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## Political Economy, Social Choice and Game Theory - Series II

Guest Editor:

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## Message from the Guest Editor

Social choice and political economy address similar issues using game theory tools. Social choice focuses on the properties of the social preference relation induced by the voting rule and examines whether these social preferences may be cyclical (leading to an empty core under majority rule and unrestricted preference domains). Political economy emphasizes the existence of equilibria (which is problematic if the core of the voting game is empty). Yet these two approaches are close, since the dominance condition that is used in discussing the core of a voting game is precisely the social preference relation that social choice theorists' study.

The topics covered in this Special Issue are embedded within political economy and social choice traditions using game theory tools that study the strategic interactions among the players in these games.



