform what is seen by Islamic revivalists as the crisis-ridden modernity or a *jahiliyya*saturated modern world (Ali 2012b) through concrete religious actions and religiously informed policies and initiate structural reforms to mitigate and eventually overcome the crisis. Constituted by ideologically and methodologically diverse revivalist movements, contemporary Islamic revivalism is a complex multidimensional and multifaceted reality. Internally diverse with a number of very different streams within itself or, as Arjomand asserts, there is a "variety in Islamic [revivalism]" (Arjomand 2004, p. 11), it pervades the entire globe with varying intensity and extent. Diverse they may be, but what brings them together is their collective grievances about the plight of Muslims in Muslim societies and Islam as their proposed solution for Muslim socio-economic and political malaise. They are united in their collective actions rooted in Islamic symbols and identities seeking to establish an Islamic state through political reform and action, "promoting the ideologies of Sharia law and jurisprudence" (Aqababaee and Razaghi 2022, p. 249), and Islamize society by popularizing and institutionalizing Islamic legal principles, Islamic norms and Islamic ethico-moral values (Ismail 2004). Their "goal is to adapt Islamic principles, values, and institutions to the modern world while recognizing the importance of Islam as a cultural frame of reference" (Maghraoui 2006, p. 6) and to "advocate for the interests of Islam and Muslims ... [and] revitalize Islamic teachings and principles not only in the private sphere but also in public (Munabari et al. 2022, p. 5).

Members of Islamic revivalist movements are not anti-modernity; they are generally opposed to Western philosophy, primarily secular nationalism, material capitalism, socialism, communism, and Westernism (Onapajo 2012). In addition, they find secularism to be the most abhorrent feature of modernity (Aqababaee and Razaghi 2022) and, therefore strive towards its removal (Ali 2012b). Ali states that:

Islamic revivalism is a defensive reaction to modernity and a response to unfavorable conditions that exists in it. This does not mean Islamic revivalism is against modernization per se, but rather it is anti-Westernization and anti-secularization. (p. 70)

Dessouki (1982) finds contemporary Islamic revivalism to be a defensive reaction to secular modernity, particularly Western secularism and for Aqababaee and Razaghi it is a response to "the New World Order, Western democracy, humanism, secularism, and feminism" (Aqababaee and Razaghi 2022, p. 250). These scholars highlight that contemporary Islamic revivalism is a defensive reaction to modernity and is against secularism more specifically.

For Islamic revivalists, secularism, both as an idea and practice, concentrates on "this-worldly" realm in contrast to the sacred and "other-worldly" domain and separates religion from civic affairs and sees the state diminishing the values and roles of religious institutions in the temporal affairs of the nation-state (Asad 2003). They point to some cases in the Muslim world to demonstrate that secular Western hegemony in Egypt, for example, and "colonised, submissive and servile Islam that accepts its confinement to the private sphere" (Soage 2008, p. 27) such as that of Kemalist Turkey has produced a serious decline of "true Islam" (Mulcaire 2016). Contrary to the promises of secular modernity, many Muslim societies experience ongoing widespread socio-cultural, economic, and political discontents (Esposito 1983; Onapajo 2012; Munabari et al. 2022) and there is a

holding back on investment in employment opportunities, education and the economy and an endless Western exploitation of non-Western countries (Bukarti 2020). They consider this to be the bane of modernity and the chief cause of its crisis (Ali 2012b). Removing secularism from modernity and replacing it with Islam as a complete way of life in which religion and state are intertwined is, therefore, their priority (Al-Banna 1999d). Similarly for Muslims in general, for them also, Islam founded on the teachings of the Qur'an and the lifestyle of Prophet Muhammad is the perfect blueprint for the way individuals should be in the society. In light of the prevailing Muslim situation, one of the great pioneers of Islamic revivalism, Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), argued that "This required the *ummah*'s purification of its existing beliefs and practices, which, al-Banna stressed, must be facilitated through the gradual establishment of a creed-correcting, reform-inducing Islamic state that fully implements the *Shari'ah*" (Mulcaire 2016, p. 1). Al-Banna's revivalism of Islam is rooted in his commitment to Islam being a "perfect" (Al-Banna 1999c, p 59) "all-embracing system" (Al-Banna 1999d, p. 87) that "covers all aspects of this world and the next one" (Al-Banna 1999b, p. 173). For Al-Banna, together religion and the world is an "all-pervading system" (Al-Banna 1999a, p. 2) of Islam which "should control all matters in life" (Al-Banna 1999b, p. 175). Far from being restricted to the domestic sphere and mere personal spiritual rituals and practices, Al-Banna asserted that "Islam is an ideology and worship, country and nation, religion as well as government, action as well as spirituality and Holy Qur'an as well as sword" (1999b, p. 173).

As far as Islamic revivalists are concerned the "modern society rewards them with material gain and consumer goods but robs their soul" (Dorraj 1999, p. 227). They "consider that in the final analysis modernism produced by reason without God has not succeeded in creating values" (Kepel 1994, p. 4). Islamic revivalists view modernity to be in need of saving and to achieve that, it must be transformed or, what is often described in the literature, to be Islamized (Jung 2016). Islamization of modernity, from a contemporary Islamic revivalism perspective, will involve the removal of secularism as an idea and practice and replaced it with Islam as both religion and state and a dominant and widespread force pervading the entire pattern of modern everyday living. From their viewpoint, the world must shift towards the religion of Islam with a return of the individual to Muslim values, dress codes, Islamic legal code, and a feeling of a universal Islamic identity and a sense of community and belonging (Dorraj 1999; Al-Banna 2009). It is an all-encompassing process of increasing the influence of Islam in all spheres of life and state policy and practice including instilling a sense of community based on Islamic values and the reordering of society according to Islamic scriptural teachings (Rahman 2021).

This is a conceptual paper which seeks to sociologically address the question why contemporary Islamic revivalism is a growing phenomenon in secular modernity particularly when the prediction by secularism that by religion being forced away from the public sphere and into the private sphere, it would overtime die out. The aim of the paper, therefore, is to review the current state of knowledge of contemporary Islamic revivalism and to then contribute to the broadening of the scope of our understanding of and develop a sociologically logical insight into the phenomenon. What is important about this paper is that it provides a logical and detailed sociological insight into the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic revivalism by using the crisis of modernity as an analytical tool, that is, identifying the determinants and consequences of the crisis of modernity. In doing so, I propose to examine in some detail three key concepts, namely modernity, crisis of modernity, and Islamic revivalism, and then move to demonstrate that modernity's failure to deliver on its promises has evoked a response from concerned and activist Muslims who have coalesced into groups or movements resulting in the creation of a global phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism. I posit that these movements claim that modernity's failure to fulfill its promise is because secularism as a key component of modernity is by nature a destructive force that has led modernity into a crisis. Thus, my argument is as follows. The contemporary Islamic revivalism is a global phenomenon which is internally diverse and is a religiously based attempt by Islamic revivalists to steer modernity out of

its crisis through finding in Islam the universal blueprint of life. Islamic revivalists are not anti-modernity but are a collective revolt against the cultural and social dislocations of modernity and strive to carve out a space for themselves in modernity. Islamic revivalist movements collectively are "a response to the conditions of modernity—to the centralization of state power and the development of capitalist economies—and a cultural expression of modernity" (Lapidus 1997, p. 1). Islamic revivalists seek to achieve this by planning to remove secularism from modernity and replace it with Islam through an all-encompassing process of Islamization—a culture building process which enables Muslims to Islamically redefine and reorient themselves to changes in their surrounding world. Islamic revivalist movements are reactive in that secular impact and a perceived cultural threat play a critical role in their ideological development, political struggle, and the remaking of the modern world. Re-introducing Islam to Muslims—proselytization—is one among many ways Islamic revivalists claim they can actively contribute to reordering modernity. Furthermore, they seek to create ways and opportunities by employing other revivalism means such as education in all spheres of life to make Islam flourish, and whenever and wherever possible build a theocracy, an Islamic state constitutionally based and operated in full light of *shari'ah* as the guiding principle reflecting the Will of Allah.

#### **2. Modernity**

The term modernity was first coined, according to Martinelli, in circa fifth century because:

It was used in an antinomic sense compared to antiquus, particularly by St Augustine to contrast the new Christian era with pagan antiquity. More generally, it was used as a means of describing and legitimizing new institutions, new legal rules, or new scholarly assumptions. (Martinelli 2005, p. 5)

However, Hunt (2008) disputes this, noting that the term modernity was first coined in the 1620s and Ossewaarde (2017) asserts that the term was first coined by Charles Baudelaire in 1864. Based on this, it is not clear when exactly the term modernity was coined but it is reasonably safe to infer based on the literature on modernity (Pascoe et al. 2015; Berman 2010; Wagner 2008, 2012; Bauman 2006) that by the late seventeenth century the term had entered common usage in the context of the squabble of the Ancients and the Moderns within the French Academy, debating about the superiority of the "Modern culture" over the "Classical culture" (Græco–Roman) (Lewis 2007). The historical epoch following the Renaissance or the Age of Reason, in which the achievements in various fields in variety of forms were made that could not be matched by the achievements of the antiquity, is when modernity as a concept and a phenomenon became part of the European lexicon and life (Gay 1998; Everdell 1997).

The root of modernity is the late Latin adjective modernus (modern) which is a derivation from the adverb modo meaning "at present" or "at this moment" or "now" (Demir and Acar 1992). It is closely associated with the spread of individual subjectivity, the rise of rationalization, rapid development in science and technology, the emergence of bureaucracy and growth of urbanization, the rise of nation-states, the development of capitalism, and a decline in emphasis on religious worldviews. Modernity accounts for the transition in the society from feudalism to a modern system. For instance, modern societies usually have capitalist economies, a democratic political system, a stratified social structure, and uses technology and machinery to enable mass production. Scholars differ in their articulations as to when this process started and when exactly the societies in the West became modern. Abercrombie and his colleagues note that:

There is disagreement about the periodization ... of modernity, some writers associatingit with the appearance and spread of capitalism from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, some with the religious changes of the fifteenth century onwards which provided the basis for rationalization, others with the onset of industrialization in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and still others with cultural transformations at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century which coincide with modernism ... . (Abercrombie et al. 1994, p. 270)

There are numerous definitions and explanations of modernity and varying versions of its history, with scholars attempting to address the question regarding modernity in many ways without a convergence in answers. As a distinct global phenomenon or condition of social existence, modernity is founded on a new form of human self-consciousness in which:

Human rationality will pre-dominate, subordinating irrationality, custom, and superstition, with the efficacy to plan for and attain progressive improvement in all social institutions through the free exercise of will. Humans have the ability to understand nature as it is—real, solid, and lawfully dependable—which diminishes dependence on theological or transcendental concepts. (A. Berman 1994, p. 2)

Wagner offers further elucidation on the concept of modernity suggesting that:

Modernity is the belief in the freedom of the human being—natural and inalienable, as many philosophers presumed—and in the human capacity to reason, combined with the intelligibility of the world, that is, its amenability to human reason. In a first step towards concreteness, this basic commitment translates into the principles of individual and collective self-determination and in the expectation of everincreasing mastery of nature and ever more reasonable interaction between human beings. (Wagner 2012, p. 4)

Modernity is not modernism or modernization (Hunter 2008; Demir and Acar 1992) and, I would like to suggest, it is best understood as a global phenomenon or condition of social existence in which a hastened and socially compelling process of conceptual transformation forms the central component rather than as the description of a specific epoch or process (Bendix 1967). In other words, it is a novel form of human existence with different constitutions of the domestic and global domains and a sharp separation between traditional community and modern society. It also includes a new cultural formation in which new social relations under a free market economy called capitalism and attitudinal transformation under the processes of secularization, liberalization, modernization, and industrialization materialized. In this conceptualization of modernity, the condition of social existence is constantly different to all past forms of human experience. This is, from a sociological point of view, a more palatable conceptualization of modernity because it enables us to understand modernity as a social reality in which human social life undergoes constant transformation and cultural, economic and political processes are in an endless motion (Maxwell 2020).

Armed with new scientific forces, technological innovations, industrial development, and rationality, modernity is pro-secular and anti-sacred phenomenon that draws the modern individual far away from the sacred to the profane. With its inventions in science and technology, acceleration in economic transformation and urbanization, creation of the nation-states, the democratization of societies, and the bestowal of equal rights to citizens; modernity is a complex forward looking global system.

Modernity rejects anything "old" or "traditional" and renders "new" a criterion for truth making with de-sacralization of knowledge as one of its key features (Lash and Friedman 1992; Martinelli 2005). It is a broad array of interrelated social and cultural phenomena as well as the subjective experience of the conditions produced by them and their continuing effect on cultural values, institutional processes, economic developments, and political activities in the society (Asad 2003). It is not an abstract idea but a system within which exists a collection of diverse tangible attitudes prominent among which is that for everything in existence there must be a cause and a reason and that nothing happens by chance or supernaturally (Soyan 1993; Brugger and Hannan 1983).

In sociology, the term "modernity" has been used to explain the rise of industrial civilization in Europe which produced a new conception of society and the social changes

occurring by differentiating the "traditional" from the "modern" or the "old" from the "new". In the works of classic sociologists, namely Marx, Weber, and Durkheim "modernity" meant a new experience of the world. For Marx, modernity was intimately associated with the emergence of capitalism and the revolutionary bourgeoisie, which facilitated the extraordinary expansion of productive forces and the creation of the global market (Morrison 2006). In Weber's work, modernity meant increased rationality where a traditional worldview was replaced with a rational way of thinking, explaining modernity's close connection with the processes of rationalization and disenchantment of the world (Symonds 2015). Durkheim had a different view about modernity which, for him, was a new form of thinking that would transform the way individuals functioned in society and was basically driven by industrialism accompanied by the new scientific forces (Seidman 1985; Parsons 1972). Given these descriptions, it can be said that modernity is a reconstituted world made possible by people themselves with the new sense of self through their active and conscious intervention in the reconstitution process. The new world is the modern society, which is experienced as a social construction, that is, an experience that makes people feel an exciting sense of freedom and makes them think of unlimited possibilities and an open future (Bickel 2018).

One very important fact in this account of social transformation and its impact on social relations and processes are the ideas of "freedom" and "autonomy" and thus the birth of the new "individual"—the emergence of subjectivity and individuality through a new sense of self. Individual interests have assumed greater importance than the collective interest of a community which was considered as an important contributing source to the development of personal identity (Tobera 2001). This idea of the "individual" or "self" contrasts the traditional individual with the modern one and, as we will see later on, Islamic revivalists find this particularly problematic. The sociological explanation of this difference is based on changes in the understanding of the human experience, social relations, the human relationship with the environment and the supernatural, the changes in economic and political relationships, and population growth and its transformation under the process of industrialization.

Industrialization involved more than just the development of the new means of production of goods and services. In fact, it involved the centralization and coordination of the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and drawing large numbers of individuals from rural communities and farming areas to work in urban centers (M. Berman 1982). The result was both positive and negative. On the one hand, the new urban workers were able to earn an income by selling their labor and feeling liberated and on the other hand, there was the uprooting of relatively stable populations, the breakup of social bonds, and feeling of alienation. Whatever way liberation and alienation were interpreted and experienced in overall scheme of things they inevitably involved a physical as well as psychological separation from the rural, agrarian, and family-based community (Lash and Friedman 1992). This meant that the established social bonds and networks that provided the source of social identity were slowly diminishing in the lived experiences of the new urban dwellers. Alienation from the traditional mode of living and its forms of identity meant that the alienated individual was suddenly under the influence of new set of values and processes. The alienated individual was undergoing a series of social transformations linked to modernity which facilitated the formation of new social relations and networks and political identities (Featherstone et al. 1995; Anani 2016; Ataman 2015).

The separation from traditional, rural, and family-based community meant the disappearance of historic values, age-old securities, and a departure from relying on established forms of social authority—religion or theology, tradition, and seniority. With regards to religion specifically, this separation manifested itself in secularization—the liberal separation of church and state into private and public spheres (M. Berman 1982; Toulmin 1990; Hafez 2011). The new urbanites liberated from being governed by theology and religion as forms of social authority and from the old traditional mode of living were now presented with new opportunities, new sources of wealth, and freedom to remake themselves and to

re-create their world. However, the conditions under which this occurred were of not their own choosing and the social transformations associated with modernity including the processes of industrialization and urbanization were taking place independent of individual input (Featherstone et al. 1995). Although these shifts created new possibilities, individuals were not instigators in this but captives because individuals were now part of something much bigger than themselves. They were, in fact, part of a new social world—society which had an impersonal structure with attributes or principles of its own. The 'free association of free human beings' in a hierarchically structured society leads to disaffection and commodification, human beings relate to one another as objects, the institutional mediation of the church between the faithful and God is eliminated, and a rationalized conduct of life is imposed on the citizens (Dahrendorff 1964; Bauman 2006).

With this, modernity promised to transform life by positively bringing about easily produced wealth, improved education and health, and better living conditions all through an advanced socio-economic system, widespread scientific and technological advancements, profound innovation, and good governance. Modernity, it seemed, delivered on its promise as there seemed to exist the material plenty, intellectual fulfilment, and social emancipation. Also, the development in individual subjectivity, the increase in scientific explanation and rationalization of things (Brush 1988), the emergence of bureaucracy, rapid urbanization, the rise of nation-states, and accelerated financial exchange and communication all seem to point to a successful modernity.

However, this promise of modernity and its numerous benefits have neither been fully fulfilled nor universal as we will see in some detail in "The Crisis of Modernity" section below. This is the key claim of Islamic revivalists and thus their grievances. We still have today the world divided into First World (developed, capitalist, industrial countries), Second World (communist-socialist and less industrialized countries), and Third World (underdeveloped agricultural countries). There are still people in wealthy countries such as USA and the UK who are undereducated or uneducated and homeless (Finley 2003; Kennedy 1997), there are areas, for instance in Sudan, where there is no running water and electricity, and poverty in some countries such as Somalia due to collapse of the economy and Yemen due to militant conflict remains rampant (Assessment Capacities Project 2017; Bukarti 2020).

Alongside this, there are number of other dark sides of modernity identified by sociologists and other social scientists (Alexander 2013; Conrad 2012; Eisenstadt 2003; Maxwell 2020; Tobera 2001). The technological development achieved in the military saw the dropping of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II and the subsequent nuclear arms race in the post-war period are evidence of the danger human mismanagement of technologies pose. Stalin's Great Purges and the Holocaust are another example of modernity's rational thinking and rational organization of social order leading to social exclusion and human extermination. Not to mention the environmental crises such as rising air pollution, industrial waste, and declining biodiversity and climate change resulting from industrial development.

Then, there are psychological and moral hazards of modern life, namely alienation, marginalization, feeling of rootlessness and hopelessness, loss of social bonds and shared values, hedonism, suffering of discrimination and injustice, absence of opportunity and future, and frustration and disenchantment of the world (Tobera 2001; Ali 2012b). Since there are people who suffer from one or a combination of these factors, it raises serious questions not only about the promise of modernity but modernity itself. Does modernity in pursuit of civilizing and development lapses into dehumanization of humanity as an inevitable outcome? Does it humanize as well as dehumanize? Is crisis innate to modernity? Thus, Scambler (1996) characterizes modernity as a failed project which has been unable to fulfil the principles of the Enlightenment. He asserts:

Two types of critique calling for the abandonment of the project have been preeminent of late. The first focuses on the undeniable failure of the project to honour its promise, most evidently concerning the rational construction of the

good society. And the second points to philosophical flaws in the explication of reason on which the project of modernity is founded. There is truth in both. (Scambler 1996, p. 568)

For those who suffer the negative consequences of modernity, modernity is an instrument of dehumanization and is in crisis and, as such, it evokes a reaction in them. Islamic revivalists are one example who we will see later are reactionaries religiously responding to modernity and its various pursuits. Islamic revivalists or Islamic revivalist movements are generally neither anti-modernity nor seek its destruction but reactionaries responding to what I would like to call the "crisis of modernity" demonstrating that Islam and modernity are mutually compatible, and it is not about choosing one or the other but about Islam inserting itself in modernity or carving out a space in it for itself.

From the perspective of Islamic revivalists, modernity itself needs to be reformed or remade. In other words, it needs to be transformed by progressively removing secularism and systematically inserting Islam into modernity to save it from self-destruction. For them, modernity, which is falling apart, does not need to be returned to a pastoral primitiveness but step-by-step must be replaced by a new pattern of life—Islam. They want Islam to facilitate individual self-actualization along with heightened community values, greater satisfaction and enchantment, which will put in motion a process of personalization of humanity and existential experience (Ali and Sahib 2022). The contemporary Islamic revivalism, which is constituted by Islamic revivalist movements, therefore, as inept, political and apolitical, splintered as is, is not merely a romantic activism of sort or a "phase" but a real, genuine, and a long-term endeavor to gradually and definitely transform (replace secularism with Islam) modernity. Although contemporary Islamic revivalism is made up of movements with divergent ideologies, distinct methodologies, and varying directions, they are all in one way or another not totally satisfied with modernity and look up to Islam for greater level of satisfaction, salvation and solution (Ali 2012a). The principal source of their dissatisfaction is secularism, which they consider to be the bane of modernity. They claim that once secularism is replaced with Islam, the crisis-ridden *jahiliyya*-saturated modernity will be permanently healed; there will be no crisis of modernity. So, what exactly is secularism? I address this question in some depth in the following section.

#### **3. Secularism Explained**

Secular refers to the worldly realm and secularism is understood to be a system or ideology that places heavy emphasis on this-worldly rather than the other-worldly realm based on the creed that there should be a realm of knowledge, ideals, and actions that is free from religious influence and directives, thus, what is often called, politically speaking, the "separation of church and state". Taylor (2007) defines secularism as a humanist mindset with a total focus on this world in pursuit of an ideal human gratification deemed to be achievable by no assistance from God or transcendental force but by mere human effort. Secularism denotes full engagement in socio-cultural, economic, and political life without ever encountering God. It is "a variety of utilitarian social ethics and sought human improvement through reason, science, and social organization" (Monshipouri 1998, p. 10). Wu notes that secularism advocates "that religion and state should be separated from one another" (Wu 2018, p. 59). In other words, religion is not being a part of both private and public life and there is no reference to religion when it comes to making decisions, to designing and developing socio-economic, cultural and political policies, to shaping and living life, and to ordering social relationships, and exclusive reliance is put on human reason to make sense of the world. Keddie says that secularism "is, the belief that religious institutions and values should play no role in the temporal affairs of the nation-state" (Keddie 2003, pp. 14–15). She goes on to say that in the last few hundred years, many scholars and writers in the West have described secularism "as a one-way street toward modernization" and in the contemporary social science works she noticed that "secularism is often interpreted as a natural concomitant of the spread of science, education, and

technology all of which seem to undermine the need for religious explanations of the world and, ultimately, for powerful organized religions in modern society" (Keddie 2003, p. 16).

Secularism separates religious institutions from state institutions and religion is not permitted to dominate the public sphere. Monshipouri asserts that:

In the twentieth century, secularism is generally known as an ideology that advocates the eradication of religious influences in political, social, and educational institutions. As a worldview, secularism has generally emphasized separation between the religious and political spheres. (1998, p. 11)

As a result, the social, cultural, economic, and political institutions throughout the modern society are removed from the influence and control of religion. A decline is witnessed in religious influence over government, institutions, ideas, and behavior, and increasing state control of both public and private spheres. Secularism enables the liberation from religious control of all vital spheres of civil society and nonreligious institutions such as education, social welfare, law, and forums for the expression of belief and action. There is an increase in the outgrowth of conviction in the supernatural, the privileging this-worldly considerations and bringing an end to religious doctrinal influence on the vital processes in modern society namely legislation and education. This entire process marginalizes and pushes religion away from the public realm to the private sphere, making it practically ineffective, particularly the religion of Islam, which is a complete way of life practiced in private sphere as well as in the public domain (Esposito 1988).

Secularism is linked to secularity and secularization. Whilst secularity is often described as a condition in which religion is absent from certain specific areas of society such as the public sphere and the state and may be the outcome of the interaction among various social factors or caused by the need of political intervention, secularization, however, is a complex process of separating religion from politics and where the overarching and the transcendent religious system is rendered insignificant and is marginal in a functionally differentiated progressive society (Riesebrodt 2007). The consideration that Islam is a complete and comprehensive way of life is critical for Islamic revivalists who argue that it is this kind of religion which is needed to transform modernity and resolve its crisis but noxious secularism obstinately stands in its way. By nature, secularism is a destructive force according to Islamic revivalists and is the principal cause of modernity's crisis and its removal, therefore, is necessary. Islamic revivalism is the process through which revivalists propose to accomplish this and overcome the crisis of modernity. Let's turn our attention to modernity's crisis and learn more about it.

#### **4. The Crisis of Modernity**

There is no doubt that modernity has:

led to many positive outcomes but ... [it has] also stimulated threat and crisis, uncertainty and risky behaviour. Human kind has managed to control many natural processes successfully and yet of all the biological species, *homo sapiens* is one of the most threatened with extinction due to its destructive tendencies (e.g., the drive towards incessant economic growth). (Tobera 2001, p. 1)

The crisis of modernity which is a complex, multifaceted, and unfolding phenomenon is certainly worthy of a robust sociological analysis. I want to concentrate not so much on how modernity articulates anew the age-long developmental problems of humanity, problems linked with the process of transformation brought about by individuals themselves as well as produced by nature which often occurs suddenly and takes us by surprise and therefore form a critical part of social dynamics, but instead on the problems of modernity facing humankind today. This is critical for our understanding of the emergence of Islamic revivalism as a global phenomenon. Islamic revivalism is a responsive phenomenon which faces diverse complex interaction with modernity and Muslims. The responsive factors of Islamic revivalism strive to develop a sustainable solution to the crisis of modernity which is socially efficient and psychologically conducive to the wellbeing of the global population. Modernity has always been seen as the antithesis of conservatism, stagnation, underdevelopment, orthodoxy, religion, and all-things old, in short, the opposite of the progressive, developed, civilized, and industrialized world. However, many contemporary debates not only give us a different perspective on modernity, they, in fact are challenging modernity's claims arguing that modern features such as capitalism and nationalism have generated a toxic mixture of disenchantment, pomposity, and developmental unsustainability and directing us towards the preservation of cultural specificities (Chiozza 2002; Nabholz 2007) and "dialogical transcendence" (Duara 2015) to re-enchant modernity. Thus, instead of embedding my analysis of the crisis of modernity in a traditional context of modernist epistemology and philosophical ontology, I have opted to transform the conceptual ground by looking at the sociological reality of modernity and socio-economic and sociological explanations for the crisis. Therefore, in this section I intend to offer a sociological description of the crisis as a backdrop to better understand the emergence of contemporary Islamic revivalism. I will elaborate on the concept of contemporary Islamic revivalism in the next section but, in passing, note here that it is a reaction to the negative consequences or crisis of modernity. Contemporary Islamic revivalism sees that the acceleration of social, cultural, economic, and political connections over the last several decades has produced a persistent drive for resource and territorial expansions and material capitalism and secularism are driving people apart and into a state of disenchantment with multiplier negative effects—crime, divorce, drug addiction, depression, poverty, heath issues, and so on. Islam's re-emergence on the backs of Islamic revivalist movements is to assert its pre-eminence on the international stage and address the crisis of modernity. Islamic revivalists such as the *Tablighi*s (members of the Tabligh Jama'at) claim to be involved in turning modernity as a *dar al-harb* (abode of war) to *dar al-Islam* (abode of peace). Some such as the *Tablighi*s claim to be working at the micro level through reforming nominal Muslims through their preaching model that involves members going on *khuruj* (preaching tour), knocking on doors of fellow Muslims and inviting them to their public lectures and learning and remembrance circles (Ali 2012a) and returning them to the "true path" and some such as *Tahriri*s (members of Hizb ut-Tahrir) claim to be working at the macro level planning and striving towards establishing the caliphate (Islamic state) in their overall journey and endeavor (Ali and Orofino 2018).

To start, we must ask what is meant by the "crisis of modernity". The crisis of modernity is associated with the idea that there is an ill-conceived thinking about and around modernity that ultimately leads to a crisis, that is, with some exceptions, there is a general state of existential disenchantment in the modern world (Everdell 1997). Before 1900, there was a general confidence in Europe (allegedly original home of modernity) among its population that European technology, innovation, science, logic, and rationality will lead the European continent and the world to ongoing progress, prosperity and a blissful life for all (Heraclides and Dialla 2015). However, by 1900 there was a shift in European attitude when many from upper- and middle-class groups began to feel dissatisfied with and apprehensive about the European civilization and began to question its doctrine, claims, promises and direction (Outram 1997). To their dismay, they realized that the promise of modernity to create an everlasting utopia, the megalopolis of humanity, will never be achieved. They found themselves feeling that there was something fundamentally deficient in European civilization and started feeling doubts about Western culture and anxieties began to emerge about some of the ideas in sciences and humanities which were further compounded by World War I (Pagden 1993). These and many other factors were collectively characterized as the "crisis of modernity". All of this resulted in new yet darker ways of understanding humanity where many started doubting the existence of progress and began thinking that reason and science does not necessarily lead to progress, prosperity, civility, and good life (Alexander 2013).

