**Part 1: Goals, Trade-Offs, Values, and Ethics**

### **Biodiversity and the UN's Sustainable Development Goals**

**Clement A. Tisdell**

#### **1. Introduction**

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (which was adopted by all United Nations States in 2015) presents an ambitious set of goals for achieving sustainable development. According to a United Nations' source, "it provides a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future" (United Nations 2015a). "At its heart are 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are an urgent call for action by all countries—developed and developing in a global partnership. They recognize that ending poverty and other deprivations must go hand in hand with strategies that improve education, reduce inequality and spur economic growth—all while tackling climate change and working to preserve our oceans and forests" (United Nations 2015a).

While the purpose of this agenda is admirable, in reality, it promises much more than it is likely to deliver. This is partly because the statements of its SDGs and their related targets had to be crafted in a way to obtain their political acceptability by nations with diverse and often conflicting interests. In order to satisfy all countries ratifying the agenda, many of the targets are rather vague and open-ended and lack compatibility. Moreover, it is left to individual nations to decide which targets they will focus on and how these will be addressed. This includes the biodiversity targets present in this agenda. Furthermore, no penalties will be imposed on individual nations failing to address any of the SDGs adequately. Basically, the extent to which individual nations pursue the SDGs is voluntary. In addition, because individual nations report on their own progress in achieving the SDGs, this gives them scope to paint a more favourable picture of their achievements than may be warranted. These limitations all reflect the need of the UN to respect national sovereignty.

Despite these limitations, the SDGs provide nudges, prompts or reminders to individual nations and communities of the need to adopt policies to respond to significant global environmental and sustainable development problems. Furthermore, the SDGs and their associated targets provide platforms for the

academic community and for the general public to discuss and analyse pressing sustainable development issues.

This chapter focuses mainly, but not entirely, on examining the biodiversity targets listed or implied in SDG 15. SDG 15 is intended to promote the sustainability of life on land and lists several targets for doing this. This list includes objectives for forest conservation, for combatting desertification, for limiting and reversing land degradation, and for stopping biodiversity loss. The discussion of the SDG 15 biodiversity targets is preceded in this article by considerations on the nature of biodiversity and its valuation. This discussion is important for showing the types of challenges that have to be overcome in specifying biodiversity targets and for setting the biodiversity targets contained in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. After this, the biodiversity targets contained in SDG 15 are scrutinized, and then other relevant targets and additional biodiversity targets contained in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are considered, giving particular attention to their compatibility with the biodiversity targets listed in SDG 15. Subsequently, in order to provide a concrete example of how one country has decided to respond to the SDG 15 biodiversity targets, the approach of India is briefly outlined and critically examined. This is followed by a general discussion.

#### **2. The Concept of Biodiversity and Its Valuation**

#### *2.1. The Complexity of the Concept of Biodiversity*

Biodiversity is both a multi-layered and a multidimensional concept (Juhász-Nagy 1993; Magurran 2003). Two major layers include:


Within each layer, the dimensions of this diversity can be measured in different ways. For example, in relation to genetic diversity, one can account for the number of genera, the number of species and the diversity of sub-species and varieties in each category. The geographical extent of each of these can be another consideration, for example, the extent to which these biodiversities are locally present, their regional occurrence and their global prevalence. Given the multilayered and multidimensional nature of biodiversity, the prospect of constructing a general index which satisfactorily embraces all the characteristics of biodiversity seems to be slim. This (as well as differences of opinion about how best to value biodiversity) makes it difficult to determine appropriate sustainable development goals for biodiversity.

#### *2.2. The Specification of SDG 15 Inadequately Related to the Nature of Biodiversity*

To a large extent, the diversity of extant organisms depends on the variety of existing ecosystems and their adequacy for enabling varied organisms to survive. In other words, the number of available environmental niches has a major influence on the extent of species diversity. This is highlighted by the fact that loss of habitat is the main cause of the global reduction in genetic diversity in the wild (Joppa et al. 2016, p. 418). Economic development is the main contributor to this loss because of its impact on natural ecosystems. Unfortunately, this relationship is not explicitly mentioned in the specification of SDG 15. Instead, it focuses on objectives to reduce poaching and illegal trafficking in wildlife and the control of invasive organisms as measures to sustain biodiversity. While attention to both these threats to biodiversity is warranted, more significant threats ought to have been considered in formulating SDG 15. Moreover, not only the loss of wild biodiversity but also the loss of existing diversity in agriculture and other bio-industries (that is, other industries culturing or husbanding living resources, such as aquaculture) should have been taken into account in proposing targets for sustaining life on earth.

These shortcomings might have been overcome if more attention had been paid to the concept and nature of biodiversity and to establishing an overarching framework for the scientific discussion of policies to promote sustainable development. However, it is unrealistic to expect scientific precision in the formulation of the targets for the Global Agenda 2030. This is because this agenda had to be formulated and modified, for it to be accepted by existing nations and stakeholders with varied interests and aims.

#### *2.3. Valuation, Biodiversity Conservation and the SDGs*

Rationally determining biodiversity targets requires some acceptable and logical method of valuing objectives. Whether or not the consensus-type political method adopted in formulating the targets for the SDG goals and the biodiversity component embedded within these is adequate in this regard is open to question. The UN's sustainable development agenda appears to pay little or no attention to the type of methods that economists have been developing to value biodiversity conservation and to economic principles but appears to rely heavily on the opinion of natural scientists for its background formulation and for the determination of its targets for biodiversity conservation. This may be because ecologists and many other natural scientists have been prominent in portraying sustainable development as primarily an ecological problem.

This raises the question of why there is a lack of attention to economics in formulating the Global Agenda 2030 targets for biodiversity conservation. There are a number of possible reasons for this. These include:


As far as the latter aspect is concerned, two different economic approaches to conservation of biodiversity (which can result in different policy conclusions) include:


The first mentioned approach is based on social cost–benefit analysis. In this case, estimates of the willingness to pay for marketed commodities as well as unmarketed environmental ones are often taken into account in determining social benefits. The second mentioned approach concentrates on the effect of the conservation of environmental resources on the level of incomes and employment. These effects are generated by marketed commodities, for example, by the sale of tourism services. This approach gives inadequate attention to the economic value of unmarketed ecological services. Disparities in the policy implications of the application of the methods of welfare economics and of economic impact analysis have been pointed out by Tisdell (2012; 2015, chp. 16). Nevertheless, all have a role to play in evaluating biological conservation.

With this background in mind, let us start to consider the nine conservation targets contained in SDG 15 (as well as three added policy proposals) and then subsequently explore additional dimensions of biodiversity conservation evident in the other SDG goals. As pointed out by Schultz et al. (2016, p. 23), targets listed under SDG 15 only directly refer to terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity.

#### **3. The SDG 15 Targets and Biodiversity Conservation**

#### *3.1. Background Information*

The aim of SDG 15 is to "protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss" (United Nations 2015b). It is accompanied by nine targets and three policy suggestions. *Target 15.1* is "by 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands and mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements". One of the questions that arises in that regard is whether all sustainable uses of ecosystems are compatible with one another and beneficial to biodiversity conservation. Cases will arise in which trade-offs are involved. How will or should the desirability of these trade-offs be determined? This remains an open question. If the three-pillar approach to analysing sustainability is adopted, it may be necessary to forgo some components of ecological sustainability (including biodiversity) in order to obtain economic and social sustainability (Barbier 1987; Barbier and Burgess 2017). As natural capital and biodiversity become scarcer due to economic growth, the economic case for their preservation becomes stronger (Tisdell 2005).

#### *3.2. Forest Conservation and Restoration*

*Target 15.2* is "by 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests and substantially increase afforestation and reforestation globally" (United Nations 2015b). This target raises a query about the type of services for which forests should be sustainably managed. For example, to what extent should they be sustainably managed for timber production rather than other valued services provided by the use or preservation of forests. These can be in conflict and may call for trade-offs. In developing countries, many poor rural communities depend heavily for their livelihoods on the utilization of non-timber forest resources (as illustrated by (Ren and Tisdell 2002)). The availability of these resources can be jeopardized when forests are sustainably managed for timber production (Tisdell et al. 2002). Furthermore, the sustainable management of forests is complicated by the fact that some local communities use these to their own advantage, which results in biodiversity losses or negative environmental consequences for other communities (Tisdell et al. 2002). This target does not take account of these issues.

#### *3.3. Target 15.3*

*Target 15.3* is "by 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods and strive to achieve a land degradation-neutral world" (United Nations 2015b).

While at first glance this seems to be a desirable target, it also has some limitations. First, to what end or purpose should the degraded land be restored? Second, what ought to be the state to which it should be returned? Is it to a state that is supportive of some feature of biodiversity or to the state in which it was able to be used in the past? For example, if it is a forest restoration project, should the forest be restored (as far as possible) to its most recent natural state or should it be restored to a modified state? Because of altering natural conditions, the attributes of land are liable to vary with the passage of time and can become 'degraded'; therefore, which of the past states (if any) should the land be returned to?

Most importantly, consideration should be given to the costs and benefits of land restoration. Available resources for land restoration are scarce, and opportunity costs are involved in such restoration. It is unrealistic to ignore these costs. though some land restorations may be justified on economic grounds, it is unlikely that all restorations could be justified on these grounds. Nevertheless, economic considerations require to minimize the costs of whatever type of land restoration is planned. Moreover, in some cases, it may prove to be impossible for humans to prevent the spread of deserts or changes in the attributes of land that arise as a result of climate change (Tisdell 2017, chp. 2), due to either natural or anthropocentric causes. In turn, these changes alter the ecosystems and impact on the sustainability of biodiversity.

#### *3.4. Target 15.4—Conserving Mountain Ecosystems*

The purpose of *Target 15.4* is "by 2030, ensure the conservation of mountain ecosystems, including their biodiversity, in order to enhance their capacity to provide benefits that are essential for sustainable development." (United Nations 2015b)

A problem with this target is that, given climate change, it is likely to be impossible to conserve or maintain all mountain ecosystems and their associated biodiversity. It is necessary to tailor policies for ecosystem conservation so as to allow for the forces of climate change, which are, to a large extent, not controlled locally. Even if current anthropocentric contributions to global warming are significantly reduced in the near future, lagged climate effects will still take their toll on existing ecosystems and contribute to further biodiversity loss. To some extent, it may be

possible to mitigate some of these effects, but several can be expected to be irreversible and not preventable.

#### *3.5. Target 15.5—Halting Biodiversity Loss by Reducing the Degradation of Natural Habitats and by Other Means*

*Target 15.5* calls for the taking of "urgent and significant action to reduce the degradation of natural habitats, halt the loss of biodiversity and by 2020, protect and prevent the extinction of threatened species" (United Nations 2015b). This in itself appears to be a desirable goal, especially for those holding ecocentric values. However, conserving biodiversity does not only depend on the conservation of natural habitats. A few species depend on human alterations to some natural habitats for their existence, and some are entirely dependent on human nurturing and the provision of suitable habitats for their survival. For example, the survival of avocados depends entirely on human efforts to cultivate them. It is also believed that the traditional land management practices of Australian Aborigines (such as systematic fire burns) were instrumental in ensuring the survival of some wild species of marsupials. The survival of threatened species sometimes undoubtedly depends on human alterations to natural habitats. This can increase their chances of survival, given, for example, the reduced size of the remaining available natural habitats and the lack of suitable natural resources for sustaining threatened species within these habitat pockets. In other words, human management and some alterations to natural (and other) habitats may be required to promote biodiversity conservation, because existing natural habitats are no longer adequate for this purpose. Of course, such human interventions involve an economic cost, and there are limits to improvements in biodiversity conservation which can be achieved by altering natural habitats.

#### *3.6. Benefits from the Utilization of Genetic Resources*

*Target 15.6* states: "Promote fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from utilization of genetic resources and promote appropriate access to such resources, as internationally agreed" (United Nations 2015b). This aspect is discussed at some length in Tisdell (2015, chp. 10). It might be noted that the emphasis in the above statement is on equity. In reality, two different aspects of this objective should be considered. These are the equity aspect and whether such payments make a positive contribution to biodiversity conservation. In some cases, even if the full 'excess economic return (rent)' received by those using genetic resources is paid to those initially having possession of these resources, this may be ineffective in providing adequate economic incentives for them to conserve these resources. Furthermore, the amount received by holders of such resources could be negligible after the costs of benefit transfers (transactions costs) are taken into account.

There is the further complication that property rights in some genetic resources (such as property rights in new plant varieties, including genetically modified organisms (GMOs)) can have negative consequences for the stock of existing biodiversity and, in some instances, could have inequitable impacts on income distribution. Consequently, this target raises a few unresolved dilemmas.

#### *3.7. Target 15.7*

*Target 15.7* calls for "urgent action to end poaching and trafficking of protected species of flora and fauna and address both the demand and the supply of illegal wildlife products" (United Nations 2015b). The intended biodiversity conservation aim of this target is clear. It does, however, overlook the fact that in some cases, the sustainable use of protected species and the marketing of wildlife products can contribute to their survival. For example, the managed commercial use of saltwater crocodiles in the Northern Territory (Australia) has made a significant contribution to their survival in the wild (Tisdell 2014, chp. 9). More attention needs to be given to the ways in which the market system (for example, via ecotourism) can promote the conservation of wildlife and supplement other means of conserving genetic diversity in the wild.

#### *3.8. Invasive Alien Species*

*Target 15.8* is as follows: "By 2020, introduce measures to prevent the introduction and significantly reduce the impact of invasive alien species on land and water ecosystems and control or eradicate the priority species" (United Nations 2015b).

The introduction of invasive alien species to new territories has resulted in a substantial decline in global biodiversity. In many cases, natural ecosystems have been degraded, and significant economic losses have been experienced in agriculture and other bio-industries as a result of these introductions. Given growing global movements of people and goods, the risk of further unwelcome introduction of undesired alien species remains quite high. The human introduction of alien species to new territories may be deliberate or accidental (incidental). Sometimes, deliberate introductions are made by government bodies to increase the productivity of ecologically based industries. Some of these have had unintended negative environmental consequences, and the benefits of their introduction have been greatly exceeded by their negative environmental costs. The introduction to Australia of the cane toad from South America to control insects infesting the sugar cane

provides one such example. It can also happen that an alien introduction to assist one industry, such as agriculture, can have adverse consequences for natural biodiversity. For example, the introduction of the semi-aquatic grasses *Hymenachne amplexicaulus* and *Urochloa mutica* to increase the productivity of the pastoral industry in the Northern Territory (Australia) has led to their invasion of the Kakadu National Park, with negative consequences for the conservation of natural habitats in this park (Setterfield et al. 2013). Furthermore, individuals who deliberately (and sometimes secretly) introduce alien species to new territories rarely take account of any negative environmental externalities which their action may endanger.

Given the limited amount of resources available for regulating the introduction of invasive alien species to new territories and for controlling or eradicating those which are already present, it is desirable to establish priorities for all of these activities. Furthermore, attention should be given to determining the appropriate total amount of public funding for pest control. In addition, public finance considerations associated with addressing issues involving the exclusion and management of alien species should be considered. In the latter respect, to what extent should industry beneficiaries of efforts to exclude or manage alien species be required to contribute to the costs of the effort involved?

Although it is reasonable to recommend in SDG *target 15.8* that priority alien species (which are already in a new territory) should be controlled or eradicated, the time frame suggested for doing that is rather short. However, more importantly, there is no prevailing clear pathway for establishing priorities for the control or eradication of invasive alien species. Several different approaches to establishing these priorities are possible, but there is as yet no resolution as to what the ideal approach is, if there is one (Tisdell et al.). Furthermore, it is important for more research to be done on how resources are, in fact, allocated for the management and eradication of alien invasive species. This can help to uncover shortcomings in current pest control practices and how these might be addressed. The need should have been highlighted for more research funding to investigate the establishment of priorities for the control and eradication of alien invasive species, instead of ostensibly assuming that these priorities are already well established.

#### *3.9. SDG Target 15.9*

The objective of SDG *target 15.9* is to integrate, by 2020, ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning development processes, poverty reduction and accounts. While this appears to be commendable as a scheme for the implementation of ecosystems and biodiversity conservation, one possible problem is

the lack of guidance about the relevant values which should be taken into account and how this valuation should occur. Furthermore, there is limited guidance about what actions should be taken in the light of this valuation. More extensive consultations between national and local government bodies (as is, for example, happening in India in order to implement its contribution to the SDGs) could have little practical effect, especially if the discussions involve mainly a limited number of public (civil) servants.

#### *3.10. Recommendations 15A, 15B and 15C*

Three recommendations are added to the targets for SDG 15 to provide extra policy guidance on how some of its targets might be achieved. Recommendation 15A is to seek more finance from all sources to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity and ecosystems. While extra finance for this purpose would help achieve this aim, finance alone is not sufficient to ensure that it is achieved. Another unresolved issue is whether it is desirable to maintain all existing ecosystems and the whole of the existing stock of genetic diversity, both the genetic stock developed by human effort as in agriculture and that present in the wild. The opportunity costs associated with the implementation of this recommendation need to be considered.

