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19 pages, 350 KB

Open AccessArticle

Ibn Taymiyya’s Fiṭralism and Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology: A Comparative Study

by Safaruk Zaman Chowdhury

Religions 2025, 16(11), 1371; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16111371 - 29 Oct 2025

Viewed by 437

Contemporary philosophers and epistemologists as well as scholars of Islamic studies have not failed to notice some striking similarities between aspects of the Islamic notion of the “fiṭra” (humanity’s archetypal nature) articulated by the medieval Hanbalī traditionalist jurist and theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328) [...] Read more.

Contemporary philosophers and epistemologists as well as scholars of Islamic studies have not failed to notice some striking similarities between aspects of the Islamic notion of the “fiṭra” (humanity’s archetypal nature) articulated by the medieval Hanbalī traditionalist jurist and theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328) and the account of the sensus divinitatis (an innate, direct perception of God) espoused by the reformed philosopher Alvin Plantinga (1932–present). This article systematically compares both these notions and more by first situating them within the antecedent historical factors and developments leading up to their emergence in their respective intellectual milieu, the theological anthropology espoused by both thinkers and the religious epistemology of each respective thinker. The article will also discuss salient differences between each doctrine and their broader parent epistemologies and will examine major objections raised against them. The comparative study reveals not only a rich source of Islamic religious epistemology to be mined by diligent researchers but the exciting application of philosophical analysis to the thought of Ibn Taymiyya. Finally, the article argues that Ibn Taymiyya’s account of the fiṭra faces some problematic epistemological conundrums, one of which will be explored in detail. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Problems in Contemporary Islamic Philosophy of Religion)

20 pages, 331 KB

Open AccessArticle

Bridging the Mackie–Plantinga Debate on Evil with Ibn Arabi’s Metaphysics

by Elif Nur Balci

Religions 2024, 15(12), 1463; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15121463 - 30 Nov 2024

Viewed by 2216

Abstract

This study examines how Ibn Arabi’s metaphysics can address key challenges in the contemporary philosophical debate on the problem of evil. John Mackie famously argues that the existence of an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil, suggesting [...] Read more.

This study examines how Ibn Arabi’s metaphysics can address key challenges in the contemporary philosophical debate on the problem of evil. John Mackie famously argues that the existence of an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil, suggesting that theism must relinquish one of these divine attributes to resolve this contradiction. Alvin Plantinga, through his Free Will Defense, demonstrates that no logical contradiction undermines the coherence of the theistic conception of God. Although Mackie concedes this point, he contends that Plantinga’s defense does not sufficiently explain why God permits evil. With the resolution of the logical problem of evil, the evidential problem has gained prominence in the theistic debate, where Plantinga’s defense remains inadequate. While Plantinga invites theists to explore potential theological reasons for God’s allowance of evil, he acknowledges that this approach may not yield strong philosophical results. In contrast, Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical framework offers a more comprehensive solution. By integrating ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics to establish a coherent relationship between God, the universe, and humanity, Ibn Arabi renders Mackie’s logical critique irrelevant. Furthermore, his approach fills the gaps left by Plantinga’s defense, offering a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between God and evil. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Problems in Contemporary Islamic Philosophy of Religion)

15 pages, 235 KB

Open AccessArticle

Plantinga and Aquinas on the Viability of the ‘Third Way’

by Bernard James Mauser

Religions 2023, 14(2), 226; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020226 - 8 Feb 2023

Viewed by 3110

Abstract

This article deals with Alvin Plantinga’s arguments against St. Thomas Aquinas’s third way to show that God exists. Although attacks on this argument have come from Christians and non-Christians, my contention is that these rebuttals of the third way arise because of a [...] Read more.

This article deals with Alvin Plantinga’s arguments against St. Thomas Aquinas’s third way to show that God exists. Although attacks on this argument have come from Christians and non-Christians, my contention is that these rebuttals of the third way arise because of a misunderstanding of the argument itself. Thus, the metaphysical background for understanding the third way is first explained, and then the arguments Plantinga raises against it are dealt with. After reading this article it should be clear that the third way to show God’s existence is plausible and that Plantinga’s attacks against it are based on a straw man rather than the substantive argument the third way actually is. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advances in Philosophical Theology)

15 pages, 222 KB

Open AccessArticle

The “Heaven Ab Initio” Argument from Evil

by Carlo Alvaro

Religions 2023, 14(2), 200; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020200 - 2 Feb 2023

Viewed by 3092

Abstract

Logical and evidential arguments from evil are generally thought to have been rebutted by various refutations, defenses, and theodicies. While disparate, these responses employ similar strategies to show that God has morally sufficient reasons to permit evil and suffering in the world, either [...] Read more.