In recent times the crisis of modernity manifests itself in high levels of meaninglessness, de-rootedness, futurelessness, hopelessness, depravity, and material and spiritual deprivation. There is evidence of rampant social injustice, acute immorality, political corruption and the despotism, and intellectual crisis (Girling 1997). Many individuals find that there is a serious destruction of nature and many problems associated with human induced climate change (Shiva 1994), that there is a prevalence of large scale conflict/wars, that economic inequality is unrelenting, that homelessness and poverty is pervasive, that there is an absence of government and corporate accountability and transparency, that corruption is widespread, that there is a dearth of food and water security, that the lack of education is growing, that human wellbeing is declining, that the lack of economic opportunity and unemployment is worsening, and injustice and discrimination are on the rise (Loudenback and Jackson 2018; Duara 2015). Ali (2020, p. 81) asserts that "The last several decades have seen the world experience deindustrialisation, the decline of the nation-state, falling productivity, growing unemployment, poverty, marginalization, inequality, violence, and the expansion of neoliberal political economies." This is compounded by meaninglessness afflicting life, people "waiting without hope"—the pervasiveness of bleakness and hopelessness, the individuating conditions of modern life bringing people apart, and modern men and women are caught up in a perpetual "tension of existence" (Etzioni 1975).

Modernity promised individuals "the good life", one which was to be blissful with democracy flourishing everywhere, women enjoying total freedom, rights for workers and improved living conditions for the masses assured, widespread prevalence of equality and social justice, and with technological advances the distance being annihilated making mobility fast and easy and communication become immediate and large-scale. It further pledged unlimited progress, plentiful unconditional trust in instrumental rationality, limitless trust in expert knowledge and in the transformative capacity of technical and scientific progress (Giddens 1991), and lastly the commitment to strategic planning and control of nature, institutional operations, and social processes assuring the smooth operation of the system (Taleb 2007). However, if we look around, we find that the "system" is anything but stable and we continue to wrestle with the fact that some of the chief promises of modernity remain unfulfilled. Amitai Etzioni, using America as a case study to examine "the crisis of modernity", eloquently summarizes the situation, stating:

True, beyond doubt, that the citizenry at large is increasingly concerned with quality and not just quantity, with the human and environmental cost of progress rather than merely the statistics of GNP, with public goods (education, health, safety) and not just personal materialism. There is a genuine and widespread yearning for a quality of life ... What the overwhelming majority yearns to achieve is a life of more freedom, less alienating work, more cultivation, beauty, "quality," sensitivity to others and openness to self, on top of and not instead of the material comforts (though not necessarily all the gadgets) and high standards of health that modernity acquired. (1975, pp. 12–13)

I acknowledge that there will be always some level of problem in the world and in individual societies, as Durkheim (1997) and Parsons (1951) point out that some level of social dysfunction in society is inevitable. However, given the scientific, technological, medical, and communication advancements and the enormous growth in instrumental rationality achieved by humans, for example, it is worrying to see that modernity is still faced by a multitude of growing problems. From war and genocide to terrorism; from nuclear holocaust to election violence; from biodiversity loss and deforestation to economic collapse and resource depletion; and from slavery and colonialism to human trafficking and child labor and abuse: humanitarian crises have appeared in all forms over the last hundred years. Take, for instance, World War I, between fifteen and twenty million deaths occurred (Mayhew 2013) and in World War II, the most deadliest military conflict in history, between seventy and eighty million people perished (Dear and Foot 2005); the Holocaust from 1941 to 1945 when Nazi Germany killed approximately six million Jews across German-occupied Europe (Bauer 2002); the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986; the Rwandan genocide and the unraveling of Congo in 1994 when Hutu and Tutsi groups wreaked havoc for hundred days in Rwanda killing around eight hundred thousand Tutsis and moderate Hutus (Powers 2011); the civil war in Liberia from 1999 to 2003 when quarter of a million people died

during the conflict destabilizing a wider region made up of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Ivory Coast (Moran 2008); the hunger in Zimbabwe from 2002 to 2020 resulting from climate change with the country struggling with a series of droughts and floods since 2000 creating a string of food emergencies and the whole situation further compounded by a corrupt and deficient government (Cavanagh 2009); the Kenyan election violence in 2007 when Kenya's Electoral Commission hurriedly and impetuously declared incumbent Mwai Kibaki the winner of a close-run election and mass protest followed which turned into violence killing around one thousand two hundred people and displacing around six hundred and fifty thousand people (Johnson et al. 2014); the Syrian civil war in 2012 creating a major refugee crisis when more than five and a half million Syrians fled the country in search of shelter in nearby countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan and even taking dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean to Europe as refugees (Pearlman 2017); the Venezuela implosion from 2016 to 2017 due to years of economic mismanagement, growing authoritarianism, political turmoil, and extrajudicial killings plunging the country into hyperinflation forcing people to scavenge for food through garbage and creating a condition for increase in disease, crime, and mortality rates (López 2018); and the deforestation crisis negatively affecting natural ecosystems, biodiversity, and the climate, with the heaviest levels of deforestation taking place in tropical rainforests (Runyan and D'Odorico 2016).

In addition, the 11 September 2001 terror attacks; 2003 invasion of Iraq and Darfur genocide; 2007–2008 global financial crisis (GFC); the 2010s Arab Spring across much of the Arab world; the rise of Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in 2020; the 10 May 2021 Israeli–Palestinian violent outbreak; the global refugee crisis; child marriage and racial discrimination; world hunger; poverty; mental health issues; global terrorism; Lebanese liquidity crisis; North Korea and weapons of mass destruction; Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict; Ukrainian crisis; territorial disputes in the South China Sea; Rohingya genocide; Indo-Pakistani wars and conflicts; Uyghur genocide; financial statement fraud; corporate crime, thuggery, and failure; excess CEO-to-worker pay ratios; obstructed nationalist aspirations; unstable or illegitimate state institutions; pervasive corruption and acute economic dislocation; increase in divorce, domestic violence, suicide, drug use and trafficking; cybercrime; organization and institutional mismanagement and dysfunction; bureaucratic inefficiency; and COVID-19 pandemic continue to plague modernity.

Also, the "commodity crisis" of recent times is another example of modernity in crisis despite ever increasing industrialization and technological advancement (Bauman and Bordoni 2014). For example, the 1973 oil crisis pushed up the price of oil by nearly 300% with serious long-term effects on global politics and the global economy (Painter 2014) and Igan et al. (2022, p. 1) observe in the context of recent global situation that:

High and volatile commodity prices pose significant risks to the global economy. The effects will be felt on both inflation and growth, and will fall unevenly across countries, depending on whether they are exporters or importers of affected commodities and how higher prices affect household and corporate income. On net, higher commodity prices are likely to erode growth and lift inflation in the short term.

Socially, the 2008–2009 financial and economic crisis, produced multiple crises setting back the progress numerous states had made towards achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals. From this, there has been continuous adverse social consequences of the crisis with widespread negative social outcomes for individuals, families, communities and societies. The impact on social progress in areas such as education and health is clearly evident. In terms of health and nutrition outcomes, this has the potential to lead to lifelong deficits for the children affected and consequently continue the intergenerational transmission of poverty (Dahrendorff 1964). "The increased levels of poverty, hunger and unemployment will continue to affect billions of people for years to come" (Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2011, p. iii).

#### **5. Why Is Modernity in Crisis?**

Scholars and experts entertain different ideas about the causes of the "crisis of modernity". The divergence in views is illustrative of the multi-variousness of the discourse of "modernity" itself reflecting the scholarly disagreement regarding the nature of "modern society" and of modern individual including different nuances of human values, ideals, commitments or excellence. One way of addressing this question, however, is to examine the philosophical underpinnings of modernity. At a philosophical level, the crisis of modernity is the "crisis of ideas" manifesting itself in the loss of its founding ideas, ideals and beliefs in the hearts and minds of people. The project of modernity was believed to be possible and provide people with life and vitality, but this is no longer the case for many people and so they doubt the project of modernity, and this doubt has, many argue, not been removed or replaced with a better alternative and in fact has entrenched itself and turned into nihilism (Childs 2000).

Another explanation for why modernity is in crisis can be found in Auguste Comte's (1798–1857) narrative about modernity in which he entertains the idea that industrial technology defines and makes "modernity" and is a great human achievement and progress of human civilization. In other words, industrialization and technologization are good for humanity and they make societies modern in which engineers and technocrats are the main figures who ensure that industrialization and technologization continue unabated. For Comte, if there was any crisis of modernity, it is only at the temporary revolutionary stage towards industrial and technological modernity. The revolutionary stage, Comte found, was unnecessarily prolonged by old, antiquated dogmas, and prejudices of the traditional and faith-based ancient world as well as pointless politicking that are obstacles to the inevitable industrial and technological development (Ossewaarde 2017). For him, industrialization and technologization guarantees liberation, bringing an end to chaotic politicking and revolutionary disruptions. To put it differently, according the Cometean line of thinking, there is no "crisis of modernity" as such only "obstacles" (tradition, religion, political squabbles, etc.) to progress that modernity is facing but will overcome overtime. This in itself is a crisis of modernity, that is, the denial of it all and also the attempt to remove tradition and religion in particular from modernity rather than facilitating their coexistence which Duara (2015) argues is much needed now.

In Tocqueville's (1805–1859) narrative, which offers yet another explanation, "modernity" denotes democracy with the full provision for equality of living conditions without aristocratic or bourgeoisie privileges. The modern world is constituted by citizens, civil, and political associations who are to work cooperatively and strive for common good promoting "Liberty", "Equality", and "Fraternity" and thereby shaping a true democratic culture. Tocqueville found "modernity" in crisis because the modern ideals such as "Liberty", "Equality", and "Fraternity" have not been consistently applied in key institutions of society including in the government and instead, the political arena in particular has been used and dominated by political agitators not to bring about positive outcome for all but for vested interests (Sclove 1995). For Tocqueville, therefore, technology—one of modernity's most cherished prizes—is not a strength and liberating force but a quandary and an instrument of human enslavement and modernity's disenchantment.

The crisis of modernity denotes modernity has become uncertain of its purpose. The purpose of modernity was to create a prosperous society embracing equally all human beings—men and women, black and white, poor and rich, young and old—a universal union of free and equal nations each comprising liberated citizens with equal rights. In other words, good and fulfilling life for all through collective and cooperative efforts involving individuals from all walks of life from all sections of the society. Modernity no longer believes in either the nobility or the feasibility of its own project (Strauss 1979), and it was only a matter of time before it was to find this out, because it was originally premised on an ill-conceived ideal. This discovery was of course bound to create, which it did, nihilism, hopelessness, and decline (Childs 2000). From philosophical and sociological

perspectives, these are discerned as the "crisis" of modernity. The crisis is not the same as defeat or annihilation, but degeneration from within. Drury asserts:

It is a set of ill-conceived ideas that ultimately lead to that crisis ... the crisis of our time is the result of our loss of faith in the modern project. Western civilization [as the creator of modernity] ... no longer believes in the nobility of its own project. It has sunk into despair and nihilism. (Drury 2005, p. 151)

Although Islamic revivalists agree with what we have discussed about modernity so far, what they find particularly troubling and most destructive about modernity and the major source of the "crisis of modernity" is secularism. From their perspective secularism is from which emanates all of modernity's problems and leading humanity towards selfdestruction.

For Islamic revivalists, whether secularism means the separation of religion and politics or confining religion to the domestic sphere or totally liquidating religion through state coercion and institutional regulation, secularism as a doctrinal framework and secularization as a process cannot be allowed to flourish any further. They seek to religiously counter and overwhelm secularism so Islam can dominate both the private as well as public domains because Islam is generally seen as a complete way of life practiced in private sphere as well as in the public domain. Their plan is to bring all vital spheres of civil society, legislation, and education under Islam by measuredly utilizing all modernity's instrumental mechanisms including science and technology, but not secularism. Contemporary Islamic revivalism, therefore, is a process through which revivalists seek to completely embed Islam with all its rituals, practices, and institutions in modern private and public everyday living. It is not an anti-modernity phenomenon but one that seeks to employ many of modernity's tools such as its science and technology and modern inventions in combination with Islamic worldview, principles and values to reform modernity and give it a renewed enchantment. In the following section, I discuss how contemporary Islamic revivalism proposes to achieve this.

#### **6. Analysis: Contemporary Islamic Revivalism as a Response to the Crisis of Modernity**

Contemporary Islamic revivalism is a complex multifaceted reactionary force, which using a distinct interpretive reading of Islam and armed with a huge army of members and supporters, aims to remove what it sees as the existing global predicament and remake the modern world in the image of an "authentic Islamic order". The predicament is perceived as the result of what is considered in Islamic revivalist circles as gross discrepancy with the standards of the bona fide Islamic tradition based on the Qur'an and *hadith*s (a record of the words, actions, and the explicit and tacit approval of Prophet Muhammad). It is a significant upsurge in Islamic consciousness particularly in nominal Muslim individuals across the globe. Constituted by a suite of disparate Islamic revivalist movements, contemporary Islamic revivalism manifests itself in a multiplicity of forms as a defensive reaction to the crisis of modernity. Its hallmark is a planning for the return to Islamic origins—the basics of the faith and legal framework (*shari'ah*) as enshrined in the Qur'an and the *sunnah* (the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad) and to strengthen Islamic influence in all spheres of life. Contemporary Islamic revivalism has a defensive reactionary ideological character and represents a defensive reaction to the crisis situations prevailing in various Muslim societies as well as in other parts of the world where there is deep ongoing socio-cultural and economic disaffection, dislocation, discontent and diminished Islamic observances (Ali 2012a; Hamid 2016; Munabari et al. 2022).

As a term, contemporary Islamic revivalism is highly contested in its meaning. Scholars are yet to come up with an agreed definition of the phenomenon and this is mainly due to the fact that it is internally extremely heterogeneous constituted by movements with diverse ideologies, interpretations of Islamic scripture and law, missions, and revivalist methods. It has been examined as a form of an increased Islamic cognizance under various umbrella terms as diverse as "awakening", "fundamentalism", "Islamism", "pietism", "radicalism", "reassertion", "reformation", "reformism", "renewal", "resurgence", "revitalization", and "revivalism" (Ali 2012a). Many scholars define contemporary Islamic revivalism by basing their understanding of it on different types of revivalist movements, including their nature, ideology, method, and aims, and so Al-Gannoushi notes that:

by the Islamic movement we mean the aggregate emitted activity motivated by Islam to achieve its objectives and constant revival for so as to control and direct reality constantly. This notion takes into account that Islam is for all time and place, which makes it imperative for its message to be revived in pursuant to the variation in time and place and development in science, knowledge and art. Accordingly, the Islamic movement's objectives, strategy and action methods will vary in correspondence to the time and place. (Al-Gannoushi 2000, p. 11)

Abu-'Azzah remarks that:

by 'Islamic movements' we mean the collection of the different organizations associated with Islam; they function in the field of Islamic activism within a framework of a comprehensive vision of human life; they struggle to re-form the latter in conformance with Islamic instructions; they await the events of the Islamic peoples' sweeping awakening both individually and collectively, through this Islamic perspective. They strive to influence every aspect of the social life so as to repair and reform it according to the Islamic principles. (Abu 'Azzah 1989, p. 179)

Abu Al-Sa'woud asserts that what he means by Islamic movements is:

the convergence of Muslim individuals in a commission that has its own governance system. Deep in their hearts, they believe in Islam, its practices, regulations and laws. They implement the Islamic teachings in their daily lives and within the limits of their power and perception ... [They] draw on *Shari'a* (Islamic law) and their role model for the frameworks of their lives which they accomplish via 'structures' they found in accommodation of their needs and the developments in their surrounding environment. (Abu Al-Sa'woud 1989, p. 354)

In this paper I rely on Ali and Sahib's definition of Islamic revivalism, which they say is:

Muslim investment in scripture-based socio-cultural, economic and political processes, institutional development and faith renewal through systematic incorporation of scripture-defined rituals and practices and the rules of the law into the pattern of everyday living and at the same time shedding all foreign accretions in normative and ritualistic Muslim practices. The idea is to employ every peaceful means to make "good Muslims" who will work for Allah and not only represent a natural beacon of hope and light but be the re-makers of a just, successful and wholesome society. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 5)

There are a number of Muslim thinkers worth discussing albeit briefly and that is because they are collectively the inspiration behind contemporary Islamic revivalism. I will put these thinkers in two categories and will call one category of Muslim thinkers as modernist revivalists, thus modernists, because they prescribed modernization of Islam and the other I will call simply Islamist revivalists, thus Islamists, because their prescription was Islamization of modernity.

The modernist revivalists were thinkers such as Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838–1897) of Persia, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) of India, and Muhammad 'Abduh (1849– 1905) of Egypt who shot to prominence as Muslim activists, modernists, and intellectuals responding to the decline and degeneration of the Muslim world brought about by the wickedness of Western colonialism and secularism. Despite minor differences in their ideas on modernity and the reading of Islamic sources—Qur'an and *hadith*s, they stood united on the question of Western intrusion and activities in the Muslim world and agreed that Muslims should understand and practice Islam on the basis of reason as this will enrich them intellectually as well as materially and enable them to effectively meet the

changing circumstances of Muslim society. They wanted education to be the means of Muslim learning about their faith using the tool of rational thinking in contrast to *taqlid* (blind and unquestioned following of theological teachings). It was in the education they saw the solution to Muslim degeneration and the capacity to rescue Muslim societies from their decline. Through education, they also wanted to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam with much of modern Western thought and values.

I call these thinkers modernists because they sought to bridge the gap between Islamic traditionalists and secular reformers. The strategy they contrived to achieve this was one of combining the internal community concerns of their time with the need to respond paradigmatically to the destruction caused by European colonialism and the challenges of modernity. Muslims continued to show internal weaknesses and the usurpation of Western colonialism which permanently damaged the local industry, changed agriculture and industrialized the economy, transformed the political processes and system, replaced key institutions such as education and judiciary with Western ones, and spread secular Western ideals and cultural values across the Muslim world (Ali 2012b; Ali and Sahib 2022).

Modernists criticized Muslim elites and rulers who opposed reform and failed to put up a fight against Western encroachment (Arjomand 2002, 2003; Ismail 2004; Ali 2012b; Ali and Sahib 2022). Harnessing political and intellectual force, they actively engaged in opposing the imperial power and worked very hard for constitutional liberties and struggled for liberation from foreign control. They presented a strong and persuasive argument for reformation by combining Islamic principles with "useful" Western institutions, values, and achievements in all areas of life—social, economic, intellectual, and political, across the Muslim World. They wanted to modernize Islam not only so it could be relevant and important in the modern world but so it could benefit from modernity.

The other category, the Islamists, includes thinkers such as Sayyed Abul Ala Maududi (1903–1979) of India, Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966) of Egypt, and Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949) of Egypt. Their activism, intellectual thinking, and revivalist paradigm originates from the profound crisis of the Muslim world during and after Western colonialism and imperialism. Their Islamist ideology is linked with achieving international liberation from Western hegemony and influence and the development crisis resulting from Western modernization and secularization of not only the Muslim world but the globe at large.

Within the Muslim world, Maududi, Qutb, and al-Banna sought the removal of Western-style modernization, which also involves secularization, and prescribed the path of development with Islamic characteristics. They saw Western values and the way of life decadent and inherently destructive, besieging the entire world overtime and plunged it into crisis. From their perspective, Western modernity ruins traditional structures and pattern of living, destroys the sacred, undermines age-old habits and inherited languages, and leaves the world as a composite of broken up elements in need of reconstruction rationally. To develop Muslim societies, they offered what may be called Islamic communitarianism as an alternative to capitalism and communism. For them, secularized (Godless) Western system cannot produce moral and ethical virtues, universal social justice, and shared wellbeing. It is scriptural Islam which is a full-proof system which can provide this according to them and, therefore, they invited Muslims towards Islamization of the modern world; it involves the re-establishment of Islamic institutions, re-invigorating Islamic socio-cultural, economic, and political processes, and realizing a true Islamic identity.

To put all this in motion, they did not want to work on building the modern nationstate with a nationalist identity, but an *ummah* (community of believers) based on Islamic faith and Islamic identity that transcends parochiality, ethnicity, and race. It "refers to the concept of the Islamic Umma . . . the Islamic government based on Islamic law—Sharia is to safeguard its existence" (Roberts 1988, p. 557). At a political level, they strongly opposed the secularist national sovereignty and nation-states and call for all Muslims to contribute to establishing an Islamic state with "divine sovereignty" where Allah exercises efficacy, universality, and control over all things. They are clearly against secularism and oppose any separation of politics and religion and advocate for the establishment of a theocratic

Islamic state where "the rule of the state must be consistent with Sharia law", ... "the executive and legislative functions and authority must obey and assist Sharia law" (Roberts 1988, p. 557).

For them, not only the Muslim world but modernity as a global system is in crisis. This crisis, according to them, can only be resolved with Islamization of modernity. This, according to them, will bring about harmony, justice, and universal wellbeing to all citizens of the modern world; something not only many Muslims are longing for but many oppressed and demoralized around the globe are aimlessly searching for.

Contemporary Islamic revivalism occupies a prominent place, particularly in the Western imagination and Western-based scholarship about Islam as a religion. Western scholars have warned against the danger of "contemporary Islamic revivalism" directing attention to a world-wide clash between Islam and the West, which they described as a "clash of civilizations". Samuel Huntington, for instance, have suggested that "A west at the peak of its power confronts non-wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and resources to shape the world in non-western ways" and the future conflict will be between " ... the west and the rest, the west and the Muslims ... " (Huntington 1993, pp. 26 & 39). From this perspective, contemporary Islamic revivalism is simply a revival of the old religious tradition which is anti-modernity and antagonistic and intolerant Muslim attitudes toward the West and non-Muslims. It is seen to be threatening to Western interests, civil order and political security, socially conservative, and geared towards establishing a *shari'ah*-based Islamic state. The military conflicts in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Sudan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Central Asia and the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers, and the bombings of civilians in Madrid, London, and Bali are seen as some of the examples of the threat Islam poses to the West (Ali and Amin 2020). The establishment of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014 is another example of the threat and concern (Ali 2018). With the downfall of the Soviet Union and the perceived elimination of communist threat, Islam, particularly in its revivalist guise, is being viewed as a new international danger (Tamim and Esposito 2000). It is considered as a wildfire spreading across the world, damaging the legitimacy of Western values and threatening the national security of Western countries and their allies.

However, not all Muslim revivalists harbor such an attitude and the support for contemporary Islamic revivalism in Muslim communities and countries, and it is not universal and unidimensional. Muslims generally and Islamic revivalists in particular differ from each other on sectarian, ideological, doctrinal, cultural, and political grounds. They also differ on many basic issues and inspired by different visions and politics and have different policies and methods to effect social transformation and improve the situation in their respective communities and societies.

The dynamics of contemporary Islamic revivalism must be understood against the ongoing dialectic of the modernization of Islam and the Islamization of modernity as it is experienced by Muslims who either materially or spiritually have become marginalized by the effects of modernity. Despite the many shades and shapes of contemporary Islamic revivalism and diversity in political attitude, Islamic revivalist movements have some commonality. These movements in different Muslim communities and Muslims societies are partly a reaction against indigenous corruption, economic stagnation and uncertainty, and the politics of tyranny and repression (Firth 1981). In the Middle East, for example, despite great economic gains made in many oil-rich countries, the benefits have not been enjoyed by all but by only elite few making material inequities and social imbalances ongoing and highly noticeable. The governments of these oil-rich countries are found to be often run by small cliques of insiders, such as the military regime of Algeria, holding the reins of power behind a civilian façade and diverting the country's oil wealth into personal accounts (Abdelhadi 2021) or the family regime of Saudi Arabia, which benefit only a small number of the population (Momayezi 1997). Sema Genç says that, "The Islamic world in Asia and Africa is blessed with abundance of natural resources. Yet, 50% of the most impoverished people around the globe reside in the Islamic world. SubSaharan Africa is amongst the

worst hit" (2019, p. 223). The growing economic difficulties, increased unemployment, and lack of educational and occupational opportunities, have made large sections of the population disillusioned and resentful, particularly young people who constitute the vast majority of the population in many cities including in the major Middle Eastern cities such as Cairo, Tehran, and Baghdad, many of which are currently overflowing with unemployed youths (Genç 2019). Many Muslim youths who are excluded from the productive sector of the economy and shunned from the mainstream society have become the general feature of the urban space in modern cities and are the main target of the revivalist campaign (Esposito 1988; Ali and Orofino 2018). Their distress, alienation, disillusionment, and dissatisfaction with political leadership and the ideological alternatives have made them opt for Islam as a means to express their overall disenchantment (Ali 2012b).

Islamic revivalists are not only concerned with the plight of Muslims but all citizens of the world who suffer under modernity. So, when they learn about suffering being experienced by others generally they point to modernity for its failures. Failures that Genç articulates as follows:

The reality of the contemporary world separates the global human population between the small minority of people who control 99% of the world's wealth and the large base of poverty stricken people who are forced to scrap a living on less than USD 1 per day. The state of appalling poverty in the world today is a serious indictment on the global leadership. It is a shameful act that belies the socalled advancements in the field of science and technology, bioinformatics, food production and lightening speed communications. All these advancements breed abject poverty. These glittering inventions, smart technologies, brand labels and artificial intelligence controlled real estate fail to address the most basic of social evils, poverty and hunger. None of these advancements matter to over a billion people around the world who go to bed hungry each day. (2019, pp. 222–23)

Islamic revivalists say that this has occurred under modernity where the society has essentially departed from a religiously authorized blueprint of how individuals should behave and the values that should be upheld by society as a whole. Hence, in modernity, they say the ideals of the modern self, with its emphasis on self-actualization and consumption, are spiritually empty. They see that modernity is governed by reason without God and has failed to create values and reneged on its promise of a better living standard for all or what Horkheimer and Adorno say that whilst modernity may have delivered "the disenchantment of the world; the dissolution of myths and the substitution of knowledge for fancy', it has also rendered the world that 'radiates disaster triumphant' (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002, p. 3) or what Griffin observes in Charles Baudelaire's work that "modernity as a world ... has lost its ordering principle and mythic centre" (Griffin 2007, p. 92) or as Jameson observes of modernity being a product of philosophical modernism criticizing that "the scientific ethos of the philosophes is dramatized as a misguided will to power and domination over nature, and their desacralizing program as the first stage in the development of a sheerly instrumentalizing worldview which will lead straight to Auschwitz" (Jameson 1998, p. 25). It is in light of this that the Islamic revivalists seek the re-establishment of tradition, that is, Islam offering a way to regain a sense of purpose, meaning, and spiritual fulfilment. Thus, in their programmatic revivalism, the remaking of modernity expresses itself as a mission to change society. Islamic revivalists believe that through the rehabilitation of the authority of religion, social institutions will once again have clear and high moral standards, politics will have a sacred expression, and the "true believers" will have a full membership in the *ummah* (Muslim community). All aspects of life will then be influenced and governed by the comprehensive implementation of the fundamentals of Islam and the *shari'ah*.

Contemporary Islamic revivalism, then, is an attempt to directly confront modernity which is considered to be producing all of the hardships and thus its crisis through material secularism. Secularism, which removes religion's influence in public and civic affairs, infuses society with Godlessness, resulting in widespread corruption and immorality, diminished ethical standard, and general decadence (Ali and Sahib 2022). Islamic revivalists do not see the need to replace modernity, but rather seek to reform it by removing secularism and infusing it with Islamic values. In other words, contemporary Islamic revivalism is about Islamization of modernity involving the popularization of Islamic symbols, principles and institutions in the society, and collapsing the sacred and profane domains into one. It is for this reason that movements such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) strive towards the establishment of the caliphate (Islamic state) or the Tabligh Jama'at (Convey the Message of Islam Group) working at grassroots level proselytizing nominal Muslims. In a more general sense, the works undertaken by Islamic revivalist movements are resulting in greater level of Islamic observance among Muslims particularly in youths (Ali 2012b).

For the revivalists, the idea is that Islam should be the global order (Ingram 2018; Minardi 2018; Onapajo 2012). Islam, they say, is the God's prescribed complete way of life and *shari'ah* is an immutable divine law (Pall 2018; Rock-Singer 2020). They believe that Islam reinforces group norms and provides for the institution of moral sanctions for individual behavior. They argue that it provides universal goals and values that in turn offer a sense of stability and unity to the *ummah* and contribute to its security and the maintenance of social equilibrium.

All Islamic revivalist movements, despite difference between them, are involved in promoting such a cause in their own way dictated by their ideology, aims, and methods as well as by the prevailing conditions in their community or society. They seek to contribute to the transformation of modernity as part of the larger project of contemporary Islamic revivalism. Their aim is to transform modernity. One key aspect of the transformation process is to rid modernity of its secularism. In other words, to enable religions such as Islam to assume a key role in both the public life and in the private setting.