Policy recommendation 15B advocates increasing the funding for sustainable forest management and the provision of "adequate incentives to developing nations to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation" (United Nations 2015b). It is, however, unclear what types of sustainable forest management are proposed for support. Forests can be managed sustainably to satisfy different targets. These targets can include maintaining their maximum economic yield for timber and ensuring the lasting availability of non-timber products, as well as the conservation of wild biodiversity (and other) services provided by forests. Attention to trade-offs is usually involved in utilizing and managing forests. Consequently, this policy recommendation is too open-ended to provide practical guidance for desirable forestry management.

Recommendation 15C is to "Enhance global support for efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protected species, including by increasing the capacity of local communities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportunities" (United Nations 2015b). This implies, among other things, that more attention should be given to ensuring compliance with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). While undoubtedly there is a case for greater control of poaching and trafficking of some endangered species, this recommendation ignores the fact that the managed sustainable use of some endangered species

is likely to be more effective in ensuring their conservation. In some cases, ranching and farming as well as other commercial uses of endangered species can be more effective in conserving endangered species. The possibilities are quite complex (Tisdell 2005, chp. 6).

Again, the proposal that local communities be provided with sustainable livelihood opportunities in order to reduce their economic motivation to engage in poaching and trafficking can contribute to biodiversity conservation in the wild. Nevertheless, one needs to take account of the limitations of such a policy. The economic opportunities open to many remote communities for increasing incomes are often quite limited (see, for example, Tisdell 2014, chp. 16). In addition, the illegal use of protected ecosystems may still remain comparatively profitable for some individuals. The main economic beneficiaries from such illegal use are often the richer and more influential members of societies (see, for example, (Wibowo et al. 1997)). This adds to the difficulty of curbing the illegal use of protected wildlife and ecosystems.

#### **4. Biodiversity Conservation and Goals Other Than SDG 15**

#### *4.1. How Well Are the Biodiversity Targets for SDG 15 Integrated with the Other SDGs?*

Although it is recognized by the UN that the SDGs and their associated targets should be implemented in an integrated manner in order to progress the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the actual statement of these goals and their associated targets display limited integration. The outlines of these items tend to be compartmentalized. This improves their comprehension but fails to take account of several of their cross-effects on biodiversity.

In order to illustrate this problem, consider first SDG14, life below the water, which focuses on life in the seas and the use of marine resources and then let us pay attention to selected targets for achieving SDG2, that is, achieving zero hunger by 2030.

#### *4.2. Conservation on Land and the Sustainability of Marine Biodiversity*

Rather surprisingly, the targets for meeting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development make no allowances for the impacts of terrestrial activities of the humankind on the conservation of marine biodiversity. It is well known that several terrestrial activities of humans can have negative effects on life in the ocean. These effects are additional to those climate changes which are attributable to human activities.

Negative effects of activities on land on marine ecosystems include:


#### *4.3. SDG2—The Zero Hunger Goal and Biodiversity Conservation*

Five targets for ending hunger by 2030 and three measures to support this goal are outlined in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Although each of the targets appears to be desirable, no attention is paid to considering trade-offs between the targets. It is unlikely to be possible to achieve all the targets simultaneously, and no attention is paid to the obstacles that have to be overcome to achieve them. For example, to what extent is the target of doubling the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers by 2030 (target 2.3) compatible with the conservation of genetic diversity as set out in target 2.5? How is it proposed to ensure this compatibility? The statement of SDG2 provides no information about these matters.

Policy recommendations 2B and 2C call for reduced international trade restrictions and market 'distortions' in accordance with the Doha Development Round and suggest ways to ensure the "proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives" (United Nations 2015a). It does not take into account the possibility that the extension of and the increasing reliance of agriculture on the market system can result in losses in agricultural biodiversity (Tisdell 2015, chps. 5 and 6) as well as in wild biodiversity. Nevertheless, policy recommendation 2A states that there should be greater investment in plant and livestock gene banks "in order to enhance agricultural productivity in developing countries, in particular least

developed countries" (United Nations 2015a). This seems to be intended as a way to offset reductions in the agricultural genetic pool resulting from market extension.

A couple of observations are in order as far as gene banks are concerned. First, the economics of these banks is poorly researched (Tisdell 2016). Second, it is not clear that developing countries will be the main beneficiaries of these gene banks. It is quite possible that large companies (with headquarters in higher income countries) engaging in the development and marketing of improved agricultural seed varieties and the upgrading of livestock breeds could be the prime economic beneficiaries. Nevertheless, there could still be global benefits. For example, agricultural seed varieties could be developed which are better able to cope with climate change than the current ones. This might not happen in the absence of these gene banks and without the presence of larger companies with a goal to develop improved seed varieties.

It is not being argued that the type of targets and policy recommendations stated in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are irrelevant but rather that they are too simplistic and, in many cases, vague. Their shortcomings are further exposed because individual nations are given considerable freedom about what targets to focus on and how. Aspects of India's plans for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are revealing in that regard.

#### **5. Brief Notes on India's Implementation of the Biodiversity Targets in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development**

India has developed its plan for implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations and NITI Aayog 2018). In relation to SDG 15, it proposes an increase of 33% in its tree cover by 2030 compared to 2015. In the same time period, it plans to raise the surface area of its inland waters in forested areas by the same percentage. Just what policy measures it will adopt to achieve these ends are not specified, and the targeted qualities of the tree cover and of its inland water bodies are not mentioned. At present, India's inland water bodies are highly polluted by effluents and human wastes (Lélé et al. 2018). This presumably has negative consequences for biodiversity.

As for SDG target 15.5 which calls for "action to reduce the degradation of natural habitat, halt the loss of biodiversity and, by 2020, protect and prevent the extermination of threatened species" (United Nations 2015b), India intends to measure its success in satisfying this target by the extent to which it is able to increase its wild elephant population. It intends to maintain this population at its 2017 level.

The choice of wild elephant numbers as a barometer of India's progress in conserving wild biodiversity is based on the belief that their presence is positively associated with healthy natural ecosystems. Wild elephants are also sometimes seen as an umbrella species (one that enables the diversity of other species) and a flagship species (species favoured by the public for conservation). Nevertheless, wild elephants are only present in a limited geographical area in India. In areas where they are not present, and especially in areas where the habitat is unsuited to their presence, other indicators of success in the conservation of wild biodiversity would be required. There is also the problem that wild elephants can cause significant crop losses and consequently reduce the amount of food available for humans (Bandara and Tisdell 2002). The effects can be devastating for the subsistence of small-scale farmers.

In response to target SDG 2.3 (increasing agricultural food productivity), India plans to double its average yield of rice, wheat and coarse grains from the 2015 baseline figure of 2509.22 kg/ha to 5018.44 kg/ha by 2030. No indication is given of how this doubling will be achieved, and in fact, the target is probably unrealistic (Tisdell 2019). No mention is made of how this strategy will benefit small-scale farmers and other disadvantaged food producers who are identified in the UN's specification of SDG target 2.3 as being most worthy of support for increasing their food production and incomes. In addition, there is no discussion of how the doubling of these yields will affect biodiversity conservation.

India's plans for implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals appear to be piecemeal. However, in this regard, it is not unique among nations. Its focus on the level of population of just one wild species, wild elephants, is inadequate as a measure of its success in conserving wild biodiversity. Furthermore, its procedures for conserving agricultural biodiversity have not been spelt out. Greater attention to the quality of its tree cover and its inland water rather than just concentrating on increases in these areas would also be appropriate from the point of view of biodiversity conservation. Additional discussion of these issues is available in Tisdell (2019).

#### **6. Discussion**

A significant limitation of the UN's SDGs is that they lack integration. Furthermore, insufficient consideration is given to the trade-offs likely to be involved in pursuing individual SDG targets. Pursuing some of the targets (for example, substantially raising food production) is likely to require alterations to existing ecosystems and changes in the stock of biodiversity. It is unrealistic to assume that

maintaining the status quo in the stock of biodiversity is compatible with satisfying all the anthropocentric targets stated in the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. Therefore, it is necessary to take account of these trade-offs and of the opportunity costs involved in the implementation of this agenda. The provision of an extra set of targets by the UN stating how this might be done (that is, a set of guidelines on how to harmonize the targets) would have been of great practical value. Alternatively, some indication of the type of research required to elucidate these trade-offs would have been useful.

Why are the UN's targets frequently vague, presented in a somewhat piecemeal manner, and why are trade-offs not specified? Most likely, this reflects the need for supplying a document which could be agreed to by nations and parties with diverse interests in it. Because the UN is administered by several bodies (many of which have different objectives, not all of which are entirely compatible), this probably influenced the composition (e.g., the piecemeal nature) of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Documents of this type play an important role in helping to secure ongoing funding for the bodies operating under the umbrella of the UN, and therefore, each probably looked for support from the 2030 Agenda. After all, the organization of the UN involves a bureaucracy which has an interest in its financial survival, as does each of the bodies operating under its auspices. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that it takes into account its own interests and political considerations in preparing documents like that drawn up for its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (cf. Svizzero and Tisdell 2016).

The UN was presumably subject to internal organizational constraints in drafting the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and by the need to consider the possible varied political reactions of member states of the UN to its draft. Given all these constraints, it is, therefore, a major achievement for this agenda to have been articulated and accepted by most nations. Although the biodiversity conservation implications of this agenda display inconsistencies and imprecision (as highlighted in this chapter), it does ensure that attention continues to be focused, globally, on the importance of biodiversity as an influence on the sustainability of development. There is a continuing need both to evaluate this diversity from the point of view of its contribution to anthropocentric economic goals and to allow for the felt obligations of much of humankind to conserve the web of life and natural ecosystems, even when doing so is of little or no apparent material economic value to humankind.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Acknowledgments:** Thanks to Evelyn Smart for the word processing of this manuscript and research assistance.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **References**


Wibowo, Drajad, Clement A. Tisdell, and R. Neil Byron. 1997. Deforestation and capital accumulation: Lessons from Kerinci-Seblat National Park, Indonesia. *Asia Pacific Journal of Environment and Development* 4: 11–28.

© 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

### **Integrating Environmental Value Systems: A Proposal for Synthesis**

**Konrad Ott and Karl Christoph Reinmuth**

#### **1. Introduction**

There is no lack of approaches to the valuation of natural and semi-natural entities in the context of environmental protection issues, especially with regard to biodiversity on the different levels of genomes, populations, species, and ecosystems. With reference to valuations, arguments are made for and against conservation, restoration, sustainable utilization, access and benefit sharing, and other ways of dealing with natural entities. Different, sometimes competing value systems are used, which are based on different presuppositions, but nevertheless can overlap. In the following chapter, some typologies of values (=schematized orderings of types of values) will be subjected to a philosophical analysis, since the lack of systematic unification is a deficit, and an analysis can contribute to a well-founded choice of a value system. A systematic theoretical step towards conceptual unity may open the view to more urgent political questions in an age of unprecedented environmental crisis. This chapter is dedicated to an analysis of existing approaches to evaluation typologies and it identifies avenues for possible synthesis. Another typology of environmental values has been given by Tadaki et al. (2017), distinguishing values (a) as the magnitude of preferences, (b) contributions to goals, (c) individual priorities, and (d) relations. With Tadaki et al. (2017), we share a basic idea: schematic value systems are important tools for the evaluative classification of complex issues. Multi-criteria decision making and environmental impact analysis also rest on value schemes, often implicitly. Value schemes are also part of a scientific ideal of operationalizing concepts and often quantify values in terms of money (monetization). Philosophical considerations, however, must be reflective upon value systems in order to keep touch with underlying questions. In particular, philosophical reflections about the role of values in argumentation, judgement and decision making, about different types of values and their relation to norms and motivation can provide information about which functions value systems must be able to fulfil and which criteria they should fulfil. This chapter analyses approaches to environmental evaluation and presents a discussion of their strengths and weaknesses. It argues

that a comprehensive and integrated synthesis of existing approaches is within reach if solutions to philosophical problems related to valuation issues are considered.

The efforts to elaborate such value systems and incorporate them into decision making are also demanded by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially SDG 15 ("Life on Land"). For example, sub-target 15.9 calls for the integration of "ecosystem and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes, poverty reduction strategies and accounts". Thus, SDG 15 implicitly recognizes the need for evaluation processes. The same holds true for Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). There has been dispute within IPBES for years about limits of and presumptive alternatives to the ecosystem service approach. The conceptual framework of IPBES wishes to include non-Western frameworks into the broad concept of "nature's contribution to people". The value-laden concept of "good quality of life" also refers to evaluations. Other concepts, such as "Mother Earth", "Systems of Life", "Intrinsic Values" and "Living in Harmony with Nature", refer to debates in environmental ethics. Neither SDG 15 nor IPBES, however, reach deeper ethical grounds. This deficit shall be addressed in the chapter in the spirit of IPBES. An ethical synthesis of value systems can and should help the integration of the 'diverse conceptualization of multiple values of nature and its contributions, including biodiversity and ecosystem functions and services' (objective 4, IPBES work programme). The following chapter wishes to contribute to improved evaluations within SDG 15 and IPBES by a robust theoretical groundwork.

This chapter is structured as follows. In the first part, we discuss the axiological concept of value and highlight the role of value systems in valuations and evaluations (Section 2). We then analyse various value systems that have been proposed in the humanities and social sciences for mapping environmental values. There is the Total Economic Value (TEV) scheme, the Ecosystem Service (ESS) approach and various value systems designed in environmental ethics (Rolston 1988; Krebs 1999; Ott 2010; Muraca 2011; Ott et al. 2016). TEV and ESS are often seen as economic schemes, which gives them the general suspicion of "neoliberal thinking" and the repugnant commercialisation of nature on the part of some environmentalists. We will see under which conditions such accusations are justified. While the TEV is clearly economic in scope and method (Section 3), the case is more complex with regard to the ESS (Section 4). Both TEV and ESS are anthropocentric, while all value systems in environmental ethics pay attention to the demarcation problem, considering inherent moral value for natural beings (Section 5). The idea of a uniform ("synthesised") valuation scheme does not require a final and perfect solution to the demarcation

problem, but such scheme should not be limited to anthropocentrism. In Section 6, we argue that the categories within TEV and ESS can and should be integrated into the essential patterns of environmental ethics discourse. As we shall see in the next section, valuation schemes can either obscure or reveal underlying philosophical and ethical problems. Our strategy is to use such schemes for revealing.

#### **2. Value Systems and Evaluations**

Since ancient times, philosophy has reflected on the status on categories named "values". The philosophy of values has been termed "axiology" since then. Sociology, psychology, history, and economics affirm subject-based axiologies since the beginning of the 20th century. Values are treated as social facts (Durkheim, Weber) from the perspective of observers. The many differences in between values can and should be explained by history, psychology and sociology, while philosophers quest for validity and the (ultimate) grounding of values. Differences between values can take different axiological correlations: peaceful coexistence, indifference, mutual support, respectful tolerance, contrariness, conflict, clash, contradiction. Conflicts over supreme values (nation, religion, socialism, purity of race) may lead to rebellions, civil wars, and revolutions. In Germany, values of natural heritage, unspoiled landscapes, endangered indigenous species, wilderness areas, etc., have enriched the spectrum of societal values since the Romantic movement (Ott 2016).

Nobody doubts that values of environmentalists conflict with those of a liberal consumer culture. According to our modern lifestyles, values of both spheres can be combined. Clearly, beautiful valleys, sparkling waterfalls and a sunset on the beach can be valued as being "good" for naturalists. One can, however, also value a robust car by which one can reach remote sites and can also enjoy a comfortable hotel room with ocean view at the coastline. Most of us value a high-tech camera for spots and sceneries. Economists argue that reasonable utility-functions would combine preferences to different goods and commodity as to maximize the individual good. High-end tourism often combines natural sceneries with luxury accommodation. Such high-end eco-luxury lifestyles, however, look morally repugnant, because not all people can realize them. In such cases, values come under moral attacks. Is it unjust to enjoy a holiday season in the outdoors as long as not all working class people on planet Earth can enjoy paid holidays? It seems fair to say that egalitarian social movements have specialized on grounding such attacks on "privileged" values, even environmental ones. Thus, appreciating values of natural entities does not escape moral critique against unjust privileges. The chapter, however, does not tackle issues of distributive justice.

#### *2.1. Philosophical Axiology*

Most contemporary philosophers see individual humans as the grounding "locus" of values. Human agency is intrinsically value oriented. If an agent wishes to reach a goal, she puts a value upon it. To agents, it seems impossible not to value. We will focus on self-conscious agents making value judgements on a daily base. If so, valuing is nothing special, but it belongs, as a mundane practice, to everyday life. Humans enjoy values and they dislike disvalues. Values are perceived, experienced, and expressed from the first-person perspective and such first-person expressions are articulated within cultures via language. Therefore, any ordinary language must include phrases and attributes expressing (dis)values. Such expressions are used in value-judgements. Value-judgements can refer to commodities, artefacts, works of art, aesthetic performances, dishes, hobbies, parties, and so on.

In general, evaluations are carried out in order to establish or determine the (relative) goodness, value, quality, virtue, or correctness of the object of evaluation we call "*evaluandum*". An evaluation should provide correctly substantiated, checkable and (at best) acceptable evaluation statements or value judgements. In the literature, evaluations are assigned various functions (Döring and Bortz 2016; Lumer 1990; von der Pfordten 1993; Scriven 1999). In practice, an evaluation should fulfil cognitive, learning and dialogue, optimisation, decision making and legitimisation functions. One central function of evaluation is to express a value judgment and to show by evaluative reasoning that the value judgement is acceptable (and should be shared). One tries to rationally convince an addressee that the value judgement is acceptable to move the addressee (latently) to act accordingly (Lumer 1990). An evaluation often implies a commitment of how (not) to behave.

Different types of evaluations can be distinguished. The corresponding classifications can be based on the occasions for evaluations, the methods used, the ways in which the results are formulated, the openness to adaptations, etc. It is to be considered that different evaluation types fulfil different functions and can therefore serve different purposes. Sometimes evaluation results are formulated qualitatively and sometimes quantitatively. Thus, marks or points can be assigned, the price can be indicated, or the evaluation result can be formulated with evaluative terms. Often, scales or ranking grades are used. Depending on the scale type, different arithmetic operations and comparisons are permitted. Paradigmatic examples of axiological terms are "good", "bad", "evil", "super", "successful", "un-/just", "suitable", "reasonable", and so on. The term "good" represents a language game of attributions, such as "admirable", "nice", "awful", "tasty", "sexy", "fancy", "gorgeous", etc. Axiological expressions differ from deontic operators which prescribe

or forbid different kind of actions. Deontic expressions and operators are, for example, "required", "ought", "forbidden" and "permitted" as well as "duty to", "right to", "in-/correct", "right" and "wrong".

Axiology becomes analysis of value judgements and asks how cultural debates about value judgements are to be performed and substantiated (=justified). All values are in a basic sense "relational" to mindsets, lifestyles, cultures, goods, and rules. Communities endorse shared values as they specify them to rules, rights, and commitments. Peace, liberty, health, safety, wealth, democracy, and decent environments are instances of "our" commonly shared moral values. It can be argued that normative statements (e.g., rules and prescriptions) are often formulated in order to summarise diverse evaluations. If X is good for us, we should act as to protect X. Prescriptive statements mediate between evaluations and rules (norms). According to such an understanding, prescriptions play a central role because they act as a bridge between the axiological evaluations and normative evaluations (Baurmann et al. 2010). Prescriptions ("Let us do something about it!") are formulated because otherwise it is not clear which instructions for action are to be obtained from axiological statements. Prescriptions summarize the efforts of an axiological evaluation—they formulate what should be done in view of the axiological considerations or prescribe the actions to be performed in view of the axiological considerations (or allow and forbid others). A prescription could state that there should be a legal regulation on the matter X (as oil spills, bycatch in fisheries, trophy hunting), but may remain silent on the specific deontic content of such environmental regulation. Grounded and shared values can constitute agreements that regulation is mandatory. Via such reasoning, the realms of axiology and deontology can be bridged discursively. Values span a broad range, starting by simple desires, wishes, and preferences and ending up with moral values such as honesty, peace, democracy, and justice. Moral values require a generic betterness relationship between two oppositional concepts: To all reasonable agents (prima facie and ceteris paribus), peace is better than war, arguing is better than violence, health is better than maladies, wealth is better than poverty, etc. A non-polluted environment is better than a highly toxic one. In environmental valuation, however, such betterness relations are full of vague qualifiers such as "spoiled", "decent", "degraded", "rich and diverse", "impoverished", "original" etc. These qualifiers indicate that a broad and unspecific betterness relation in favour of decent environmental conditions might be of moral value, while specifications remain culturally bounded (Section 6). By moralizing values ("This was a dirty trick!"), we take a turn from the expression of values to deontological validity claims. In his seminal "*Philosophie und Sprache*" (Hönigswald [1937] 1970), philosopher Richard

Hönigswald argued that such a shift can be justified by means of discursive axiological language (see Ott and Surau-Ott 2017). Following Hönigswald, a discourse ethical axiology must distinguish between *attribution* and *grounding*. Attribution means that agents attribute positive and negative values to entities and events. Grounding means that agents present and exchange *axiological reasons* why they attribute values as they do. This implies the distinction between expressive lingual articulation (*attribution*) and well-considered reflective value judgements (*grounding*). Articulation is sincere, while grounding is considered reasoning. In the following, we are concerned with reflected evaluations (as opposed to spontaneous evaluations) or well-considered reflective value judgements (grounding).

Depending on the type of evaluation and the reason for the evaluation, different forms of grounding can be distinguished. Accordingly, different rules of reasoning and quality standards may be relevant and different reasons may be legitimately put forward. Making claims for axiological validity supposes that values can be shared. Grounding values provides chances of values being shared. Shared values constitute particular cultural communities. In axiological grounding, reasoning may refer to substantial cultural traditions (as nature conservation), eudemonic experiences, phenomenological descriptions, psychoanalysis, narratives, history, and even literature and poetry. Axiological grounding does not necessarily have to refer to morals. It can be "deep" without touching morals. To the Neokantian background of Hönigswald, grounding values was a transcendental enterprise ("Wertgeltung"). As we shall see with respect to environmental evaluation, axiological grounding differs from transcendental justification (Section 5). It remains mundane. The phenomenology of nature (Böhme 2016) is helpful in grounding evaluations with respect to nature, because it reveals the perceptions and experiences on which evaluations rest. Sensual mediated bodily perceptions are turned into meaningful experiences with nature. Meaningful experiences are evaluative, and the values can be made explicit. Thus, phenomenology can ground values in a specific way of life. Quite often, a reflective articulation of past experiences presents sufficient grounding. If I say: "I strongly dislike this smell since it reminds me of vomiting in childhood", no further grounding is required (ceteris paribus). The bad memory counts as sufficient reason. We will return to the problem of axiological grounding throughout the following sections. In any case, axiology operates within a range having a contested border zone to deontology (rightness). This borderline region between evaluations, moral values, ideals, obligations, and principles is highly contested even among ethicists. To sum up the point we wish to make: *From an*

*axiological perspective, valuation schemes should be conceived as to fulfil the requirement of allowing for both articulation and grounding*.

#### *2.2. Economic Evaluation*

Economics assumes that individuals make rational choices according to their preferences. Economic approaches being grounded in a concept of preference are paradigmatic to liberal individualism. A preference is a binary value-judgement ("To me, x is (ceteris paribus) better/worse than y"). An individual agent prefers a state of the world X over Y according to her mental states. Reaching X gives utility (welfare) to the agent. The degree of preference is intensity. Behaviour reveals actual values people really hold. Many, but not all values materialize in commodities (cars, mansions, books, carpets, jewellery, gardens, etc.) which are relatively scarce and have an exchange value signalled by prices. One realizes values via consumption. Economic axiology is liberal, individualistic, flexible, etc. Economists show respect for the many ways in which persons may value commodities, cultural events, and social affairs. Preferences are to count. Economics, however, is disinterested in grounding. Economists assume that people themselves know their real preference best, since they have privileged access to their mental states. Ontogenetic origins, manipulation, advertisement, self-deceit, and indoctrination are abstracted away from economic models. Economics assume authenticity of all or most preferences and they ground their models on such heroic assumptions. To ethics, however, authenticity of evaluations is an ideal, not a given. On a second-order layer, we all should wish that our important values are actually "ours" (Frankfurt 1971). Disregarding such shortcomings, economists apply this general axiological approach to nature, resulting in environmental economics and the TEV-scheme (Section 3) and even the ESS-scheme (Section 4).

After clarifying what is to be understood by the complex term "evaluation", the role of values in relation to *evaluations* can now be analysed. Values play a dual role in evaluations. First of all, they are central to all evaluations, as they guide the selection of criteria and standards and thus also the design and formulation of criteria. In order to fulfil the function of criteria design, one must be clear about one's own values and their strength (or intensity). If nature conservation is important to you and you attach a high value to biodiversity, then you will use appropriate criteria to evaluate interventions in nature. In view of the evaluation functions, in particular enabling decision making, formulating evaluation results is often attempted not only in evaluative terms, but to use "objective" numerical values for the supply of decision bases. Since various aspects of situations can be evaluated in different

ways using different criteria, but clear decisions have to be made (e.g., laws have to be given), this way attempts to minimize complexity and to abstract away difficult questions. Many scholars wish to operationalize evaluations. The evaluation *that* X is of value to P remains vague if it is not specified to the question *how much value* does X have to P in relation to many other valuable entities and events. Such specification must homogenize, and, in economics, there is no better homogenizer than money, as specified by willingness to pay (WTP). If a person P values X positively, her WTP should be greater than zero. The epistemic idea to operationalize values numerically in monetary terms deserves reflective scrutiny: May such operationalization open our eyes or may \$-numbers blind us against the actual substances of values? How is numerical economic operationalization related to attributing and grounding? What axiological lessons can be drawn from contingent value studies of virtual WTP for nature conservation?

The second function of values is precisely to formulate evaluation results. Since we are talking about reflected evaluations here, one can assume that value statements are the result of well-founded evaluations. One can demand and give reasons for certain valuations and value systems. One can point to missing transparency of evaluations and doubtful consequences. Arguing about values and evaluations is possible. Values and valuations are related to philosophical underpinnings and frameworks. Valuations are associated with varieties of values and major philosophical questions. A philosophically informed analysis can help answer the question, which value systems can fulfil the purposes and deliver appropriate evaluations. As stated above, axiological discourse should give credit to the plurality of value encounters with respect to both attribution and grounding.

The result of this section implies, that all environmental value-schemes should be aware about the deep axiological background within they operate. Environmental value schemes should be able to integrate axiological reflections on the ontology and epistemology of values, such as perception and experience, the status of preferences, clashes of values, second-order preferences, the contested zone of moral values, the many axiological correlations, the role of prescriptions within evaluations, and the distinction between grounding and attribution. Schemes of values as such navigate on a surface over deep water. Such topics kept closely in mind, we turn to the evaluation of nature.

#### **3. Total Economic Value**

In environmental economics, the Total Economic Value of Nature (TEV) approach was proposed (see Randall 1987; Pearce and Moran 1994; Plottu and Plottu 2007;

see also contributions in Pushpam 2010). It is based on a preference-based axiology and embedded in micro-economic theory of rational choice. The intensity of the preferences is reflected in the willingness to pay (WTP) for nature conservation or in the willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for a loss of preferred nature. Interestingly, the concept of intensity forms an interface between economics, phenomenology and even morality (Ott 2013). Nature can be a source of both values and disvalues such as earthquakes, pests, infectious diseases, etc. It is trivial to state that nature is not just good for humans. For the rest of the chapter, we keep the dimension of disvalues and disservices closely in mind but focus the benign and beneficial dimension of nature. Nature is conceived being a broad source of utility for humans and "utility" is a generic term for all kinds of benefits, welfare and pleasures that result from it. One can use natural systems as a source of resources and as sinks for pollutants. The "source-and-sink" perspective is common in environmental economics.

This anthropocentric and preference-based TEV approach also distinguishes between use values and non-use values. Use values include, among others, yields (direct use) and tourist areas (indirect use), which can be measured in monetary terms by travel cost analysis.

Option value, bequest value and existence value are categories of non-use values within the TEV and refer to preferences in favour of nature conservation and protection. *Option values* refer to a preference to make decisions from a number of actual future options whose details are uncertain or unknown in the present. If tropical forests and the deep sea are regarded as natural "laboratories" in which many types of biochemical compounds are "tested" by the forces of evolution, humanity has prudential reasons to preserve such environments for future food production, medical, pharmaceutical, or chemical research being grounded in the value of human health. Since humans are omnivores, option values are important for future food security. Perhaps an ecological civilization will shift cultural barriers against certain edible plants and insects. Algae also can have many options that are still unknown. Whatever that may be, members of current generations should keep promising options open. Nature destruction can exclude options before they are identified. Option values of nature are dispositional ones. As such, they are hard to monetize. There are many ways by which nature can be "optional" to humans. Genes, species, and even landscapes are full of options many yet unrealized. Restoring nature should also count as an option. Grounding option values oscillates between generic and specific options. The option value of the sea floor is highly generic, while the option value of some algae species can be specified in terms of food processing. Grounding option values present specific dispositions of how the non-human world

might become significant for human intentions. Ironically, there might be economic analogies between option values of nature and the speculative future value of a start-up company at the stock markets. In principle, stock markets value the future, not the present. If this principle is applied to option values of natural assets, value may increase. Licences for exploring some areas (prospecting) may also indicate option values.

Another axiologically interesting category within the TEV is *existence value*. A beloved person is a paradigm case for existence value. The existence value applies to natural entities when an agent evaluates the mere existence of a natural being N without further interest to utilize N. It is perfectly reasonable to say, "It is good to know that there are snow lizards in remote parts of Central Asia." The existence of X is preferred over the non-existence of X: X > ¬X. This preference may clash with the opposite evaluation of another person: ¬X > X. To some people it would be better if there were no wolves around, while some other people prefer the existence of wolves in a given area. Conflicts over the existence of natural beings will prolong in conflicting prescriptions (regulations), such as licences for hunting wolves. It might be an instance of inconsistency if a person P gives positive existence value to an old tree but gives negative existence value to its leaves in fall. Can P wish to have the tree without its leaves?

As many contingent value studies strongly indicate, the existence value is, to many persons, at odds with the ongoing extinction of many species. It does not even seem inappropriate to place an existence value even onto biodiversity as such. If the WTA or WTP for the protection of an endangered species were US\$ 1 per month, however, the existence value of biodiversity could devour all income and wealth ("embedding effect"). Despite this strange effect, it is perfectly reasonable to greatly appreciate a diverse natural world.

Nature's existence values cannot be neglected in monetary terms either. Since affluent people in the North are putting high WTA values to the existence of tropical nature, including crocodiles, tigers, rhinos, etc., the progressive destruction looks repulsive from an economic point of view. WTA, however, remains a virtual payment and does not mobilize real financial assets for protecting nature. There are many ideas regarding how to make real incentives to protect nature out of virtual WTA.

Values of existence are often associated with the slogan "Use it or loose it". The organization of high-end tourism to present the "Big 5" is much more rational than the deforestation of forests to produce charcoal. Tourism is an industry that has specialized in bringing wealthy people to places where they can realize existence values ("I really have seen a lion in the wild!"). When wealthy people accept high

travel costs to experience X, X is economically very valuable. In the next section, we will review the parallels with the cultural services of ecosystems.

Existence values can be grounded in many reasonable ways. If a person would mourn over the loss of X and might miss X deeply in her life, she implicitly has given existence value to X. These ways of groundings indicate that WTA is a better measure for existence value than WTP. Grounding existence values touches the problem of *missing* something or missing somebody (dearly). The scheme "P missing X" gives grounding for existence value. Who, however, misses species that have gone extinct? Does anybody miss virtual species which might have existed but have gone extinct before they have been identified by taxonomists?

For many people, a garden with birds, butterflies, bees, spiders, dragonflies and bats is better than a garden with only a few abundant lawn species. Lawn people, however, prefer the non-existence of most plant species in their gardens and act accordingly. Thus, existence value in TEV is just about factual evaluation according to given preferences. On methodical grounds, TEV must be silent on the "goodness" of evaluation or the quality of the grounding. In economics, any person is free to say: "I do not miss anything, if X does not exist anymore". In environmental ethics, however, existence value is more about what environmentally well-informed persons *should* miss and what *should* count as loss (Section 5). TEV restricts itself to social facts, while environmental ethics must go beyond, if the entire ways we value natural beings should be transformed.

Option and existence values become *bequest values* when people want to preserve options and existence for future generations. In economics, bequest values rest upon contingent altruistic preferences. Any person remains free to argue that he has no preference with respect to future affairs which may occur after his maximum life expectancy. The figure of "homo oeconomicus" will support such ignorance because death eliminates all preferences. We will show in Section 5 that TEV does not lay an adequate moral foundation for questions of intergenerational justice.

#### **4. Ecosystem Service Approach**

The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Report introduced the concept of ecosystem services (ESS). It was adopted by the TEEB study (The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity). This anthropocentric concept aims to bridge the gap between nature and human well-being and make the values of nature visible to decision makers and the wider public. Prominent references are Costanza (2008); Daily et al. (2009); Norgaard (2010); Sagoff (2011); Kandziora et al. (2013); Davidson (2013); Chan et al. (2012); Jax et al. (2013); Spangenberg et al. (2014).

ESS takes the form of a cascade ranging from nature to natural capital to a flow of services that offers benefits to people relative to the underlying values. ESS distinguishes between services and disservices of nature, but most ESS studies abstract disservices away. Disservices are, for example, pests, earthquakes, thunderstorms, heavy snow, but also sharks that kill people. Rain (although it is not produced by ecosystems) can be seen as a disservice for tourists, but as an important support service for farmers.