Logical and evidential arguments from evil are generally thought to have been rebutted by various refutations, defenses, and theodicies. While disparate, these responses employ similar strategies to show that God has morally sufficient reasons to permit evil and suffering in the world, either to preserve human freedom, for the sake of the moral growth of human souls, or to train humans to be able to act freely without sinning once in heaven. In this paper, I defend the heaven ab initio argument from evil (HAIAFE), which demonstrates that God could have accomplished all these goals, without the need for evil and suffering, by creating human beings directly as spiritual beings in a non-physical state of eternal bliss. Moreover, I will argue that the HAIAFE is both a logical argument from evil and a “deodicy”, i.e., a vindication of a deistic god. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

12 pages, 230 KB

Open AccessArticle

Defending the Free Will Defense: A Reply to Sterba

by Luis R. G. Oliveira

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1126; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111126 - 21 Nov 2022

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2348

Abstract

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the [...] Read more.

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

14 pages, 270 KB

Open AccessArticle

A Wittgensteinian Antitheodicy

by Timo Koistinen

Religions 2022, 13(11), 1113; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111113 - 17 Nov 2022

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 2112

Abstract

Contrary to the majority of contemporary analytic philosophers of religion, James Sterba argues in his book Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) that Alvin Plantinga with his famous free will defense has not succeeded in solving the logical problem of evil. However, [...] Read more.

Contrary to the majority of contemporary analytic philosophers of religion, James Sterba argues in his book Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) that Alvin Plantinga with his famous free will defense has not succeeded in solving the logical problem of evil. However, Sterba is not alone in disputing this generally accepted view in analytic philosophy of religion. D. Z. Phillips (1934–2006) has argued that the logical problem of evil has not been solved and he further holds that it has not even got off the ground. The aim of this article is to explore Phillips’ criticism of the free-will defense and mainstream theodicies. His critique is relevant for Sterba’s atheistic stance because Phillips’ arguments are partly applicable to forms of philosophical atheism that share the same assumptions with philosophical theism. In the first part of the article, I will briefly describe the starting points of the best-known solutions to the problem of evil in analytic philosophy of religion and refer to some aspects of Sterba’s arguments. After that I will explore Phillips’ ethical and conceptual criticism against frameworks used in the discussion of theodicy. Finally, I will pay attention to Phillips’ Wittgensteinian view of the task and the aim of philosophy in order to clarify some problematic aspects of his thought. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

15 pages, 250 KB

Open AccessArticle

God’s Prime Directive: Non-Interference and Why There Is No (Viable) Free Will Defense

by David Kyle Johnson

Religions 2022, 13(9), 871; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13090871 - 16 Sep 2022

Cited by 3 | Viewed by 3910

Abstract

In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will [...] Read more.

In a recent book and article, James Sterba has argued that there is no free will defense. It is the purpose of this article to show that, in the most technical sense, he is wrong. There is a version of the free will defense that can solve what Sterba (rightly) takes to be the most interesting and severe version of the logical problem of moral evil. However, I will also argue that, in effect (or, we might say, in practice), Sterba is correct. The only working version of the free will defense requires embracing a view that entails consequences theists traditionally have not and cannot accept. Consequently, the one and only free will solution is not viable. Unless some other solution can be found (Sterba argues there is none), the logical problem of evil, as Sterba understands it, either commits one to atheism, or a version of theism that practically all theists would regard as a heresy. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

10 pages, 222 KB

Open AccessArticle

Sterba’s Logical Argument from Evil and the God Who Walks Away from Omelas

by Erik J. Wielenberg

Religions 2022, 13(9), 782; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13090782 - 25 Aug 2022

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2766

Abstract

The logical argument from evil, generally thought to have been defused by Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense, has been reinvigorated by James Sterba’s exposition and defense of a new version of the argument that draws on recent work in moral philosophy. Whereas J.L. [...] Read more.