Under revivalism, Islamic growth means an increase in the number of adherents and also an escalation in spirituality and religiosity in all Muslims. Islam would become influential in other spheres of life such as economic, social, cultural, and political and seeks intervention in legislation and policy making (Nasution 2017). This is considered as a "higher form" of Islamic development particularly noticeable in the public sphere with growing display of Islamic symbols, for example, Muslim men wearing head caps and Islamic attire and women wearing *hijab* (head scarf) or *niqab* (face veil) or *burqa* (a garment which covers the hair, neck and all or part of the chest); practices, for instance, Muslims praying at work such as in city offices or manufacturing factories and eating *halal* (permissible) food in restaurants; and policies, for example, Muslim men permitted to drive taxis wearing their Islamic attire rather than taxi uniform in global cities such as Sydney and Dhaka. Also part of the process is the provision of prayer facilities and services, evening and weekend meetings, scripture teaching, and public lectures particularly in urban spaces and saturating the public sphere with all types of Islamic activities such as Muslims praying in parks and holding barbeques and symbols such as halal signs and mosques with *minaret* (a balcony from which a *muezzin* (caller to prayer) calls Muslims to prayer). Importantly, under the efforts of revivalism, the Muslim world and other parts of the world where Muslims reside have witnessed the burgeoning of mosques, Islamic schools and *shari'ah* and Islamic studies programs, Islamic banks, health centers, nursing homes, *madrassas* (Islamic seminaries), guilds and associations with similar functions (Sullivan 1994). These establishments operate in parallel with state-run organizations and institutions as some scholars say as the "nucleus of dual power"—a state within the state (Dodson and Montgomery 1981) as is the case of Jama'at-e-Islami in Bangladesh (Ali and Amin 2020). In the context of the impersonality of modern life and the penetrating force and lure of free-market neoliberalism, these communal-based establishments also offer "a new consciousness, sense of self-worth, and capacity for action among the poor people" (Levine 1988, p. 241). In enlisting in these establishments, the dispossessed and de-rooted Muslims not only find themselves being compensated for their low social status by feelings of increased piety and religious superiority but also discover their power among

overwhelming feelings of weakness and powerlessness (Ali 2012b). Through collective action, they bring hope and resolution to a crisis situation.

Islamic revivalists link otherworldly salvation to worldly transformation. They see themselves as workers of Allah, as divine instruments of righteousness, morality, and justice with a vocation for salvation and deliverance. They work towards developing a general attentiveness to Allah's guidance, provide for family members, the relatives, and the community and improve and change the qualities of personal character by developing new desires, new affections, new sources of happiness, and new purpose and goals, all in an attempt to reorder and remake society and culture more similar to Allah's Will being carried out on earth. They see themselves to be tasked with Islamizing the secular and religiously sanctioning their religious activities by overturning the separation of religion and politics. Another salient aspect of Islamic revivalist movements is their emergence as an alternative to the dominant ideology of the secular state and secular authority.

We can see from this the fact that Islamic revivalist movements as part of a larger phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism are integrative movements. They are also reactive movements of political awakening and faith building involving the members in a process of redefining and reorienting themselves towards transformation in their personal lives and in their surrounding spaces. Since secularism poses a threat to Islam, the revivalists as the new guardians of their faith resort to self-defense reviving and revitalizing ever stronger ties with Islam by undergoing proselytization in their respective movements. They believe that they can became good examples for other Muslims and fellow citizens who can then try to emulate them and at this grassroots level, modernity will gradually and surely transform for the better. Through spiritual elevation and moral regeneration and the introduction of scripture-based Islamic ritual and practices, socio-economic and political processes, and institutional development they attempt to bring the *ummah* together on the basis of a new way of pursuing life in modernity. All of this is for the purpose of reenergizing Islamic teachings and rituals and attempting to make *shari'ah* and scriptural Islam (based on Qur'an and *hadith*s) a dominant mode of existence in modernity.

#### **7. Conclusions**

Modernity is a complex global phenomenon. It is an intricate composite of particular socio-economic and politico-cultural norms, attitudes and practices pervading the entire globe. Characterized by technological innovation, scientific advancement, medical discovery and inventions, predominance of rationality, the emergence of bureaucracy, rapid urbanization, the rise of nation-states, accelerated financial exchange and communication, and an expansion of secularism, that is, a decline in emphasis on religious worldviews, modernity over the ages has brought about monumental transformation in the society making the patterns of living distinct from the past and life more "modern" and "progressive". With these provisions, modernity promised humanity a life of prosperity, wellbeing, and justice.

From the viewpoint of contemporary Islamic revivalism modernity's promise came to fruition only in certain parts of the world, largely in the West and as a result Muslim world in particular was left out and is yet to enjoy modernity's promise. The unfulfilled promise of modernity is captured in the following characterization of modernity. For Bradbury and McFarlane "in the modern human condition [there is] a crisis of reality, an apocalypse of cultural community" (Bradbury and McFarlane 1991, p. 27), or for Ann-Catherine Nabholz modernity is "the disconcerting experience of rupture which is intrinsic to the concept of modernity" (p. 12), and for Adorno "its origins are more the negation of what no longer holds than a positive slogan ... the new is akin to death" (Adorno 1997, p. 21). Thus, according to Islamic revivalists, modernity's promise cannot be fulfilled universally because it's one of the key features—secularism—is a major obstacle to worldwide prosperity, wellbeing, equality, and justice and is the bane of modernity, leading it to its own crisis such as a widespread poverty and lack or absence of investments in education, employment opportunities, and the economy in many countries.

Contemporary Islamic revivalism is not anti-modernity but anti-secularism and anti-Westernism and, therefore, is a religious based response or reaction to the crisis of modernity. It is as much a reaction against modernity as is part or an expression of modernity (Lapidus 1997). It is internally a complex and diverse phenomenon. The crisis of modernity not only impacts on Muslims but affects people all around the globe. Even in the wealthiest of countries such as the United States of America and Australia, many ordinary citizens are not spared from the crisis of modernity who battle for employment, education, social justice, health care, medical service, equality of opportunity, and general contentment.

Islamic revivalists explain that the crisis of modernity is the direct outcome of choosing to desacralize the world through popularization of the principles of secularism and through the process of secularization—separating religion from politics. Material capitalism as a macro-economic and macro-cultural system and secular values have led to great prosperity and brought about substantial benefit to well-being, providing high levels of personal and political freedom and well-produced infrastructure, health, and social provisions. However, at the same time, there are growing levels of inequality not only in poor countries but most affluent nations alongside economic stagnation and constraints that have produced diminished opportunities and increased insecurity for many citizens. It has also undermined religious spirituality which is for many people a source of enlightenment, purpose, belongingness and offers a sense of psychological and social wellbeing.

From Islamic revivalist perspective this collectively characterizes the crisis of modernity and, therefore, cannot be allowed to persist and they have taken it upon themselves to save the world, for themselves and for others, from what they see as the unfolding of self-destruction and a global catastrophe through the crisis of modernity. In respons, they have contrived a plan and that is to give the world what they call Islam—a complete comprehensive way of life based on Qur'an and *hadith*s (Prophetic Traditions) and governed by divine law—*shari'ah*. Islamic revivalists assert that through the reformation of key institutions in society such as the family, education, and courts, Islamization of the pattern of everyday living, and the establishment *shari'ah*-governed caliphate, modernity can be saved from self-destruction and that is what they are striving for.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

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## *Article* **Extremism(s) and Their Fight against Modernity: The Case of Islamists and Eco-Radicals**

**Elisa Orofino**

The Policing Institute for the Eastern Region (PIER), Anglia Ruskin University (ARU), Chelmsford CM1 1SQ, UK; elisa.orofino@aru.ac.uk

**Abstract:** Extremism in both its vocal and violent forms is a core topic of research, as well as a priority issue standing at the top of national and international security agendas. While most of the literature is still focused on violent forms of extremism, an emerging research trend is looking at vocal extremism and radicalisation as crucial steps to understand, as Neumann said "what happens before the bomb goes off". Within this new trend, scholars are interested in exploring the ideology of extremist groups (rather than just their methods) and the frames (schemata of interpretation) they disseminate in order to win more followers and fidelise their members. Based on the author's previous research, as well as on relevant data extracted from the manifestos and relevant publications of emblematic groups of both ideologies, this paper compares Islamists and Eco-radicals as two forms of extremism fighting the Western-sponsored modernisation process. By exploring the meaning of "modernity", as well as the role played by frames, this research sheds light on three common frames present in both ideologies, i.e., the enemy to fight, the victims to protect, and the change to achieve. These three frames are the linchpin of the discourses of both forms of extremism. By innovatively unpacking these frames from a comparative perspective, this research offers new insights into the impact of modernity on the development of alternative and extremist ideologies.

**Keywords:** extremism(s); Islamism; eco-radicals; modernity; frames

#### **1. Reactions against Modernity**

The term "modernity" is generally intended as a positive term in the Western world and is usually associated with progress, emancipation, and evolution (Hroch et al. 1998). Modernity stands as both a historical era (the Modern era) as well as the specific sociocultural norms and practices that emerged during the Renaissance in the late 17th century and the Enlightenment (18th century), mostly in Europe, where the individual and his postmaterial needs started to gain prominence over other priorities of the past (Wagner 2012). When looking back at the 1960s, the modern era appeared to be characterised by a wealthy First World (Western countries) marked by the development of individualism, capitalism, urbanisation, and a belief in the possibilities of technological and political progress (Goody 2013; Ihde 2009).

Modernism has marked a complete revolution in common thinking and in the principles and codes of conduct, as well as producing several ethical questions for those embracing it. These ethical questions have created frictions in the choices of several individuals on how to identify their priorities, on how to deal with the problems arising during the journey of life, as well as on their identity. As Bruce Lawrence concluded in his book *Defenders of God*, modernism stands as "the search for individual autonomy driven by a set of socially encoded values emphasising change over continuity; quantity over quality; efficient production, power and profit over sympathy for traditional values or vocations, in both the public and private spheres" (Lawrence 1990, p. 1).

If this rationalisation and striving for change led to important conquests of the modern world, they also led to a deep crisis investigated by prominent intellectuals across social

**Citation:** Orofino, Elisa. 2022. Extremism(s) and Their Fight against Modernity: The Case of Islamists and Eco-Radicals. *Religions* 13: 683. https://doi.org/10.3390/ rel13080683

Academic Editor: Jan A. Ali

Received: 14 June 2022 Accepted: 22 July 2022 Published: 26 July 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

sciences. In different ways, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Sigmund Freud, and the evolutionist tradition in anthropology and sociology represented by Herbert Spencer and Edward Tylor, were anxious with the social and historical revolutions which led to the secularised, industrialised nation-states of Western Europe and North America (Woodward 2002). Although it started as a mere Western phenomenon, modernisation was exported all over the world, in different cultural contexts, accompanied by a high degree of opposition.

Modernisation has triggered and continues to trigger extreme reactions around the world. The term extremism is often associated with fundamentalism, which stands as a major adverse response to modernity, strongly rejecting all concepts associated with it, e.g., capitalism, individualism, and materialism (Lawrence 1990). While the term fundamentalism was initially associated with the evangelical Protestant movements emerging in early 20th century, preaching the return to core principles of Christianity and defending verbal inerrancy of the Bible, fundamentalism has been increasingly associated with the Muslim world after 9/11 (Ataman 2015). As the word itself suggests, fundamentalism stresses the need to go back to the "fundamental(s)", the "essential(s)" of a religion, which is something that is regarded positively by many Muslims, as it is good and acceptable to refer to the fundamentals of Islam, such as the belief in the unity of God (*Tawheed*), in Prophet Mohammad, and the *Qur'an*.

However, soon after 9/11, Western discourses have started portraying fundamentalism as a bad word, often associated with terrorism and violence. Islamic fundamentalism<sup>1</sup> is today intended as an umbrella term including several groups, movements, organisations, and ideologies willing to implement an Islamist social order and often an Islamic state, i.e., the Caliphate (Piscatori 1991; Orofino 2020b). Fundamentalists see Islam as a *deen* (a way of life), not just as a religion, and therefore strive to fight (verbally and sometimes even physically) everything that clashes with the fundamentals of Islam, giving voice to strong anti-colonial arguments that often overlap or complement anti-imperialistic and anti-American stances. Given the boldness of such stances, fundamentalism and extremism are often conceptualised as synonyms.

Fundamentalists are notably against modernity and all related concepts (such as materialism, individualism, and hyper-rationality) that push men far away from God and the spiritual dimension. However, religious fundamentalists are not the only ones opposing modernity and all its effects on society. Eco-fundamentalists (or eco-radicals) have also emerged as a reaction against modernisation and the intensive exploitation of natural resources in the name of progress. As is the case of Islamist fundamentalism, eco-fundamentalism also stands as an umbrella term encompassing different groups and solo actors fighting the side effects linked to the use of technology and industrialisation on the environment, as well as fighting a society they perceive as being made up of "agents of modernisation that are emphatically caught in the maelstrom of hazards that they unleash and profit from" (Beck 1992, p. 37).

This article explores organised group action against modernity by using Islamist and Eco-fundamentalist groups as case studies. Previous research by the author has shown many commonalities between different kinds of fundamentalism causing extreme behaviours.2 This article innovatively compares Islamists and Eco-fundamentalists as two reactions against modernity, and it sheds light on three common frames (schemata of interpretation) across these umbrella groups, present in both their vocal and violent expressions. This paper will first explore the significance of creating meanings and frames within a specific organisation. It will then progress by exploring specific case studies (Islamists and Eco-radicals) and will conclude with a discussion comparing the frames and highlighting the several commonalities across these two extreme ideologies.

#### **2. "Constructing" Meanings to Fight against Modernity**

"The transmission of the meaning of an institution is based on the social recognition of that institution as a 'permanent' solution to a 'permanent' problem of the given collectivity" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 87).

Institutions play a pivotal role in the definition of priorities within the lives of individuals and strongly influence their behaviour. Although there are different definitions of institutions within relevant scholarship in social sciences, anthropology, and beyond, some of the most agreed-upon are Keohane and Murphy's (1992) and Hodgson's (2015). Keohane and Murphy asserted that "institutions are persistent and connected sets of rules (formal or informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations" (Keohane and Murphy 1992, p. 871). Hodgson opted for a more straightforward definition stating that "institutions are integrated systems of rules that structure social interactions" (Hodgson 2015, p. 501).

Both definitions comfortably sit within the constructivist theory—a meta-theoretical label that explains actions and human behaviour in light of their identification of specific sets of rules and values (Andresky 2008; Orofino 2020b). These elements are powerfully conveyed when an individual is a member of a group. To use Berger's and Luckmann's words, groups can be regarded as a "permanent solution to a permanent problem of the given collectivity" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, p. 87). Groups are indeed institutions, as they rely on a specific set of rules and ideological tenets as well as being established to address specific problems within a certain community. Groups represent a form of organised action that is able to address a pressing issue while providing a meaningful purpose and a sense of belonging to the members.

Constructivists scholars would concur on regarding groups as hubs where individuals are exposed to a system of beliefs and new concepts which—through continuous culturing,3 use of symbols, images, and practices—they end up internalizing (Eggen and Kauchak 1999; McInerney 2013; Woolfolk 2010). Vygotsky, one of the main contributors of social constructivism, has greatly theorised about the learning processes of individuals within a group, arguing that individuals learn concepts and construct meanings because of their interaction with other individuals and with their environment (Vygotsky 1978, 1994).

From a constructivist perspective, groups can shape the social reality the individual perceives by providing him/her with a new lens through which he/she interprets the world. Groups work as structures providing an ensemble of rules, bonds, processes, and means to which the individual is subject, which can limit but also empower his/her actions (Giddens 1984). Individuals place significant importance on their membership to a specific group as it comes with relevant emotional value (Tajfel 1972, p. 72). Individuals identify themselves with the group to which they belong, as the group usually is able to provide a purpose in life, giving significance to the actions of the individuals as noble actions for a noble cause. Groups often enhance the self-esteem of individuals and play a pivotal role in defining who the person is and for what she/he stands (Guan and So 2016).

Groups convey meanings through specific frames, i.e., "schemata of interpretation that enable individuals 'to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their living space and the world at large" (Benford and Snow 2000, p. 614) Frames heavily impact the members' interpretation of reality, as well as constructing precise values and priorities. Frames stand as a powerful tool used by the leadership of groups to attract new members and mobilise adherents and strengthen their loyalty. Frames are also employed to identify problems or who or what is to blame and to suggest a viable solution (Orofino 2020a).

This paper implements these theoretical assumptions using Islamic fundamentalists and Eco-fundamentalists (or radicals) as case studies for this analysis. This paper shows how common frames between the two umbrella organisations (including both non-violent and violent expressions) impact the interpretation of reality for their members and how reality appears to be filtered by three frames, i.e., the enemy to fight, the victims to protect, and the change to achieve.

#### *2.1. Islamists Frames against Modernity*

The manifestos of Islamist groups are the first place to identify specific frames against modernity. Non-violent groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and Tabligh Jama'at (TJ) all stress the decline of the Muslim world as the product of Western

influence in various areas of life (Ali and Orofino 2018). The dissolution of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 (after more than four centuries) is regarded by Islamists as the result of the European colonial presence in the Middle East and the subjugation of the Muslim lands during the 19th and 20th centuries. European-imported "modernity" in the *Dar al-Islam* (Land of Islam, the Muslim world) is regarded as the beginning of the decline of Islam as a *deen* (a way of life). The hostility towards the West as an immoral, materialistic, and individualistic civilisation dates much farther back than the emergence of Islamist terrorism in the early 2000s. These narratives have been circulated since the early 1900s in the Middle East through influential intellectuals, such as Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyd Qutb, and Taquiddin Al-Nabhani.

These three thinkers were impactful activists, forefathers of contemporary Islamic activism, and creators of specific frames that are narrated today almost unaltered. All these three men had experienced oppression by their contemporary political authorities and witnessed the decline of Islam in favour of a modern society based on materialism and seeking physical pleasure (Orofino 2021). The rejection of modernity– as strongly associated with Western influence—worked as a trigger for the creation of specific groups. Two of the most long-living Islamist organisations still active today were established as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). The MB was established in Egypt in 1928, and Al-Banna and Qutb have been the symbols of the organisation over the decades. An-Nabhani founded HT in Palestine in 1953. Both groups were characterised by a difficult relationship with national authorities and the desire to restore the glory of Islam as the only saving grace for which humanity (including non-Muslims) could hope.

The experiences and the convictions of Al-Banna, Qutb, and An-Nabhani led to the construction of specific frames that still work today as the lenses through which Islamists interpret the world. As mentioned above, these frames are: (1) the enemy to fight; (2) the victims to protect; and (3) the change to achieve. The enemy of Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram in recent years is exactly the same as the MB and HT in the early 1900s: the West as a system. As forefathers of Islamist activism (and fundamentalism/extremism), the three intellectuals set the grounds for understanding the West as a monolithic system of oppression (cultural, military, economic) against the Muslims. Islamists are strongly convinced of the existence of a Western agenda to annihilate the Muslims (An-Nabhani 1998), on their will to exploit resources in the *Dar al-Islam*, as well as on the will to force Muslims to adopt a Western version of Islam (Suarez-Murias 2013). For all the reasons mentioned above, Islamists in the early 1900s, as well as contemporary Islamists, are engaged in a continuous fight against the West that can be both vocal (an intellectual war) and physical (jihadi terrorism). However, as discussed, the frames motivating this perpetual fight are the same, regardless of the method used.

Moving onto the second element, the victims that Islamists strive to protect are the *ummah*, i.e., the global community of Muslims all over the world. The dismantlement of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, the Muslim diaspora after the occupation of Palestine, and the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 are regarded as the main factors that have caused dangers and insecurity for Muslims around the world. Islamists move from the assumption that the Caliphate was the only system of government based on Islamic law (*shari'a*) and therefore able to protect the morality of the *ummah* and to ensure fairness and accountability through a pious leader, i.e., the *Khalifa* (caliph) (Ataman 2015; Orofino 2015). The consequent advent of political modernisation with the emergence of Western-imposed nation-states stands in the eyes of Islamist groups as a further step towards political decline, moral corruption, and economic subjugation, evident in the following excerpt:

Ideologies do not end by the downfall of the states which embrace them, even if this downfall leads to the break up and fragmentation of the states, rather they terminate when their nations and peoples renounce them and embrace other ideologies and start moulding their lives on their basis. (Hizb ut-Tahrir 1996, p. 5)

This extract from HT's publication *The American Campaign to Suppress Islam* (Hizb ut-Tahrir 1996) is emblematic of the Islamist thinking behind the fall of the Caliphate and the political re-organisation of the Middle East into nation-states, which have fragmented the unity of populations under the banner of Islam and jeopardised the primary role played by Islam as a *deen* by replacing it with new ideological concepts (Western-imported) all relating to capitalism, materialism, and individualism, which are all products of modernity (Iqbal and Zulkifli 2016).

Furthermore, Islamists around the world concur on the fact that the *ummah* is in danger, both in Muslim majority countries as well as in the West. Groups like HT (nonviolent) and ISIS (violent) base an important portion of their propaganda on depicting the *ummah* as in a state of perpetual threat where the only way to feel safe is to join the group (Baran 2005). While in the West, Muslims are threatened every day as they are seen as a "suspect community" and therefore victimised and vilified, in the Muslim world—allegedly controlled by corrupt leaders—"true believers" are persecuted and therefore not allowed to practice Islam (Buzan et al. 1998; Orofino 2020b).

The uncertainty and fear disseminated through Islamist discourses around the enemy and the victims lead to the third element of this analysis, i.e., the change to achieve. In a logical line of thought, the enemy (the West as a system) is persecuting the victims (the *ummah*); therefore, something needs to change, and this is a priority. The desired change within Islamist discourses is related to the re-establishment of the Islamic State (Caliphate). Whether they strongly believe the Islamic state in the contemporary world to be a viable political system (HT, ISIS, Boko Haram) or they consider participation in electoral politics as a way to promote Islamic law (Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami), Islamist groups stress the need for all Muslims to go back to Islamic law in order to purify their hearts and mind from Western *kuffar* (unbelievers) thoughts (Taji-Farouki 1996; Hizb ut-Tahrir Global 2017; Shepard 2003).

The Caliphate is regarded with a romantic outlook by Islamists as it constitutes the (ideal) place where Islam reigns in all spheres of life and where the political and social dimensions do not need to be separated. Whether it should re-emerge as the product of an intellectual revolution (HT) or by means of war and coercion (ISIS, Boko Haram), the Caliphate is still a core frame in the discourses of fundamental Islamists (Ali and Orofino 2018; Rahnema 2008). The Caliphate is regarded by the Islamists as the change for which all Muslims should work to improve their lives and their security and to be on the right path as abiding by divine law.

#### *2.2. Eco-Radical Frames against Modernity*

Eco-radical groups (or, more broadly, the radical environmental movement, REM) have far deeper roots than the recent rise of Extinction Rebellion (XR) and Earth First! (EF) on the global scene. Eco-radicals' activities became prominent in the late 1960s with Greenpeace, for decades the icon of the fight against whaling ships and nuclear weapons testers (Seaman 2004). As in the case of Islamists, eco-radicals emerged as a protest-forjustice umbrella group opposing Western modernisation and related concepts (capitalism, materialism, and globalisation) and advocating for the need to reconnect with nature and preserve it (Manes 1991). Also, within this umbrella group, different organisations4 co-exist, having different methods but—as in the Islamist case—common frames.

In terms of methods, eco-radicals appear to be leaderless resistance organisations engaged in the defence of Mother Earth through a variety of actions, which include civil disobedience, ecotage, and monkeywrenching.<sup>5</sup> Besides the prominent XR, iconic ecoradical organisations at present are the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), Earth Liberation Army (ELA), and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF). Given the leaderless nature of these organisations, recruitment and mobilisation campaigns often happen online, through social media, or dedicated websites (Mente¸s 2019). For instance, XR messages inundate the web, and the official website of the group has a specific section, "campaign", where members and sympathisers can learn more and get organised.6 The XR website also has another

section called "digital rebellion", where they provide guidelines on how to rebel digitally if people cannot join the cause physically.7

Users can access several resources—including publications and press releases—that work as evidence for the claims of the group. XR also works as a good example to show how important "self-organisation" is for eco-radicals. As mentioned above, in the absence of structured leadership, organisations promote forms of spontaneous aggregation that are intended to produce specific forms of activism. In the case of XR, their official website provides a comprehensive section on their "self-organised system" (SOS) where users can access information regarding how the group operates and why they chose this particular method:

The XR UK Self-Organising System (SOS) is designed to shift power out of people and into the processes of the system so that no single person has power over another person or the system itself. The system is modular and can be used as individual parts depending on the needs. It is used closer to its entirety by more stable and core teams. (Extinction Rebellion n.d. b, "Self-Organising System")

As highlighted by the above statement regarding XR SOS on their official website, eco-radicals are very much in favour of light forms of bureaucracy and are strong advocates of spontaneous aggregation mechanisms that will eventuate into collective action. On this subject, the online space works as the best scenario to foster spontaneous aggregation. As discussed above, the actions may vary across various organisations, but the ideological frames are mostly the same across all groups. They all fight against a common multifaceted enemy that is represented by capitalistic societies and their extreme anthropocentrism, implying the superiority of humans above all other nonhuman beings (Alberro 2020). Anthropocentrism and the non-regulated quest for profits over the last century—together with the industrial and technological revolutions—led to the extreme exploitation of natural resources and nonhuman beings who are considered by eco-radicals as the victims that require protection and advocacy (Cafaro 2015).

In order to ensure this protection, eco-radicals are determined to dismantle capitalism and anthropocentrism and replace the current emphasis on the exploitation of natural resources with a culture based on renewable energies and sustainable development (Hernandez 2007; Glasser 2011). As in the case of Islamists, discourses encouraging the desired change are entrenched with apocalypticism focused on the view of an imminent widespread ecological collapse. This vision fosters an urgent sense of action and moral obligation to intervene and join the cause, which is what motivates activists to join the activities of Eco-radical organisations both online and offline (Cassegård and Thörn 2018; Alberro 2021).

#### **3. Discussion**

Frames play a pivotal role in influencing the behaviour of individuals, especially within collective action. The above overview of Islamist and Eco-fundamentalisms has provided useful insights into common frames across multiple ideologies and groups and how these frames impact people's understanding of the world. Furthermore, it is a fact that modernisation and the connected notions of capitalism, materialism, and anthropocentrism have triggered different reactions around the world and throughout the decades.

In the case of Islamists, the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate and the restriction of the role of Islam as a mere religion—rather than a *deen* (a way of life)—created important grievances that were heavily associated with Western interference in the Muslim world. Discussions above have elucidated how the economic, political, and cultural alleged subjugation of the *ummah* by the West has been perceived as the result of the modernisation process, which heavily impacted political institutions and economic progress.

The quest for profit, the shift of attention from the spiritual dimension to the material one, as well as the implementation of democracy as a Western-imported concept in the Middle East all worked as elements to enhance the alleged "clash of civilisations" highlighted by Islamist intellectuals decades before Samuel Huntington (2000). More specifically, AnNabhani—HT's founder—conceptualised the incompatibility between Islam and the West in the early 1950s, although the full volume, including his thoughts, was published by the organisation in 2002, *The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilisations*. Thinkers like An-Nabhani see a civilisation (*hadhara*) as a "collection of concepts about life" (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2002, p. 5). These concepts derive from the core set of beliefs that the individuals have adopted and have a major influence on his/her way of interpreting the world. This means that a civilisation determines the kind of frames that are propagated within a certain society and within an organisation. As mentioned above, these frames impact individuals' priorities in life, their behaviours, and also shape the purpose of their existence.

Therefore, Islamists believe that the main problem with Western civilisation is the fact that it is praising man-made concepts instead of God and also has opposite goals to those of Islam. In fact, while Western societies' ultimate aims are mostly related to profit and power, a genuine Islamic society should be focused on the afterlife and on works that please God (Ahmed and Stuart 2010). Islamists are convinced that civilisations are either spiritual or man-made, and they clearly identify Islam as the spiritual one and Western civilisation as man-made (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2002).

When we say clash, we mean Muslims and their deen ... and Christians and their religion and the Capitalists and their civilisation, on the other side. It is a malicious attempt by the leaders and intellectuals of the Capitalist civilisation to differentiate between Islam and its followers, i.e., between Islam and Muslims. So they claim that Islam is great, but Muslims are backward, and some of them are terrorists. They are liars in their view, for if Islam was really great in their view, then they would have embraced it. However, they attempt to delude the naïve from amongst Muslims, attempting to reduce the rancour against them when they strike a Muslim people or when they attempt to spread the concepts of their civilisation among Muslims. (Hizb ut-Tahrir 2002, p. 9)

As highlighted by HT's extract above, Islamists see a clear separation between Islam and the West, standing as two opposing civilisations that would never come to an agreement as their nature (divine vs man-made) is incompatible. This is a common thought among both non-violent and violent Islamist groups, who would all agree on their role as blessed leaders for a change aimed at restoring the Islamic glory and to fight (intellectually or physically) the *kuffar*. This extract also highlights two core Islamist frames discussed above: the West as the enemy and the *ummah* as the victims. The West is depicted as a corrupted system, made up of liars who aim to jeopardise Muslims' faith and replace it with their concepts about life. At the same time, Muslims are depicted as *naïve,* and they see it as a priority to raise awareness of Western corruption among the *ummah* so that they do not get deluded.

Although the specificities of the frames are completely different, eco-radicals' claims mirror the Islamists' ones as they have the same points to raise against capitalism and Western civilisation, especially after modernisation.

This is our darkest hour ... the science is clear: we are in the sixth mass extinction event and will face catastrophe if we do not act swiftly and robustly. The wilful complicity displayed by our government has shattered meaningful democracy and cast aside the common interest in favour of short-term gain and private profits. When Government and the law fail to provide any assurance of adequate protection, as well as security for its people's well-being and the nation's future, it becomes the right of its citizens to seek redress in order to restore dutiful democracy and to secure the solutions needed to avert catastrophe and protect the future. It becomes not only our right, it becomes our sacred duty to rebel. (Extinction Rebellion n.d. a, "Declaration of Rebellion")

This extract from XR UK "Declaration of Rebellion" works as an emblematic example of the frames disseminated by eco-radicals and their similarities with the Islamist ones. Although quite short, this extract includes all three relevant frames object of this study: (1) the enemy; (2) the victims; (3) the change. The enemy is the UK government in this instance; however, when analysing other documents and manifestos of other Eco-radical groups, they blame Western governments in general for the environmental decline we are all experiencing presently.

It is easy to grasp that the European expansion and the various stages of the modernisation process caused some decline, which appears to be quite hard to reverse. The industrial revolutions and the *great acceleration* (the dramatic growth in human activities started in the second half of the 20th century) have altered the human relationship with nature and deeply damaged it (Steffen et al. 2015; Shoshitaishvili 2021). Not only Ecoradicals but also eminent scientists refer to the "epoch of anthroposcene" as the present, where human activities have not only increased, but they have had a massive impact on the environment.8 The prominence of profit in all policies sponsored by Western governments as well as extreme expressions of capitalism (such as consumer capitalism)<sup>9</sup> characterising modern society is regarded as the main enemy by Eco-radicals. However, this is exactly the same enemy Islamists are fighting against: both ideologies identify the West as a corrupt system based on an endless quest for profit and the extreme satisfaction of material needs.

XR UK's extract also pointed out who the *victims* are in their view. Eco-radicals see humankind as both victims and perpetrators: the victims are future generations who will be forced to live in a devastated world moving towards mass extinction. The perpetrators are current and past generations, especially politicians and ruling elites who allegedly "fail to provide any assurance of adequate protection, as well as security for its people's well-being and the nation's future".10 As in the case of Islamists, eco-radicals portray an apocalyptic setting where the need for action to defend the specific target group is urgent. Furthermore, just like the Islamists, Eco-radical groups present themselves as blessed leaders who are able to drive the victims towards a change. This desired change is also elucidated in XR UK's Declaration of Rebellion: they aim to "restore dutiful democracy" in order to avoid a catastrophe and safeguard the future (ibid.). Whether it is a sustainable (dutiful) democracy or a Caliphate, both ideologies present an alternative form of government as the best option to avoid the decline that the contemporary world is unavoidably navigating.

#### **4. Conclusions**

This study has originally discussed the frames against modernity common among two of the most prominent extremist ideologies today, i.e., Islamism and Eco-radicalism. After focusing on the importance of frames as schemata of interpretation of reality—and therefore core concepts propagated by groups to their members—this study highlighted how, as different as they can be, Islamists and eco-radicals have three core common frames that are the same across all their expressions, i.e., both violent and non-violent forms of extremism.

The three frames explored were the conceptualisation of the enemy, the victims, and the desire for change. This study demonstrated how these three concepts are present in both ideologies and how they clearly define the messages of the groups, their actions, and the behaviours of their members. This study innovatively concludes that although very different in terms of contents, Islamism and eco-radicalism stand as two forms of extremism that emerged as a response against the modernisation process and the shift it implied towards materialism, capitalism, and anthropocentrism. By reading the groups' manifestos and publications, it becomes evident that both ideologies emerged as a way to counter the Western expansion as well as the unregulated capitalism-based economic progress, which were (and still are) creating different sorts of harm worldwide.

As the Islamists expose Western colonial occupation and the introduction of *kuffar* concepts in the life of Muslims (steering them away from Islam), eco-radicals denounce the misbehaviours of governments and companies who are turning a blind eye to the consequences of their profit-oriented policies. In both cases, the grievances against the Western modern political, economic, and cultural system are what motivates the actions of these groups. As this article showed, more research is needed on this topic, as understanding the narratives of extremist groups across multiple ideologies stands as a key step to building

counter-narratives and creating a middle ground where the clash of civilisations—as well as the simple clash of opinions—can be attenuated.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** Not applicable.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **Notes**


#### **References**

Ahmed, Houriya, and Hannah Stuart. 2010. Profile: Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK. *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* 10: 143–209.


Beck, Ulrich. 1992. *Risk Society Towards a New Modernity*. London: SAGE.


Shoshitaishvili, Boris. 2021. From Anthropocene to Noosphere: The Great Acceleration. *Earth's Future* 9: e2020EF001917. [CrossRef] Steffen, Will, Wendy Broadgate, Lisa Deutsch, Owen Gaffney, and Cornelia Ludwig. 2015. The trajectory of the Anthropocene: The

Great Acceleration. *The Anthropocene Review* 2: 81–98. [CrossRef]


## *Article* **Tajdid (Renewal) by Embodiment: Examining the Globalization of the First Mosque Open Day in Australian History**

**Salih Yucel 1,2**


**Abstract:** The concepts of *tajdid* (renewal) and *mujaddid* (renewer) in Islam are discussed mainly in scholarly works. Although all Muslim scholars agree on the necessity of *tajdid*, they differ regarding the scope of *tajdid*, who the *mujaddids* are, and their primary role. Most scholars agree that the primary duty of the *mujaddid* is to restore or lead to restore correct religious knowledge and practice and eradicate the errors from the past century. Renewal of correct religious practice can be local or global. This article first briefly discusses the notions of *tajdid* and *mujaddid*. Secondly, it examines the first "mosque open day" initiated by the Australian Intercultural Society (AIS) and Affinity Intercultural Foundation (AIF) in 2001 before the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US. A mosque open day gradually has become a common practice of most mosques in Australia and has been globalized by Muslim minorities worldwide. This paper examined about 240 pages of results via the Google search engine and 500 pages of results via the Yahoo search engine, and the AIS's and AIF's archives about mosque open days. This paper argues that the globalization of mosque open days can be considered a renewal of an Islamic tradition.

**Keywords:** *Tajdid*; renewal; Australian Muslims; Said Nursi; Hizmet Movement; mosque open day; Muslims in the West; Australian Intercultural Society; Fethullah Gülen; Affinity Intercultural Society

#### **1. Introduction**

The concepts of *tajdid* and *mujaddid* have been discussed since the second century of Islam, particularly during the Muslim world's social, spiritual, and political crisis. The discussion about *tajdid* has evolved through the prophetic tradition. Prophet Muhammed said, "Allah will raise for this community at the end (or beginning) of every hundred years the one who will renovate its religion for it" (Abu Dawud n.d.). Although there is an agreement about the authenticity of the hadith, there are various opinions among Muslim scholars on what the *tajdid* is and its scope, who the *mujaddid* (renewalist/revivalist) of every century is, and the criteria of being a *mujaddid*. The attributes of the *mujaddid* and their role in *tajdid* have been extensively discussed. This research will contribute to the field of renewal in Islamic studies by focusing on how the mosque open day began in Australia and then gradually became a practice in the Western world. Historically, the mosques were not just places of worship but also functioned as the centres for education, welfare and unity of the society, regardless of ethnicity or religious background. However, after colonization, mosques gradually reduced in scope and eventually became merely places of worship. This article first will briefly discuss the concept of *tajdid*. Secondly, it will shed light on Said Nursi's (d.1960) renewal approach to Christian Muslim relations and how his view was applied globally by the Hizmet Movement. Finally, it will examine the first mosque open day in Melbourne and Sydney by Hizmet affiliates before the September 11 terrorist attack. However, how other mosques or Islamic organizations worldwide have become pillars of inspiration, requires further research.

**Citation:** Yucel, Salih. 2022. Tajdid (Renewal) by Embodiment: Examining the Globalization of the First Mosque Open Day in Australian History. *Religions* 13: 705. https:// doi.org/10.3390/rel13080705

Academic Editor: Jan A. Ali

Received: 29 April 2022 Accepted: 27 July 2022 Published: 31 July 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

#### **2.** *Tajdid* **and** *Mujaddid*

*Tajdid* and *mujaddid* is a well-discussed topic by the scholars. Kamali argues that *tajdid* is a broad and comprehensive concept that he calls "civilisational renewal" (Kamali 2018, p. 144). Muhammed al-Ghazali (d.1997) states that *tajdid* is a divine sunnah (Al-Ghazali and Musa 2009, H1430/2009). According to Turner, *tajdid* happens when necessity dictates (Turner 1998 in (Yilmaz 2003)). *Tajdid* can be categorized as *amm* (general), which consists of the entire renewal as Kamali calls civilisational renewal, or *khass* (specific), which consists of part renewal, such as *tajdid* in education or *tajdid* in spiritual life. *Tajdid* can also be classified as internal, which aims for spiritual renewal, and external, which proposes societal renewal.

Most scholars agree that the responsibility of *mujaddid* is to renew the *sunnah* and eradicate the *bid'a*, innovations. They also agree that "the function of the *mujaddid* is the restoration both of correct religious knowledge and of practice, and act as its corollary the refutation and eradication of error" (Algar 2001, p. 295). Doi asserts that "the ultimate purpose of *tajdid* is to establish the truth and remove falsehood and overthrow tyrannical order and establish the justice in the land" (Doi 1987, p. 213). However, most of the *mujaddids* in Islamic history did not get involved in politics and avoided taking any position in the government except Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (d.720), who is considered the first *mujaddid*. In my view, the *mujaddids* primarily aimed for a spiritually healthy society and preferred people's happiness in the hereafter, over worldly happiness. This primary aim of *mujaddids* is less discussed in academia than the renewal of the worldly affairs of society.

While some scholars view *mujaddid* as a single person in each century, others argue that *mujaddid* is not one person but a group. Said Shabbar views "renewal as a movement initiated by one or more individuals, while others view it as a movement initiated by an entire community" (Shabbar 2018, p. 12). His view is based on well-known scholars such as Ibn al-Athir (d.1233), Imam Nawawi (d.1277) Al-Dahahabi (d.1348) and al-Suyuti's (d.1505) interpretation of the above-mentioned *hadith*. Al-Nawawi asserted that "it is possible that the emergence of mujaddid in every century to be in the form of a group of people from various backgrounds and areas corresponding to their grandeur and expertise such as in worship, *fiqh, hadith, tafsir* (interpretation)" (Ismail et al. 2017, p. 188). Although there is no unanimous agreement among the scholars, Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (d.720), Imam Shafi'i (d.820), Imam Bukhari (d.870), Imam al-Ghazali (d.1111), Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328), Jalaludin al-Suyuti (d.1505), Uthman Dan Fodio (d.1817), Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi (d.1944) and Said Nursi are considered to be *mujaddids*. Al-Suyuti asserts that the *mujaddid* exercises wide influence through his person, students, and followers. He also asserts that *mujaddid* should come from the *Ahl Al-Bayt* (offspring of the Prophet) (Algar 2001). However, some mujaddids, such as Imam Shafi'i (d.820), Imam Bukhari (d.870) and Ahmad al-Faruqi al-Sirhindi (d.1624), are not from *Ahl Al-Bayt*. The determination of *mujaddid* is based on "predominant opinion (*galabat al-zann*) among scholars contemporary with him and by means of the benefit is had from him, his companions and from his writings" (al-Suyuti cited in (Algar 2001, p. 296)).

Al-Qaradawi also asserts that *tajdid* cannot be performed by a single person but by a group that works together in the interests of truth (Shabbar 2018). "There is consensus also that the *mujaddid* must be a scholar" (Algar 2001, p. 295). He is not just a scholar in religious sciences, but should also have knowledge in secular sciences at an encyclopedic level. After examining the scholarly sources regarding the *mujaddids*' biographies, it can be said that *mujaddids* were 'walking sunnah' who reflected the time they lived in. Furthermore, they were bestowed with *ilm mawhiba* (gifted knowledge). It is the knowledge of the inner dimension that can be gained through devotion, compassion, love, suffering, tears, worship, and *dhikr* (remembrance of God), besides acquiring traditional knowledge. It is an inspiration (*ilham*) that manifests in the heart, mind, and action.

Muslim scholars paid more attention to the notion of *tajdid* after the collapse of the Islamic civilization and colonization of the Muslim world, which caused various types of crises (Ali 2003, 2014). During this period, there was an emergence of many Islamic leaders or faith groups aiming for the salvation of faith, the restoration of Islamic law and ethical principles in Muslim lands. "Their emergence is deeply embedded in the sociological reality of the Muslim world" (Ali and Orifino 2018, p. 48). While some leaders and scholars blamed external powers for the crises, others focused on society's social, spiritual, and political illnesses.

Said Nursi was an Ottoman and Turkish Republican scholar who is considered a *mujaddid* (Algar 2001; Nursi 2007a; Voll 1999; Keskin 2019; Ansari 2017) 1. He viewed the causes of crises as coming from within Muslims. To him, the main reasons for the collapse of the Islamic civilization were the literalistic and scholastic approaches to the Islamic sciences that caused people's weaknesses in faith. Nursi believed that for a successful external *tajdid*, the internal *tajdid* was necessary. Without internal *tajdid*, religion would be a dry theology and a non-practice, a set of dogma such as human ideologies. He also identified major reasons for the collapse of the Islamic civilization: the lack of hope, truthfulness, and unity in the Muslim society, and despotism or a lack of freedom in politics and preference for individual interest over the common good (Nursi 1996a). Nursi viewed ignorance, poverty, and disunity as the major enemies of the Muslim world (Law 2017).

In his Friday sermon at the Umayyad Mosque in 1911, Said Nursi indicated the importance of renewal regarding Christian–Muslim relations when Christians occupied almost half of the Muslim lands. He validated the difference between the two religions. He proposed to abstain temporarily from the discussion and debate of points of difference to strive against irreligiosity or absolute unbelief, which harms both faiths' moral values (Nursi 1996a). Nursi foresaw the impact of globalization in the early 20th century.

While most Islamic movements in the modern era primarily focused on the renewal of Islamic law, economy, and politics according to *Sharia* principles, Nursi persistently centered the renewal and reinterpreting of the issues of Islamic faith in the modern era. He aimed first to embody the perfections of Islam and the true faith with virtuousness in the individual conscience. His renewal methodology is more "embodied-spiritual" rather than externalizing the religion in appearance only. Nursi calls this *tamsil*, which means the inadvertent overspill of genuine practice (Keles 2014). He wanted to form a spiritually and socially healthy society through this methodology.

Nursi focused on *imani* (faith-related) *tajdid*, which he believed was under attack from materialistic philosophy, behind the mask of sciences since the late 19th century. He theorized the renewal principles in his magnum opus, *Risale-i Nur*. For Nursi, "the *Risale-i Nur* provides irrefutable, rational, and convincing evidence against claims of materialistic philosophy" (Nursi 2007b, p. 257). It also enables the believer to gain faith by investigative certainty (*tahkiki iman*) from blind faith by imitation (*taklidi iman*) (Algar 2001). Nursi suggests that "*Risale-i Nur* is a product of *fayz* (a sublime effusion) and he is the spokesperson or interpreter of it" (Nursi 2007a, p. 24). Due to 34 years of Jacobin secularists inflicting oppression, persecution, imprisonment, and exile, Nursi could not put his philosophy of renewal into practice. This was not the destiny of Nursi only but almost all *mujaddids* in Islamic history. They became influential after their deaths, just as Nursi did.

Influenced by Nursi, Fethullah Gülen,<sup>2</sup> a Turkish Islamic scholar, also validated the difference between two faiths and historical conflicts. However, bringing the differences, historical conflicts, and polemics to the table, will not necessarily prevent conflict. Gülen proposed cooperation between civilizations as an alternative to the clash of civilizations. Like Nursi, he wanted Muslims to focus on common points regarding Muslim and non-Muslim relations.

#### **3. Gülen's Approach to Renewal**

Fethullah Gülen, the founder and spiritual leader of the Hizmet Movement reads the Prophet's life as comprising 90% *tamsil* or role modelling. To him, religious values can be carried out through *tamsil* (Yucel 2011). Under his spiritual leadership, the Hizmet Movement put Nursi's renewalist philosophy into practice in spirituality, education, and social life but did not, or could not, do so in politics. Yilmaz (Yilmaz 2003, p. 208) argues that "the movement that has evolved around the ideas of the charismatic figure of Fethullah Gülen provides an example of a renewal with a potential for influencing the Muslim world". He also suggests, "Gülen has reinterpreted Islamic understanding in tune with contemporary times and has developed and put into practice a new Muslim discourse with respect to some traditionally sensitive issues" (Yilmaz 2003, p. 209). Gülen took Said Nursi's principles of theoretical foundations and applied them in his own life (Sarıtoprak 2011). He also put these principles into practice in the Hizmet Movement's social and educational activities. Like Nursi, Gülen believed that without inner *tajdid*, establishing a morally and socially healthy society was impossible.3 When commenting on this, Gülen said that "people's ears are full but their eyes are hungry for role models" (Yucel 2011, p. 65) in all areas of life, including educational institutions. In his philosophy, representation comes before communication or *tabligh* preaching.

Gülen grew up and lived in a Jacobin secular state where every public and educational activity related to religion was under (and remains under) state control and the scrutiny of the Turkish intelligence services. Teaching religion was initially banned in public education until the 1980s and then limited to one or two hours in public schools. Promoting irreligiosity was the state policy. Girls or women wearing headscarves were not allowed to study in schools or universities. Oppression and persecution were common for those who wanted to serve the religion.

While other Islamic groups and Muslim scholars established mostly unofficial religious institutions as the regime allowed them, the Hizmet Movement started opening private secular educational institutions such as tutoring centers, schools, and universities in the early 1980s and continued to do so until 2015. The Jacobin secularists, particularly the army, scrutinized the Hizmet Movement's educational and social activities. Due to a lack of freedom of religious education, the Hizmet affiliates aimed to teach Islamic moral values through role modelling in their *dershanes* (student houses), dormitories, tutoring centers, schools and universities, on top of the secular education they provided. It is estimated that over sixteen million students (mostly lower and middle class) were educated in these institutions between 1980–2016, according to the educational coordinator (personal communication, Yavuzlar 2021). Such types of education have led to intellectual and moral renewal in Turkey. Yilmaz calls this "*tajdid* by conduct" (Yilmaz 2003).

In light of Nursi's theory of renewal and Gülen's interpretation, the Hizmet Movement has internalized religion and successfully applied social and educational activities in more than 160 countries (Yucel 2011). Embodying or internalizing the religion was not an option but was necessary in the Jacobin secularist state of Turkey and the secular world, where religion, especially Islam, is mostly seen as a threat or at best, a private issue. It can be said that the Hizmet Movement affiliates have focused on Islamic moral values, which are universal more than *Sharia* law.

Based on Nursi's theory and Gülen's explanation, Hizmet affiliated individuals initiated interfaith relations with non-Muslims in Turkey in early 1992 and then throughout the world, including Australia. Local non-governmental organizations were established to build bridges between Muslims and non-Muslims in 2000. These included the Australian Intercultural Society (AIS) in Melbourne and Affinity Intercultural Foundation (AIF) in Sydney. These organizations were established before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, an incident that created more fear of Islam and Muslims, as well as distrust, suspicion, and violence against Muslims. At this point, there were some scholarly arguments that Islamic values contradict democracy, pluralism, and secularism, thus, Muslims in the West could not integrate into society. The AIS aims "to serve as a catalyst in enhancing mutual understanding and respect in this multicultural nation of ours" (AIS 2000). To date, the AIS and AIF have implemented countless events and projects aimed at fusing the Australian community around the concept of "understanding through interaction"(AIF 2000).

#### **4. Limitations**

This paper examined online English sources on Yahoo and Google between January 2001 and March 2022. It is possible that there could have been other mosque open day attempts prior to 2001 in non-English speaking countries, or the organizers might not have publicized it online. The author attempted to reach out to the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California about their first mosque open day in 2002. However, the author was unsuccessful. The aim was to find out who inspired them for such a project. Hizmet affiliates have discussed the benefit of mosque open days in their global interfaith dialogue meeting. Whether there were other mosque open days throughout the rest of the world that was inspired by the mosque open day in Australia requires further research.

#### **5. Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework of this article will be based on an analysis of Nursi's theory of renewal through "persuasion" not force and the data analysis of a mosque open day. To Nursi, persuasion should be used to convince people in the modern age via *tamsil,* which can be called embodiment of religion. Thus, he proposes using persuasion over force, proactive responses over aggressive reactions, and peace over disorder (Vahide 2005). Having witnessed the horror of the first and second World Wars, Nursi believed that time had abrogated using power. Nursi also believed that since almost 90% of Islamic values are universal, this could be conveyed with the embodiment of the religion, which can be called *tamsil* in Turkish. Nursi discussed the embodiment of religion in the early 20th century. He applied it himself and with a small group in his study circle. Due to the lack of freedom of teaching and practising religion in the newly established Republic of Turkey in 1923, he could not reach out to wider society.

Embodying religion for social changes has been discussed in the academic literature in the last two decades. Mellor and Shilling (2010) examine Max Weber and Emile Durkheim's works regarding the embodiment of aspects of religion in a secular and modern society. Mellor and Shilling argue that "religiosity is not just a matter of beliefs and values, but is to do with lived experiences, practical orientations, sensory forms of knowing and patterns of physical accomplishment and technique that impact upon day-to-day lives in far-reaching ways" (Mellor and Shilling 2010, p. 217). Jones (2019) analyses embodied religiosity in human understanding mainly from Christian and secular perspectives. Although his work focuses on the embodiment of other religions, particularly Christianity and Buddhism, it neglects Islam. Nikkel (2019) discusses a theory of the embodied nature of religion from various philosophical perspectives, which Islam considers the primordial state (*fitrah*) of the human being.

For Nursi, embodying the religion is more important than proselytizing. One of the best examples of embodying the religion is mosque open day. Based on the author's data, the mainstream media coverage was quite positive regarding mosque open days worldwide. It was attractive and welcomed by the politicians, faith leaders and the local people. According to the organizers, it contributed to the reduction of fear of Islam and Muslims. Furthermore, it built bridges between different faiths and communities and somewhat placed Islam on the centre stage with the Mosque open day, and this, therefore, is a form of Islamic revivalism because it brings both Muslims and non-Muslims towards better and greater recognition of Islam and gives Islam a boost.

#### **6. The First Mosque Open Day in Australia: A Local Renewal**

#### *6.1. Can a Non-Muslim Enter a Mosque?*

Similar to every place of worship, there are rules and ethics regarding using mosques. Authentic *hadiths* tell us that the Prophet Muhammed received non-Muslim individuals and Christian delegations from Najran in his mosque (Salama 2018). Muslim jurists set the rules for Muslims and non-Muslims entering and using mosques. Whoever enters it should be in a state of purity. Scholars have different opinions regarding non-Muslims, menstruating women, and a Muslim adult who has not performed ablution or is not wearing the appropriate dress code. The jurists discussed the issue in detail based on each case. There are three major points of view. The first group of scholars expressed the view of not allowing polytheists but allowing Christians and Jews with appropriate dress codes. The second group allowed all if they would like to learn about Islam or see how Muslims perform the ritual prayer, how they treat each other, and learn about their character. The third group, which is the minority view, does not allow the entering of non-Muslims or adult Muslims without ablution, and views the entering of menstruating women as *makruh* (disliked) (Al-Qurtubi 2014). Most scholars gave *fatwa* (edict) for allowing them to enter mosques, except for *Masjid al-Haram* (*Ka'bah*).

Although there is no unanimous agreement among the Muslim jurists regarding the entering of non-Muslims into mosques, most of them allowed non-Muslims to enter, subject to certain conditions. Hanafi, Shafi'i and Hanbali scholars hold that non-Muslims can enter all mosques except for the *Ka'bah*. Some Maliki scholars maintain that non-Muslims should not enter a mosque except for a necessity (Dar al-ifta.org n.d.).

During the classical period in Muslim lands, churches, mosques, and synagogues were places where Muslims, Christians, and Jews interacted with each other. For example, in Cyprus, Muslims, Christians, and Jews would cook food and take it to each other during their holidays such as *Eid*, Christmas, and Hanukah (Yucel 2010b). This was a custom in Jerusalem as well when it was under Ottoman rule.

Muslims performed their ritual prayer side by side with Christians in Syria for centuries (Ibn H. awqal cited in Carlson 2015). The cathedral of St. John the Baptist in Damascus had a portion set aside for Muslim prayers. In some villages in the eastern part of Anatolia, half of a building would be used as a mosque while the other half as an Armenian church before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. There was interaction between the worshipers. In 638, Caliph Umar visited the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, where Jesus was baptized (Yucel 2013). Interaction can be observed in Lebanon where almost half the population is Christian, and the other half is Muslim. Such customs contributed to social harmony. However, this practice has been neglected or forgotten in Muslim lands over time.

#### *6.2. The First Mosque Open Day in Australia*

Living in Australia since 1987, the author did not witness or hear of any mosque open day until 2001. None of the Islamic organizations attempted to have a mosque open day. Research shows that there were no mosque open days in Australia prior to 2001 (Sneddon 2021). This paper examined about 240 pages of results via the Google search engine and 500 pages of results via the Yahoo search engine, as well as the AIS and AIF archives regarding mosque open days. The author did not find any news items regarding mosque open days in any English-speaking country before September 11, 2001, except an AIS mosque open day in Melbourne, which was covered by the local Turkish Zaman Australia. The second one was on September 2, 2001, at Gallipoli Mosque in Sydney organized by the Affinity Intercultural Foundation. (Dunn et al. 2015; Polat 2001). The State Minister of Turkey Sukru Sinai Gurel who was on an official visit to Australia also visited Gallipoli Mosque and was briefed about mosque open day. The third mosque open day was organized at a Turkish mosque in Broadmeadows, Victoria. Local members of parliament, councilors from Hume City, non-Muslim clergies and neighbors participated. Hizmet affiliated educated members of the community provided tours and responded to the questions of attendees (Polat 2002, January 28). After September 11 terrorist attack, the mainstream media began to cover mosque open days in Australia. In my view, there were three possible reasons that Muslims did not consider mosque open days. The first was due to a lack of necessity. Muslims did not feel a need for it. The second was a lack of role modelling. The first generation of Muslim immigrants in the West came from countries where mosque open days did not exist. The third reason is the neglect or misunderstanding of the majority view of jurists who allow non-Muslims to enter mosques, but preferring the minority jurists' view who did not permit non-Muslims to enter a mosque without ablution in the classical period.

I discussed the first mosque open day with a Hizmet affiliate Orhan Cicek who was the executive director of the AIS between 2000–2010 via Zoom, phone calls and emails (personal communication with Cicek 2022, March 22–29). I asked about the origin of the idea for a mosque open day project. Inspired by Nursi's above mentioned Damascus Sermon and Gülen's interfaith dialogue philosophy, he held that the political, social and religious conditions of the world at that time compelled them to hold an open day. In addition, they aimed to strive against prejudices and misconceptions of Islam and Muslims. The mistrust and fear of Muslims grew after the collapse of communism and the Iraq war in 1991. After the collapse of communism in 1990, Bernard Lewis' clash of civilizations theory was further developed by Samuel Huntington, then institutionalized and politicized with media support throughout the world. The actions of some Muslim extremist groups further fuelled mistrust and increased the fear of Islam and Muslims, particularly in the West. On the one hand, fighting against growing radicalism had become state policy in many countries, including Australia. On the other hand, prejudices and physical attacks towards Muslims were increasing. Gradually, it had become a threat to social harmony. Muslims were seen as a threat, particularly in Western countries. According to Cicek, the second motivation behind the idea was Said Nursi's new theory on Christian-Muslim relations, which is set out in his work, *Risale-i Nur*, and applied by Hizmet affiliates in Turkey in the early 90s and onwards when there was political tension between secularists and Muslim groups, including the Hizmet Movement. During this tense and divided period, the Movement organized *iftar* (breakfast) dinners during Ramadan and reached out to non-Muslims (who were scapegoats) and secularists in order to build social harmony. The motto was 'the art of living together'. It can be said that the Hizmet affiliates saw the benefit of reaching out to non-Muslims and secularists in light of Nursi's philosophy about Christian-Muslim relations.

