



Social Coordination Games

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Message from the Guest Editors

Coordination on an equilibrium, if achieved and maintained, may form a convention for a group or a society: Once a particular way of doing things becomes established as a rule, it continues in force because individuals prefer to conform to the rule given the expectation that others are going to conform. Conventions specifying how to collaborate in a joint project, on what side to drive, how to allocate tasks in a team, or how to share the product of joint work and standards such as software or hardware platforms are examples, among many, of successful coordination.

Both theoretical and experimental contributions are welcome. Relevant topics include (but are not limited to):

- Selection among payoff-dominant, risk-dominant, and maximin conventions;
- Nature and effectiveness of focal points;
- Coevolution of conventions and interaction structure;
- Learning social coordination;
- Anti-coordination games;
- Errors and the selection of conventions;
- Rationality in social coordination;
- Social preferences, social norms, and homophily as coordination devices;
- Psychology of social coordination.

