



Contracts, Incentives and Information: Theory and Evidence

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Message from the Guest Editors

Dear Colleagues,

The topic of contracting is a prominent application of game theory. Models involve dynamic games with transfers and asymmetric information, in which principals move first by offering contracts and agents best-respond accordingly. Moreover, the communication of verifiable and unverifiable information can play a key role in such interactions. Behavioral economics can also enrich our understanding of contracting, e.g. contracts can be designed to exploit the psychological biases of agents. This special issue is intended to reflect these developments. To this end, we welcome submissions, using theoretical, empirical, or experimental methods of investigation, on the following areas:

- Moral hazard, adverse selection, mechanism design, and incomplete contracts
- Communication, information disclosure, and information design
- Behavioral effects e.g. mistakes and the interplay of financial and non-financial incentives
- Related applications (e.g. insurance, investment, consumption, and policy)