Nursi had once been posed a question in relation to returning to the glory days of the Ottoman Empire before its collapse. Nursi said, "I will say one thing; perhaps you could memorize it (which means is very important in Turkish culture): the previous state is obsolete; it is either the new state or total annihilation (˙ I¸ste, eski hâl muhal; ya yeni hâl veya izmihlâl), which means that it is not possible to return the glory days of the Ottomans. There is a need for renewal and it is essential. Otherwise, it will be total annihilation" (Nursi n.d.). His renewal philosophy included a new approach to Christians- Muslims relations as mentioned above.

In the mid-1930s, Nursi also wrote about the importance of collaboration between Muslims and Christians. He said,

It is even recorded in authentic traditions of the Prophet that at the end of time, the truly pious among the Christians will unite with the People of the Qur'an and fight their common enemy: irreligion. And at this time, too, the people of religion and truth need to unite sincerely not only with their own brothers and fellow believers, but also with the truly pious and spiritual ones from among the Christians, stop temporarily from the discussion and debate of points of difference in order to combat their joint enemy: aggressive atheism. (Nursi 1996b, p. 204)

According to Cicek, Nursi realized the impact of globalization. He foresaw that irreligiosity and debauchery would be harmful to humanity and there would be a great need for collaboration between adherents of different faiths, particularly Christianity and Islam. After the September 11 attacks, there was a risk of radicalization of some Muslims due to their vulnerability in Western countries. He added how Nursi believed that "persuasion" was necessary for renewal instead of force (Nursi 1996a, p. 79).

According to Cicek, after moving to the US in 1999, Gülen felt the necessity of interfaith dialogue, not only as a remedy against Islamophobia and misconceptions about Islam and Muslims, but also to prevent radicalization. Based on all these reasons, the board members of the AIS agreed to organize the mosque open day. However, initially they had little idea on how to do it. After a lengthy discussion, the board identified university open days as a model and adopted it for the mosque open day.

The AIS approached many mosques' administrations in Victoria, but they were not interested or were against the idea due to juristic or cultural reasons. Initially, they faced considerable resistance from the Muslim community. Cicek pointed out that Muslims immigrated to Australia with their traditional and cultural understanding of Islam. Some were reactionary to having non-Muslims in mosques due to non-Muslims' lack of ablution, hence a state of spiritual impurity; it is a requirement to have *wudu* (ablution) for entering a mosque for spiritual and physical purity. Many Muslims lived in lower socioeconomic suburbs with other migrants and may not have had strong relations with their non-Muslim neighbors due to language barriers, as well as cultural and religious differences. Cicek continued,

On the other hand, Australians had a negative conception about Islam and Muslims because of the conflicts between Christians and Muslims for many centuries. The September 11 terrorist attack and Iraq war triggered that historical mindset. This caused more mistrust and prejudice against Muslims. (Cicek 2022, Personal communication, 23 March 2022)

Whenever there was a terrorist attack or conflict within Muslim countries, the *hijab* wearing women were attacked and mosques were vandalized. According to Cicek, the mosque open day aimed to foster a greater understanding of the Muslim religion and culture. It would help Muslims integrate into the society and reduce radicalization among the Muslim youth, which was important for social harmony. On the other hand, it would help alleviate Islamophobia, overcome mistrust and prejudices against Muslims, and build rapport with a wider community.

Cicek and his colleague approached Ibrahim Dellal (d.2018), a leading figure in the Muslim community and board member of Sunshine Mosque in Victoria. Ibrahim talked to the mosque board members but there was resistance due to the high possibility of disapproval and a negative reaction from the mosque's congregation. After discussion with the board members for weeks, they agreed to have a mosque open day at Sunshine Mosque outside of Muslim prayer times. The open day preparation took months. Twelve young Australian-Turkish men and women who were to serve as guides, were educated about the mosque architecture as well as being prepared for the possible questions by participants.

The AIS invited senior Christian leaders, Jewish leaders, the consul generals of the US, UK, and some consul generals of Muslim countries, as well as locals. Flyers about the open day were distributed to the neighbors of the mosque as well. Members of the media were invited, including those from ABC and SBS. However, before September 11, 2001, the media was not interested in covering a mosque open day. The author could not identify the exact date of the first mosque open day but found that it was sometimes in July 2001.

More than 300 non-Muslims turned up for the first mosque open day. The visitors were divided into groups of 10. Each group was guided by a mosque tour guide and informed about the mosque architecture, the place of the mosque in Islam, the basics of what Islam is and who Muslims were. The organizers answered questions at the end of the tour. The *adhan* (call to prayer) was called and two *rakats* (units) of *nafila* (supererogatory) prayers were performed to allow non-Muslims to observe how ritual prayer is performed in a mosque. Some Muslim families had prepared and brought finger food to display their hospitality.

According to the stories I have collected from the organizers, it seemed that many participants harbored negative thoughts. Some feared the threat that Islam and Muslims posed to society and to civilization overall. One visitor said that when she passed by the mosque and saw the minarets, she thought they resembled Saddam Hussein's missiles. Another visitor thought Muslims prayed to a different God than Christians. A student came to the door of the mosque and was hesitant to enter. She thought Muslims prayed to the devil. Some people were suspicious that Muslims hid something in the mosques. Seeing people with beards around the mosque reminded some of Osama bin Laden. They thought women were forced to serve their husbands and wear the *hijab*. One participant who lived near the mosque indicated that she was suspicious about Muslims. Most of them were not aware of what happened in a mosque. They asked why Muslim men can have

four wives. There were questions about whether Australian Muslims practiced female genital mutilation. One of the non-Muslim neighbors shared this:

The construction of this mosque began 15 years ago. I would pass by and was curious about what was going on in the mosque. The people would come for the prayers and park their cars in my street. Every Friday, many people would attend. Twice a year, there would be a huge gathering with hundreds of attendants. I was very curious about this mosque and what Muslims were doing in the mosque. When I saw Muslims with beards and turbans, I was afraid. Now, I know what the mosque is and who Muslims are. (personal communication, March 22, 2022)

According to the mosque open day guides, many people were relieved that Islam had peaceful teachings and that Muslims were opening to them, showing their faith, and sharing their culture. Overall, it successfully bridged the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims and reassured many people in an era of fear.

Some Muslims harshly criticized the AIS and AIF mosque open days. They thought it was an innovation (*bid'a*) that contradicted the tradition of the Prophet. Some literalists argue that any practice that was not undertaken by the Prophet and four rightly guided caliphs is innovation and, therefore, must be rejected. They even argued that the AIS and AIF were watering down Islam. According to the organizers, some fundamentalists and political Islamists accused the AIS and AIF of creating an ecumenical new religion that combined Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Ironically, those Muslims who criticized AIS and AIF for the mosque open day project, began to have mosque open days in their places of worship after 2010.

The organizing of mosque open days before the September 11 terrorist attack shows the event as being proactive, instead of reactionary. The AIS Executive Director encouraged thirty-five Hizmet interfaith dialogue organizations to organize mosque open days when they had a global consultation meeting in Germany, before September 11 terrorist attacks. According to the AIF data, the mosque open days in Melbourne and Sydney inspired other Muslims. The AIS invited Imam Fahmi al-Naja (d.2016), the former Grand Mufti of Australia, and some local *imams* and presented the positive results of the mosque open day. All were convinced to have mosque open days for their respective mosques. The Lakemba and Penhurst Mosque's administration in Sydney approached the AIF and asked for their support to host a mosque open day. After the September 11 attacks, other Islamic organizations were compelled to reach out to their non-Muslim neighbors. Mosque open days have become a vehicle for striving against the fear of Islam and Muslims. The mainstream media have also started to cover mosque open days positively. This paper found that mosque open days have gradually spread across Australia. After the killing of a police accountant, Curtis Cheng, by a Muslim terrorist in Parramatta, there were anti-Islam rallies over the following weekend. Approximately one week later, subsequent to the rallies, a group chanted anti-Islam slogans where the Friday prayer was held in Parramatta. To reduce the tensions, the Lebanese Muslim Association set up the National Day of Unity at the Federal Parliament House where fifty representatives from different faiths participated, which occurred on 13 October 2015." The National Mosque Open Day was launched by the Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull at Parliament House as part of National Day of Unity. The Opposition Leader Bill Shorten and the Greens Leader Richard Di Natale also participated" (Ireland 2015). The Islamic Council of Victoria officially began promoting and coordinating mosque open days Victoria, in 2017.

#### **7. Discussion**

*Tajdid* means renewal in Islam, but it does not mean introducing something that contradicts the core principles of the religion. It is rediscovering a neglected tradition, or an issue related to the faith and presenting it according to the needs of the age. It is akin to purifying the water and serving it in a nice new glass instead of an old cup. Gradualism is a divine tradition. Some may call it a natural law that is reflected in the universe. The renewal of the issues related to faith and their application occur gradually. The *mujaddid* plants the seed of renewal and asserts that this seed will grow and become a fruitful tree in the future. Watering the seed of renewal, fertilizing the growing plant, pruning the sapling, and offering the fruits to people are the duties of future generations. If the biographies of *mujaddids* are examined, it can be noticed that renewal takes decades, sometimes centuries. For example, the impact of the works of the great jurist Imam al-Shafi'i, who is considered the *mujaddid* of the second century of Islam, was greatly felt after his death, and continues to this day. The same thing can be said of Imam Bukhari's (d.870) work.

Nursi planted the seed of renewal in his work *Risale-i Nur*, primarily when covering faith and some social issues, including Christian-Muslim relations. The Hizmet Movement has taken his theory of renewal and applied it to education and relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. As mentioned above, Nursi's methodology is based on persuasion and convincing people, not using force. This paper shows that the AIS and AIF were established in light of Nursi and Gülen's works, leading to the initiation of the first mosque open days in Australia. The aim of the open days was to address prejudices, misconceptions, and radicalization, as well as to defuse the possible tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Based on data in this study, the second documented news about a mosque open day appeared in California in 2002 (Islamic shura Council 2022), after the one in Australia. This was followed by numerous New York mosques that had mosque open days in 2003. Cologne Central Mosque had its the first mosque open day appear on social media in 2004 in Germany. Mosque open days spread worldwide over the next decade, including in the US, UK, Japan, Germany, France, India, Hong Kong, South Africa, and Sri Lanka. Almost all global media outlets such as the BBC, CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, Fox News, al-Jazeerah, Asia News, and Deutsche Welle covered these events. Sites such as the New York Times, Boston Globe, The Guardian, The Age, Sydney Morning Herald, Boston Globe, Huffington Post, Hindu Times and more, also covered the mosque open days. Some organizations such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Dialogue Society (2011) in the UK prepared online guides for mosque open days. The media coverage was quite positive and helpful for alleviating prejudices against Muslims. Innumerable non-Muslims and local religious leaders and dignitaries have participated in mosque open days.

In the long run, Islamic organizations in Muslim minority countries realized the significant contribution of mosque open days for building bridges with non-Muslims and promoting Islam. Interestingly, even some conservative Muslim groups such as *Jamiatul Ulama* in South Africa who may not have been happy to see non-Muslims entering a mosque without ablution, ended up organizing a mosque open day in 2019. They too felt the necessity of reaching out to their neighbors. Such projects have been developed to be family friendly. For example, the Islamic Centre of North Texas made the mosque open day a social event. There was a *henna* designer for women, face painting for children, an Islamic arts table, and a *hijab* trial area for non-Muslim women. Islamic organizations marketed the event with phrases such as "Visit my mosque", "Working together with other faiths", "Hope not hate", "Open mosque day — next door!", "A day at the mosque", and "A tour of the mosque". Muslims in the UK established a website (https://visitmymosque.org/) for mosque open days. Also, many traditional ethnic foods were served at mosque open days. Interestingly, some organizations in the Muslim majority countries such the University Malaysia Pahang organized mosque open days for non-Muslim citizens (pimpin.ump.edu.my n.d.). Pakistan based *Minhaj ul Quran* International, an Islamic Movement that is led by Tahir-ul-Qadri, held mosque open days all over the world in their mosques in 2007 (Mosque Open Day 2007). In 2019, Egyptian based *Quwwat ul-Islam* Society also organized mosque open days in Cairo for non-Muslim citizens (Quwwat ul-Islam 2019).

Based on an examination of information about the mosque open days on the mosques' websites, media coverage and YouTube videos, they appear to have been well prepared and professionally conducted. However, some seem poorly organized due to a lack of professionalism and resources. This study found positive feedback based on testimonials covered by the media and people on YouTube. However, measuring the contribution of

mosque open days to social harmony could be another research topic, as it is beyond the scope of this paper. Most of the open days embodied the Muslim faith through warm and welcoming hospitality rather than proselytizing. On the other hand, this research found that a small number of the open days were used as an instrument for the proselytization of the religion.

The success of mosque open days becoming a globalized phenomenon is based on several reasons. First, the war on terror created curiosity about Islam and Muslims in Western society. Second, Muslims felt compelled to reach out to the wider society due to political and social conditions in the first two decades of the 21st century. Third, telecommunications and information technology helped the spread of mosque open days faster than expected. Finally, the theological and educational background of board members of the AIS and AIF inspired them to initiate such a timely project, which was later adopted by other Hizmet affiliates and Islamic organizations throughout the world. Furthermore, the mosque open day project triggered some faith based or Islamic schools to take their students to non-Muslim places of worship in Western countries to learn about other faiths, ensuring the flow of knowledge was taking place both ways.

Based on the collected data, some marginal groups and anti-Muslim individuals harshly criticized the mosque open days. Far-right groups were suspicious about non-Muslims being educated about Islam and Muslims at mosque open days. Jihad Watch, Meforum and the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Watch are a few of them. This is beyond the scope of this study.

*Tajdid* is a renewal, not reform. It is not inventing something new that has no foundation in the religion but reasserting a neglected or forgotten Islamic tradition. *Mujaddid* is '*ibn zaman'* the son of his time who digests the knowledge for renewal and presents it according to the needs of the time. Inspired by Nursi's renewal philosophy, the Hizmet Movement reasserted Islam through the embodiment of the faith and institutionalized it in a religious, social and educational context in secular Turkey. Hizmet has also become globally influential to a certain extent. While most Islamic movements have engaged in Sharia, Islamic schools, Qur'an courses, and mosques, the Hizmet Movement has opened private educational and health institutions and humanitarian aid organizations without labelling them as Islamic. Instead of proselytization, the Hizmet affiliates embodied their faith. Mosque open days can be considered *tajdid khass* (a specific renewal) that has contributed to striving against misconceptions about Islam and prejudices towards Muslims in the West.

#### **8. Conclusions**

Historically, all *mujaddids* theorized the principles of *tajdid*. Their students and followers of the students took these principles and applied them in their spiritual and social lives through *tamsil* or role modelling. The mosque open days as the *tajdid*, began with baby steps in Melbourne and Sydney in 2001, before the 9/11 terrorist attacks but later became a common practice in Australia and worldwide. Nursi theorized the renewal in the early 20th century regarding Christian-Muslim relations. Under the spiritual leadership of Fethullah Gülen, the Hizmet Movement developed it further and put it into practice in many countries. The mosque open days are one example. To overcome prejudices and mistrust, Islamic organizations saw the social benefit of mosque open days and have globalized them. This study found that the initiative of AIS in Sunshine Mosque and AIF in Gallipoli Mosques before September 11, 2001, gradually influenced Islamic organizations to organize mosque open days in Australia.

The followers of Said Nursi's students believed in the social and spiritual benefits of his principles of Christian-Muslim relations and applied them when opportunities arose. When the AIS and AIF board members and volunteers initiated the mosque open day project first in Melbourne and then in Sydney, before the September 11 terrorist attacks, they would not have imagined that it would be applied nationwide and then globally. They faced great challenges. Some Muslims accused them of watering down Islam or creating an

ecumenical new religion, but they did not quit. The political and social conditions of the world that were created by the war on terror at that time, compelled them to initiate such an initiative.

Historically, mosques were visited by individuals or small groups out of curiosity or to learn about Islam and Muslims. Some groups or schools visited for excursions. Based on data collected online and to my knowledge, as an active and connected member of the Muslim community, there were no organized mosque open days in Australia before 2001. It is possible that there could be some unrecorded mosque open day attempts in the world previously. However, they might not have found an environment and sufficient support to grow.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Data Availability Statement:** Not applicable.

**Acknowledgments:** I would like to thank AIS and AIF for their assistance.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **Notes**


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**Derya Iner \* and Mirela Cufurovic**

Centre for Islamic Studies and Civilisation, Charles Sturt University, Auburn, NSW 2144, Australia **\*** Correspondence: diner@csu.edu.au

**Abstract:** The resurgence of religion worldwide proved that secularization is not a de facto reality of modernity and the initial chaos that came along with the birth of postmodernity evolved into uniquely developing combinations that recognized cosmopolitan, multicultural, and hybrid (i.e., fluid and hyphenated) identities. Universal values became more instrumental than ever to connect members of hyper diverse societies while ethnocentric, nativist and exclusivist patriotism expired (and only recently starting to attract far right and white supremacist groups alone). Most Islamic revivalist movements emerging from this context have had minimal interactions with non-Muslims and influence on mainstream societies. Being in search of a solution to respond to the overwhelming effects of the West on Muslim societies, these revivalist movements could not change (and maybe contributed to) the binary positioning of Islam and the West. On the contrary, the Hizmet movement, inspired by Muhammed Fethullah Gülen and his predecessor Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, appeared in the global arena as an Islamic revivalist movement whose discourse resonated with the commonly shared universal values of every culture, ethnicity, and religion. The Hizmet movement did not position itself as an antithesis to Westernization, secularism, and modernity; the movement adopted a universalist and all-inclusive attitude, which re-introduced to the world that Islam is universal religion with the capacity to accommodate people of diversity and meet the needs of every age. This paper explores the Hizmet movement's historical, theological, and social roots as a transnational Islamic revivalist movement. It analyzes the movement's outreach across multicultural societies and its capability to adapt to a changing world through its educational and interfaith and intercultural activities across the globe. While unpacking thirty years of the Hizmet movement's activities and the contribution to the literature, the paper also addresses some of the criticisms that have emerged regarding the movement and its activities, particularly in the wake of the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. It should be noted that much criticism toward the movement emerged in recent years, and the movement did not face much backlash in its early years of development. With this in mind, this paper explores the development of the Hizmet movement and how much of its initiatives rapidly left a positive mark on diverse societies around the world. The paper is thus structured chronologically, tracing the birth, growth, stagnation, and transition (or according to some collapse) of the movement. The paper, by extension, too, positions the Hizmet movement within the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism as this movement is born out of similar conditions as are other Islamic revivalist movements but taking a slightly different direction, which is that it challenges the prevailing binary 'us and them' discourses produced mostly in ethno-centric political discourses.

**Keywords:** Hizmet; Fethullah Gülen; Said Nursi; revivalism; modernity; revivalist movements; education; interfaith dialogue; intercultural dialogue; Islamic movements; multiculturalism; cosmopolitanism

#### **1. Introduction**

Islamic revivalism is a concept borrowed from a *sahih hadith* (authentic Prophetic Tradition) that promises the revival of the Muslim community every hundred years through a 'reviver' of the religion (Sunan Abi Dawud 4291, Book 38, Hadith 4278). This *hadith*

**Citation:** Iner, Derya, and Mirela Cufurovic. 2022. Moving beyond Binary Discourses: Islamic Universalism from an Islamic Revivalist Movement's Point of View. *Religions* 13: 821. https://doi.org/ 10.3390/rel13090821

Academic Editor: Jan A. Ali

Received: 10 July 2022 Accepted: 30 August 2022 Published: 4 September 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

encouraged charismatic religious leadership to counter the pressuring socio-political as well as spiritual crises of Muslim societies, especially in the turn of the twentieth century. During this time, Muslim nations witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman empire, the abolishment of the Caliphate, the rise of nation-states based on the notion of nationalism, western modernity, and secularization. Islamic revivalists during this time wanted Islam to be the social and global order.

Revivalist movements are characterized by a shared basis of three central elements: the need to return to the Qur'an and the *sunnah* (the prophetic way) set by the Prophet; and a reaffirmation of authenticity (Hirschler 2005). Yet, each of these three central elements are subject to contending theories influenced by local traditions, cultural, socio-political, and economic conditions, as well as differing levels of human reasoning which may affect Islamic understanding and practice (Esposito 2005). Even so, all revivalist movements aimed to rejuvenate the Islamic community by referring to Islam. Revivalists also strongly rejected orientalist judgements that degraded Islam and its representation while recognizing the shortfalls of Islamic societies; they suggested a flexible and adaptable Islam that complied with the needs of modern times (Esposito 2005). Some early Muslim revivalists included Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1702–1762), Muhammad bin Abd Al-Wahhab (1703–1793), Sayyid Ahmad Barelewi (1786–1831), and Mahdi Sudani (1844–1885).

Much like early revivalists, Islamic modernists rose to respond to the cultural and political waves of Western colonialism and imperialism. Islamic modernists attempted to "form modernity in Islamic terms" rather than turning back to the past in nostalgia, asserting that there was no clash between Islam and modernity because Islam, originally, appealed to rationality and reason (Lapidus 1997). While they believed in the necessity of reinterpretation and reform, their goal was to provide "a parallel response to the deeper forces transforming the world order in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (Lapidus 1997, p. 455). They stressed Islam's capacity to adopt modernity without much difficulty, particularly as Islam itself has once managed a growing civilization for some centuries prior to Western development and influence (Esposito 2005). Some notable Islamic modernists included Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Rashid Rida (1865–1935), and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938).

There is a third, politically motivated, strand that has gained momentum with the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979. The onset of this revolution in 1979 saw an immediate rise in Islamic insurgencies across the Middle East. For example, the seizure of the Grand Mosques in Saudi Arabia in 1979, the assassination of Anwar Sedat in Egypt in 1981, the Hama Uprising in Syria in 1982, and the 1983 United States suicide bombing in Beirut, Lebanon. These insurgencies desired to fix the failure of secular governments by strengthening Islamic influence in political, economic, and social life (Momayezi 1997). Their motives also included opposition to Western influence, imperialism, and intervention, much like Islamic modernists, however, their defensive reactions to modernity (Esposito 1999) were in response to the belief that there is no need to import Western beliefs and values found within modernity; Islamic thought is self-sufficient and has the capability to create a modern pattern for Muslim societies, including Muslim minorities living in the West (Esposito 2005). Within this strand, only a few tended toward radicalism (Esposito 1999), whereas the majority adhere to a more purified Islam seeking "purification from foreign accretions and the securing of a political authority in an attempt to form an Ummah (Muslim community)" (Ali 2012, p. 61).

Despite Islam being the main drive for all, revivalist movements are molded by local and/or national circumstances. For instance, Esposito notes that these movements emerge in countries where modernization has been the strongest; the most powerful manifestation of Islamic resurgence has occurred in more 'modernized' secular Muslim countries, such as in Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, and Algeria (Esposito 1999). In contrast, the revivalists of ethno-religiously diverse societies such as Indonesia opted for collaboration rather than confrontation with the government. While *Muhammadiyah* (founded by KH Ahmad Dahlan in 1912) appeared to be a modernist movement promoting education, *Nahdlatul Ulama* (founded by Hasyim Asy'ari in 1926) developed a traditional path in response to their modernist tendencies. Likewise, pro-Islamic rulers in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore negotiated with the Islamic revivalists which eventually gave Muslims the confidence to live with and reconcile their customary, ethnic (later national) and religious identities in multicultural societies (Mutalib 1998; Khalil and Haddad 1995). In countries such as Thailand, the Philippines and Myanmar, where Muslims are a minority and where religious intolerance by the state and aggressive tendencies by Islamic revivalists are present, tensions and conflict abound (Mutalib 1998).

Besides socio-political revivalist movements, a few movements have focused on reviving Islamic spirituality through traditional Islamic education for decades. For instance, the Deoband Movement founded in India in 1867 by Muhammad Qasim Nanautavi and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, which committed to spreading *Darul Ulum madrasas* (Islamic schools) that provided purely religious education centers worldwide. They held public morality by classical Islamic education and knowledge (Ingram 2018). Maulana Muhammad Ilyas (coming from the Deoband stream) founded the *Tabligi Jamaat* in Mewat India in 1927—an apolitical movement whose priority was to teach Islam and renew one's commitment to the religion (Ali 2003). Sufi movements managed to survive in the revivalism era without altering Sufi customs. However, all these movements that prioritized the revival of Islamic knowledge and spirituality merely targeted Muslim populations. Even while spreading their message in the Muslim minority countries, they had minimal interaction with non-Muslims and minimal influence on mainstream societies. Furthermore, being in search of a solution to respond to the overwhelming effects of the West on Muslim societies, most of these revivalist movements inevitably reproduced the binary positioning of Islam and the West.

However, resurgence of religion worldwide proved that secularization is not a de facto reality of modernity (i.e., desecularization), the close interaction of the global with the local in the age of interconnectedness gave rise to glocalization (Karpov 2010). Western societies accommodating second, and third generations migrants also rhetorically moved away from ethnocentrism to multiculturalism. The initial chaos that came along with the birth of postmodernity evolved into uniquely meaningful combinations that recognized cosmopolitan, multicultural, and hybrid (i.e., fluid and hyphenated) identities. Universal values have become more instrumental than ever to connect members of hyper diverse societies while ethnocentric, nativist and exclusivist patriotism expired (only just recently attracting far right and white supremacist groups).

At the turn of the millennium, the Hizmet movement appeared in the global arena as an Islamic revivalist movement whose discourse resonated with the commonly shared universal values of every culture, ethnicity, and religion. For some groups, this new discourse was a mere appropriation to be accepted by mainstream societies. For the followers of the movement, these universal values are a part of Islam, and are thus informed by Islamic principles, and should therefore be genuinely followed. Because of this, the movement aimed to reach out to a broad range of audiences both in local and global contexts.

The Hizmet movement of Turkey was inspired by Said Nursi (1877–1960) and founded by Fethullah Gülen. Unlike some other revivalist movements, the Hizmet movement did not position itself as an antithesis to Westernization, secularism, and modernity. Moving beyond binary concepts, the movement adopted an all-inclusive attitude, which re-introduced to the world Islam as a universal religion, with the capacity to accommodate people of diversity and meet the needs of every age by interpreting the immutable verses of the Qur'an according to the social and cultural conditions of the time.

This movement focused *not* on how Muslims can better practice their religion and survive in this challenging world as Islamic societies and communities, but rather how they could reach out to all corners of the world through Islam's universalist principles. These principles include notions of peace and tolerance to overcome internal and external as well as local and global major problems, which are formulated in Said Nursi's Damascus Sermon as ignorance, fragmentation, and poverty. Inspired by Nursi, Gulen formulated his

movement based on three solutions: education, dialogue, and charity activities in Turkey first and then around the world.

This paper thus explores the Hizmet movement's historical, theological, and social roots as a transnational Islamic revivalist movement. It analyzes the movement's outreach across multicultural societies and its capability to adapt to a changing world through its educational and interfaith and intercultural activities across the globe. While unpacking thirty years of the Hizmet movement's activities and the contribution to the literature, the paper also addresses some of the criticisms that have emerged regarding the movement and its activities, particularly in the wake of the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey. The result of this failed coup has left the movement in limbo.

It should be noted that much criticism toward the movement mostly emerged in recent years, and the movement did not face much backlash in its early years of development, which is perhaps why, for example, one senior U.S. government official stated that the movement and its activities are "too good to be true" (Hansen 2013). With this in mind, this paper explores the development of the Hizmet movement and how much of its initiatives rapidly left a positive mark on Muslim societies around the world. The paper is thus structured chronologically, tracing the birth, growth, stagnation, and transition (or according to some collapse) of the movement. The paper, by extension, too, positions the Hizmet movement within facing other Islamic revivalist movements as a movement born out of similar conditions but taking a slightly different direction: the universalism of Islam, which challenges the prevalent binary 'us and them' discourses produced mostly in ethno-centric political discourses.

#### **2. The Historical Development of the Hizmet Movement**

Although founded in the 1960s on the ideas of Fethullah Gülen, the Hizmet movement was shaped in response to the socio-political and economic circumstances that fashioned much of Turkey throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Sunier 2014). Arising as a religious innovative force, the movement rapidly became known for its shared ideals and teachings of universal principles as well as its intense web of formal and informal networks. Following the spirit of the Ottoman millet system in which every faith community had freedom to run its own institutions (Barkley 2005), the Hizmet movement aimed to be "faith-inspired in motivation, yet faith-neutral or inclusive in manifestation" (Keles 2016, p. 5). Gülen himself regards the movement as a cultural activity whose spirit is based on the voluntary cooperation of many people who may not have organic ties or mutual acquaintances, much less know each other, but who all share the faith of Islam (Koyuncu-Lorasda ˘gi 2010).

While the core principles of the movement are self-evidently spiritual and theological, the socio-political realities that took place since its founding were influential in molding the dynamics that would define the movement and its practice. Despite coming from religiously vigorous circles of an Eastern city, Erzurum, Gülen first began speaking to the masses upon his official appointment as an *imam* (religious leader) to Edirne, on the border of Eastern Europe, where alcohol consumption was relatively high and religious observance was neglected among the locals. Gülen was then appointed to Izmir, a Hellenistic city with a multi-religious population, but one where religion attracted little interest. Because of this, the city became known as *gavur Izmir* (infidel Izmir)—a label that also indicated the ancient Greek city's failure to assimilate into contemporary Anatolia's conservative country culture.