ESS wants to close the gap between nature and man. The ESS scheme mediates between the two abstract poles of nature and culture, overcoming a mere divide (dichotomy). The ESS cascade begins with a concept in which nature is gradually transformed by human action. Nature is not just wilderness. Many managed ecosystems produce ecosystem services. Prudent management can increase the flow of some services, but such an increase often comes at the expense of other services. Thus, many ecosystem services originate from mediations between nature and human labour. The provision services of yields often require agriculture and gardening, even if there are some berries and mushrooms out in the wild.

One should distinguish between stocks and funds of natural capitals. Stocks, such as fossil fuels, can only be consumed away. Consumption diminishes the stock over time. Funds, however, have intrinsic properties to self-increase by proliferation and growth. There are non-living funds (as freshwater cycles) and living funds, such as organisms, species, populations, and ecosystems. Funds equal "renewable resources". The distinction between stocks and funds explains why it is false (non-sustainable) to treat funds as stocks. If funds are treated as being stocks, they are over-utilized. Both stocks and funds yield flows, but details of this fund-flow correlation remain puzzling. A tree stores carbon (regulating service), it produces oxygen, timber and, perhaps, eatable fruits (provisioning service). If, however, the tree is appreciated as being beautiful, is there a series of pictures flowing from the tree to the eye of the beholder? Rather not. If oak trees symbolise my home county, what kind of flow might this be? Both examples indicate that the fund-flow model does not work well with respect to the domain of cultural services. Cultural values are not flows stimulating preferences, but are constituted by axiological-cultural perceptions, by attribution and grounding (Section 2). Here, it must suffice to state that the stock-flow model must undergo modifications to be acceptable to philosophical axiology. We return to this point in the final section.

Moving further along the cascade, it is further assumed that humans are benefitted by such "flows". A service benefits some beneficiaries somehow. Without such benefit, some humans would be worse off. Thus, a service counts as "good". If

so, it has positive value (benefit) to someone. To destroy such values implies a loss or a damage being done to somebody else. This value is never isolated from other values but embedded in the entire horizon of values coming in multiple constellations and retreating into a deep background. Thus, the ESS cascade finally immerses into the entirety of cultural values being connected to evaluations, cultural frames, prescriptions and, at least sometimes, to deontic terms.

When using value systems, such as ESS, one should point out that one uses the term "service" as a purely technical term that is established in the sense of "ways in which nature can be useful to humans". Regretfully, the term "services" conveys misleading connotations. Nature does not offer services like a company does. We should not perceive nature in analogy to the service industries, but in its ecological naturalness and its fertility, resilience, diversity and abundance. The "service" terminology has become common parlance worldwide. Even if there are good reasons against such terminology, we should not discard the terminology completely, but integrate the ESS-approach in a broader ethical framework.

The ESS approach distinguishes between *supporting*, *provisioning*, *regulating* and *cultural* services. Each category includes several subcategories. The category of supporting services is controversial. They are basic environmental requirements for services, but not services themselves. They are necessary preconditions for services without being services. Such supportive "services" are ecological functions and structures that sustain the totality of a particular ecosystem (sometimes referred to as "natural integrity"). Supporting services are "primary values", such as exergy, the emergence of productivity and resilience, and fertility as generic disposition of living beings. Since supporting services may include double counting, some scientists abstract them away from the realm of real services. However, some important ecosystem services, such as pollination, are neither provisioning nor regulating or cultural services. If they belong to the category of supporting services, this category should not be fully abstracted away. We may place a high existence value on top predators, but we should remind ourselves that ecological systems are running via the invisible support of small organisms. Supporting services are systemic underpinnings of actual services. As such, they are more basic, but often remain invisible. In economic terms, they are primary values which cannot be monetized. The concept of "ecological integrity" makes good sense if it points to the cluster of supporting services (soil formation, trophic levels, emergent traits, self-organization) which can be studied by scientific ecology.

*Provisioning* services refer to all species used by humans, including spices, cosmetics, pharmaceutics and medicines. Provisioning services run parallel to the

TEV use values. These are mainly yields that can be measured both physically and in monetary terms. *Regulatory* services also belong, albeit rather indirectly, to the category of TEV use values. They can also be measured in physical terms and by economic replacement costs. A famous example from the Catskill Mountains close to New York city showed that the investment and supply costs for the purification of fresh water using technology were far higher than letting the mountain range do the job. Thus, the mountain range was preserved for its regulatory services on economic grounds. If reed can filter toxic substances from wastewater, it also performs a regulatory service. If the reed will be used to stow walls to secure heating energy, it also provides a supply service. Pollination by bees is far cheaper than by human labour. In this way, the ESS approach can open our eyes to innovative bioeconomic strategies for the multiplication of ecosystem services.

*Cultural* services are often underrepresented in ESS studies because they are difficult to quantify and monetise. The domain of cultural values encompasses aesthetic values, leisure and recreation, local design and natural heritage, meditation and transformation, and not least the spiritual and symbolic significance of nature. It is widely recognized in the literature that cultural services are highly important to many people but are underrated in many ESS studies. This is an axiological mismatch within ESS. As mentioned above, the stock-flow model misrepresents the axiology of cultural services. Both mismatch and misrepresentation indicate that cultural values stand in need for a better ethical framework (Section 5).

The ESS approach points to the many compromises and trade-offs between provisioning and cultural services in land use. There is a trade-off (conflict) between aquaculture and recreation in coastal zones, a trade-off between blooming meadows and intensive biomass production, a trade-off between rewetting bogs or peat extraction, a trade-off between habitats for endangered species and tourist destinations.

The ESS approach as such is silent on how such trade-offs are to be decided. ESS as such does not include a theory of decision making, conflict resolution, or weighing goods. ESS can, however, identify cases, in which trade-offs are decided against the demands for nature conservation. There are reasons to believe that societal demand for nature conservation has, meanwhile, become higher in developed countries than its supply.

ESS, however, does not provide specific solutions to the interrelated problems of discounting, substitution and compensation. The problem of the marginal destruction of nature also remains unsolved in ESS. It is silent on whether ecosystem services are equitably distributed among different social groups. The distributive justice of ecosystem services opens up a broad field that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. ESS enables the functional substitution of ecosystem services. If a "service" is removed, such loss can be substituted by another service. Substitution of services faces limits in the domain of cultural services. Therefore, ESS requires some additional ideas for the uniqueness of some natural sites ("de re" protection).

To sum up, ESS is not a comprehensive theory of nature conservation. It is rather a schematic tool than a theory. With some caveats ("flow", "service", "monetization"), it fulfils the requirement to allow for attribution and grounding. ESS has one crucial common feature with TEV: it is about factual evaluation only. If people prefer to maximize provision services at the expense of cultural ones, no ESS-experts can reject such a choice as being "wrong". Used in proper ways, however, ESS may be catalytic for environmental axiological discourse, because it stimulates contest over factual evaluations and motivates reflections on the ways we evaluate.

#### **5. Value Systems in Environmental Ethics**

Environmental ethics established classifying maps of values and ethical frameworks. After decades of discourse in environmental ethics, some essential (constitutive) ethical frameworks and value types can be identified and differentiated. These generic frameworks and value types have been mapped several times (Rolston 1988; Krebs 1999; Ott 2010; Muraca 2011; Ott et al. 2016). This section is based on these studies and pursues two concerns: It aims to distinguish five major value types and frameworks and to highlight the parallels between these patterns and categories of TEV and ESS. This opens many doors for further reflection on these categories.

#### *5.1. Metabolic and Reliance Values*

Human systems depend on and are embedded in natural systems that provide many different resources, goods and services. The direct use of nature for food and shelter is "metabolic" because, as Marx notes, all human societies depend on a continuous metabolism with nature. This general truth about man's dependence on nature is independent of technology and property rights. The categories "metabolic values" or "reliant values" are intended to cover this fundamental dependence. Dependence on nature differs depending on the spatial scale and degree of substitutability. Metabolism should be understood broadly. The metabolic values of nature have been mediated by human work, in particular by agriculture, animal husbandry, mining, forestry and fishing, including aquaculture. The extraction of oil, natural gas and coal provides fuels that are of instrumental value for many purposes. Breeding is a strategy to increase the instrumental values of cows, sheep, rice, and apple trees. The regular supply of fresh water, heating and cooking facilities to almost all members of society has taken many decades even in technologically advanced countries. In (post-)industrial and urbanized societies, such dependence is often overlooked. Full supermarkets are simply a matter of course to many people. Environmental ethics is critical against such forgetfulness and ignorance which rest on Locke's statement that only 1% of economic value directly stems from nature.

Humans have no alternative but to organise metabolism with nature. Social metabolism was intensified from the Neolithic to the great acceleration of the present age. Fundamental Neolithic achievements have paved a long way to the full-grown Anthropocene. Such achievements were permanent settlements, agriculture, ploughs, networks, domestication and breeding techniques, storage, crafts and medicine. Modernity can be understood as a shift from qualitative services to increasing quantities ("more of the same"). It is a clever idea to catch fish via nets, but now the nets have become miles long and deep, catching the marine food web and influencing the development of fish species. As many narratives and figures indicate, the increased metabolism collapses into systematic plundering of our planet's resources. The large-scale industrial metabolism with nature is exaggerated in many respects and for centuries has led to a huge raw material stock and a consumer culture (see Trentmann 2016).

Metabolic and dependency values are conceptually close to "utilization values" within TEV and close to provisioning and regulating services within ESS. The problem with TEV is that only factual preferences of individuals are recorded, regardless of whether these preferences are well informed or not, which can lead to the underestimation of some ecosystem services. The entire cluster of reliance values, direct utility values, provisioning services, etc., apparently just requires simple grounding in terms of (basic) needs, preferences, and demand. Utilization values can be conceived as being demand driven. Such a conception, however, may block a critical reflection upon current consumption patterns (in the Global North) and aspiration levels (in the Global South). The line of reasoning ("reliance values") has been linked to the environmentalism of the poor through concepts of decent livelihoods, especially in the Global South (Martinez-Alier 2002). Many people are reliant upon access to natural resources which might be blocked by property right regimes (as in cases of large-scale land acquisitions, see Voget-Kleschin (2013)). Reliant values open a broad range of questions over environmental distributive justice which are beyond the scope of this chapter (see Ott 2020).

TEV and ESS do not ask for proper attitudes with respect to the many "gifts" of nature supporting metabolism, such as the attitudes of gratitude, frugality, and humility. Environmental ethics should stimulate the idea that grounding such metabolic reliance values should not be demand driven but should become rather virtue based (see end of this section).

The perspective of mainstream microeconomics can underestimate basic dependency values for methodological reasons, too. Economists can admit that primary goods such as oxygen, freshwater, fertile soil, photosynthesis, etc., are, as such, beyond price. The price of planet Earth is infinite, but the economic cost–benefit analysis evaluates local or regional changes at the margin. Thus, it is the method of marginal assessment itself which underrates nature. Therefore, metabolic values are dialectical as they shift between basic dependence on nature, marginal degradation, and substitution processes. Freshwater and fertile soils are paradigm examples for this peculiar dialectic. At the heart of this dialectics is the recognition that humans basically remain reliant upon nature even under recent conditions of almost perfect mastery of nature. Environmental ethics turns the economic perspective of primary values upside down. Each and any part of nature counts as being a parcel of primary values. The flip side of a marginal increase in utility is the marginal loss of primary values. Such dialectics turns into the political economy of strong sustainability (Daly 1996).

#### *5.2. Eudemonic Values*

There is now widespread consensus that the distinction between instrumental and inherent value is not a dichotomy if instrumental values are embedded in a certain understanding of a mean–end relation. The recent debate on relational values (Chan et al. 2016) is about overcoming such dichotomy. All values, however, are relational (Section 2). Instrumental values are relational to demands and needs, eudemonic values are relational to ideas about a good human life and to virtues, inherent moral values are relational to criteria of moral considerability. If so, the concepts of values and evaluations imply relatedness. Unrelated values would be "absolute" ones, but we see absolute values as an oxymoron. If so, the term "relation values" is either an analytical truism or it must point to a specific kind of values beyond the instrumental-inherent divide. As Chan et al. (2016) rightly argue, relational values are embedded in practices and traditions, they shape collective cultural belongings ("identities") and they are grounding particular concerns against environmental degradation and the loss of unique sites. If so, we see relational values close to cultural services and overlapping widely with eudemonic values.

Since it is beyond the scope of this chapter to judge all articles on "relational values" (see Knippenberg et al. 2018), we restrict ourselves to the option being opened by Chan et al. (2016) and Himes and Muraca (2018) to conceive specific relatedness in terms of eudemonic values (see also Ott 2016).

Eudemonic values can be seen as a third broad category of values that includes aesthetic, locational, restful, transformative, and spiritual encounters with nature. Reconciliation between man and nature within the paradigm of instrumental rationality will not succeed. Clever animals have only instrumental and at best prudential reasons to protect natural resources. Environmental ethics emphasizes the many ways in which humans are bestowed by nature with types of pleasure, joy, wonder, connectedness, and even bliss and reverence. Eudemonic values give a new perspective on how different people might, could and should shape their lives with and in nature. They refer to outdoor activities that people perform for their own sake, such as hiking, sailing, diving, climbing and even hunting. If you go on a hiking trail for the sake of hiking, you give this activity eudemonic value. Other examples of so-called "eudemonic" values include the beauty of nature, a (deeper) sense of home ("Heimat"), relaxation, joyful physical exercises, biophilic sensations and spiritual encounters with nature. Here, nature reveals itself as an essential dimension of a good, flourishing and meaningful human life. Eugene Hargrove, Allen Holland, Angelika Krebs, and Roger Scruton have also argued along these lines.

The area of eudemonic values resembles the category of cultural services within ESS and it includes the existential value of TEV. It should become clear that some eudemonic values (aesthetic, spiritual, symbolic) would not be sufficiently taken into account by existence values or cultural services. In any case, it is unclear how a spiritual understanding of nature as being "sacred" can be captured by the usual definition of existence value ("value to the mere existence of a natural being N without any further interest to utilize N"). This is also true for biophilic attitudes. With some likeliness, hegemonic concepts of modernity have oppressed biophilic dispositions, while an ecological civilization will liberate them anew. Eudemonic values also make it clear that one could and should restore nature as a joyful focal practice.

#### *5.3. Future Ethics*

In connection with questions of distributive justice and the necessary conditions for a good life, responsibility towards future generations with regard to metabolic and eudemonic values is important. Future ethics is about fair legacies at different levels. Most approaches are critical to the promise of a growth-oriented economy that future generations will be far better off than previous generations, as scarcity of

commodities is reduced by GDP growth and technological innovation. Overabundance of commodities may coexist with increasing scarcity of nature's values. It seems uncertain whether future humans will simply conform to such situation. They might also deeply mourn the losses, some of which might be irreversible.

Ethical approaches face different problems with future generations. A utilitarian approach to posterity must face the abhorrent conclusion that it would be better to increase the mere number of sentient beings as long as the worst beings still prefer to be alive rather than non-existent. A contractarian approach does not capture the convictions that we owe something to posterity, since we cannot yet make contracts with future persons. If all obligations come from real contracts and contracts are concluded for rational self-interest, contractarian ethics cannot justify binding obligations between generations. Paradoxes of future ethics consist in bringing individuals into existence and controlling population size.

For questions of future ethics, the option value and the bequest value of TEV as well as all service categories of ESS are taken into account. Within TEV, however, the bequest value is nothing more than an altruistic preference that one may or may not feel for one's descendants or for distant future human beings. To economists, saving something for others is a kind of sacrifice. Bequest values are comparable to those of donorship. From natural inclination, the bequest values are mainly dedicated to the offspring, while morality also requires concern for distant and remote future human beings. Within a preference-based approach, it must be accepted that the bequest values decrease with increasing distance in time and space (as is often the case). TEV-scheme cannot see the moral difference between contingent altruistic preferences and mandatory obligations to future generations. Being morally obliged to do x is different from doing x out of an altruistic preference. The resulting action may be the same, but the reasons are different. Ethicists will not like to base future ethics solely on altruistic preferences. If so, TEV is not a suitable framework for intergenerational justice. If so, we need to transform the category of bequest value into a more refined and comprehensive ethical framework, recognizing rights of future persons against present persons.

The moral beliefs behind the "bequest value" of TEV require a deontological interpretation of future ethics. In principle, nobody should live at the expense of others. This principle also holds for distances in space and time. If so, current generations must not live at the expense of posterity in terms of environmental values. If the chain of generations implies a fundamental egalitarianism between generations (no generation is "better" than any other), then one can assume that future generations should have approximately the same living conditions as today's

generations. If all people were equal in the present, the standard of comparison would be easy to determine. Since humans are, at present, highly unequal in many respects (salaries, wealth, education), it is almost impossible to apply a comparative standard on a global scale. At the global level, one should rather adopt an absolute standard, which is a moral threshold for a worthy human life; however, it is specified in terms of needs, welfare, or capabilities. Such an absolute standard should be quite demanding in terms of capabilities (Nussbaum 2011). Within an ongoing chain of generation, no generation should come in a situation in which a substantial fraction of humans fall below a demanding threshold line defining a decent human live also with respect to environmental resources. Thus, current generations are obliged to prevent such a situation. This obligation demands cautious foresight independent from contingent degrees of risk aversion.

At a particular level, however, political communities (states, nations) can and should pursue the strategy of bequeathing legacies to future members of a particular state on a comparative basis. They should protect the nature capitals and the natural heritage on their national territory. The conservation, preservation and restoration of nature is never entirely "universal" or "global" but must remain a special and "located" enterprise. Grounding nature's values touches the problem of specific territories which are inhabited by specific people. Inhabitation is full of values ("place making", "coiling the land") which might be shared by particular communities but cannot be as universal as moral rules. Grounding values in specific territories reveals that territories are not just neutral space. Inhabitation values, if grounded, may conflict with cosmopolitan values.

A conflict-laden dialectic takes place here. If intergenerational justice to an absolute standard cannot be limited to future people and should not be ignorant against current poverty and misery, and if some states can ensure a high comparative environmental standard exclusively for their own present and future populations, then the demands of morality and global justice will inevitably exert high pressure on such comparative standards as being "privileges". From the moral point of view, the universal absolute standard seems to override certain comparative standards being enjoyed by some, but not all people. The future world might be highly patchy in terms of nature conservation. Some people will enjoy the results of success stories in nature conservation, while other people have to face results of environmental destruction. On which grounds are the few happy wealthy Norwegians and Canadians entitled to enjoy their sublime landscapes in a world full of slums? Such moral dialectic also points to immigration policy, for wealthy states that pursue ambitious environmental (and social) policies will become attractive destinations for migrants.

The moral tension between absolute and comparative standards makes a brief meta-ethical reflection on the problem of overridingness and a presumed hierarchy of reasons mandatory. Should specific moral reasons to help poor people always "trump" all other kinds of reasons, be they based in values, traditions, loyalties, role obligations, prescriptions, cost estimates, nature conservation objectives, etc.? Are moral reasons to be embedded in other kinds of practical reasons or are moral reasons always to be placed at the very top of a hierarchy of reasons? Embedding moral reasons, however, will bring different results with respect to nature conservation than a supremacy of moral reasons. Just think of curtailing human entitlements in order to safe species from extinction, restrict access to protected areas, or enhance local biodiversity via reforestation at the expense of agriculture. Both TEV and ESS are too schematic to address such peculiar and highly political casuistry.

#### *5.4. Inherent Moral Value*

The problem of demarcation concerns the question of how to draw the line between morally considerable beings ("moral community") and other entities, or, to put it otherwise, which entities have inherent (or intrinsic) moral value and which have not, even if they may have considerable instrumental (functional, economic) or eudemonic value. Even if one supposes a broad spectrum of values, discussions about inherent moral values as attributed to natural beings are and shall remain highly important (see Ott 2008).

Moral problems must be solved as well as other problems. If a problem is a real problem at all, solutions must be within reach—and this also holds for moral problems as the demarcation problem. After decades of debate, the demarcation problem seems to be somewhat paradoxical—an essentially controversial search for a "true" solution.

The extent of the solutions to the problem of demarcation put forward so far can be determined as follows: (a) sentimentality, (b) zoo-centrism, (c) biocentrism, (d) eco-centrism, (e) gene-based approaches, (f) (pluralistic) holism. As Ott (2008) has argued, the demarcation problem requires the identification of morally relevant characteristics (properties) attributed to natural beings. In this way, one will not fall victim to the naturalistic fallacy.

Candidates for morally relevant traits are sentience, communication skills (Ott 2015) and openness to a world "outside". The (gradual) ability to communicate deserves special attention (Hendlin and Ott 2016). Western culture has long underestimated the ability to communicate within nature, and it has wrongly silenced nature (Friskics 2001). In nature, however, there is both noise and voice. If animals can give a voice to their mental state, we can and should interpret such voices and translate them, as advocates, into human discourse.

Most scholars would attribute inherent moral values to sentient creatures. If inherent moral values are based on morally relevant attributes (such as sentience or teleonomic structure) and if the most relevant attributes (sensation, communication) are gradual, then it might be permissible to graduate inherent moral values. We should better not homogenize morally relevant traits. The concept of equality could trigger the errors of homogenization of natural beings with morally relevant traits. The principle of equal consideration of each individual sentient member of the moral community makes grading possible. The survival strategies of mice, frogs, turtles, etc., as such (r-strategies) place hardly any value to the individual. This is of some relevance to how we should value such r-species individuals. The moral standpoint does not require all small wild sentient animals to be protected from suffering and premature death. Egalitarian animal welfare activism and the idea of "policing" wild food webs exaggerate sentientism in an absurd way. The egalitarian animal rights movement is completely reversing the way humans have treated animals since the Neolithic Revolution. It is an absurd demand that man should strive to reduce the pain of prey in terrestrial and even marine systems and ideally transform wild nature into a gigantic zoo. An egalitarian sentientism loses contact with human practices such as domestication, animal husbandry, gardening and hunting. Policing wild nature, granting political rights to pets, and the abolition of hunting and domestication present a somewhat weird result of animal rights theory. The result looks strange because it runs counter to how humans interacted with animals since they left the stage of hunters and gatherers. Egalitarians may reply that historical reasons (reasons from traditions) are generally invalid from a right-based moral point of view. Here, we reach the deep question of how morality and history might be correlated within an ethical theory. How much moral content beside transcendental commitments of arguing can and should be safeguarded from the winds of historical change?

Whatever the answer, *equity* is a gradual alternative to equality. Equity means adequacy to the degree to which morally relevant abilities are actually present in a natural being. The faculty to sentience should be coupled with the ability to communicate under the principle of equity. Plants do not communicate with each other, but they transmit signals that are decoded by other plants in the environment. This differs from the gestures with which dogs interact, and such interactions differ from a linguistic interaction between a chimpanzee and a human being. A discursive being would therefore not be equated with a capacity to exchange information on

biochemical signals. A principle of equity, coupled with the combined criteria of sensitivity, communication and biological strategies, can provide a solid basis for gradually overcoming anthropocentrism, which is in reflective equilibrium with common intuitions about what we owe non-human beings.

This entire pattern of reasoning about inherent moral value goes beyond TEV and ESS. However, most TEV and ESS scholars acknowledge that the Inherent Value Problem should be taken seriously. Within the TEV, however, it holds that if all people believe that Anopheles mosquitoes are worthless, there is no reason to protect them. If WTP is zero or less than zero, there are reasons to remove such parts of nature. Only if people want to see penguins or observe whales is there a reason to protect these animals. In the case of whaling, however, economists would try to maximize the net present value of whale watching tourism and whale hunting for trade. Rich Norwegians may sometimes like to watch whales, but they also enjoy whale meat in some expensive Oslo restaurants—and they will pay for both. The efficient solution would be to protect the whale populations that live near tourist destinations and kill whales in remote parts of the ocean for luxury food with a fancy smell of decadence. This solution seems clearly cynical to conservationists who may give inherent moral values to whales. To sum up, the problem of inherent moral value in nature cannot be properly addressed within TEV and ESS. Since it should count as real moral problem, environmental ethics cannot be reduced to TEV and ESS. The criteria of sentience and ability to communicate constitute a gradual scale of moral considerability with some leeway to cultural variances (as in case of husbandry and hunting).

#### *5.5. Conceptions of and Attitudes towards Nature*

The considerations so far in this section illustrate how diversely nature is valued and how reluctant one should be in view of one's own ignorance to make conclusive and unambiguous evaluations. This is the reason for the fifth set of issues concerning conceptions of and attitudes towards nature. Within environmental ethics we find approaches based on a *non-scientific concept of nature*. Here, nature is conceived as something other than a collection of mere objects that fall under general natural laws. Many thought patterns within contemporary environmental ethics take a critical attitude towards a "purely scientific" interpretation of nature. In this interpretation, nature is nothing more than (a) the subject of scientific description and explanation, (b) a warehouse of resources that can serve as an entrance into industrial production, and (c) a hostile force against human longing for safety, health, and comfort. Within environmental virtue ethics, it is accepted that certain

attitudes to and perceptions of nature are morally more appropriate than others. A general attitude of dominance, mastery and control can be rejected for moral reasons. The idea of deep ecology, as conceived by Arne Naess, was to sidestep modern ontology and replace it with "ecosophies". Ecosophies are not in direct competition with science. Ecosophies only assume that nature can show itself in its naturalness in modes and ways beyond scientific observation, data mining, and causal explanation. These ecosophies may have one thing in common: nature reveals itself in different forms in different places for open-minded people. Nature shows up (eventfully) as "physis", "creation", "kosmos", "dao", "wild" or "pacha". ESS can address such revealing of nature within the category of spiritual values, being a sub-category of cultural values. ESS must hold contact with religious studies. Here, monetization clashes with the logic of the sacred. This logic is not just about the strict protection of sacred sites and sacred groves, but goes beyond if entire ways of lives are seen in perpetual spiritual encounter with ancestors, spirits and deities of land and sea. Seen from the category of spiritual cultural values, the entire ESS and TEV schemes look "Western". The ongoing conceptual debate within IPBES is about Western biases within ESS and TEV. And rightly so. Jetzkowitz et al. (2017) have argued that humanities are necessary for an in-depth understanding of the underlying cultural and religious traditions of non-Westerns approaches to the "more than human world". In philosophical terms, cultural traditions have always shaped habits and attitudes. Non-western moral systems are often closer to virtue ethics than liberal Western universalism. In environmental ethics, one should take the bonds between worldviews and virtues seriously. This holds true for debates over SDG 15 and within IPBES.

*Environmental virtue ethics* requires an appropriate attitude towards oneself, others, time, and natural beings. Environmental virtues ethics evaluates arbitrary characteristics of individual character and bases environmental virtues on moral arguments. The virtue of sufficiency is based on resistance to the consumerist excessiveness of human metabolism. Many (biophilic) virtues are based on eudemonic values. Eudemonic values can have a transformative force, as Bryan Norton argued (Norton 1988). Environmental virtue ethics demands with a future ethical impact the prudential virtues of restraint and care, foresight and precaution. It also means being aware of finiteness and mortality, since the earth belongs to the living in usufruct (Thomas Jefferson). It can also justify the existential attitude of reverence for life, located at the interface between biophilia and biocentrism. Values, virtues, and moral obligations are often expressed in narratives, nature essays, proverbs, chants, and consultative citizen juries. There are valid meta-ethical arguments

why not only voices in environmental discourse should be considered that meet Western standards of logical thinking. Eye-opening modes of linguistic articulation, including "thick" phenomenological descriptions, can change attitudes towards natural beings, including landscapes, and sensitize one to the many values of nature. After all, environmental virtues can trigger new maxims such as "leave no trace". Eudemonic-cultural values, strong sustainability and the gradual overcoming of anthropocentrism should shape one's own set of environmental virtues. The spiral-shaped combination of eudemonic-cultural values, strong sustainability, environmental virtue ethics and the recognition of unscientific, spiritual encounters with nature could be described as "deep anthropocentrism", being augmented by some reasonable solution of the demarcation problem. Both TEV and ESS abstract away the problem of virtues, but grounding existence value, cultural services, and bequest value has to remove such abstraction. If so, environmental virtue ethics stays alive in SDG 15 debates.

#### **6. Synthesis of Approaches**

In this final section, we will not present a quick "take home message" but remain rigid theoretical grounds. In particular, we will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the ESS and TEV with respect to axiological discourse about environmental evaluations. We also will correlate ESS and TEV to environmental ethics. Such correlation takes two opposite routes into (1) decision making and economy, and (2) ethics and philosophy. The first route presumes to be of practical relevance for SDG 15 processes, while the second route is about theoretical synthesis.

On the first route, TEV and ESS open eyes for values and services of nature which are hard to ignore by policymakers. ESS values can be combined with TEV values. The combination of provisioning services (ESS) with option value (TEV) gives reason to conserve genes "in situ" (or as second-best solution in seed banks). TEV and ESS can determine through opinion polls how groups of people actually benefit from natural capital, and they can say this in the language of preferences, interests, trade-offs and opportunity costs. Such economic parlance is "lingua Franca" in our commercialized world. One does not conform to this parlance if one makes use of it at some occasions with a "caveat". TEV and ESS can and should give voice to disadvantaged groups in a commercialized word in ways that also can become critical against commercialized mindsets.

TEV and ESS can also point to the many trade-offs in human–nature interactions. Both TEV and ESS can be useful schematic tools designed to make the values of nature visible to people with economic mindsets and decision makers being confronted

with economic models (cost–benefit-analysis). TEV and ESS reveal serious trade-offs, while cost–benefit analysis shows simplified solutions in terms of efficiency. Thus, decision makers must become aware that they make "real" decisions, sometimes rigid, harsh, and uncomfortable.

ESS and TEV make the values of nature visible, but they do so for different eyes. The quantification and monetarisation of instrumental values not only highlights the ecological value of nature to policy makers, but also provides information for market-oriented companies. Economic visibility is dialectical in itself. ESS and TEV can make people aware that nature has become scarce in many respects. Recognition of the scarcity of nature, however, also provokes clever strategies in the real economy, including investment brokers, portfolio designers, developers and business consortia, to acquire scarce natural resources through property rights ("assets") and mobilize the return on investments and payments accordingly. Recognition of the scarcity of nature can draw attention either to issues of conservation, restoration and distributive justice (however specified) or to rational, interest-based private strategies to acquire scarce natural resources (land, water rights, concessions, quotas). The business perspective implicitly recognizes the collective scarcity of valuable nature but wants to use ESS privately.

The economic perspectives on the scarcity of nature often become an entrepreneurial perspective: How can an entrepreneur profit from ecological services? How can business models be designed accordingly? How can payments be initiated and managed? Once you have made the scarcity of nature visible, it is difficult to avoid such selfish business prospects for natural values. The large-scale acquisition of land ("land grabbing") is a paradigm case, but one can also think of the acquisition of concessions for timber and fishing, the acquisition of CO<sup>2</sup> credits, the acquisition of beautiful places as travel destinations, and the like. Such acquisition strategies can affect local livelihoods, as a broad NGO discourse shows. They can distribute the benefits of ESS according to the given unequal patterns of purchasing power. Not surprisingly, egalitarian concepts of distributive environmental justice often reject TEV or ESS because of associated business models. Many people dislike the ideas that one may make a profit out of the conservation of nature or that nature's values are traded on markets. Market-based solutions and business-models count as corruption of the "spirit" of nature conservation. Market-based acquisition of ESS is either unfair or corrupt (or both). Thus, there are many warnings that ESS must be safeguarded against neo-liberalism. Warnings against "neoliberal commodification" may, however, also obscure the potential for transitions within environmental entrepreneurship, "green" investments and corporate restructuring. TEV and ESS are tools and measures that make the values of nature visible. It is inevitable that they will do so for business models, but one should not be afraid of new coalitions between "green" bio-economy and entrepreneurship.

There might be many morally decent ways to make some money with TEV or ESS. Beautiful campsites on Swedish lakes can mobilise the willingness of stressed-out Germans to pay to relax in such an open-air hut. Farmers might specialize in producing agroecological services beyond yields. The same holds for forestry. Why not pay some entrance fee for a land art park presenting sculptures in landscapes? Why not get payments for natural climate solutions with respect to carbon dioxide removal? Why not shift agrarian subsidies to the production of cultural services and existence values? What is wrong with market gardening? Why not support green entrepreneurship politically? Why not stimulate restoration via monetary incentives? If production of ESS would be profitable, ESS might become less scarce in the future. If so, there might be democratising pro-poor "trickle down" effects of ESS. A mere denial of business models may underrate the prospects for innovation (Ziegler 2020).

In view of its internal dialectic of monetarisation of TEV or ESS, the economy can and should take the plunge into critical political environmental economy. To do this, economists would have to think about the scarcity of nature in close connection with environmental ethics, distributive justice and sustainability science. Debates at the interfaces of ethics and economics are about discounting, compensation, replacement costs, the replacement of functions and ("de re") the uniqueness of some special natural monuments (such as the Grand Canyon, Wadden Sea, Great Barrier Reef, and many others). The economic visibility of the scarcity of nature requires economic-ethical disputes over property rights over stocks of natural capital, commons, open access, types of acquisition, kinds of payments, fair benefit sharing, fair burden sharing, and promising business models. On the first route, we reach the basin of attraction called "political economy of nature". SDG 15 and IPBES are committed to inquire this basin of attraction, being full of sharks.

Schemes should not be taken for granted but should be seen as tools and devices for navigating over deep ethical waters. Limits of monetization open the second route of philosophical reflection upon value schemes and upon single categories within. The search for monetization is based on the ideal of operationalization and on the desire to homogenize the multitude of heterogeneous environmental values. Monetization is reductive to one unified measure. Numbers simplify, but both ESS and TEV have intrinsic reasons to withstand its own tendency towards simplification. Environmental ethics wishes to appreciate the heterogeneity of natural values. Appreciating heterogeneity might be an important step on the road of transforming environmental evaluations in the spirit of environmental ethics, as to be found prominently in the work of Holmes Rolston (1988) and Arne Naess (1989).

