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## **Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation: Theory and Evidence**

Guest Editors:

## Dr. Jie Zheng

School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

## Prof. Dr. Shaoan Huang

Center for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, China

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## **Message from the Guest Editors**

Dear Colleagues,

Competition, coordination, and cooperation are three fundamental types of relations for strategic interactions among individuals, firms, and countries.

This Special Issue (short for CCC: T&E) aims to promote research that studies either one of the abovementioned strategic interactions among players, adopting the approach of either theory, empirics, or experiment. We encourage the submission of papers that either deliver new insights into these relations or provide new evidence that confirms the existing theory, or both. The topics of interest include but are not limited to: online and offline competition; competition with incomplete information; dynamic contests; group contests; coalition formation; conflict networks: coordination success and failure: mechanism design for cooperation; prisoner dilemma; public goods game; battle of the sexes; matching pennies; rock-paper-scissors game; Blotto games; externalities and free riding; rent seeking and inequality; social comparison and peer effect; information sharing and information disclosure; and gender difference in the relevant behavior.