During this time in the early 1960s, Turkey found itself under the influence of adverse secularization and materialism. Schools were taught by teachers who stressed evolution and questioned the existence and belief in God. This epidemic was also present during Nursi's time. When a group of high school students complained about the 'poisonous ideas' spread by their teachers, Nursi provided commentary on faith related verses by examining the verses with science and reason (Nursi, Bediuzzaman Said n.d.). Gülen would also deliver conferences on Darwin's theory of evolution in the early 1970s to the youth at the time of great doubt and would tie together religion and science in his talks to show the

compatibility between the two (Gülen 1971). As a result, science and reason became the core teaching of Hizmet inspired schools; students were encouraged to become teachers to raise a 'Golden Generation' of Muslims in Turkey and abroad.

Being an *imam* (religious leader) in a highly secular city like Izmir where religious observance was ignored and where locals did not attend mosques, Gülen had to deliver his talks in coffee houses where men gathered and gambled for hours (Pandya 2012). In these casual gatherings, Gülen would gradually warm people up to the idea of religion and the observance of religious practice and abstinence from sin such as gambling. When the Hizmet movement was founded in the late 1960s, this circumspect activism became its key strategy. In a time of illiberal secularism that dominated Turkey during the Cold War, the movement's adherents could only engage in cautious activism and dialogue, much like Gülen himself, to protect themselves from being made outcasts by the Kemalist bureaucracy (Balci and Miller 2012). Such discreteness became a characteristic of the Hizmet movement's general approach so much so that followers who lived through the democratic periods and military regimes of Turkish history had to deliberately conceal their Islamic dynamics while engaging with the public, and at the same time, meet their expectations, such as delivering high quality education to prepare the youth for the competitive university entrance exams (Balci and Miller 2012).

In the 1990s, however, Gülen and his followers broke the paradigms about religion, religiosity, and religious leaders in Turkey, by opening university tutorial centers throughout the country and starting dialogue activities between different streams of the society. But it was the discreteness due to military occupation and the rise of secularism that forced the movement to put their Islamic narrative on the forefront of their mission.

The movement's thought and practice highlight the dynamism and diversity of not only the Islamic faith, but Muslim politics, as its activities and values contest the categories set by Western liberal history—due to orientalist attitudes—onto Islam and Muslim societies. Their model shows that there is no 'template of ideas'; Islam, as well as its Muslim societies and faith-based organisations, "are influenced by a number of factors, which, while including scripturally defined precepts, also include national identities, economic circumstances, and social status" (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, p. xi). Aside from proactively showing the dynamism of Islam and Muslim politics, they also challenge modernization theory—a theory that centers on the sharp and artificial contrast between 'modernity' and 'tradition', whereby tradition is construed "in negative terms only" (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, p. 23). Tradition, as the movement shows, helps to "facilitate development and social and political changes *because* they are cast in terms of the traditional framework" (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, p. 25).

The movement has a successful history of activism which has fashioned a distinctive response to the questions posed by modernity. Its contemporary interpretation of Islam has allowed not only Turkish Muslims, but Muslims from around the world to develop their own institutions to engage with modernity and its challenges. By the 1980s, the movement evolved into a nationwide education-focused community. It had successfully developed the biggest charity and philanthropy organization (called *Kimse Yok Mu*), several publication houses that publish magazines, books, and journals in several areas, and had the most selling Turkish newspaper (called *Zaman*) with a circulation of one million. Thijl Sunier (2014) writes that global conditions have generated new and diverse forms of sociability that has led to new Muslim self-understandings, whereby Muslims increasingly use Islam as a propositional model for civility, responsibility, and civic engagement. As a non-political movement investing its capital into establishing civil organisations, the Hizmet movement is frequently addressed in the literature as a form of 'civil Islam', whereby its practices and theological groundings are, in fact, seen as having explicitly cosmopolitan underpinnings (Sunier 2014).

From the 2000s, however, the movement evolved into a transnational entity concentrated on dialogue and non-denominational education. Focusing on the Hizmet movement in Germany, Araks Pashayan argues that in instances where separatist withdrawal take

place among Muslim communities across German towns and cities, the Hizmet movement encourages integration based on cultural exchange and enrichment rather than assimilation. They have built centers and schools to build a bridge between the two communities. This integration model allows the German population to understand and accept the values and experiences of Turkish and other ethnic Muslim minority groups who feel isolated from the rest of German society (Pashayan 2012).

It is the movement's depth and breadth that allows it to root itself to a variety of contexts, making it and its practices "an 'outward-looking' rather than an 'inward-looking' form of organization, which constitutes the dominant mode of religious and interest-based organizations" (Krause 2012, p. 57). Wanda Krause writes that because of its dynamism and diversity, the Hizmet movement is uniquely positioned to tackle instances of terrorism and Islamophobia, for example, as it embraces a 'common good' and emphasizes the universality of values, spirituality, and principles of justice—goals that directly challenge dominant dualistic perceptions of religion, particularly Islam, as being a source of conflict in a modernized, secular world of 'war on terror' era (Krause 2012).

#### **3. The Spiritual Dynamics of the Hizmet Movement since Its Inception**

A former Secretary General of the United Nations once stated that peacebuilding is "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (Boutros-Ghali 1992, p. 204). What he meant here is that peacebuilding stems from an active civil society that generates social capital in the form of cooperation over religious and ethnic divisions, trust, and open debate which is conducive to peace and harmony between all sections of society. As civil society is an important space where pluralism and diversity can be fostered, it therefore can play a positive role in sustaining peace (Hampson 1996). The most notable and effective method of peacebuilding by a civil society, however, is preventative peacebuilding—for instance, community capacity building and fostering collaborative relationships amongst different groups within societies.

It is instrumental to stimulate each community's own local, cultural, and religious dynamics to be able to foster effective long-term peace. The Hizmet movement has strategically utilized some spiritual dynamics to become a civil society and a transnational faith-based movement, focused on love and tolerance through education and dialogue. The movement mobilized its followers with "strong faith-based motivation, long term commitment, religious, spiritual and moral authority and ability to facilitate constructive social relations between different groups of population" (Esposito and Yilmaz 2010, p. 4). In this instance, it is not so much religion that is influential, but rather "the ways in which it has been interpreted and practiced" (Esposito and Yilmaz 2010, p. 4) by the movement to create a stable yet dynamic and diverse civil society.

While most leaders of other revivalist movements fixated on the problem of the West, Fethullah Gülen avoided such discourse. He concerned himself primarily with peacebuilding in highly diversified modern societies where internal conflicts and fragmentations would be the more real, urgent, and upfront issue in the twenty-first century, rather than a mere paradigm like the Islam-versus-West discourse. As such, Gülen emphasized the need for a new generation of Muslims to equip themselves with agreeable qualities, like wisdom, compassion, faith, and knowledge, for them to rise above the structural inequalities and the socio-political circumstances they faced (Agai 2002). In fact, Gülen's ideas were inspired by his own time and circumstances. Upon examining his own generation, he found that lack of proper education was the essence of the problem that many young believing people faced. Using this observation as a guide, Gülen then inspired his followers to found educational institutions to develop a more knowledgeable and inclusive generation—one that can integrate their Muslim identity and morality with modern realities and positive sciences (Çelik 2010). He called this dream generation *Altın Nesil* (the 'Golden Generation').

Unlike some revivalist movements which seek to erect a caliphate under a capable political leader and unlike some revivalist spiritual movements who promote their leaders as spiritual saviors, the Hizmet movement promoted an embodiment of a leadership by an entire generation called the Golden Generation, which was to change the image of Islam in the entire world. This dream young generation aimed to cultivate "an intellectual and spiritual enlightenment drawn from the traditional sources of Islam" (Çelik 2010, p. 61). But even though the Golden Generation bases itself around religion, Bekim Agai argues that it has been transformed from being, initially, a so-called Turkish form of civil Islam to a more universal ideal (Agai 2002). Part of this transformation is the result of Gülen's conviction that, although there are certain aspects of Islam that are not open to interpretation, there are other areas within Islam that can be subjected to disparate settings, historical conditions, language, sociocultural characteristics and so forth, and are thus open to interpretation (Çelik 2010). For example, the Islamic conception of life in Morocco "came to mean activism, moralism, and intense individuality", while the very same concept in Indonesia "emphasized aestheticism, inwardness, and the radical dissolution of personality" (Çelik 2010, p. 62). And so, when political scientists spoke of a 'Clash of Civilizations', Gülen fervently urged the building of 'breakwaters' to prevent such a clash (Saritoprak 2010).

Gülen's Golden Generation, in some way, exemplifies Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on the establishment of peace in society. For both Gülen and Ibn Khaldun, peacebuilding is a sacred task. But unlike Ibn Khaldun, whose theology on peace rested on the notion of *asabiyya* (group solidarity)—thus carrying its own risks of excessive group loyalty which can be detrimental to the maintenance of a harmonious society—Gülen based his peace theology on the integrity of the individual where peacebuilding is one of 'bottom-up' social change (Saritoprak 2010; Sykiainen 2006). In this way, the Golden Generation, through the quality of its individuals, should be able to practice and spread justice and compassion in their societies. Gülen (2006, p. 110) says:

... maybe in the near future some selfless people, who sacrifice themselves to make others live, with united hearts and minds through their efforts ... These selfless people will discover the interconnectedness of the divine command and the laws of nature. People will repent of the previous meaningless fights with one another ... Everyone will love human beings as a duty towards God. It is exactly this time when the world, which is a corridor to Paradise, will become a paradise-like place that will always be enjoyed.

Here Gülen stresses the importance of dedicated, selfless individuals in the establishment of peace. Without them, or without a 'Golden Generation', such peace would not be possible. To maintain these ideals of peace and ensure the flourishment of these individuals, Gülen placed an emphasis on educational institutions whereby these institutions would help "bring up such individuals from the realm of imagination to the realm of realization" (Saritoprak 2010, p. 181).

Gülen's theological ideas can be collated under three main areas: service; positive action; and *tamthil* (representation), which can be reframed as the "tongue of conduct" (Ozubuyuk 2013). These three areas—or 'spiritual dynamics'—have mobilized followers of the Hizmet movement and shaped the movement's outlook since its inception, along with, of course, Gülen's 'Golden Generation' and peacebuilding strategies. All three spiritual concepts are related to 'viceregency'. As a Qur'anic term, it reminds human beings that their role in this world is to live as 'divine representatives' (Qur'an, 2:30). This concept, according to B. Jill Carroll, loads the movement's followers with a sense of social responsibility (Carroll 2007). For Gülen (2005), viceregency is an action and determination to make a positive change in the world:

In fact, we need genius minds with iron wills that are able to carry the role of vicegerent of God on Earth, and which are able to intervene in events and challenge the orphan spirit and puny thought which attach no importance to the consciousness of responsibility, humane values, knowledge, morality, true contemplation, virtue, and art in such a vast territory, we need refined minds and an iron will which will embrace and interpret creation in its depth and entirety and humanity in all its worldly and other-worldly vastness.

Gülen organically connects the social responsibility of the vicegerent human being with service to humanity as a spiritual performance. Salih Yücel elaborates on this concept by referring to a renowned Prophetic saying: "the master of the people is the one who serves them" (Yücel 2018, p. 95). Gülen systematizes this leadership-servanthood interaction with a spiritual backdrop through education, humanitarian aid, and dialogue in the service of humanity—no matter their religious, cultural, ethnic, economic, political, or social background (Yücel 2018).

Moreover, instead of limiting the Hizmet movement's social responsibility to their home country Turkey, Gülen envisions to spread the service throughout the world by following the Qur'anic prospect of 'viceregency on Earth' and employing the concept of *hijra* (migration on the path of God) (Yücel 2018). Through these two concepts, Gülen was able to inspire the movement to become transnational as they 'migrated' and settled from Turkey to other parts of the world, and actively and confidently interacted with the host societies without feeling inferior. Furthermore, their effective interaction with the host society since the early years of their migration has broken the migrant versus host society, and assimilation versus alienation debates, which have been in force in multicultural western societies for decades.

Apart from their social capital, which will be addressed in the following sections, the movement's spiritual motivation behind migration was influential in their quick and effective integration and contribution to mainstream societies. Although the idea was to represent Islam, the movement did not preach the faith nor conducted forced conversions. They instead focused on highlighting Islam's universal values to the worldwide community, particularly as Gülen considered representation to be a Prophetic method and therefore a valuable essence of the movement and its goals (Yücel 2018).

This spiritual goal and method worked well to overcome prejudices against Islam and Muslims. Personal interactions with real and presentable Muslims demystified old orientalist dichotomies while proving anti-Muslim arguments wrong. This was made effective due to, not only the movement's belief in its social responsibility to act as viceregents on Earth, but also the movement's transnational reach, personal interaction, and institutional collaborations in the host societies that allowed the movement to effectively demystify all imaginary stereotypes toward Islam and Muslims.

Along with their focus on social responsibility through viceregency and migration, the Hizmet movement has also placed a focus on positive action. Both positive action and service are mutually inclusive since both discharge self-interest for the sake of public interest (Walton 2015). Positive action includes being proactive rather than reactive and "engrossing oneself in the constructive actions of building and repairing rather than engaging in destructive behavior" (Yücel 2018, p. 109). Gülen's action-oriented approach is inspired by Nursi who lived under surveillance by an adverse secular system yet said: "Our duty is to act positively; it is not to act negatively [ ... ] We are charged with responding with patience and thanks to all the difficulties we may encounter in this positive service of belief which results in the preservation of public order and security" (Walton 2015, p. 43).

The followers of the Hizmet movement have upheld positive action by occupying themselves with altruistic services and treating positive action not only as an end goal, but as a method of achieving the desired positive outcome in any given situation or circumstance (Walton 2014). Are these core ideas and values of the Hizmet movement practicable for everyone, especially in times and places when, and where, totalitarianism is in force? Despite not enforcing its high standard to lay people, Gülen instructed his followers to show unconditional positive action. For example, the movement showcased positive action when it faced political allegations and persecutions orchestrated by the Turkish President, Tayyip Erdogan. The movement was accused of plotting against the state by conducting a failed coup in 2016, which has, since that time, faced "intense and massive hate crimes and severe persecutions, some of which concluded with deaths and

suicides while in custody" (Alkan 2019, p. 212), the purge of thousands of Hizmet followers, and international defamation campaigns. On the one hand, Gülen sought justice from the authorities and demanded international inquiry of the failed coup by a judicially independent international body, and on the other, he encouraged his followers to show patience and positive action in the face of intensifying oppression against the movement after the coup attempt (Shalal 2016). Gülen deliberately utilized religious dynamics to curb emotional eruption and any potential rebellions within the movement to preserve peace and fulfill the movement's positive action motto.

Cemil Alkan's textual analysis of Gülen's sermons delivered within the first two months after the coup attempt found that Gülen focused on holding oneself accountable; acknowledging the hardship of the Prophetic path; and showing patience and positive response with mannerisms (Alkan 2019). Accordingly, while publicly challenging injustice and seeking civic ways to reinstitute justice, Gülen did not allow frustration to overcome the movement as it could easily turn into social discord and contradict with the existential pillars of the movement (such as peace, positive action, and dialogue).

In his post-coup sermons, Gülen reminds his followers of Nursi's formula of abstaining from "the cruel principle of giving a similar response" and encourages oppressed followers of the movement to be forgiving just like the Prophets were in times of hardship (Alkan 2019). For example, the Prophet Muhammad had said "no blame on you" as the conqueror of Mecca, while Prophet Yusuf forgave his brothers for their wrongdoing when he became the ruler of Egypt. Gülen also moves beyond religion and reminds his followers to not ruin the positive reputation of the movement, but "maintain the legacy of the movement in the face of hardship" (Alkan 2019, p. 224). On the first anniversary of the coup, while persecutions were still on the rise, Gülen declared: "The power is embedded in the truth and the truthful one is merciful" (Alkan 2019, p. 225). Gülen's call for patience during a time of turbulence does not stem from despair, or even passivism, but rather "a determined strategy to prevail to the end with endurance" (Alkan 2019, p. 225). Evidently, positive action is infused in Gülen's discourse style, including the movement's response to negative stereotyping of Muslims. Without referring to Orientalism or anti-Muslim discourses, Gülen undermines Islam-versus-West dichotomy by focusing on universal values that are adhered by everyone, deliberately straying away from binary terminology which would inevitably produce an oppositional 'Other' in relation to oneself.

There are two key streams where the Hizmet movement has implemented these spiritual dynamics and has shown how their historical development influenced much of their ideals and practice: dialogue and education. Both streams directly challenge binary 'us and them' discourse through their use of inclusive language and espousal of universal values for they show that religion and modernity can co-exist—or more specifically, that Islam is dynamic and diverse and as a universal religion, the values promoted by Islam can be implemented to reach solutions to both global and local problems.

#### **4. The Hizmet Movement and Its Dialogue Institutions**

To effectively overcome fragmentation, which was diagnosed by Nursi as one of the overarching problems of the society, the Hizmet movement facilitates 'a dialogue of civilizations' whereby civilizations are thought to be built through interfaith dialogue and education, rather than inter-communal and inter-religious rivalries and conflicts (Bozkurt and Yildirim 2012). The movement therefore "synthesize[s] tradition and modernity, religion and science" in a proactive attempt to oppose essentialist Orientalist and exclusivist Islamist claims that Islam and Muslim politics are monolithic (Hefner 2005, p. 5). Akbar Ahmed (2007, p. 6) points out the timely and much needed response of the movement to a 'perceived' clash, which has sometimes been reinforced by both parties:

In a world where the most prominent Muslim leaders speak of conflict and confrontation, Gülen provides us with a 'new voice' that calls people of all faiths to the 'divine table'. Through his guidance we can create a world where dialogue is our first course of action and confrontation is our very last.

The Hizmet movement's advocacy for dialogue through dialogue institutions navigated by Gülen's extensive discourse of peaceful coexistence has subsequently led to the establishment of interfaith and intercultural practice models across the world community. By emphasizing the universal values people share, and thus de-emphasizing their differences, Gülen finds diversity and tolerance to be a natural phenomenon—people can coexist peacefully despite differences in cultures and religions (Gülen 2004).

Universal dialogue has become the "main tool of social innovation and conflict resolution for social inclusion, coherence and peaceful co-existence" for the Hizmet movement (Yilmaz 2007, p. 25). This is rooted in Gülen's effort to promote dialogue and tolerance across all groups in society, in Turkey and abroad. Prior to September 11, the movement established the Journalists and Writers Foundation—a foundation that sought to "support strategic public intellectual initiatives in the promotion of dialogue" (Barton 2007, p. 4). The Journalists and Writers Foundation is an example of the Hizmet movement's proactive approach in tackling anti-Muslim discourse, particularly as it was founded prior to September 11 where Islamophobia became a critical issue. The foundation is also an example of the movement's willingness to extend their dialogue not just into schools, but across other platforms, such as the media, arts, sport, academia, and religious streams.

The Hizmet movement entered the post-9/11 era with interfaith dialogue and a focus on education already developed and implemented. In fact, the movement's first dialogue centers, established in major Western cities, predate 9/11. For example, in 1999, the Dialogue Society was established in London and the Rumi Forum in Washington. Accordingly, the movement's pre-9/11 interfaith activities were not a mere response to, nor a defense of, Muslims in the face of the 9/11 attacks. The dialogue activities, as Paul Weller (2012, p. 18) concludes, have "offer[ed] resources that engage with the secular; are ready for dialogue with Christians; are confident of what Islam can offer: and yet also acknowledge the current reality of the situation for Muslims and Islam in Europe [and elsewhere] rather than promoting only an idealized vision of the past or the future". Because this type of dialogue was neither defensive nor responsive, and was developed confidently from within long before 9/11, it has effectively been able to dispel the doubts about Islam and Muslims represented by the movement.

Co-existence and diversity are apparent within the movement's own organizations; on its board were prominent members of mainstream western societies and members from different religious, political, and philosophical backgrounds, seen in their dialogue organizations like the Rumi Forum and the Australian Intercultural Society (Rumi Forum 2019a, 2019b). By including ethno-religiously diverse members, students, and teachers in their dialogue organisations and in their schools, the movement—as a minority group—has confidently expanded beyond its comfort zone to amalgamate with the mainstream population. This was a common practice especially in countries where the Muslim population was scarce, such as in Russia, Mongolia, Burma, Nepal, Vietnam, Korea, and Cambodia.

The movement overtly celebrated diversity in schools by organizing the International Festival of Language and Culture, held every year in the countries where Hizmet inspired schools operate (International Festival of Language and Culture (IFLC) 2019a). During these festivals, students from Hizmet schools across their respective countries come together, irrespective of their religious, cultural, or ethnic identities, to perform local, English, and Turkish songs, dances, poetry, and other performative arts. Through their performances, the students deliver universal messages and showcase those values through the building of friendships during the preparation stages (International Festival of Language and Culture (IFLC) 2019a). Several people have expressed their awe of the movement's initiative, with some stating, "events that encourage young people from different linguistic and cultural backgrounds to share their experiences are very important. Because each generation has to rediscover and get to know itself, so that peaceful co-existence remains a matter of course" (International Festival of Language and Culture (IFLC) 2019b). The International Festival of Language and Culture is an example of how an ideal world could come about through positive dialogue initiatives. Without putting religion or religiosity to the foreground, such practical encounters facilitated by the Muslim founders of these schools indicates Islam's appreciation of indigenous cultures. This gesture, in the context of underdeveloped countries, also meant a clear deviation from the footsteps of those hegemonic, missionary, and colonial foundations which exploited and undermined local people, their languages, and their cultures.

In the context of Western societies, the movement's "practical global effort for peace and understanding" (Wright 2012, p. 171) shaped an example of "how migrants [ ... ] can adapt and integrate into a host society dominated by a very different culture [which shows that] peaceful coexistence is possible amongst different ethnic groups [ ... ] in a European context" and within other Muslim minority countries (Lacey 2010, p. 229). As these various examples have illustrated, the movement has successfully managed to operate confidently as a global phenomenon in different geographies of the world, including the West.

#### **5. The Hizmet Movement and Education**

Education has become another means for the movement to reach wider society via parent communities. According to Gülen, education is key for the development of intercivilizational dialogue and collaboration. This is because it is only through education that one can establish peace; education breaks the barriers produced by stigmatization, racism, discrimination, and conflict. Nursi's diagnosis of ignorance as one of the main problems in our society inspired Gülen's educational activities—a vital requisite for economic, social, and political advancement. Accordingly, "individuals will respect democratic law and human rights only if they receive a sound education", since social justice and peace "are achieved by intellectually enlightened people with strong moral values and a sense of altruism" (Ebaugh 2010, p. 34). Gülen continually emphasized Islam's universal values to reach wider society in a way that aligned with the ethical principles behind the movement's foundations.

While prominent Islamic scholars of Western academia, such as Isma'il Al Faruqi, Naquib al-Attas and Sayyed Hossein Nasr were heavily involved in philosophical discussions on Islamization of knowledge in the 1980s, Gülen did not show any particular interest in this debate (Al-Faruqi 1987; Dzilo 2012). Problematizing distinctively two different epistemological sources was an intellectually valid, but equally binary, discussion. Instead of Islamizing knowledge, Gülen opted to show how science and religion are intrinsically connected through the movement's quality educators and educational institutions. This allowed Hizmet schools to tie science and religion with their 'service for humanity' concept and encouraged students to engage in the love of learning. However, Gülen did not start up these educational institutions himself; these were taken onboard by the Hizmet movement who wanted to put into practice Gülen's emphasis on the importance of education and of creating environments in which young people, Muslims and non-Muslims, could expand their knowledge. For Gülen,

... school is essentially the 'theater' in which all the scattered things of the universe are displayed together. It provides its pupils with the possibilities of continuous reading and speaks even when it is silent. Because of that, although it seems to occupy one phase of life, the school dominates all times and events. Every pupil re-enacts during the rest of life what he or she has learned at school and derives continuous influence therefrom.

#### (Kurtz 2005, p. 380)

The Hizmet movement has established a variety of initiatives, such as charities, foundations, media, television channels, radio, business associations, and schools, to build and maintain a peaceful civil society (Kayaoglu 2010). But it is the educational institutions that take up most of their effort and operate worldwide as non-denominational and independent schools.

Within the schools, the movement offers an integrated education model where technical and moral training are combined—namely, the integration of science and faith-inspired values. This decision was shaped by the historical experience of Turkish society—a society

that has "gone through violent ideological and political conflicts during the last one hundred years" (Bozkurt and Yildirim 2012, p. 50). Moreover, competition between the secular and the religious educational systems in Turkey "lay at the heart of the social tensions and crises, because the graduates of these schools with such restricted focus lacked an integrated perspective for the future of society" (Michel 2003, p. 72). And so, Gülen inspired to develop an educational system that offered solutions for local and global problems, and a system that imparted humanitarian as well as moral values in students while also preparing them for the competitive world of science and technology.

The movement began with a few schools in Turkey in the 1990s, expanding to Central Asia and the Balkans shortly thereafter. But by the end of 2014, these schools flourished across more than 160 countries around the world primarily because they preserve a modern, secular curriculum to "lay the foundations for a more humane, tolerant citizenry of the world where people are expected to cultivate their own faith perspectives and promote the well-being of others" (Kurtz 2005, p. 380). Most schools have produced highly educated individuals who have taken on high-ranking positions with the power to change the fabric of their countries through their knowledge and activism (James 2017). This initiative, where schools provide a science and universal values-based education, challenges contemporary notions that science and religion are irreconcilable. It also challenges the belief that Islam and Muslims are outdated and inferior, who do not want to make a positive contribution to their societies.

The reconciliation of science and religion has been proactively introduced in Hizmetinspired schools not through the act of preaching but through the "the tongue of conduct" (Ozubuyuk 2013). As Thomas Michel wrote, "secular educators saw religion as at best a useless expenditure of time and at worst an obstacle to progress", but for Gülen, and by extension the Hizmet movement, science and religion are not only compatible forces, but they also complement one another (Michel 2003, p. 69).

As Gülen (2002) asserts,

... we no longer have any other way of escaping from the cloudy atmosphere of illusions enveloping us, or any other way to reach Truths and, more importantly, the most manifest Truth. To achieve this, we must become unique representatives of scientific knowledge combined with religious spirit.

Gülen's vision for the education model is not to impose an understanding of Truth through faith and science, but rather to help raise individuals with a balanced worldview. In his view, the education and training of a new generation of Muslims—the 'Golden Generation'—should be holistic; the aim is to raise "ideal people", individuals of "thought, action and inspiration" who are able to negotiate themselves through a rapidly demanding and changing world (Graskemper 2007). These students would then use their knowledge and training for the service of humankind, bringing harmony and understanding between different peoples as the material and spiritual realms were reconciled in their educational upbringing (Yavuz 2013).

Writing about the importance of education in modern society in general, Robert W. Hefner (2005) argues that education has "a greater democratic benefit when it conveys a spirit of intellectual 'bridging' rather than exclusive 'bonding'". What Hefner means here is that education that generates a bridging of multiple ideas in the form of collaboration is more important than exclusivity because it is the bridging of ideas that creates a natural bond between different people, and this, in turn, fosters an environment of harmony, tolerance, and diversity—and even espouses dynamism. Hefner also writes that "education is the most paradigmatic of modern cultural institutions. Today no society can compete even in the lower rungs of the global order without a well-run educational system [ ... ] higher education is a shimmering example of all that is best about modern freedom and civic decency" (Hefner 2005).

Indeed, educational institutions, when offering a combination of faith-based, sciencebased, and other based knowledge—much like those established by the Hizmet movement can foster 'sustainable development' by connecting local values and cultures with international values, preparing specialists through capacity building to promote a sustainable future, and creating public spaces through civil society associations (Vargas 2000). The Hizmet movement, therefore, provides intermediary networks that contribute to the integration of individual citizens and the state (Özdalga 2005).

The integration of individual citizens and the state is a method of peacebuilding; in Hizmet inspired schools, "young people from different religions, languages, and cultures study, are educated, and admired in the same educational institutions. Loving and understanding each other is the main principle" (Sevindi 2008, p. 75). For example, in Kenya, Hizmet-run schools have not only been functioning as secular alternatives to religious Christian missionary and Islamic schools, but "also as barriers to potential ethno-religious conflict between Kenya's local Christian tribes and its politically empowering Muslim minority" (Kalyoncu 2008, p. 350). The movement has helped locals in Uganda to take a pragmatic approach to development by "instill[ing] in them the notion of relying on their own resources instead of international aid" (Kalyoncu 2008, p. 350). In the Philippines a country with communities stigmatized by Muslim-Christian battles—the Hizmet-led schools have brought together Christian and Muslim students, not by taking part in the conflict, but by identifying "common grounds where they get together and cooperate to tackle their common problems" (Kalyoncu 2007, p. 605). According to Zeki Saritoprak (2007), the movement's educational institutions, overall, have contributed to the "building of peace in many areas of conflict", including Kosovo, Albania, northern Iraq, Northern Ireland, Macedonia, and Banda Aceh.