As we have argued in Section 2, evaluations can be argued with respect both to attribution and grounding. Grounding evaluations of natural entities is at the core of environmental axiology. TEV and ESS are not well suited for grounding as far as they are preference based. It is sufficient for evaluation to state or reveal a preference and declare some WTP or WTA. Such preference-based approaches may disconnect us from a deeper sense of valuing nature—and sharing such grounded values. Both TEV and ESS only point to values which are held by people as matters of facts (actual preferences), but do not allow for a prescriptive approach about values and commitments which peoples *should* hold (Section 5). Preference-based approaches obscure the profoundness of axiological life being connected to the more-than-human world. The following remarks also wish to explain why cultural ecosystem services are not "flows" from stocks of natural capital.

Cultural values overlap strongly with the so-called eudemonic values in environmental ethics. From an economic perspective, the economic value of such cultural services must be measured through travel cost analysis, combined tourism analysis or contingent valuation. Studies can provide useful information to stakeholders and policy makers. If a contingent valuation study shows that most tourists do not like noise on the beach, a destination becomes financially more valuable if noisy vehicles are banned by local authorities. Such useful methods, however, remain at the surface of cultural values. In relation to deeper layers of cultural services, other approaches such as cultural history, literary narratives, landscape painting, poetry, conservation history, cultural anthropology, religious studies, etc., can contribute to a deeper understanding of cultural services being grounded in eudemonic values. Non-Western modes of expression, as in songs, chanting, rituals, and proverbs, or practices such as pilgrimage and feasting should be taken into account. Eudemonic values remain embedded in the particularities of narratives, traditions, and practices (MacIntyre 1984). On reflection, we stand in need to reconcile the universal with the particular within environmental ethics. Universal commitments, as opposition against environmental victimization, obligations against future generations, and protection of sentient beings must be reconciled with particular traditions, cultures and even spiritual ecosophies being embedded in particular worldviews. A spirit of transformation in an age of crisis may not rest solely on universal commitments, but may need stronger bonds of place making, focal practices of conservation, beloved unique landscape, and cultural heritage. An integrated value system is a precondition for such reconciliation.

The TEV categories "option value" and "existence value" can and should be implemented in the ethical argumentation patterns. The existence value falls into the category of eudemonic values and also touches on the virtue-ethical question of what kind of person one wants to be. On a first stage of reflection, a preference for the existence of natural beings opens a path of deep questioning (*sensu* Naess) about being human in a natural world. On a second stage of reflection, one may also cast doubts on the idea that mere existence as such can be of value. If a person wishes to ground an attribution of existence value to a natural entity, such grounding must go beyond the statement "X exists". Grounding existence values must refer to cultural heritage, beauty, transformative value, widening identification, inherent moral value, etc. If so, "existence value" functions as a turn-table: it is an outer frontier to economics but also an entrance doorway to environmental philosophy, asking what kind of preferences we should have with respect to the existence of natural entities. The problem of the intrinsic value of biodiversity, as stipulated in the preamble of the Convention Biological Diversity, has to be grounded at this point. If biodiversity is both about different entities and variability amongst them, the existence value becomes far more profound than a willingness to pay for endangered crocodiles. Which attitudes are appropriate to the many ways by which organisms are capable of existing? Existence is about the "more" within the more-than-human world.

Even the category of option value reveals profoundness on reflection. How can one act in order to preserve and increase good options in the future? Should we create options by interventions or by omissions? Nature can be "optional" in many respects, as in eudemonic options and options for new spiritual encounters with the more-than-human world. Options should not only refer to future resources, but also include future options for people who want to liberate their biophilic dispositions and live as naturalists. A further stage of reflection may reflect upon options as dispositions within a "world". Why do we believe that the natural world we live in is full of options? An (onto)logical analysis of modes of dispositions in nature is still missing. Such analysis might be a common focal research point for logicians, ontologists, and ethicists. Lie (2016) has presented an ontology of dispositions and relational realism which may ground the concept of options values also with respect to long-term responsibility.

The spiritual values of sacred sites as such remain obscure and opaque to scientific and economic methods. Perhaps only phenomenological expressions, such as atmospheres, auras and sacred sites, can be perceived by sensitive embodied spirits and how they form specific moods that come close to such spiritual encounters with nature. When people become radically open to special places ("genius loci", "sacred sites"), it becomes pointless to ask for opportunity costs to replace them with shopping centres. Within ESS, the category of "spirituality" is at the outer edge of cultural services, but it opens a vast array of encounters with nature which are, in fact, alive in many cultures, but should not be downplayed by Western values schemes. There is broad agreement that this category should find a proper place in SDG 15 and IPBES. Environmental philosophy cannot abstain from a philosophy of religion (see for overview Jenkins et al. 2017).

Finally, the two functions of value systems (Section 2) are to be considered in their fulfilment. While value systems such as TEV or ESS can be useful for establishing evaluation standards, values play an important role in specific, complex, grounded evaluations. The axiological grounding of goodness in nature is different from truth claims, moral claims, and sincere expressions of sentiments. As our examples of "eudemonic", "existence", "option", and "spiritual" indicate, rounding value judgements is an immersion into the cultural lifeworld, not just making explicit a contingent mental state. Grounding values means to adopt a commitment to care for something being shared as being "good". Can TEV and ESS be transformed toward such grounding? Yes, in principle, they can. As we argued at the end of Section 4, TEV and ESS can become catalytic for environmental ethical discourse, as presented in Section 5. The identification of factual values may serve as a solid entry point for environmental ethical discourse.

Ethical beliefs are an integral part of our ways of life and judgements should be in a reflective equilibrium with our other beliefs. In order for value systems to perform their functions, they must help set the standards that we want to use—where we arrive at evaluation results that are consistent with our intuitions and where we know that we are valuing something for the best reasons. Well-reasoned evaluations about nature and about man–nature interaction can result if we synthesize ESS, TEV, and the patterns of reasoning within environmental ethics. The result of this chapter indicates that synthesis is within reach. Such synthesis is of high significance to both SDG 15 and IPBES, even if it had been reached on an independent route. To support the implementation of SDG 15 and the IPBS process in the longer run, we wish to have grounded a comprehensive value system being designed for specific evaluations in diverse settings. The reflective route being taken may nourish the spirit of substantial transformation in human interaction with the more-than-human world more than moral postulates. On this reflective route, one may become astonishingly aware that there is so much goodness within nature. Such astonishment looms at the end of the second route and, as always, at the beginning of philosophy (Plato, *Theaitetos*, 155d). **Author Contributions:** Conceptualization, Konrad Ott and Karl Christoph Reinmuth; writing—original draft preparation, Konrad Ott and Karl Christoph Reinmuth; writing—review and editing, Konrad Ott and Karl Christoph Reinmuth.

**Funding:** This research received no external funding.

**Acknowledgments:** We thank two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.

**Conflicts of Interest:** The authors declare no conflict of interest.

#### **References**


© 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

### **Can Justice Respect Needs and Nature? The Idea of a Nature-Respecting Su**ffi**ciency**

**Rafael Ziegler**

#### **1. Introduction**

Imagine a train ride. The passengers rush through the doors of the train. Having passed the threshold to their desired space, they sit down, relieved. Zoosh, chuuggaa chugga, chugga-chuga, choo. The journey starts. Westward. Trains are a 19th century paradigm of innovation and frontiers pushed ever further. They provided images of progress and destiny.<sup>1</sup> This "progress ride" has been accompanied by an increasing standard of living but also an evergrowing economy, disregarding and violating other land users and uses, and undermining the conditions for safe travel. According to the 2019 Global Biodiversity Assessment, all major drivers generally point in a direction of unsustainability (Díaz et al. 2019). It concludes that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 14 and 15 for the protection of life below water and on land, cannot be achieved without "transformative change" (Díaz et al. 2019, p. 39). This chapter contributes to this discussion via a focus on the transformation of values. It proposes a nature-respecting sufficiency.

In a move from the train to the automobile and spaceships, popular metaphors are "planetary guard rails" and a "safe operating space" (Biermann and Kim 2020). In the process, the image of the train has changed. It is associated with romantic sounds that are reassuring in comparison to the further accelerated, high-emission planes and rockets that keep on pushing boundaries. The train has become the environmentally friendly vehicle. So when I travelled for the first presentation of this paper, southward from Montreal to New York by train, some people congratulated me for having taken the train (and some, no doubt, thought I was a bit strange and did not have much to do if I could take such a "long" trip). But with a view to history of the progress ride, such praise and change in image is suspicious. Or to explore the image further, having passed the threshold for the train ride, we now increasingly focus on the rails of the train, held together by thresholds, metal or wooden pieces that ensure that the train travels safely. These thresholds become an

<sup>1</sup> See for example John Gast's painting *American Progress* as discussed by Brown (2016).

image for material limits; their disregard derails the train on its journey. As travellers on the "Anthropo-Train", we increasingly insist on limits and boundaries. But is this focus on boundaries enough for the called for transformative change?

This chapter contributes to the values aspect of the seemingly neutral question of environmental limits and boundaries as well as the protection of biodiversity and non-human life on land and in the oceans. Transformation in the view proposed here requires a change in values. For this, the chapter draws on environmental and political philosophy (Taylor 1986; Nussbaum 2006) to propose the idea of a nature-respecting sufficiency. It thereby also shows the contribution of sufficientarianism to sustainability theory and politics, and it challenges the perception of sufficientarianism as a minimalist theory of justice with little regard for inequality and unsustainability. Rather, sufficiency calls for a focus on the resources needed for living in dignity and a justification of resource use above this threshold.

Section two situates the concept of sufficiency in the theory of justice and environmental sustainability. Section 3 turns to the minimum sufficiency threshold, and Section 4 to its upper limits. Section 5 discusses objections, and Section 6 concludes with implications for (sustainable) economy and the technological and social innovations highlighted by the Global Biodiversity Assessment (Díaz et al. 2019).

#### **2. Su**ffi**cientarianism**

In philosophy and environmental studies, sufficiency is used in different, only partly overlapping ways. In the theory of justice, sufficiency usually refers to a minimum threshold that people are entitled to as a matter of justice (Fourie 2016). In environmental studies dealing with sustainability, sufficiency can refer to a preference of quality over quantity, of virtuous action and social relations over having more. Such eco-sufficiency (Kanschik 2016) articulates specific views of a good life that competes with others. Sufficiency also refers to a concern with environmental limits, i.e., that our consumption and production uses environmental resources and sinks in such a way that the long-term stability of socioecological systems is secured (Spengler 2016). This second "eco" use of sufficiency is directly relevant for intergenerational justice and global justice, i.e., with a view to those already losing their livelihoods in the present due to climate change and the extinction of species.

The double relation between justice and sufficiency is manifest in the uses of enough. As Frankfurt (1987) noted, "having enough" can mean that any more would yield unpleasant results. Perhaps, the chips served on the train are so tasty that you want to have a second bag. You come to regret this directly after, feeling sick. A limit has been reached. Eco-sufficient discourse highlights how consumer

democracies are driven by dynamics of marketing and profitability that structurally lead to overconsumption, one of the key indirect drivers of current unsustainability (Díaz et al. 2019). However, as Frankfurt noted, "having enough" can also be used to say that a requirement or standard has been met. In this use, there is no implication that more would be bad. Rather, enough here means that a person has enough to eat, enough access to goods, etc. It is this standard or requirement that is in the focus of the sufficientarian theory of distributive justice.

There is a relation between the two uses. If my over-eating of chips and cake comes at the cost of you or distant others not having any, then there are relations between sufficiency as a requirement and standard and sufficiency as a limit (Spengler 2016, p. 930). The next section will first turn to sufficiency as a standard or requirement, and Section 4 will turn to it as a limit.

#### **3. Su**ffi**ciency as a Standard or Requirement**

The sufficiency requirement raises a host of questions (Fourie 2016): What is the currency of the standard (resources, needs, capabilities . . . )? What is the scope of the associated community ("America first"?, all humans, . . . all X)? Are there weighting rules where policies or decisions affect closeness to the threshold or positions below and above the threshold, etc.? How are sufficientarian principles and currencies justified? And related to this last question: is the sufficientarian view itself part of a more general theory or approach also including further values and principles? It follows that there is a variety of sufficientarian conceptions, depending on the respective answers to these questions.

#### *3.1. The Currency of Su*ffi*ciency*

The position taken here adopts capabilities as the category for evaluating thresholds, i.e., the real opportunities of people to do and to be what they have reason to value.<sup>2</sup> These heterogeneous doings and being are called functionings. A well-known version of such a position is Martha Nussbaum's theory of basic justice that spells out the concept of dignity via a list of central capabilities as entitlements of basic justice (Nussbaum 2006, pp. 76–78)<sup>3</sup> . Sufficiency, as used here, adopts this focus on dignity as a way of selecting capabilities and functionings.

<sup>2</sup> In addition to Nussbaum's theory of basic justice see also (Anderson 2010; Claassen 2017; Nielsen and Axelsen 2017; Ziegler et al. 2017; Drydyk).

<sup>3</sup> For a discussion and defense of lists, see (Claassen 2010). There are also other ways of creating lists of central capabilities, and the very idea of such a list has also been criticised. For the purpose of this

#### *3.2. Agency*

Central to the capabilities approach is a focus on human agency. This focus originates with objections to theories and policies of development that treat human beings as means rather than ends (Sen 1999). The latter legitimates the priority of economic growth and developmental policies over democracy, education, and culture with the claim that such goods will follow later, once people are affluent enough to "afford" freedom. By contrast, Sen puts the emphasis on an "agent-oriented view" (Sen 1999, p. 11) that highlights the intrinsic and instrumental value of agency for justice and development. An agent is "someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievement can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well . . . " (Sen 1999, p. 18).

The focus on acting situates the capabilities approach within traditions of political philosophy that emphasise the need not just to look at formal rights but also at the real opportunity to exercise and enjoy them. Or as Nussbaum puts it, "each person as an end and as a source of agency" (Nussbaum 2000, p. 69). The idea of persons as ends is particularly clear in political agency, and the discussion of values, norms, laws, and policies governing social life. Such agency requires the capacity to reflect, to discuss, to decide, and to bring about—including to decide not to participate (Nussbaum 2006, p. 184f). Thus, agency as used here is very different from the agent in standard economics, who is supposed to act on behalf of a principal.

Elizabeth Anderson has proposed a capabilitarian sufficientarian position called *democratic equality*:

The fundamental requirement of democracy is that citizens stand in relations of equality to one another. Citizens have a claim to a capability set *su*ffi*cient* to enable them to function as equals in society (assuming they have the potential to do so). Democratically relevant functionings include adequate safety, health and nutrition, education, mobility and communication, the ability to interact with others without stigma, and to participate in the system of cooperation. (Anderson 2010, p. 83)

Democratic equality underscores the relation of political agency with other capabilities. In her sufficientarian view, "citizens are entitled to *enough* education, for example, to

article, I bracket both the issue of further refinement of the capabilities list and the philosophical case for proposing such lists.

be able to advance informed claims in public forums, at a level of articulateness that elicits a respectful hearing" (Anderson 2010, p. 83, italics added).

Furthermore, rather than thinking of citizens in terms of representative individuals, the capabilities approach suggests that treating citizens as equals calls for a focus on the diversity of individuals and their contexts. Or in the image: when there is a serious risk that people might not be able to get onto the train, perhaps simply because there is no access for wheelchairs or for strollers, or if some groups are not "supposed" or "expected" to participate in the ride, etc. Nussbaum's list of central capabilities offers a comprehensive starting point for considering the agency of citizens, further thinking about and spelling out such capabilities in context.

#### *3.3. Principles of Distribution*

At first sight, a section on principles of distribution seems question-begging. Is sufficientarianism not precisely the view that a minimum threshold is required for justice? That there is really only one principle—that of sufficiency?

Already, Anderson's concept of democratic equality points to a more complicated situation. Democratic equality? How can equality have a place in a sufficientarian approach? Drawing on Nussbaum's Aristotle-inspired capabilities, Nielsen and Axelsen (2017) distinguish three types of capabilities: in relation to biological and physical human needs, in relation to the social interests of individuals, and in relation to their interests as autonomous individuals. The biological category, they suggest, is non-positional: distribution here must only be enough in a minimum threshold sense. If I have sufficient drinking water, it does not really matter very much for my nutritional need if somebody else has 10-times this amount of freshwater. By contrast, the social category is positional: political freedoms, freedom of assembly and of association, require equality. It is not enough for me to have one vote if my neighbour has ten. Here, the principle is equality, underscoring the importance of Anderson's insistence on democratic equality. Their last category refers to quasi-positional capabilities. Rational reflection, imagination, critical thinking, and normative evaluation in their view can be conceived of in terms of a sufficientarian threshold, but there is a need to consider pressures from external factors. "A person's opportunity for getting a meaningful job that is appropriate to her level and type of education is not only dependent on her personal capacities and acquired skills but also on competition from other human agents and social norms" (Nielsen and Axelsen 2017, p. 56).