The logical argument from evil, generally thought to have been defused by Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense, has been reinvigorated by James Sterba’s exposition and defense of a new version of the argument that draws on recent work in moral philosophy. Whereas J.L. Mackie’s argument uses what can now be seen to be overly simplistic principles to try to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God and any evil at all, Sterba’s argument uses more sophisticated moral principles and seeks to establish a logical incompatibility between the existence of God (specifically, the God of Perfect Being Theology) and specific sorts of evil that our world contains. Here, I provide a brief exposition of Sterba’s argument and then sketch one possible theistic response to the argument. On the basis of that discussion, I conclude that Sterba’s argument is not decisive as it stands. However, I then develop a revised version of Sterba’s argument and argue that the Perfect Being Theist faces the following dilemma: she can answer the revised version of Sterba’s argument only by accepting a position that is deeply at odds with commonsense morality. Therefore, although Sterba’s argument does not quite succeed, it points us in the direction of a serious problem for Perfect Being Theism. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Do We Now Have a Logical Argument from Evil?)

8 pages, 300 KB

Open AccessArticle

God and the Playpen: On the Feasibility of Morally Better Worlds

by Cheryl K. Chen

Religions 2021, 12(4), 266; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12040266 - 12 Apr 2021

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 2883

Abstract

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why [...] Read more.

According to the free will defense, God cannot create a world with free creatures, and hence a world with moral goodness, without allowing for the possibility of evil. David Lewis points out that any free will defense must address the “playpen problem”: why didn’t God allow creatures the freedom required for moral goodness, while intervening to ensure that all evil-doing is victimless? More recently, James Sterba has revived the playpen problem by arguing that an omnipotent and benevolent God would have intervened to prevent significant and especially horrendous evil. I argue that it is possible, at least, that such divine intervention would have backfired, and that any attempt to create a world that is morally better than this one would have resulted in a world that is morally worse. I conclude that the atheologian should instead attack the free will defense at its roots: either by denying that the predetermination of our actions is incompatible with our freely per-forming them, or by denying that the actual world—a world with both moral good and evil—is more valuable than a world without any freedom at all. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is the God of Traditional Theism Logically Compatible with All the Evil in the World?)

13 pages, 234 KB

Open AccessArticle

Default Agnosticism

by Francis Jonbäck

Religions 2021, 12(1), 54; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12010054 - 13 Jan 2021

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 5073

Abstract

Agnosticism has always had its fair amount of criticism. Religious believers often described the first agnostics as infidels and it is not uncommon to see them described as somewhat dull fence-sitters. Moreover, the undecided agnostic stance on belief in gods is often compared [...] Read more.

Agnosticism has always had its fair amount of criticism. Religious believers often described the first agnostics as infidels and it is not uncommon to see them described as somewhat dull fence-sitters. Moreover, the undecided agnostic stance on belief in gods is often compared with being unsure about such obviously false statements as the existence of orbiting teapots, invisible dragons or even Santa Claus. In this paper, I maintain that agnosticism can properly be endorsed as a default stance. More precisely, I use a strategy presented by Alvin Plantinga and argue that it is rationally acceptable to be agnostic about the existence of God. I also anticipate and answer a number of objections. Finally, I offer my conclusion. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Agnosticism)

10 pages, 216 KB

Open AccessArticle

God’s Presence within Henry’s Phenomenology of Life: The Phenomenological Revelation of God in Opposition to Plantinga’s Affirmation of God’s Existence

by Andreas Gonçalves Lind

Religions 2018, 9(6), 187; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel9060187 - 12 Jun 2018

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 3482

Abstract

The recent debate on the notorious Anselmian proof of God’s existence, usually called the “ontological argument”, is placed within an analytic approach, since Alvin Plantinga revisited this argument beginning in the sixties and especially during the seventies. At the same time, Michel Henry [...] Read more.

The recent debate on the notorious Anselmian proof of God’s existence, usually called the “ontological argument”, is placed within an analytic approach, since Alvin Plantinga revisited this argument beginning in the sixties and especially during the seventies. At the same time, Michel Henry contested this proof, situating the debate in a completely different area of philosophy. Henry’s critique does not concern the question of logical validity or the matter of rational justification of religious belief. Rather, Henry focuses on the way existence is conceived. In so doing, his phenomenology of life shows the difference between affirming God’s existence (in every “possible world”) and accessing God’s presence inside the ego’s subjectivity. In this article, I will try to show how Henry’s way of proceeding makes self-life-experience a legitimate foundation for a belief in God’s presence (not only the simple intellectual affirmation of His existence). Full article

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