

Special Issue

Political Game Theory: Coalition Formation and Dynamic Aspects of Collective Decision Making

Message from the Guest Editor

Understanding the connection between individuals' preferences within groups of agents (such as legislatures, electorates, households, international organizations, etc.) and the collective decisions of those groups has become a fundamental research topic in economics and political science. There is a rapidly growing, but yet far from comprehensive, game-theoretical literature on the dynamic aspects of this relationship. Articles are invited that further explore the interaction between individual preferences, strategic incentives, and collective decisions induced by political institutions in dynamic collective decision-making problems. Contributing authors are invited to approach the topic from either a noncooperative strategic vantage point or a more cooperative game-theoretic perspective. Topics welcomed include but are not restricted to committees and cabinets, legislative bargaining, collective learning, dynamic stability, repeated elections, bureaucratic policy making, and coalition formation.

Guest Editor

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closed (25 November 2022)



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