Sufficientarians should endorse the plurality of capabilities and the respective questions of distributive logic raised by them. However, they should not follow the

specific suggestion that the biological category is non-positional. It is true that some aspects depend on personal traits (such as one's metabolism and bodily condition, for example, being pregnant), but much also depends on social and environmental traits. In times of drought, cities in California and South Africa seek to enforce bans on water consumption for green lawns, etc., precisely for this reason. The water consumption of my neighbour affects my capability, and vice versa. Thus, a similar reasoning applies as for the category of autonomous individuals. They are quasi-positional: there are sufficientarian reasons to consider distribution so as to promote and secure the individual capability "from external pressure" (Nielsen and Axelsen 2017, p. 57). In a word, we have to think about the biological aspect of capabilities ecologically. Turning to patiency, it becomes evident how pervasive these quasi-positional reasons are.

#### *3.4. Patiency*

Anderson's democratic equality assumes, as she notes, that citizens "have the potential to do so" (Anderson 2010, p. 83). Some members of the community do not have this potential, contingently or permanently. Children have limited or developed capacities for deliberation and acting on reflected goals. A severe accident can prevent a person permanently from such deliberation and action. As Anderson notes, "additional principles must be supplied for such issues" (Anderson 2010, p. 84).

But is this just a matter of additional principles? And of children and future generations? Legal practice in many countries has moved to recognize further non-human animals. Environmental ethics discusses the moral considerability of animals, plants, ecosystems, and entities as such (Gorke 2010). Whatever one's positions in such debates, environmental ethics suggests that the community of justice is larger than the domain of human agents. One way of exploring this point is to consider contingent and permanent *patiency*, understood as the well-being and flourishing of living beings, no matter if this flourishing is based on reflection and deliberation, i.e., political and moral agency.

Dignity is not limited to agency.<sup>4</sup> Rather, we can and should consider the dignity of patients. Partly, this is out of mere self-interest: we are all (potential) patients to some extent and in some contexts. Partly, this is out of consideration for the ends of others. Nussbaum (2006) has recognized this point and proposed a sentientist

<sup>4</sup> Sen introduces agency in relation to "the mediaeval distinction between 'the patient' and 'the agent'", positioning his "freedom-centred understanding of economics and of the process of development is very much an agent-oriented view" (Sen 1999, p. 11).

boundary of justice as a realistic utopia for our time. As "realistic utopia" indicates, her proposal is informed by a pragmatic political diagnosis. It is not a systematic implication of a philosophical approach based on flourishing. Her specific boundary proposal has been critiqued as arbitrary and inconsistent (Wolf 2012, p. 52).

The concept of flourishing at the core of the capabilities approach includes life as such. It is not difficult to identify the functioning needs of humans and non-human lives. As in the case of children, the autonomy-part might be missing or reduced, but this does not preclude the identification of functionings (Anderson 2010, p. 94). The potential to function here is not so much a matter of autonomous choice, but rather of bodily and contextual traits that enable flourishing.

Paul Taylor has recognized this point drawing a distinction of moral agents and moral patients (or, synonymously, subjects, (Taylor 1986, p. 13). "Perhaps the most ethically significant fact about moral subjects," he notes, "is that it is always possible for a moral agent to take a moral subject's standpoint and make judgements from its standpoint about how it ought to be treated. The standard implicit in such judgements is the furtherance or preservation of well-being of the subject, not of the one who does the judging" (Taylor 1986, p. 17). This yields a flourishing test of moral considerability: are moral agents able to identify the good of the subject without reference to any other entity and thus, its instrumental uses for others (Taylor 1986, p. 61)<sup>5</sup> .

In Taylor's philosophy, this leads to a normative position that recognizes and respects the flourishing of all life,<sup>6</sup> once we note that our knowledge of the evolution of life places us as living beings among other living beings, who also have their good and who cannot be demonstrated to be inferior to us. Ideas of human superiority (in the Western tradition) are the likely remnants of pre-evolutionary, dualist Cartesian or Christian worldviews. By contrast, the attitude of respect for nature is supported by a worldview informed by evolutionary theory and ecology—as well as by other cultural and religious worldviews, including other varieties of Christianity.

Worldview has implications for our thinking about capabilities. Axelsen and Nielsen claim that some capabilities related to physical needs are non-positional. This argument depends on the assumption that the relevant resources are "freely available". Or, to revisit the example, 120 litres of freshwater per day might be

<sup>5</sup> As one reviewer pointed out, this also leads to questions about the inclusion of novel entities, in particular due to developments in artificial intelligence. This interesting question is beyond the scope of this chapter, though prima facie Taylor's moral considerability test also applies to such entities.

<sup>6</sup> While I focus on Taylor, there are important further contributions such as (Agar 2001; Varner 1999). For the sake of this exposition of nature-respecting sufficiency, I bracket this intricate further discussion. For comprehensive older and more recent, critical, discussions see (Gorke 2010; Basl 2019), respectively.

fully sufficient for me in the sense that it does not matter if my neighbour uses 240 or 1200 litres etc.; it does not follow that this water is not taken from other beings in a way that harms their good. For example, the growth in consumptive use of water for agriculture and energy is a key cause for the enormous pressure on aquatic ecosystems worldwide (Ziegler et al. 2017, p. 110). The more general point suggested by the example is that it is prima facie not irrelevant what happens above the threshold, i.e., when basic interests have been met. Rather, consumption above the threshold is very likely to interfere with the good of others.

Revisiting the train image, this subsection suggests thinking of the train as a safe travelling space not only for active, "able-bodied" citizen agents, but also for all living beings—a Noah train. Alternatively, we can leave the train to human agents, who as inventors, engineers, entrepreneurs, managers, conductors, and passengers are most directly benefitting and responsible for exploring the frontiers of the blue planet—but note that the environment of the train has significantly changed: it is not just stuff out there, but a living, morally significant landscape. Do not throw your garbage out of the window!

#### **4. Su**ffi**ciency as a Limit**

The discourse of limits to growth and its revival in national eco-space boundaries and planetary boundaries discussions (Spangenberg 2003; Biermann and Kim 2020) calls for a reduction in production and consumption. "The idea broadly demands that human beings should limit their consumption in order to remain below a level that would be 'too much' in terms of harmful emissions and resource extraction—in other words, to remain below a maximum . . . " (Spengler 2016, p. 925). The currently most widely discussed limit of this nature is the warming upper limit in climate change policy, that is, an increase of no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius decided on in the 2015 Paris COP21 climate agreement. It is argued for on a number of grounds: moving to an even higher degree of warming would yield unpredictable risk to societies and ecosystems; this would especially harm the global poor, who often lack the technological means for climate adaptation; this would lead to further forced migration with unpredictable consequences for social stability and peace; it would further accelerate the sixth mass extinction of species . . . to name but the more prominent grounds.

Noteworthy is the specification of environmental limits in terms of resources and environmental goods (CO2, water consumption, nitrate etc., (Steffen et al. 2015). Moreover, the focus is not primarily on "my CO<sup>2</sup> consumption" in comparison to yours, but on levels that are relevant for the functioning of the system and via this

functioning point for individuals; for example, tipping points of the global climate system that, via extreme weather events, undermine secure shelter.

Respect for nature has important implications for thinking about such limits. The notion of relevant harm is extended beyond harm to humans. For example, in climate ethics (Nolt 2011), this extends the community of moral patients that is put at risk via anthropogenic climate change, from changes to habitats and conditions of flourishing that force migration and shift ranges to the extinction of species that cannot adapt quickly enough.

More radically, nature-respecting sufficiency challenges the standard conception of resources and sinks as limits, i.e., as an upper limit that might be reached after considerable economic growth. Any use of resources above the one required for reaching the human dignity threshold is likely to be at a cost to other members of the community and their ability to enjoy a sufficient minimum. I therefore speak of a resource threshold (that complements the central capability threshold). It is a sufficientarian, instrumental consideration in the philosophical sense that the argument is not based on an intrinsic problem with some having more resources than others as such (as in an egalitarian position), but with the effects of high consumption on others.<sup>7</sup> This consideration requires a shift from resource limits to a resource sufficiency threshold as a starting point—whereas simple sufficientarianism, by contrast, is typically associated with distributive agnosticism beyond the threshold. Respect for nature provokes the shift in the burden of justification: as we live in a doubly full world, not only with almost 8 billion people but also myriad other creatures everywhere, there are prima facie no free resources. The key question becomes the justification of consumption and production beyond the resource threshold of living in dignity. Assuming that there are synergetic ways of producing and consuming that do not harm other members of the community or that even improve their positions, there is possible extension (and innovation) beyond the resource threshold—yet, this cannot just be taken for granted.

Instrumental considerations of unequal distribution are not only an environmental matter. Ingrid Robeyns has provided arguments that support *economic* limits (Robeyns 2017b). First, economic inequality undermines political equality. She notes that the financially affluent can use their wealth to buy votes, for agenda-setting, to influence public opinion and for lobbying to undermine democratic policy-making

<sup>7</sup> Holland (2008) calls the environment a meta-capability, in the sense of a precondition that is necessary for central human capabilities. Others have criticised the terminology: the environment is not a capability (see Robeyns 2017a, p. 171).

(for example, via the threat to move production elsewhere). Second, she argues from unmet urgent needs: the financial resource of the affluent could be used to finance the fight against extreme poverty and deprivation as well as collective action problems that require government action. She argues for limitarianism as the view that it is "not morally permissible to have more resources than are needed to fully flourish in life" (Robeyns 2017b, p. 1).

Limitarianism has an instrumentally motivated egalitarian tendency. However, its focus on a "fully flourishing life" indicates a potentially higher level of resource use than flourishing in relation to central capabilities (Robeyns 2017b, p. 24). If the latter is defined relatively generously, the two might coincide; if it is defined very restrictively, there is a space between the resources required for leading a life in dignity and for being rich (in the morally permissible way). Either way, the consideration of resource use with a view to the moral community of all life puts pressure also on economic limitarianism to move the justificatory burden and ask what economic resource use beyond dignity is justified.

To conclude this section on sufficiency as a limit: First, in the environmental discourse, the limit is focused on resources and environmental goods rather than capabilities. Second, the discourse tends to focus on them as part of systems (the climate, the water cycle, etc.). Will a higher absolute level of CO<sup>2</sup> provoke a system imbalance with harmful consequences? How emissions are distributed within the system is secondary for this question. A beneficial implication of this point, at least from a capabilities perspective, is that unequal distribution of resources can be consistent with such limits in consideration of heterogeneity of contexts—say, more energy requirements of somebody living in a cold climate. By contrast, in the economic case, distribution is of primary importance due to the relative power of the rich over the poor. The reason, however, is also systemic. Unequal distribution undermines democratic politics: the rich have too great an opportunity to lobby for their interests, while the least advantaged might be entirely excluded from participating. Third, nature-respecting sufficiency leads to a rethinking of capabilitarian thresholds and resource limits. Rather than asking how much we can maximally produce and consume and stay within a "safe space", it suggests as primary questions: What resources do moral agents need to lead a dignified life? What resource use above this level is justified because it is synergetic with the dignity of all members of the moral community? To be sure, the system questions remain very important here too. However, they are not oriented by a maximization perspective, but by one of enough resources.

There are two advantages of this sufficientarian approach. First, for some systems, it is difficult to define planetary boundaries (see, for example, the difficulties linked to the discussion of a freshwater boundary, (Ziegler et al. 2017); a focus on resource requirements thus suggests a less constraining starting point. Second, some boundaries have been transgressed according to the planetary boundary account: genetic diversity, phosphorus, and nitrogen (Steffen et al. 2015, p. 736). In terms of the resilience concept orienting this account, there is no systemic reason to think that we could simply "move" back to the old, "safe" space. As noted in the introduction, the image of the Anthropo-train continuing its ride therefore rings hollow. In this emerging new social–ecological reality, we can, however, still ask if people's resource needs in relation to central capability are met, if production and consumption respect nature, and how both relate to new system dynamics. This reflects the point that ecosystems are dynamic and do not have a predetermined construction or operating plan (Gorke 2010, p. 142).

#### **5. Nature-Respecting Su**ffi**ciency Reconsidered**

Nature-respecting sufficiency endorses the "positive thesis" (Fourie 2016, p. 18) of sufficientarianism: "the moral significance of a non-instrumental sufficiency threshold, encapsulating the idea that it is a priority for individuals to reach or not to fall under such a threshold". Spelling out this thesis, however, yields a number of specifications and qualifications. First, threshold does not mean a line limiting a homogenous box, for example, of income. The diversity of all the SDGs in this respect is therefore a welcome feature. Rather, the standard refers to a heterogeneous set of capabilities articulating the concept of dignity that motivates the concern with a threshold. In practice, therefore, it is a demanding process to discuss relevant thresholds across capability categories in context. Second, for some capabilities, i.e., those of political equality, the threshold is intrinsically relational. For other capabilities, based on quasi-positional goods, relations are instrumentally important. Once we accept the attitude of respect for nature, we are living in a full world without free resources. Instrumental concerns are everywhere. This environmental resource point is enforced by the consideration of the negative role of economic inequality for political equality. Third, the style of thinking suggested by nature-respecting sufficiency puts central focus on the specification of a standard of dignity for moral agents, and with it, on distinguishing needs from wants and basic interests from further interests. In this way, nature-respecting sufficiency is a way to articulate philosophically the idea of sustainability, with its discourse based on meeting "the

needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Brundtland definition).

Adopting the weak versus strong sustainability terminology of sustainability discourse (Neumayer 2010), *strong* sufficientarianism is based on the recognition that in a full world with almost 8 billion people and a still growing global economy, meeting a threshold of dignity for present and future generations depends on respecting limits and seeing the negative consequences of further growth in production and consumption if non-substitutable natural capital is consumed. *Weak* sufficientarianism holds that technological progress and markets will help us tackle limits and boundaries. Nature-respecting sufficiency seeks to expand the scope of the moral community to include life as such. Thus, it is not only *strong*, i.e., endorsing the idea of environmental constraints to human activity, but also *transformative* of our conception of nature as a resource for us: nature is more than a capital to be preserved or for the "Anthropo-train" to speed on. Nature-respecting, transformative sufficiency is strong; strong sustainability can, but need not, be transformative. Strong sustainability, however, is necessarily drawn to a discussion that sees humans and their economy as part of socioecological dynamics. The planet is not made for humans to exploit and conquer as they please, nor is such conquest without significant risks. Is there a benevolent, slippery slope?<sup>8</sup>

#### *5.1. Standard Objections to Nature-Respecting Su*ffi*ciency*

According to the arbitrariness objection (Fourie 2016, p. 26f), sufficientarianism is morally arbitrary as there is a continuum of well-being and wherever sufficientarians posit a threshold, the threshold lacks the moral significance claimed by its positive thesis. According to nature-respecting sufficiency, this objection needs to be discussed in two parts. For positional goods, there are non-arbitrary, relational reasons for an egalitarian threshold. If you have two votes, this undermines the value of my vote. For quasi-positional goods, the reasoning is different. It is not based on the idea that well-being somehow suddenly diminishes beyond a threshold. Rather, it is the (potential) harm to others that outweighs the increase in well-being beyond a threshold of dignity. Is this idea still arbitrary in a morally relevant sense? Returning to the example of freshwater consumption, we can note that there is a variety of proposals for what counts as sufficient freshwater per head. Peter

<sup>8</sup> The most elaborate philosophical proponent of strong sustainability, Konrad Ott, suggests to move from anthropocentrism and sentientism to moral considerability based on prehension, which, empirically, he finds most plausible for animals, and hence, speaks of a zoocentrism (Ott 2010, p. 143).

Gleick argues that 50 litres of freshwater per capita per day are needed for drinking and domestic use; Malin Falkenmark, investigating freshwater use of societies with high technological development, argues that 274 litres per day are required; Eran Feitelson combines ideas from both approaches to identify a middle-ground (Feitelson 2012). In addition, a capabilities approach perspective would point to relevant differences in personal and other traits. For example, the freshwater requirement of pregnant and breastfeeding women is higher than those of other people of the same age. These examples and considerations suggest that there is some variety around freshwater resource needs. However, this variety seems more a matter of practical and contextual considerations, and it does not seem arbitrary in a morally significant way (legitimating, say, giving 1000 litres of water to Americans, and 1 litre of water to Mexicans). Thus, nature-respecting sufficiency leaves leeway for specifying a threshold, but not in a morally arbitrary way. The example also suggests that nature-respecting sufficiency can motivate and justify the inquiry into thresholds, but the determination of thresholds requires public debate as well as other disciplines (as in the example hydrology, political science and public health).

According to the indifference objection (Fourie 2016, p. 27), sufficientarians fail to worry about morally significant inequality above the threshold. Provided everyone is above the threshold, it does not, for example, matter if one group is at the threshold and one much beyond that. Again, we need to consider this objection in two parts. For positional capabilities, the objection evidently directly fails. For quasi-positional capabilities, nature-respecting sufficiency considers inequality for instrumental reasons. Again, using the water example, if I use freshwater for a swimming pool and lawn in a dry summer, this contributes to a reduced environmental flow in the river from which the water is abstracted, or contributes to a lowering of the groundwater table, etc.—all with consequences for other species and human neighbours. Thus, the indifference objection here only holds for purely egalitarian reasons. In practical terms, there are ample grounds for not being indifferent.