The Hizmet movement ensures that all educational institutions are run by quality educators and thus emphasizes the importance of addressing "all aspects of a person's mind, spirit, and self" (Bozkurt and Yildirim 2012, p. 55). An educator is comprehensive and incorporates universality in their teaching methodology. They provide guidance and implement it with flexibility according to the circumstances of the school and its students (Agai 2003). Gülen also stresses that the educator's role is to "fill science with wisdom so that it will be applied usefully to society" (Agai 2003, p. 58). In Albania, for example, the Hizmet educators, due to their focus on universal values, science, and quality education, gained approval by both the government and the Albanian public. But when the movement began their activities from as early as 1992, there was resistance, partly because of strong Albanian nationalist sentiments, and partly because Albania had "formed its national identity in opposition to the Ottoman Empire" and thus did not want Islamic or Turkish nationalism to be promoted in its schools (Agai 2003, p. 66). As the movement slowly began to take influence, they engaged in activities that allowed the students to develop a "joy of giving" while also teaching them discipline and providing them with guidance (Agai 2003, p. 66). One teacher viewed this initiative in a positive way, admiring the movement's delivery of a "vision of humanity" to a society that had lost its "human dimension during its communist era" (Agai 2003, p. 66). Through this example, one can see how the Hizmet movement constructs its ideals around local concerns. This is made possible because of religious values being "transformed into a language of ethics" and it is this belief in shared values that prompted Gülen's and by extension, the Hizmet movement, efforts at dialogue (Agai 2003, p. 66).

The movement's emphasis on universal values, and educational and civic activities, also helped overcome the Turkish-Kurdish conflict (Gurbuz 2015; Kalyoncu 2008). As such, the movement's commitment to principles of universalism, tolerance and positive action in their educational institutions allowed them to overcome political conflicts embedded in their own history, like Turks and Albanians since the Ottoman era, and the Turkish government and its Kurdish citizens since the 1920s.

In the global context, Hizmet-led schools have helped to break down misunderstandings around Islam's incapacity to offer a modernized education model, and misunderstandings about Islam's incapacity to align itself with scientific values and principles. In the meantime, the movement developed a unique Islamic revivalist approach by reaching out and fixing the problems of not only Muslim but a global audience by providing education

to remove ignorance, dialogue to remove fragmentation, and charity and social upward mobility thought high quality education to remove poverty, not only among Muslims but also around the entire globe.

#### **6. Criticism of the Hizmet Movement**

While the Hizmet movement's inclusive humanistic attitude has been appreciated by their audience, some have expressed skepticism, finding the movement—as one senior U.S. government official said—"too good to be true" (Hansen 2013). Some of these criticisms were a reaction toward 9/11 by neo-conservatives and far right circles accusing many Muslim groups, including the Hizmet movement, of having hidden agendas and Islamist intentions (Hudson 2008). A similar criticism was echoed by some secular Kemalist circles of Turkey. Unlike other Islamic movements in Turkey, Gülen's discourse was surprisingly not at odds with the Kemalist secular state, which triggered suspicions about the authenticity of his leniency (Cagaptay 2010; Hudson 2009).

Some Islamic groups criticized the movement for staying away from Islamist rhetoric and agenda. The movement, neither seeking an Islamic state nor problematizing a secular state (if the state does not interfere in the groups' legal religious activities), was found to be un-Islamic by some circles and was accused of interacting with Christian and Jews more than Islamic groups. Gülen's dialogue initiatives, especially in its early days when he met with Pope John Paul II in 1998, were severely criticized and some conspiracies were generated, such as Gülen being appointed by John Paul II as a secret cardinal (WRM 2016). The movement's international language and culture festivals were also found by some to be un-Islamic; Turgul Keskin (2009, p. iv) defined Hizmet as an "Islamic movement without Islam". The movement evidently drew criticism because it did not fit into existing categories of Islamic revivalist movements and religious organizations in the Muslim world, with the movement's "rapid expansion" also being questioned (Pew Research Center 2010).

Most of the recent political criticisms of the Hizmet movement are driven from pro-Erdogan circles due to the 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey which, according to Erdogan, was plotted by the movement. Still, despite being exclusively two different Islamic movements (i.e., one is a politically motivated Islamist party, and the other is a spiritually motivated interfaith and education driven movement), Ergodan and Gülen developed a temporary "mutually beneficial relationship" in the 2000s (Sandal 2021). Yet, it quickly started to crack in 2010 with the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis. The Turkish aid flotilla set off to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza, which resulted in the killing of ten Turkish activists. In contrast to AKP's condemnation of the Israeli attack, Gülen criticized the initiative as being counterproductive. Breaching the Israeli authority by not seeking a legal permission was a naïve and uncalculated move. This friction grew further in a series of political crises in the following years. Upon the arrest of Erdogan's crew consisting of senior bureaucrats, businessmen, and sons of ministers on corruption charges in Turkey's covert gold-for-oil trade with Iran on 17 and 25 December 2013, the movement was declared by Erdogan to be a "parallel state" which allegedly infiltrated in the police and judiciary in the service of "dark alliances" (Erkoyun 2020). Afterwards, Erdogan waged an open war on the movement by closing the movement's schools, tutorial centers, newspaper, television channel and seizing the movement's income generating channels like banks, publishing houses, and the businesses owned by Gülen's followers. Officers from the police and judiciary were sacked due to an alleged relationship with the movement. Furthermore, affiliating the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016 with the movement, Erdogan declared the movement a terrorist organization and issued a state of emergency. Soon, more than 110,000 people were detained and nearly 50,000 imprisoned. Calling the coup attempt a "gift from God", Erdogan purged all his opponents including the pre-existing lists of profiled public employees from the movement (Gol 2016).

The political turmoil stirred by the Erdogan government overshadows the reputation of the movement, inviting controversy. But Gülen's message to his followers and the world did not change; he called his followers to show patience and peace. Still, the movement's educational, interfaith, intercultural, and charity institutions and activities have decreased significantly due to Erdogan's efforts to finish the movement in Turkey and overseas; however, the movement's institutions are still in force in those countries where Erdogan's political pressure is not influential.

Like in all Islamic revivalist movements, Gülen—as the movement's founder—played a central role in the dynamics and direction of the movement. Indeed, some academics referred to the movement as the 'Gülen movement' in recognition of his efforts (Ebaugh 2010; Esposito and Yilmaz 2010; Krause 2012; Lacey 2010; Michel 2003; Agai 2003; Kalyoncu 2007). However, Gülen's charismatic leadership and his direct association with the movement has raised some questions about whether there is sufficient internal criticism within the movement itself, and to what extent the movement would have the capacity to address new challenges once Gülen is no longer around to inspire its mission.

The movement has attempted to address these questions, to some extent. For example, its website and its followers' websites, social media, and YouTube channels have increasingly shown the movement's willingness to engage in some internal self-criticism on past mistakes, such as close affiliation with politics, rigid hierarchies, misuse of loyalties by intermediary persons, structures and systems bounded by strong personalities in power, weakened check and balance system, man-oriented nature of the movement, and the like. According to the discussions on their YouTube channels, some ex-members of the movement have fervently criticized Gülen and his close circle, while some of the movement's followers have directed their criticism not toward Gülen, but the executive members in his consultation team. Weller's recent book *Hizmet in Transitions*, especially the "New Foci for Old Questions" captures these post 2016 discussions (Weller 2022, pp. 131–90). But Gülen himself did not shy away from self-criticism. He publicly confessed that close interaction with politics was a forbidden affair (referring to the movement's close relationship with Erdogan's political party) (Alkan 2019) because the movement's core principles centered on the renewal of faith rather than political affairs—the same message Said Nursi spread through his teachings and sermons.

While criticisms toward the movement across media platforms and their social media pages have become increasingly diversified following the failed coup attempt in 2016, some critics interpret this new phase of the movement as counteractions for rebirth, while others yet see it as a sign of collapse.

#### **7. Conclusions**

Although being a product of similar circumstances, the Hizmet movement displayed some different features than politically revivalist Islamic revivalist movements of the time. Like other movements, the Hizmet movement was built upon a strong spiritual and theological basis. For instance, Gülen has been motivating his followers for decades with a Prophetic *hadith* which promised that the name of Prophet Muhammad will reach every place where sun sets and rises (Sahih Muslim 2889a, Book 41, Hadith 6904). Migrating to different corners of the world with this mission, the followers of the movement could flag the name of Prophet Muhammed by offering service to the host countries through education, interfaith/intercultural dialogue, and charity. These areas of service were strategic moves to solve the shared problems of the time which were ignorance, fragmentation, and poverty according to Said Nursi.

While most of the movements prioritized local problems and the revival of the *ummah* (Islamic community), the Hizmet movement aimed to reach out to non-Muslim populations in its early stages and prioritized connecting with non-Muslims based on service and other universal values like peace, love, tolerance, and dialogue—much needed assets to overcome local and global conflicts. The movement's long-term strategy, especially as a minority group within its countries of migration, showed how the movement based its operations on not converting nor controlling, but co-existing with other members of society. The mission of service to achieve the same shared goals by speaking the same shared (universal) language helped the acceptance, accommodation, and appreciation of the movement in most of the corners of the world regardless of ethno-religiously and culturally differing contexts. The movement's co-existence framework also helped to subtly change the distorted image of Islam and Muslims in different corners of the world.

The adverse secular circumstances and long-lasting conflicts between religion and science as well as tradition and modernity greatly shaped the movement's objectives since its inception, which made it more attuned to the needs of the world community. The movement's vision, mission, and strategy has also proactively countered binary dichotomies such as science and religion, Islam and West, and the Clash of Civilizations by combining science with religion in its educational institutions and fostering dialogue to counter various types of conflicts through dialogue centers. As such, its interaction with real people in more than 160 countries through the 'language of conduct' effectively defeated centuries-old imaginary biases against Islam and Muslims.

In the meantime, the movement showcased that an Islamic revivalist movement can still be authentically Islamic without keeping *sharia* (Islamic law) and the Islamic state at the forefront of its mission and by adhering to democratic and secular systems which do not interfere in any legal religious affairs of the religious groups. By doing so, the movement's revivalism aimed for a renewal—a new interpretation of the Qur'anic verses—in tandem with the demands and values of the contemporary world, rather than a puritanical withdrawal from the existing world in attempt to escape to the dreamed time of the Prophet and *salaf al salihin* (pious ancestors) (Ali and Orofino 2018).

Instead of creating its own dream island, the movement opted to negotiate with existing challenges. Like other revivalists of ethno-religiously diverse societies such as Indonesia, the Hizmet movement also opted for collaboration rather than confrontation with authorities. The movement operated and interacted actively across the globe on a personal and institutional level, providing up to date, applicable, and effective solutions to the local and global post-colonial world through its educational, dialogue, and charity institutions. While being engineered by philosophically sound and well-grounded universal values, the Hizmet movement strictly adhered to its theological roots. Like Muhammadiyah, the Hizmet movement promoted education; like many other Islamic movements operating in the West in the wake of 9/11, the Hizmet movement also accelerated its interfaith activities across Western societies; like spiritual revivalist movements, the Sufi tradition laid the foundation of the Hizmet movement. Currently, the Hizmet movement finds itself in a significant transitional period (Weller 2022) due to being restricted by adverse political, economic, and social circumstances, which may challenge the movement's future progress and its prospects.

**Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, D.I. and M.C.; formal analysis, D.I. and M.C.; resources, M.C. and D.I.; writing—original draft, M.C. and D.I.; writing—review and editing, M.C. and D.I. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Data Availability Statement:** Not applicable.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **References**


Ali, Jan. 2003. Islamic Revivalism: The Case of the Tablighi Jamaat. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 23: 173–81. [CrossRef]


James, Jonathan D. 2017. *Transnational Religious Movements: Faith's Flows*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications India.


### *Article* **Emotion Work in Tabligh Jama'at Texts**

**Rizwan Sahib**

Department of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney University, Milperra, NSW 2214, Australia; 16821457@student.westernsydney.edu.au

**Abstract:** This study examines the emotional dynamics of the written and oral texts of Tabligh Jama'at—respectively, *Faza'il-e-A'maal* (Virtues of Good Deeds) and *bayan* (religious sermon). In them, the study identifies emotion work—the attempt to generate certain emotions. The study discusses how the texts' emotion work relates to Tablighi discursive ideology (framing) and also posits several emotions that the emotion work might generate. From these findings, the study offers the idea that Tablighi emotion work contributes to transforming Muslims' emotional sphere by attaching them emotionally to ultimate religious concerns. By enchanting Muslims' emotional sphere and attaching Muslims to Islamic social actors, values, practices, and Islamic revivalist goals, Tablighi emotion work contributes to the social transformation of individuals and society.

**Keywords:** Tabligh Jama'at; emotion work; emotions; framing; social transformation

#### **1. Introduction**

Emotions are "complex mental phenomena" (Ben-Ze'ev 2009, p. 42) that inspire motivation and agency (Gecas 1991). Emotions are pervasive in our everyday lives (Harris 2015, p. 3). In fact, any behaviour of a social nature or within a social context has some sort of emotion mixed in it (Bericat 2016, p. 496). In turn, sociologists find that emotions are inherently social (Lively and Weed 2016).

These characteristics of emotions make them an important factor to consider for our purposes, which is to gain a better understanding of the Islamic revivalist movement known as Tabligh Jama'at (Convey the message of Islam group). While emotions have been mentioned in studies of Tabligh Jama'at, no study yet has dedicated empirical and analytic attention to the emotional dynamics that play a role in the movement's goals and methods. The present study addresses this lacuna by exploring what sociologist Hoschchild (1979) terms "emotion work"—the attempt to evoke and shape emotions—in Tablighi written text *Faza'il-e-A'maal* (Virtues of Good Deeds) and oral text *bayan* (religious sermon).

The study aims to answer the following questions: (1) What kind of emotion work do Tablighi texts perform? (2) What emotions does Tablighi emotion work attempt to generate? (3) What are the implications of this emotion work for Tabligh Jama'at as an Islamic revivalist movement that aims for the social transformation of society through individual reform? Exploring these questions, the study aims to contribute to the field of Tabligh Jama'at research by lending an analytic eye to its emotional dimension to gain a better understanding of how the movement achieves its goals of individual and social transformation.

In what follows, the study provides information about the Tabligh Jama'at as an Islamic revivalist movement. It then reviews literature on Tabligh Jama'at that speaks to factors that enable it to achieve its transformation goals. That review identifies the movement's emotional dimension as lacking investigation. The study then accounts for what has been observed about the movement's emotional dimension, and in doing so identifies emotion work as a suitable area of inquiry. The subsequent two sections give an overview of the theoretical and methodological approaches the study uses to pursue this area of inquiry. The results section describes the five kinds of emotion work in Tablighi texts

**Citation:** Sahib, Rizwan. 2022. Emotion Work in Tabligh Jama'at Texts. *Religions* 13: 632. https:// doi.org/10.3390/rel13070632

Academic Editor: Jan A. Ali

Received: 30 May 2022 Accepted: 4 July 2022 Published: 7 July 2022

**Copyright:** © 2022 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/).

and offers a discussion around which emotions this emotion work might generate. The discussion section then interprets those findings. The study concludes with suggestions for future work on emotions in Islamic revivalist movements.

#### **2. Tabligh Jama'at as an Islamic Revivalist Movement**

Contemporary Islamic revivalism took hold of Muslim communities in certain parts of the world during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Among the several movements and organisations (for example, Jamaat-i-Islami; Muslim Brotherhood; Hizb-ut-Tahrir) that originated in those times is Tabligh Jama'at—which Jan Ali (2012) translates as 'Conveying the Message of Islam Group'. The Tabligh Jama'at was founded in the Delhi region of India by a Deobandi trained scholar named Muhammad Ilyas Kandhlawi (1885–1944). Ilyas attempted the Islamisation of Mewat—an area outside Delhi—in the early 1920s by establishing religious schools called *maktab* or *madrasa* (Marwah 1979, p. 94). However, he soon noticed that the schooling system he had helped set up there was not having the desired effect (Ahmad 1991, p. 512). This situation concerned Ilyas so greatly that in the late 1920s he moved to Basti Nizamuddin in the Mewat region to begin missionary work in the form of *khuruj* (preaching tour). The initial thrust of the preaching activity Ilyas established was so successful that the Tabligh Jama'at conference held in Mewat in 1941 was attended by twenty-five thousand people (Ahmad 1991, p. 512). After Ilyas' death, his son Muhammad Yusuf became the leader of the Tabligh Jama'at. Yusuf expanded on his father's success by sending preaching parties outside India to numerous countries (Gaborieau 2000, pp. 127–30). This expansionary intent resulted in Tabligh Jama'at today being a transnational phenomenon.

The name 'Conveying the Message of Islam' refers to the Tabligh Jama'at preaching to Muslims the importance of Islamic faith and praxis. Ilyas believed that preaching is a duty for a group of Muslims. Muslims must revive *iman* (faith) and Islamic praxis because another prophet would not be coming to Earth (Ali 2012, p. 125). To revive *iman* and Islam in Muslims, Tablighi preaching tours provide participants with much opportunity to learn about the rituals and etiquettes of Islam. Three-day, ten-day, forty-day, and four-month preaching tours are a holistic education environment where one can implement straight away what one learns through oral instruction. Tabligh Jama'at hopes that an individual's transformation into a pious person is sustained on his return home, and that over time, the transformed individuals will encourage his immediate social circle to also become more religious—in this way, society will be gradually transformed.

#### **3. Factors Underpinning Tabligh Jama'at Social Transformation**

In terms of what facilitates the individual and social transformation goal of Tabligh Jama'at, the literature on the movement has focused mainly on three factors: political freedom to travel and preach; social networks and organisational resources at the movement's disposal; and the movement's ideology or ideas (for a review of this literature, see Ali and Sahib 2022, pp. 51–53).

While each of these factors are important for a movement's ability to engage in activism, in the past few decades, social movement scholars have researched the emotional dynamics of mobilisation (for a review of this literature, see Van-Ness and Summers-Effler 2019), exploring emotions that lead to participation (Pickard and Bessant 2018; Hu and Wu 2021; Weiss 2021; Asún et al. 2022; Nikolayenko 2022; Petrini and Wettergren 2022), emotions that sustain commitment (Feigenbaum et al. 2013; Ransan-Cooper et al. 2018; Pirkkalainen 2021), and emotions that hinder mobilisation (Summers-Effler 2010; Østbø 2017). These studies support Jasper (1998, p. 407), who observed, early on, that emotions play a role in individuals being drawn to a particular movement, and in their subsequent decision to remain in the movement and to participate in its activities. These implications of emotions in social movements are also observed also by Bericat (2016, p. 504):

Many emotions, such as indignation, moral shock, anger, fear, shame, pride and humiliation, condition and inspire social movements, whether in their origin, recruitment of members, maintenance of organization or in the struggle to achieve their objectives.

In view of these observations, we may posit that even where other factors exist, a movement may not be able to achieve its goals for social activism and transformation if it cannot arouse in people certain emotions. Without emotions people may not move from the balcony to the barricade, or in the case of Tablighis, from their own homes to other Muslims' front doors. The next section explores why emotions are an important feature of Tabligh Jama'at, and therefore worthy of closer examination.

#### **4. Emotions in the Tabligh Jama'at**

Research on the Tabligh Jama'at emphasises emotions as a key element of its outlook and existence. Timol (2022, p. 16) notes the group's "anti-intellectual yet emotionally charged ethos ... " and that "For large numbers of devotees, participation in TJ clearly is an emotionally satisfying experience" (ibid., p. 15). Pelkmans (2017, pp. 115–19) says of the contents of Tablighi *bayan* and storytelling that they create an "emotive energy". Marcia Hermansen (2008, p. 83) describes the movement's call as not to an abstract set of jurisprudential rules, but "Rather, the appeal is more personal and emotional". Gugler(2013, p. 72) sees the Islamic revivalism of the Tabligh Jama'at as "seemingly anti-intellectual, or rather, emotional". Talib (1997, p. 45) reports that the Tabligh Jama'at's "enduring symbols, moods, and activities" have an intense "emotional reality". Pieri (2019, p. 367) comments that "TJ's goal was to reignite a passion for Islam among lapsed Muslims". His observation is echoed in Pool (2021) who identifies in Tablighis cool (for example, conviction) and uncool (for example, excitement) emotions—or what he calls "passions".

The emotional impetus of the Tabligh Jama'at derives from its key texts the *Faz'ail-e-A'maal* and *bayan*. Barbara Metcalf (1993, p. 593) notes of *Faza'il-e-A'maal* that its "stories are meant to engage the listener—or reader—not only intellectually, but emotionally ... " She goes on to describe the stories in the *Faza'il-e-A'maal's* main pamphlet which is titled *Hayaat-us-Sahabah* (The Lives of the Companions) as "emotional dramas" that the reader has to "respond [to] with feeling" (Metcalf 1993, p. 595). As regards *bayan*, Rashid (2006, p. 366) and Sikand (1999, p. 45) comment on its "forceful" and "emotive style". In his observation of *bayan*, Horstmann (2009, p. 120) says, "During Friday prayers in the *markaz* (prayer hall), during prayers in the local mosque and during missionary tours, preachers virtually cry out their sermons in a very emotional way, raising piety for and fear of God". Talib's (1997, p. 47) description of *bayan* is also important: "The actual presentation is punctuated by the listeners' deep sighs and the narrator's show of emotion". This observation points to the emotional effects that the content of the *bayan* can have on an audience.

Together, these observations are important in that they create a picture of the Islamic revivalism of Tabligh Jama'at as generating and generated by emotions. These emotional dynamics are pointed to more closely in other studies. Talib (1997, p. 47) reports the following statement from a Tablighi in India: "In the work of *da'wa* emotions are shaped and given direction". Jan Ali (2012, p. 178) says, "the selected hadiths in the *Faza'il-e-A'maal* generate a sense of concern and even fear and motivate the participants towards their implementation". Commenting on an invitation a Tablighi gave to a Muslim during *jawla* (preaching round) in which the former spoke about death and the grave, Ali (2012, p. 195) says that it:

... demonstrates that an appeal to emotion is used to arouse religious consciousness. By positing this world as ephemeral and a testing ground which one day everyone will abandon, the Tablighis make a direct emotional appeal to the 'heart'.

These observations: that Tablighis *shape*, *give direction to*, *generate*, *appeal to* emotions show that Tabligh Jama'at's preaching tries to shape the emotions of individuals in a way that accentuates the appeal of participation in its preaching tours.

These observations open up an avenue to examining the emotional dimension of the Tabligh Jama'at through Hoschchild's (1979) concept of "emotion work"—which refers to the shaping of people's emotions. While the above findings from the literature are perhaps enough to justify using Hoschchild's concept, the study particularly takes a cue from Horstmann (2009, p. 113), who poignantly observes in Tablighi circles "emotional work [which] includes the hagiographic telling of the sufferings and endless pains of the first travellers who are widely regarded as martyrs". The idea he puts forth is that the Tablighi method of conveying its message is emotive, and it seeks an emotional outcome. This is exactly what emotion work, conceptually speaking, seeks to unpack.

As will be seen later, emotion work as a concept and analytic approach is useful not only for conceptualising the emotional dimension of Tabligh Jama'at, but also in gaining a clearer understanding of the movement's transformative potential.

#### **5. Theoretical Background**

#### *5.1. Emotion Work*

Arlie Hoschchild (1979, p. 561) defines emotion work as "the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling". Emotion work is illustrated through phrases such as "I *psyched* myself up", "He *killed* their hope", "She *tried hard* to make me feel grateful". The italicised verbs indicate the *work* involved in producing, respectively, the emotions of determination, hope, and gratitude.

The act of managing emotions may occur in three ways: (1) on oneself by oneself; (2) on others by oneself; (3) on oneself by others (Hoschchild 1979). This study explores the third type of emotion work in the sense of how Tablighi texts attempt to generate emotions in Tablighis and potential recruits.

The term emotion work was originally applied to conceptualising the everyday, ordinary management of emotions by individuals at home and in the workplace. More recently, social movement scholars have examined how activists manage their own and others' emotions in social movement contexts (Maney et al. 2009; Gould 2015; Hagemann 2015; Jacobsson and Lindblom 2016; Kleres and Wettergren 2017; Santos 2020; Marquez 2021; Siegel 2021; Tuomola and Wahl-Jorgensen 2022). For instance, Hagemann comments:

Emotion work, defined as active practices to regulate emotions, is ... an important strategy for social movements in order to motivate and legitimize collective action and to induce group cohesion (Hagemann 2015, p. 13)

Jasper (1998, p. 405) indicates the centrality of emotion work to social movements by observing that "It is affects and emotional responses that political organizers appeal to, arouse, manipulate, and sustain to recruit and retain members". *Appealing to, arousing, manipulating*, and *sustaining* all signify emotion work.

#### *5.2. Frame Theory*

Emotion work does not occur alone; it coincides with another important mobilising activity: framing. Frame Theory (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Benford and Snow 2000) has developed our understanding of movements' meaning making activity. Specifically, movements construct or identify a problem and a target of blame for the problem occurring (diagnostic framing); they offer a solution to redress the problem (prognostic framing); and try to persuade people to act through vocabularies of motive that focus on the urgency and severity of the problem, the efficacy of the proposed solutions, and the moral propriety of undertaking action (motivational framing). The ideational constructs that result from these framing tasks are called collective action frames.

As regards framing in Islamic movements, Quinton Wiktorowicz's (2004) exploration of the framing strategies of the Salafi movement is useful for our purposes. He identifies four key strategies—vilification, exaltation, credentialing, decredentialing—that Salafi Muslim activists deploy to legitimise certain Muslim intellectuals as sacred authorities (ibid., pp. 162–64). This study is similar in that it explores the emotional framing strategies that Tablighi texts use to legitimise *tabligh* and self-reform as the means to avert the Muslim crisis.

#### *5.3. Tabligh Jama'at Framing*

Ali and Sahib (2022), recognising the lack of conceptualisation of the ideational aspect of the Tabligh Jama't, draw on Frame Theory to explain the structure of Tablighi ideas and their resonance for Muslims in the modern world. Analysing the *Faza'il-e-A'maal* and several Tablighi bayans that were commonly performed in the Friday night Tablighi gatherings in Sydney, Australia, they identify the following collective action frames: Muslim crisis, *iman* (faith), self-reform, *tabligh* (preaching), Allah, urgency, severity, responsibility, and rewards (Ali and Sahib 2022, pp. 72–82).

To take a few examples of Tablighi framing, diagnostic framing can be seen in Hasan's (1994, p. 24) statement that "The current disease in the body of Muslims has sprung from the extinction of the true spirit of Islam in our hearts". Identifying contemporary Muslims as culpable for the Muslim crisis is a key aspect of the Muslim crisis frame. Another example of framing in a Tablighi text is the following *bayan* statement that exemplifies the *tabligh* frame:

Prophets came and made this effort [*tabligh*]. And they made this effort by visiting people, going to the people, and knocking on every door. And the Prophet Muhammad, he came, and he also did the same effort. Went and visited people, knocked on every door. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 75)

The speaker here legitimises *tabligh* by connecting it with the practice of the Prophets. Ali and Sahib's (2022) findings advance our understanding of the meaning making activity of Tablighi texts. The present study draws on these findings in conjunction with a sociology of emotions approach—that is, the concept of emotion work—to better understand the transformative potential of Tablighi textual discourse.

#### *5.4. Emotions and Framing*

Emotions are important components of framing (Schrock et al. 2004; Eyerman 2005; Snow et al. 2018; Raffaeli et al. 2019; Dzhengiz et al. 2021). Snow et al. (2018, p. 397) point out that "the appeal to or use of emotion appears to be a central feature of motivational framing". They also identity anger and guilt (and fear and disgust) as accompanying "shock framing" (ibid., 2018, p. 483), which is exposure to an emotionally arousing stimulus. Additionally, commenting on the close relationship between framing and emotions, Eyerman (2005, pp. 44–45) says, "Movements are often spurred into existence by cognitively framed emotions, anger, frustration, shame, guilt, which move individuals and groups to protest, to publicly express and display discontent". In their study, Schrock et al. (2004) examine how in a transgender support group emotion work and motivational framing combine to create "emotional resonance" or "emotional harmony" between activists' collective action frames and recruits' emotional lives.

Considering these points, this study holds that emotion work corresponds closely to framing, therefore, in the Results section, the different kinds of emotion work will be discussed in reference to the collective action frames identified in Ali and Sahib (2022).

#### *5.5. Method*

The main tenets of the history of emotions are that emotional experience and expression change across time and place; societies value, define, and judge certain emotions in different ways; and that emotions have been known by various terms corresponding to different bodily and mental states (Frevert 2016, p. 49).

In the academy, scholars study emotions from a variety of theoretical perspectives, including developmental, sociological, personality, biological, cognitive, and health-related (for essays on each perspective, see Barrett et al. 2016). The concept emotion work arose from the sociological approach to emotions, in particular the idea that people's emotions

are shaped and constrained via emotion management practices (Lively and Weed 2016, pp 69–70).

This study focuses on examining emotion work in Tabligh Jama'at texts. Texts are important sources of emotion work as "We interpret texts, buildings, gardens, rituals, and other human artifacts for the emotions displayed or aroused in audiences" (Jasper 2011, p. 298). The texts that this study analyses to identify emotion work are *Faza'il-e-A'maal* (Virtues of Good Deeds) and *bayan* (religious sermon).

The *bayan* statements mentioned in the Results section are taken from Ali and Sahib (2022). For more detail on the data collection for that study, see Ali and Sahib (2022, pp. 59–63). The method of participant observation Ali and Sahib (2022) used to collect *bayan* data aligns with Van-Ness and Summers-Effler (2019, p. 419), who include participation and observation as methods through which "Social movement scholars can capture emotion"; and with Goodwin et al. (2004, p. 424), who say, "Participant observation is another method that can be used to study the everyday emotional culture of movements".

In addition to *bayan*s, this study examines the contents of the pamphlets that comprise *Faza'il-e-A'maal* (for an overview of these pamphlets and their contents, see Masud 2000, pp. 83–85). These pamphlets were written to create in their reader a desire for piety and preaching. Tablighi founder, Muhammad Ilyas, saw the pamphlets as useful for motivating Muslims for preaching (ibid., p. 80). Therefore—and because their contents are elaborated on in Tablighi *bayan*—the pamphlets are a potentially rich source of emotional framing.

#### *5.6. Results*

From my reading of the pamphlets of *Faza'il-e-A'maal* and *bayan*, I identify five kinds of emotion work that correspond to the collective action frames found in Ali and Sahib (2022). I also identify several emotions that this emotion work might generate in individuals. The corresponding relations between Tablighi framing, emotion work, and emotions are illustrated in Table 1 below.


**Table 1.** Tabligh Jama'at Framing, Emotion Work, and Emotions.

#### 5.6.1. Reflexivity

For the Tabligh Jama'at, not all Muslims are aware of the crisis afflicting Muslims around the world. The movement's texts attempt to make Muslims aware of their lowly state in material and spiritual terms. They do this through the Muslim crisis frame and emotion work of reflexivity. According to the Muslim crisis frame (Ali and Sahib 2022, pp. 72–73), Muslim lowliness is marked by apathy, lack of faith and religious praxis, and

lack of political, economic, and social power. This assessment is illustrated in the following statement: "Muslims of today [are] sunk in misery and disgrace, a people who possess no real strength or power, honour or dignity ... completely demoralised, apathetic, shallow and helpless" (Hasan 1994, p. 4).

Through this discursive work the Muslim crisis frame awakens individual Muslims to the plight of Muslims as a whole. In doing this, the frame produces the emotion work reflexivity which may generate self-directed feelings of shame and guilt. Take the following statement from the pamphlet titled *Faza'il-e-Tabligh* (The Virtues of Preaching): "Millions of Muslims have indulged in manifest false-worship, not to speak of neglecting prayers and fasting; yet they are never conscious of their practices ... " (Zakariyya 1994a, p. 5). The Muslim hearing this statement may feel ashamed of his neglect of Islam and preoccupation with worldliness, and the words "they are never conscious of their practices" may prompt him to feel culpable for the Muslim crisis having arisen. Such guilt is illustrated in the following Tablighi's statement: "Today the Muslims are at the receiving end and it means that there is something wrong with us. It is the result of our karma" (Chakrabarti 2017, p. 162).

Reflexivity prods Muslims to compare themselves to the Muslims who came before, namely the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. By such comparison, Muslims today will see themselves as lowly. This discursive move is evident in a *bayan* where the speaker says:

All the *barakah* [blessing] and the greatness that was seen in the Sahabah [companions of the Prophet Muhammad], why this is not being seen in the lives of the Muslims here? Because we've left that duty, we've left that responsibility that Allah has given us. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 80)

Ihtishaamul Hasan (1994, p. 8) also makes the comparison between Muslims before and Muslims now:

History proves that the early Muslims had been able to reach the highest summit of honour and glory, whereas the present-day Muslims seem to have moved in the opposite direction.

These statements urge Muslims to reflect on how they have let down Islam and Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. The guilt that might arise as a response to this emotion work will make Muslims feel that they are "part of the problem". Importantly, shame and guilt are moral emotions (Haidt 2003, pp. 859–61). Therefore, reflexivity lends to the Muslim crisis frame a layer of moral seriousness which increases the salience of the Muslim crisis to Muslims today.

#### 5.6.2. Entrustment

Tablighi texts offer emotional relief from shame and guilt in the form of redemptive framing. This framing comes as the idea that the Muslim crisis can be reversed into Muslim flourishing if only Muslims apply themselves to a revival of *iman* through *tabligh*. Through participating in these activities Muslims can go from being part of the problem to being part of the solution.

This framing is captured in the prognostic and motivational framing of the "*iman*", "*tabligh*", and "responsibility" frames. *Iman* and *tabligh* frames speak to the most important things in the world in the eyes of Tabligh Jama'at: faith in God and the tactic of *tabligh* to revive it (Ali and Sahib 2022, pp. 74–75). The responsibility frame posits that implementing preaching and reviving *iman* is the duty of all Muslims today (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 80). A few examples of these frames in *Faza'il-e-A'maal* and *bayan* are the following:

*Iman* frame:

The way to regain to honour, grandeur, exaltation, glory and virtues by Muslims, lies only in their being strictly faithful. (Hasan 1994, p. 7)

*Tabligh* frame:

Real sentiments and love for Islam are practically dead in us and our belief in it has dissipated. Obviously, when the very source becomes dry, the channels of virtue, good deeds and fine attributes, which can flow from it, are not to be seen any longer ... the only means for the building up of this source, and maintaining a constantly proper flow of religious benefits from it, is the act of "Tabligh [i.e., preaching]," which really and truly is the life-blood of Islam. (Hasan 1994, p. 24)

Responsibility frame:

Allah has given us a big responsibility! ... There is no Prophet to come. This is our responsibility. That's why the elders say, this is our biggest sin! [that we do not make effort]. We have not taken up this responsibility. ... The past year 90 million people have gone without *iman*. We are responsible. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 80)

We have been given the responsibility of the *ambiya* [Prophets] ... All the *barakah* [blessing] and the greatness that was seen in the Sahabah [companions of the Prophet Muhammad], why this is not being seen in the lives of the Muslims here? Because we've left that duty, we've left that responsibility that Allah has given us. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 80)

These framings together produce the idea that reviving *iman* or calling to *iman* is something passed down from the eminent Muslim personalities of the past. The emotion work corresponding to these framings is what this study defines as entrustment. Entrustment is the idea that *iman* is a trust, and that Muslims today have a mission to protect that trust through conducting *tabligh*. This sentiment is seen in Aashiq Ilaahi (1994, p. 12), who says in his pamphlet *Six Fundamentals*:

To call the wrong doing and negligent people to Allah, and to instruct them with His commandments, was really the duty of the Ambiyaa [i.e., Prophets], which has now been entrusted to the Muslims.

What kinds of emotions may entrustment generate? One emotion that may arise is pride, which is a positive feeling of having achieved something valued or virtuous (De Hooge and Van Osch 2021, p. 2). People become proud when they appraise themselves as being responsible for accomplishing something seen as socially valued (Mascolo and Fischer 1995). For Tablighis, pride may arise as a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction from participating in the socially important deed of preserving *iman*. Pride may come from having *iman*, as *iman* is something that is most pleasing to Allah. Pride may also come from one being a caller to Allah or a worker for Allah, and that one is following in the footsteps of the eminent Muslim personalities of the past. Pride may come from the image of *tabligh* as a mission. For example, Muhammad Zakariyya (1994a, p. 14) says, "The main cause of our [i.e., Muslims] decline is that we do not pay attention to Tabligh nor do we help those who devote themselves to this sacred mission". Balci (2012, p. 70) alludes to pride which he calls "self-esteem"—as something created by being on a mission: "Being given such responsibilities, like da'wa missions for the stray sheep of the Muslim community to keep on the straight and narrow, increases young people's self-esteem".

Tabighis may also experience what psychologists call "group pride". Group-based pride occurs when one identifies with a social group that has achieved something socially valuable (De Hooge and Van Osch 2021, p. 2). Tablighi texts offer Muslims a collective identity with those eminent Muslim personalities of the past—the Prophets and their disciples and companions. Tablighi texts tell Muslims today that by undertaking *tabligh* they are undertaking the "work" or "occupation" that the Prophets and their disciples and companions undertook. Ihtishaamul Hasan (1994, p. 30) says about *tabligh* that "it was exactly this type of work which every prophet of Allah Ta'ala had to do as his sole occupation". Thus, being a Tablighi is to inherit the special work of preaching from the Prophets mentioned in the Qur'an. The following statement in one *bayan* illustrates this discursive move: "Allah has given us the work of the prophets" (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 83).

The main pamphlet of *Faza'il-e-A'maal—Hayaat-us-Sahaabah* (Lives of the Companions) speaks to the exemplary struggle and hardships the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions endured in cultivating *iman* and Islam, and in preaching. For example, Muhammad Zakariyya (1994b, pp. 15–18) tells the story of Prophet Muhammad's journey to a town outside Mecca called Taif to call its people to Islam. The local chieftains rejected the Prophet upon his invitation to them to convert to Islam. Zakariyya (1994b, p. 16) describes the Prophet in this situation as "a rock of steadfastness and perseverance". Reading or hearing such stories may encourage Muslims to also do whatever it takes in terms of time, effort, and finances to call people to Islam. This consideration is illustrative of the emotion of elevation. Elevation is a feeling of upliftment and desire to do good upon witnessing another person undertaking a morally beneficial act towards others (Haidt 2003, pp. 863–64). Elevation ties in with the reason Muhammad Zakariyya wrote *Hayaat-us-Sahaabah*, that is, for mothers to read its contents to their children so as to "create in them an Islamic spirit of love and esteem for the Sahaabah, and thereby improve 'Imaan'" (Zakariyya 1994b, p. 12). Here, I interpret love and esteem as elevation. Muhammad Zakariyya (1994b, p. 13) goes on to say that the stories of the Companions "serve as a beacon of Faith and Practice". Therefore, if a Muslim wants to be inspired or elevated to practice *iman* and Islam, he/she may turn to *Hayaat-us-Sahaabah*.

Finally, entrustment, in combination with the responsibility and *tabligh* frames, may generate the emotion of determination (also called "challenge"). The psychology literature defines determination as "a positive, energized feeling stemming from the believed ability to overcome actual and potential obstacles to achieve one's goals" (Kirby et al. 2014, p. 383). Indeed, Tablighis are known for their tenacity, resourcefulness, and commitment to preaching, sometimes in very difficult circumstances. Tablighi commitment to preaching aligns with the notion that the action that stems from the emotional state of determination is effort (ibid., p. 384). In Tablighi circles much discussion contains references to the term "effort". Ali and Sahib (2022, p. 84) document a few instances of this framing. I mention one example here where a speaker elaborating on *tabligh* said:

This is the effort on which Prophet Muhammad made effort, and He made every Sahabah [Companions of Prophet Muhammad] to stand up with this effort. And Sahabah did the effort (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 84)

By hearing about the sacrifice and effort made by the Muslim personalities found in *Hayaat-us-Sahabah* and mentioned in *bayan*, Muslims today may become determined—i.e., make effort—to overcome obstacles in their day-to-day preaching adventures.

#### 5.6.3. Micro Shock

Fellow feeling is not only the domain of entrustment, but also results from another facet of Tablighi emotion work called micro shock. Jacobsson and Lindblom (2016, pp. 71–72) use the term micro-shock to describe the practice of animal rights activists looking at films and pictures of animal abuse, for example, in fur farms. Watching these stimuli generates anger and outrage, which then spurs individuals towards activism.

In the case of Tabligh Jama'at, micro-shock occurs through shocking ideas of Islam being destroyed or people going to hellfire as punishment for lacking *iman* and Islam. Micro-shock thus corresponds to the motivational frames "urgency" and "severity" (Ali and Sahib 2022, pp. 76–78). Severity and urgency framing are illustrated in the following statements in *Faza'il-e-A'maal* and *bayan*:

Today ... every particle of Islam is being destroyed one by one before our very eyes. (Hasan 1994, p. 31)

The time is moving fast and so is the pace of deterioration in the religion of Islam. The situation demands a strong, quick, and determined effort by one and all for arresting the rot and stopping further degeneration. (Hasan 1994, p. 20)

If we see a burning fire, we will go to stop the fire. So, what about the millions of people who have already died and are going to *jahannam* [hell]? It is our fault! We have failed to do this work. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 83)

The Prophet is not here today. His companions are not here today. So, who is going to worry about the *ummah*? Everyday hundreds of thousands of people pass away. How many of them die without *iman*? (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 77)

In Tablighi discourse dying without faith is the ultimate ruin of a human being. By forwarding the alarming proposition that everyday hundreds of thousands or millions of people are headed towards this ruin, Tablighi texts perform the emotion work of shocking the audience into giving emotional attention to this situation. When the speaker prefaces the shocking statistic of hundreds of thousands of people passing away without faith with the words, "who is going to worry about the *ummah*?" he is prodding the audience to have other-oriented feelings: to *worry*, to *care*, to *empathise*, and to have *sympathy*. For simplicity, I subsume these feelings into the emotions of concern and compassion.

First, concern refers to the disquietedness one may feel due to worry or anxiety about something (Roughley and Schramme 2018, p. 15). In Tablighi circles, concern is denoted by the commonly heard Urdu or Arabic term "*fikr*". Tablighis always encourage each other to have *fikr* for *din* (religion) or *fikr* for *akhirah* (afterlife). For example, Jan Ali relates a Tablighi in Sydney saying about the benefits of *khuruj*: "Everyone comes with same fikr [concern] with same niyat [intention] and with same aim to do the same thing together, that is, to become good God-fearing Muslims" (Ali 2010b, p. 167). Second, compassion is "the feeling that arises in witnessing another's suffering and that motivates a subsequent desire to help" (Goetz et al. 2010, p. 351). For some Tablighis it may be the imagined suffering of others in the afterlife that creates a tender-heartedness and subsequent desire to save people by conveying the message of Islam to them. The following statement by a Tablighi in England illustrates compassion:

It is not enough to give those in need food or clothes. If a man is starving and you give him food he will be hungry again. If you give him clothes then he will have them until they wear out. But true mercy is to inform them of Allah. True mercy is to teach them *salat* [prayer], because *salat* will last for life! (Pieri 2015, p. 144)

#### 5.6.4. Transcendence

The central frame around which the other Tablighi collective action frames revolve is the Allah frame. Ali and Sahib (2022, pp. 78–80) describe the "Allah frame" as calling Muslims to remember that Allah is almighty and to heed Allah's promises of aid and rewards for those that work for him. The Allah frame urges Muslims to have trust in Allah when embarking on preaching. The following *bayan* by a Tablighi in Sydney illustrates this framing:

*Da'wah* [calling people to belief in Allah] has an effect on the heart of the *da'i* [propagator]. This is because he has strong certainty that for whom He is calling He is listening. He is with him. Every single thing in the universe moves with the permission of Allah. Nothing can harm, nothing can benefit except with the permission with Allah. ... The *daұi* must have certainty that every single thing in this world is going to support me because "I am a caller of Allah". The ocean will not go against me. ... Every single thing is supporting me. ... The power is with Allah. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 79)

The emotion work found in this framing is transcendence. Transcendence aims to attach one emotionally to Allah by instructing one to seek Allah's aid. Muhammad Zakariyya (1994a, p. 23) says in *Faza'il-e-Tabligh*, "Asking from Allah, even if it be the mending of a shoe is in itself part of religion". The following words from a *bayan* also prompts Tablighis to rely on Allah:

Believe in the power of Allah, and the mountains will move. ... This thought has to be in your hearts. ... If you have this thought then the effect is there. We have the way, we have the structure. We do not need anything else. We need to implement. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 80)

Emotional framing like this attaches the heart to Allah through the emotions of hope (in Allah's aid) and optimism (in the potential success of preaching efforts). Transcendence tells the Muslim that she need only implement preaching and Allah will take care of the rest. Transcendence may thus counter any negative emotions such as disillusionment and frustration that may arise in preaching activity that does not result in positive responses by potential proselytes.

The focus on Allah's aid and Allah's rewarding one may also generate love for Allah. This idea is supported by Jan Ali's (2010a, p. 110) observation that Tablighis adopt an "Allah-friendly attitude" and that for Tablighis "The attitude of the faithful towards Allah should be inspired by love, gratitude, patience, self-sacrifice, and complete devotion". Love for Allah is encouraged by Tablighi texts. For example, in the pamphlet *Six Fundamentals* contained in *Faza'il-e-A'maal* the author connects *zikr* or remembrance of Allah with love of Allah: "The true believers should remember Allah most often, and by contemplating the wonders of His creation, they should glorify Him, and thereby strengthen their love for Him" (Ilaahi 1994, p. 7).

Transcendence expands the emotional world of the Tablighi by generating in him an interest for the religious life over a worldly or purely material existence. Interest is an emotion that motivates humans to expend effort and brainpower to do things that they are curious about or that fascinate them (Silvia 2008, p. 57). Interest underpins much of human motivation to learn and explore (ibid.). Tablighi texts attempt to generate interest in the religious life by making it seem fascinating. They achieve this by framing the religious life as self-cultivation and self-improvement. This discursive move represents what Ali and Sahib (2022, pp. 75–76) call the "self-reform" frame. The following statements from Tablighi texts illustrate this frame:

[When people have changed their condition] only then can we derive full benefit from the existing religious institutions which, in turn, can serve the community in a befitting manner (Hasan 1994, p. 23)

Say to yourselves that we are going on the path of Allah externally to reform ourselves internally (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 76)

Self-reform can be interesting in the sense of it being an exploration into the spiritual potential of human life. Ihtishaamul Hasan (1994, pp. 28–30) outlines five practices that Muslims can perform that will contribute to their self-reform: (1) memorising and correctly reciting the Muslim testimony of faith; (2) punctuality in performing the five daily canonical obligatory prayers; (3) daily recitation of the Qur'an; (4) daily time for *dhikr* (remembrance of Allah); (5) and good relations with and attitudes towards all Muslims. These acts provide an interesting way of life that lends meaning to one's day-to-day existence.

This facet of Tablighi teaching should not be underestimated for its potential impact on people's lives. If we consider, with Charles Taylor (2007, p. 307), that in modern secular societies "our actions, goals, achievements ... have a lack of weight, gravity, thickness, and substance. There is a deeper resonance which they lack, which we feel should be there", pious living offers a lifestyle that has a metaphysical significance and therefore pious living carries a certain gravity. Because of modern society's lack of meaningful pursuits, as observed by Taylor, pious living becomes interesting for its very meaningfulness and consequence for one's afterlife.

#### 5.6.5. Compensation

Aside from a meaningful existence, Tablighi texts posit pious living as beneficial for one because *iman*, Islam, and *tabligh* are rewarded in the afterlife. This idea draws on the motivational "rewards" frame (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 81). The following *bayan* statement illustrates this framing:

A person who spends his life building up his faith, even if it is only so much as a mustard seed's weight, this effort will be rewarded with a space in Paradise which will be bigger than the universe. In this space he will be gifted a mansion which will be so amazing it will dumbfound the owner. (Ali and Sahib 2022, p. 81)

This message entices the audience with the image of a paradisical mansion that will be so immense that it will dumbfound its recipient.

Such framing is illustrative of the emotion work of compensation. Compensation is the attempt to attach Muslims to pious living and preaching through the emotions of anticipation, excitement, and desire. These emotions are interrelated, as the more an individual feels anticipation and excitement about heavenly rewards, the more she/he would desire to live a life of piety and preaching. Tablighi texts do well to encourage this kind of emotional attachment. Take the following statement from Aashiq Ilaahi (1994, p. 12) in *Six Fundamentals*: "Leaving one's home and family for the cause of Allah has great rewards for the subject in the next life, just as Rasulullah [Prophet Muhammad] has clearly told us". The emotion work here is to attach the reader to preaching by creating anticipation, excitement, and desire due to the great returns or rewards that preaching gives its doer.

To sum up this Results section, we point to Tablighi texts as performing five kinds of emotion work: reflexivity, entrustment, micro shock, transcendence, and compensation. This emotion work is intricately connected with Tablighi framing. Together this emotional framing lends to Tablighi message an immense emotional potential as seen in the several emotions mentioned above. The next section discusses the implications of this dynamism for Tabligh Jama'at as a transformative phenomenon in the modern world.

#### **6. Discussion**

Tablighis have invested in the social transformation of the modern world through individual reform and self-development (Ali 2012). They aim for transformation because, like all Islamic revivalists, they face the challenge of "an overwhelming modern society whose effect is unambiguously corrosive to totalistic religious belief and practice" (Azmi 2000, p. 236). Because of this feature of the modern world, Tablighis have feelings of indignation, moral outrage, disdain, and contempt towards it. These feelings are seen, for example, in the following Tablighi's observation that the world is "a house of dishonour" that "poisons its lovers in their trance" and that on the Day of Judgment the world will manifest as "an old hideous woman" (Talib 2000, p. 72). Additionally, another Tablighi describes Western society as a "polluted and dirty environment" which preaching will cleanse (Masud 2000, p. 108).

Social transformation is "qualitative change in the nature and character of human societies" (Groenewald 2000, p. 18). Historians Will and Ariel Durant (Durant and Durant 1968, p. 32) point out that "Society is founded not on the ideals but on the nature of man". Therefore, transformation of society is intertwined with transformation of individuals that make-up society. For this reason, this study has given close attention to an important facet of human life—the emotions. Considering that individual human beings are the building blocks of a society, and that emotions or feelings are a core element that constitutes the human, social transformation of society pertains—to some degree—to change within the emotional sphere of human life. Additionally, it is here that Tablighi emotion work contributes to social transformation—by enchanting the Muslim's emotional sphere.

To explain this point, if we take secularisation (a hallmark of the modern world) as "the decline in the proportion of their time, energy, and resources which men devote to superempirical concerns" (Wilson 1982, p. 149), then Tablighi emotion work defends against this process by generating in Muslims an emotional attachment to ultimate religious concerns such that they might expend energy for pious, spiritual pursuits. This strategy of Tabligh

Jama'at is seen in Ihtishaamul Hasan's (1994, p. 23) statement that "[Muslims must launch a] counter-effort, where we are able to revive the dead spirit of each and every Muslim and rekindle in him the love and attachment for Islam". I offer here a brief explanation of how the emotion work mentioned in the Results section of this study contribute to this process of attachment for Islam.

Transcendence, for example, may generate emotional attachment to Allah in the form of hope and optimism. Thus, a Tablighi writing a letter from the United Kingdom to the second Tabligh Jama'at leader Maulana Muhammad Yusuf, says " ... those who believe in Allah have proved by their actions that this environment can be changed" (Masud 2000, p. 108). Here, the individual affirms his attachment to Allah rather than attachment to his own or other material means of changing society. Such is the importance of attachment to Allah in Tabligh Jama'at that Ali (2012, p. 242) says, in the movement "All human emotions are concentrated and directed towards Allah as a matter of priority".

The emotion work of micro shock—the use of impactful language (for example, "eternal punishment") and images (for example, people burning in hellfire) to awaken people to the destruction of Islam and people's future punishment—may attach Muslims to Islam and their fellow humans in the form of concern and compassion. Such emotional framing may cause those for whom Islam and people's future have low salience, to begin to have concern and compassion for Islam and people's faith.

Reflexivity emotion work for its part prods Muslims to reflect on their deficiencies in material power, religious character, and failure to work for Islam. Such reflection may result in shame and guilt, as seen in one Tablighi's reflection while on *khuruj* (preaching tour) in the United States:

Arriving here, we realize how much wrong we have done to the faith of the Prophet, how we have neglected the spreading of this faith. The whole Umma [i.e., Muslim community or nation] is now suffering for it. The whole Umma is humiliated ... We have attracted God's punishment because of our bad deeds ... . The situation calls for serious deliberation and weeping. (Masud 2000, p. 117)

The shame and guilt in this statement show that reflexivity has caused him to become attached to existential concerns, namely the state of the Muslim *umma* and religious faith.

These facets of Tablighi emotion work contribute to the Tabligh Jama'at being what Peter Berger (1999, p. 4) calls a religious subculture, which is a means for people to reject modern ideas and values found in the society outside the religious group. Tablighis see the modern world as having corrupted the emotional sphere of human life by replacing love of God and religion with love of *dunya* (worldliness) along with fascination, hope, and pride in temporal things. Therefore, in their preaching, Tablighis attempt to detach Muslims from love of these things. Gilles Kepel (2000, pp. 196–97) reports on the theme of a Tablighi *bayan* he attended in Paris: "A gradual detachment from the connections with this world, by means of prayer, dhikr [i.e., remembrance of God], 'ilm [i.e., knowledge of God], and 'going out' will lead the true believer finally to the peace that the spirit longs for".

Tablighi emotion work is central to this detachment process by directing Muslim attention and emotions to ultimate religious concerns. For example, where once there was desire for a high-salaried job and status amongst peers, now there is desire for Allah's pleasure and status amongst the eminent Muslim personalities of the past.

In view of these points, emotion work to some degree underpins the Tabligh Jama'at being what Bryan Wilson (2010, p. 89) calls "religious community", which is an "ongoing local group" set against society which is "essentially secular". The Tabligh Jama'at aims to defend against secular society by forming local groups in which *iman* and Islam are considered signs of one's flourishing. *Iman* and Islam may be things that modern society deems inconsequential or even detrimental to human flourishing; hence, the contrasting nature of the religious community and secular society, and that the formation of the former becomes a defence against the latter. By re-directing Muslim emotions to ultimate religious concerns, emotion work contributes to the formation of an anti-secular, or at the very least, un-secular, community culture.

Tablighi emotion work and its emotions make Tablighi communities into an emotional haven from the travails of the modern world outside. This idea is illustrated in one Tablighi's comment that spending time with a Tabligh Jama'at results in one having "emotional poise"—that is, "if *akhirat* [i.e., Afterlife] is one's real purpose, then Allah bestows upon such a person an emotional poise that cleanses the heart from worldly worries" (Talib 2000, p. 64). Time spent in a Tablighi community provides what Kinnvall and Svensson (2017) describe as "ontological security" which is an emotional response (i.e., feelings of spirituality, solidarity, and purpose) to the negative feelings of ontological insecurity and existential anxiety produced by a modern world marked by secular global governance, transnationalism, and national security.

The above discussion allows us to opine that Tabligh Jama'at participates in the social transformation of the world by detaching people emotionally from a purely material and secularised way of life and attaching them emotionally to a pious life such that pious living becomes a deeply satisfying and serious affair. Exploring the emotion work performed by Tablighi texts has allowed this study to make this analysis of the Tabligh Jama'at. Emotion work, therefore, is not only a key action of Tablighi texts, but a window into the nature of the Tabligh Jama'at as a transformative phenomenon in the modern world.

#### **7. Conclusions**

Tabligh Jama'at's preaching parties and Tablighi communities are characterised by a religious subculture infused with certain emotions engendered by the emotion work performed by its literary and oral texts *Faza'il-e-A'maal* and *bayan*. Tablighi emotion work attempts to re-enchant the individual's emotional sphere by re-orienting his/her aspirations, fascinations, loves, and concerns for purely material, vain matters to religious matters. This re-orientation or detachment/attachment process is achieved by Tabighi texts through five different kinds of emotion work: reflexivity, entrustment, micro-shock, transcendence, and compensation. This emotion work may potentially generate the emotions of shame, guilt, interest, pride, elevation, concern, compassion, anticipation, excitement, desire, hope, optimism, and love for Allah.

Through generating these emotions, Tabligh Jama'at participates in the transformation of people's emotional dimension such that they become emotionally attached to Allah, Islam, Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, *iman* (faith), *tabligh* (preaching), Muslims, and the afterlife. Tablighi emotion work instructs Muslims to feel passionately about these things, and in doing so, increases their attraction and commitment to the Islamic revivalist cause. By attaching Muslim hearts to religious concerns, Tablighi framing and emotion work aims for an emotional awakening in Muslims that reverses or protects against the corruption of human emotional sphere by the secular modern world. By enchanting human emotional life, Tablighi emotion work contributes to the enchantment of society—one person and local Tablighi community at a time.

This study is a preliminary attempt to introduce the sociology of emotions into Tabligh Jama'at research. Several avenues remain open for further research using this approach. For example, we may explore the Tablighi participant side of the movement to see how the emotion work of Tablighi texts is received by participants and potential recruits. Future examination of emotion work in Islamic revivalist movements could designate a space to exploring the personal, cultural, social, and political factors that impact the resonance of a movement's emotion work for Muslims from different backgrounds. Such research avenues open up a place for emotions in our understanding of Islamic revivalism in the modern world.

**Funding:** The author received no external funding in performing this research.

**Institutional Review Board Statement:** Not applicable.

**Informed Consent Statement:** Not applicable.

**Data Availability Statement:** Not applicable.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

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