



Non-Imitative Dynamics in Evolutionary Game Theory

Guest Editor:

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Message from the Guest Editor

Game Theory, originally conceived as the mathematical theory of decision processes, has successively provided a mathematical framework for the theory of the evolution, allowing the rising of purely analytical studies on this topic. In particular, Evolutionary Game Theory has been employed in the last few decades to resolve the conundrum of cooperation. In order to cope with this problem, in many game-theoretical models, the evolutionary process is schematized with an imitation mechanism; that is, the agents with low fitness copy the strategies of the best performing ones with a probability given by the model's details. However, there can be several different mechanisms that can make a population evolve and explore the possible strategy evolutionary landscapes. Therefore, in this Special Issue, we aim to collect papers that contribute to theoretical research about these diverse types of processes. Such papers can be purely mathematical, focused on simulations, or both. Possible applications, not only to theoretical biology, but also to social, psychological, and economic dynamics, are highly recommended.