According to a further objection, sufficientarianism is also problematic below the threshold (Fourie 2016, p. 27f). How should we deal with difference below the threshold, i.e., various groups being not well-off? Should those least well-off be prioritized? Or those that can be made to reach the threshold? My intuition is that those most disadvantaged should be prioritized, say the person with one litre a day over the person with 49 litres a day. However, disadvantage below the threshold is not, even conceptually, a simple matter as there is a variety of types and capabilities of disadvantage. So how do you compare and weigh disadvantage across them? Is disadvantage in health more important than political disadvantage?

Education more important than economic opportunity? Empirical research suggests that disadvantage clusters (Wolff and de Shalit 2007): if you face problems in one capability category, say health, you are likely to also face problems in another one, say economic opportunity. At first sight, this empirical finding makes life easier. If disadvantage clusters, it becomes less complicated to identify socially excluded or marginalised groups and to accordingly prioritize those most disadvantaged. However, empirical research also suggests that supporting such groups yields policy dilemmas. A study of Roma exclusion in Hungary shows that support for excluded Roma is having counter-productive, exclusion re-enforcing effects, if only the Roma are targeted by social policy (Molnár 2017). Other, less excluded groups have to be included so as to improve social ties and avoid further enforcement of Roma exclusion that would be created by a focus on the least-advantaged only. Thus, there might not be a straightforward way of prioritizing below the threshold. However, this point does not depend on a specific moral theory—it is, rather, a challenge that all approaches dealing with disadvantage and social exclusion have to deal with and cautions not to move too quickly from philosophy to policy. Rather, the philosophical contribution here is to motivate the focus on those in need and central capabilities, a small yet still important contribution given that much biodiversity protection in practice depends on the livelihood protection and practices of indigenous people around the world.

Finally, according to the bottomless pit problem, sufficientarianism problematically suggests prioritizing the least well-off, even if this exhausts all of society's resources (Fourie 2016, p. 29). Nature-respecting sufficiency calls for a complete reversal in thinking on this point. The most disadvantaged are not the bottomless pit; the bottomless pit are the affluent in a growth-based world, taking away resources and undermining life conditions for others in the present and future. An Oxfam report estimates that the richest 10% of people in the world are responsible for around 50% of global emissions, whereas the poorest half accounts for only 10% of global emissions (Oxfam 2015).

#### *5.2. Specific Objections to Nature-Respecting Su*ffi*ciency: Unliveable and Counter-Intuitive*

How can human moral agents, given their bodily condition as heterotrophic beings that, unlike plants, cannot produce their own food via photosynthesis, possibly *not* violate rules of respect for nature? Rules such as non-maleficence (the duty not to harm any entity in the natural environment that has a good of its own), non-interference (the duty to refrain from placing restrictions on the freedom of individual organisms, hands-off policy with regard to whole ecosystems and biotic

communities, i.e., providing space for ecosystems due to minimal interference by humans), or restitutive justice (the duty to restore the balance of justice between a moral agent and a moral subject when the subject has been wronged by the agent)<sup>9</sup> are simply not liveable in the world as it is and given the kind of beings we are, or so this objection holds.

A response is priority rules that deal with the inevitable conflicts over resources in a full world (Taylor 1986, pp. 264–305):


The basic move is to enable moral agents to deal with conflicts in a systematic manner. The capabilities approach, via Nussbaum's conception of dignity and central capabilities, offers a way to further spell out the distinction between basic and non-basic interests, which Taylor draws on but does not elaborate further. However, nature-respecting sufficiency suggests more than just filling out open issues. In the sufficientarian perspective, the first two principles seem uncontroversial and the second one, in fact, typical for sufficientarianism. But the sufficientarian approach to distributive justice is different: it demands a *su*ffi*cient* share where resources are needed to meet basic interests. In this way, the sufficientarian principle of distributive justice resonates well with the priority articulated in the proportionality principle. On this basis, moreover, the sufficientarian conception suggests an elegant simplification, merging principles one and four in favour of a principle of self-preservation: moral agents are entitled to foster and secure central capabilities for living in dignity.

<sup>9</sup> All rules from (Taylor 1986, pp. 172–86).

Take the example of a water dam proposal for energy production. The sufficientarian perspective is not a priori against the dam. Rather, it asks prior questions: what are the energy needs of the community or region; what are the ways to meet them (considering say, also, wind and solar)? And based on this, what is the best way to meet needs while minimizing harm. In practice, this likely requires an energy plan for the region, rather than letting dam construction be guided by economic opportunity and subsequent impact assessment.

But what about the third, minimum wrong principle? In Taylor's philosophy, the principle is there to secure a place for human, non-basic interests that are important for civilized life and that play a central role in their conception of the good life (Taylor 1986, p. 281). Moreover, these interests are to be compatible with an attitude of respect for nature. Taylor thinks, for example, of classical music and the concert halls required for it. In a capabilitarian conception of basic interests, there is a place for culture within Nussbaum's complex conception of living in dignity, with music, for example, via the central capability of play. This suggests that the idea of minimum wrong should accompany the principle of self-preservation as a qualification. Accordingly, the next subsection will further turn to this suggestion and the social and ecological design it calls for.

But is nature-respecting sufficiency not contra-intuitive? Do slime molds have the same standing as humans? The self-preservation principle, valid as such for all living beings, takes some of the apparent counter-intuitiveness away. It is legitimate to meet and secure the dignity of human agents (as is the self-preservation of non-human animals), and on the expansive central capabilities list, this covers considerable grounds of human agency. Interestingly, the principle of self-preservation has a quasi-transcendental justification for humans as moral agents: meeting and securing central capabilities ensures that the conditions of moral agency are met, and thus, of ensuring a precondition of the respect for nature demanded by environmental philosophy.

Still, imagine a case of emergency—a burning house—and stipulate that you are able to save either another human or a mouse trapped in the pantry? Should you not save the human rather than the mouse? Nature-respecting sufficiency can, again, make a transcendental pragmatic appeal to moral agency in response to such cases: if we do not achieve and preserve a threshold for human moral agents, there is not going to be any discussion of morality anyway. A minimalist, i.e., agency-preserving form of "speciesism", suggests a reason why I should save the human. This idea repeats the special, architectonic value of practical reasoning (Nussbaum 2000): practical reason is required for there to be choice regarding any of the capabilities

and functionings. Likewise, moral agency is required for there to be any discussion and choice of justice and sustainability. This provides a first reply and helps explain why, in this chapter, I do not use the traditional language of anthropocentric versus (a variety of) physiocentric positions. However, no doubt, more discussion is required on this point.

#### *5.3. Nature-Respecting Su*ffi*ciency Ignores Human Ingenuity and Innovation*

As noted in the introduction to this section, the emergence of an international sustainability discourse sparked controversy between economists with faith in the power of technology and markets to deal with limits on the one hand, and on the other hand, economists who called for a deeper change in values and the protection of nature. More recently, eco-modernists have revived the case of the technology optimists. As Peter Cannavò writes:

Eco-modernism is most fundamentally the view that economic growth can be "decoupled" from environmental degradation, through technical ingenuity and the development of substitutes for scarce resources and polluting technologies; ecomodernists also argue that economic growth and prosperity are preconditions for environmental responsibility. (Cannavo 2019, p. 8)

Cannavò notes that writers such as Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger from the Breakthrough Institute argue against a "politics of limits, which seeks to constrain human ambition, aspiration, and power rather than unleash and direct them" (Cannavo 2019, p. 8). In this view, the sufficientarian focus on thresholds and limits is misguided: wherever challenges emerge, human ingenuity, powered by science and innovation, will come up with new solutions that fix the problem. "If it [climate change] matters, we will solve it" (Steven Pinker quoted in (Davies 2018). This optimism of the eco-modernists takes us to the weak sufficientarianism introduced above. It accepts the importance of a threshold of dignity but views it along with the idea of limits as a signalling device for innovation and markets.

Nature-respecting sufficiency offers three considerations for eco-modernists and related ways of thinking. First, as an environmental philosophy it points to the costs of eco-modernism in the present as we know it. A direct driver of species extinction is the economic exploitation of land and water; moreover, an indirect driver of this is technological innovation (Díaz et al. 2019, p. 5). Either eco-modernists would have to say that this is not a morally relevant loss or, speculatively, that future research and innovation will allow for re-making of lost species and restoring habitats, whenever "we eco-moderns" feel it is important to fix the problem. Thus, the position rests on a gamble on the future.

Second, the gamble of eco-modernism is more general. We do not know what technological change will achieve in the future and what unintended consequences will result from this. As Cannavò notes:

. . . such an invasive, physical remaking suggests that humanity, like nonhuman nature, will become raw material for a brave new future, and there are the inevitable questions of who is designing our transformed descendants, who is carrying out the experiments, and who will suffer the collateral damage along the way. Who will be at the mercy of those whose hubris and ambitions demand the reengineering of Earth and humanity? The potential scope of domination by some over others becomes truly sobering. (Cannavo 2019, p. 12 )

In science- and technology-oriented discussions of sustainability, the precautionary principle has therefore been invoked: When "human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm" (UNESCO-Comest 2005). The precautionary principle offers an important addition to nature-respecting sufficiency in the context of current knowledge-based, technological innovation for commercial use. It further qualifies the way of thinking about the principle of self-preservation, in addition to the principles of proportionality and minimum wrong introduced above. There is also an emerging research community—responsible innovation—that takes such precautionary concerns seriously and, rather than viewing precaution as a mere "slowdown of progress", reframes the issue as an opportunity for innovation that, from the beginning, reflects on purpose, anticipates consequences, and seeks to be responsive in the process (Owen et al. 2013, p. 34ff).

Third, and beyond a focus on technology in responsible innovation, it is misleading to pit an eco-modernist open future against status quo or past-loving, anti-technology tree-huggers. There is plenty of space to embrace ingenuity and innovation in nature-respecting sufficiency. Notions of well-being and prosperity in the capability approach cover both the multiple realizations of capabilities as well as the material and non-material aspects of this. ". . . . It is possible to live good lives that are also just and ecologically sustainable, if we understand well-being and human flourishing in terms of human capabilities while giving more weight to the non-material capabilities . . . If we shift the way we are thinking about well-being towards those non-material capabilities *and* if we think about how we can realise the same capabilities with smaller ecological footprints, then we can still enjoy equal or

even higher levels of well-being, while putting less pressure on ecological resources and ecosystems" (Robeyns 2017c, p. 3)<sup>10</sup> None of this precludes human ingenuity. But it shifts the focus from the means—technological novelty for commercial use in the hegemonic conception of innovation—to the ends and a change in practices. Viewed this way, it is unsurprising that the 2019 Global Biodiversity assessment recommends *social* innovation in its proposals for a transformation for sustainability (Díaz et al. 2019, p. 9). However, we immediately have to add that change in practices is not "good" as such either, but rather, calls for ethical discussion of the values and principles animating such change, including an equal consideration of resistance to change, exnovation (or the deliberate divestment from past products, programmes, and policies) and the creative restoration of traditional practices (Ziegler 2020a, see also Zerbe on social agriculture and traditional land use types in this volume).

But does nature-respecting sufficiency, with its emphasis on intrinsic and instrumental reasons for equality, not undermine the entrepreneurial incentives that trigger the search for solutions in response to pressing unsustainability problems, including material gains for those least well-off (Rawls 1999, p. 63)? This frequently expressed concern is at the very least not evident in light of empirical innovation research. For a start, it shows that much innovation is due to tinkerers in households and communities and their "free innovations" (von Hippel 2016), whereas traditional innovation policy in an unequal society tends to reinforce inequality and personal gain is but one motive among many others (Ziegler 2020a, p. 75f). Knowledge-based innovation is consistent with government investing in innovation as a public good—for example, by giving a university resources to investigate technical and social alternative approaches to energy use, without this "more of resources" being linked to an increase in private wealth. Society can provide scientists and innovators with extra means at their disposal to investigate a disease, and reward significant results with prestige. Public-driven innovation missions have been major drivers of significant innovations (Mazzucato 2013). Immediately relevant for the protection of "life on land" (SDG 15) is the large amount of public funding for agriculture; for example, in the European Union, the possibility to shift funding from direct payments to eco-schemes for rewarding multi-functional agriculture and for this to enable coordination and a landscape-level focus (see Lanker et al. this volume).

<sup>10</sup> A further point that I can only mention here is the importance of human development for tackling population growth. As Sen (1999) has argued, human development and the importance it gives to educational and economic opportunity for women, is in practice also an effective way of reducing population growth

Paludiculture, or the productive use of wet or rewetted peatlands, provides an example for a potential sustainability innovation mission (Ziegler 2020b).

#### **6. Conclusions**

"A flourishing life on land is the foundation for our life on this planet," states the introductory sentence to SDG 15.<sup>11</sup> Nature-respecting sufficiency provides philosophical resources to appreciate the transformative potential and philosophical complications of protecting life, land, and waters. It calls for a focus on both agents and patients, and the thresholds and principles required for leading a life in dignity. Its scope is comprehensive, inclusive of all life. It offers one way to spell out a respect for nature in the theory of justice. In Albert Schweitzer's famous words: "I am life that wants to live, in the midst of life that wants to live" (Schweitzer [1923] 1990, p. 308).

As a philosophical contribution, nature-respecting sufficiency does not spell out the threshold values for each capability, let alone measurements or specific policy proposals. It rather provides a style of thinking about sustainability, biodiversity, and SDGs. Public discussion and many other disciplines are needed to spell out thresholds in context as well as economic arrangements that can sustain a sufficientarian ethos in practice.

The justification of nature-respecting sufficiency is complex. The starting point is the dignity of all living beings and their central capabilities. The conception specifically recognizes the role of moral agency via a principle of self-preservation, according to which it is permissible for moral agents to foster and secure their central capabilities. This is accompanied by:


For both agency and patiency, the positional and quasi-positional nature of capabilities plays an important role in recognizing intrinsic and instrumental reasons

<sup>11</sup> For the full text see the website: https://www.globalgoals.org/15-life-on-land (last accessed 2.10.2021).

for a concern with equal distribution. In the background is Taylor's important point that the attitude of respect for life is supported by an evolutionary and ecological worldview and with it, a rejection of human superiority.

This chapter distinguished weak, strong, and transformative sufficiency conceptions. Weak sufficiency treats thresholds and limits as signals for human ingenuity. Strong sufficiency recognizes dignity and basic need thresholds, along with resource limits and sink requirements in a growing, global economy. It remains open to the idea that the world and its natural capital is there for humans to conquer and exploit—even in the absence of it being made for us.<sup>12</sup> If this idea is rejected, it becomes transformative. Nature-respecting sufficiency calls for a change in basic values, to recognize us as one species among others, as moral agents on a continuum of moral patiency. Other environmental philosophy variations of transformative and strong sufficiency are possible and worthwhile exploring further.

While it is thus strong and transformative, the critical discussion of nature-respecting sufficiency showed that the view is not static, pitted against human creativity and innovation. To the contrary, it gives such innovation a distinct focus: the priority principle of self-preservation, accompanied by proportionality, minimum wrong, restitution—and in our knowledge-driven societies—precaution. As a result, it suggests inter alia the importance of complementing technological innovation with a consideration of social innovation (a move made by the 2019 Global Biodiversity Assessment), and to do so in a way that equally considers exnovation or the ending of practices. Again, however, it must be stressed that the role of philosopher here is limited. It proposes a style of thinking rather than solutions. It also helps explain doubts regarding the romantic train and more recent safe operating space metaphors of sustainability. The ultimate challenge is a change in practices and culture, and technological metaphors obscure this point.

A better final navigational metaphor, originating from practice and culture marginalized by "progress", is accordingly: "Walk gently on the earth" (Wagamese 2019) <sup>13</sup>. We both need new practices and technologies, as well as better recognition of old ones and their creative response to current pressures (Díaz et al. 2019, p. 18; Ziegler 2020a). When I travelled northward again from my first presentation of this

<sup>12</sup> For example, in the planetary boundaries discourse, it might invite the narrative of maximizing growth within limits (Crépin and Folke 2014, p. 58).

<sup>13</sup> Wagamese identifies this as a central teaching of Ojibwe practice, i.e., one of the North American cultures, pushed away and disregarded by "progress" (see footnote one). However, he also stresses the non-parochial, universally shareable (and differently reachable) status of this teaching.

paper, halfway through the trip from New York to Montreal, the atmosphere in the wagon took a distinctly agricultural flavour. A group of Amish people had entered the train, taking the train for two stops, to visit some community members as far as I could tell. They were chatting lively and laughing. As I was looking at them, a boy was curiously looking at me sitting there with my laptop.

**Acknowledgments:** This work has benefitted from prior presentations at the ISEE session of the American Philosophical Association (January 2019), virtual meetings of the environmental ethics research group Greifswald and GRÉEA Montréal, as well as the helpful comments of two reviewers and the editor. The first parts of this chapter are based on my book on innovation and ethics (Ziegler 2020a).

**Conflicts of Interest:** The author declares no conflict of interest.

#### **References**


© 2021 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
