**6. Discussion**

An important exploration of the development of construction waste recycling systems is the study of the game interaction between the government agency and different recyclers, as well as the evolutionary trajectory of participants. Due to the lack of effective management strategies in the past, construction waste recycling has brought significant impacts on the environment and human health [7,32]. To improve environmental quality, many countries' governments have enacted a variety of environmental incentive policies [1]. However, there are multiple parties involved in the construction waste recycling system, and the existence of conflicts of interest makes it difficult to effectively implement environmental incentive policies. In particular, the existence of uncertainty in the external environment, makes the behavior of participants in the construction waste recycling system more complicated [15]. Under the premise of bounded rationality, the stochastic evolutionary game model is built to analyze the complex behavior of participants, in which the Gaussian white noise is introduced to describe the impacts of uncertainty factors on stakeholders' decision evolution trajectories. Balancing the interests of participants is the key to improving the quality of construction waste recycling. For example, China established a Processing Fund for Waste Electrical and Electronic Products in 2012 to assist the formal recycling sectors of the electronic waste dismantling industry. The dismantling fund has lost \$8 billion since its establishment, with the fund already stagnant in 2017. As a result, the management of e-waste recycling cannot rely solely on subsidies, but also on corresponding punitive measures, which is consistent with previous research [33] and also useful for construction waste recycling. According to Andrew et al. [34], different policies must be implemented based on the characteristics of different countries in order to improve governance quality. Furthermore, environmental uncertainty is a significant factor that must be considered during the decision-making process. The random interference factors can influence the equilibrium strategy's trajectory [16]. In addition, certain critical values are determined so that the system behaves chaotically.

There are also some limitations in this paper. There are differences in construction recycling management and environment incentive policies in different countries. This paper built a stochastic evolutionary game model for a case study of China, which would be greater applicability by considering different environmental incentive policies in different countries. In addition, this paper only considers the government agencies, waste producers, and waste recyclers, and introduce Gaussian white noise, China's dual government systems also play an important role in construction waste recycling. More practical conclusions would be obtained by considering the combination of political concentration and economic decentralization of dual government systems.

Base on above analysis, some implications are proposed as follows:

