Search Results (8)

In this paper, I explore the problem of human freedom and responsibility in light of current neuroscientific research, particularly focusing on Libet-style experiments. Beginning with a review of significant experiments on the nature of human will, starting with Libet’s influential series from the 1980s, I survey various interpretations of these experiments including those that pose challenges to concepts of human freedom and responsibility. Subsequently, I introduce the perspective of Mehmed Akkirmânî (d. 1760), an Ottoman scholar who advocates for a libertarian view of human freedom within an occasionalist framework and constructs sophisticated arguments against theological determinism. Akkirmânî’s analysis of human will delineates different aspects such as inclinations, intentions, and decisions, positing that humans possess freedom solely in their conscious decisions, thereby suggesting a limited scope of free will. I argue that Akkirmânî’s views are remarkably consonant with contemporary scientific findings and align with some libertarian positions. His occasionalist perspective offers an alternative model to contemporary naturalist physicalism in elucidating the connection between mental and neurophysical states. Full article

The paper explores Michael Novak’s understanding of the human person and his normative case for the market economy, specifically its points of agreement and tension with natural rights libertarianism. For Michael Novak, the imago dei provides the strongest account for the relationship between the market economy, human dignity, and natural rights. Rationalistic attempts, such as those within libertarianism, cannot adequately ground human dignity or sustain free institutions capable of serving the common good, the market economy, and political liberty. However, Novak’s affinity to his libertarian interlocutors presents an opportunity for dialogue on the necessity of economic freedom and related theological influences on natural rights theory for securing human flourishing. Full article

The meaning of justice can be defined according to a juridical, human, theological, ethical, biomedical, or social perspective. It should guarantee the protection of life and health, personal, civil, political, economic, and religious rights, as well as non-discrimination, inclusion, protection, and access to care. In this review, we deal with three theoretical concepts that define justice in all its aspects. (1) The utilitarian theory, which justifies moral statements on the basis of the evaluation of the consequences that an action produces, elaborating a pragmatic model of medical science. (2) The libertarian theory, which considers freedom as the highest political aim, thus absolutizing the rights of the individual; here, the principle of self-determination, with respect to which the principle of permission/consent is the fundamental presupposition, plays a central role in the definition of the person. (3) The iusnaturalist theory, in which man’s moral freedom is identified with the ability to act by choosing what the intellect indicates to him as good; the natural moral law that drives every conscience to do good is therefore realized in respect for the person in the fullness of his rights. In conclusion, different forms and conceptions of justice correspond to different organizations of society and different ways of addressing ethical issues in the biomedical domain. Full article

This paper explores how educational commons, in which education and learning are shaped by the members of the educational community in terms of equality, freedom, and creative participation, contribute to addressing inequalities, empowering democracy, and enhancing inclusion. The discussion focuses on the crucial debate around public formal education and the potential for radical democratisation it offers through three case studies carried out in formal and non-formal educational settings in Thessaloniki, Greece. The research was conducted in three different types of education centres: a public kindergarten, a self-organised autonomous libertarian educational community, and an after-school programme of a primary school where Workshops for Nurturing and Developing Environmental Resilience (WONDER) were implemented by the environmental organisation Mamagea. Through patterns of commoning practices, like peer governance, co-creation of knowledge, and peer learning, the case studies aimed to establish the prerequisites for the co-creation of a community that offers pupils and students, teachers, and educators the chance for self-formation and equal participation. The article makes the case that educational hierarchies and governance models can be reconfigured in order to incorporate the democratic values of solidarity, equality, self-organisation, and self-formation even in structures that are still tailored to formal schooling. The article argues that educational commons can make a decisive contribution to tackling inequalities, and the commons logic can grow effectively in school education under specific conditions. The pedagogical practice is shifted in educational commons in ways that balance out contemporary enclosures based on several inequalities. Full article

Here, we will approach Conspiracy Theories (CTs) and, specifically, QAnon following the three traditional sociological fields of research. After an introduction in which we contextualise CDTs socially, culturally, economically and politically and in which we establish a conceptual map of what they mean, on the historical level (1), we will clarify their religious genesis, through the main analogies between them, magic and religion and their practices and rituals, as well as the conversion of conspiratorial agents into social agents of a religious nature. On the analytical side (2), we will deal with the QAnon belief system. Finally (3), from a critical perspective, we will describe the causes and harmful consequences of QAnon, both for religious sentiment itself and for democracy. We will conclude by pointing out that QAnon affects the coherence and stability of religious beliefs and democracy; in fact, it can be seen as libertarian authoritarianism and populism, advocating a sick freedom, the ultimate expression of the modern feeling of individual powerlessness and of a Modernity that has failed to deliver on its promises. Full article

James Sterba has recently constructed a new and compelling logical problem of evil that rejects Plantinga’s free-will defense and employs the concept of significant freedom and the Pauline Principle to demonstrate an incompatibility between the existence of horrendous evil and the God of classical monotheism. In response, Jerry L. Walls, among others, has claimed that the doctrine of heaven can explain why God is justified in permitting horrendous evils in the world—an argument known as the afterlife theodicy. In this article, I explore this line of defense against Sterba’s logical problem of evil. I suggest that if the afterlife theodicy is to be effective, it must accept non-speciesist, strong universalism; deny or explicate divinely informed prior consent; reject an elective model of forgiveness; discard postmortem libertarian free will; and explain why God values libertarian free will in earthly life but not in the afterlife. Full article

This paper is a defense of the big ideas behind the free-thinking argument. This argument aims to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with epistemic responsibility in a desert sense (being praised or blamed for any thought, idea, judgment, or belief). This lack of epistemic responsibility is problematic for the naturalist. It seems to be an even worse problem, however, for the exhaustive divine determinist because not only would humanity not stand in a position to be blamed for any of our thoughts and beliefs, but it also surfaces a “problem of epistemic evil”, which can be raised against the knowledge of God, the rationality of humans, and the trustworthiness of Scripture. Full article

Should the freedom of churches and other religious institutions come down to little more than a grudging recognition that “what happens in the church, stays in the church”? In this article, I provide a more robust definition of what I call institutional religious freedom than a crabbed and merely negative understanding. In addition, I also go beyond a libertarian-style defense of institutional religious freedom as the ecclesiastical equivalent of the “right to be left alone” by suggesting a multitude of reasons why institutional religious freedom in a robust form deserves robust protection. Especially amidst exigent challenges such as the global COVID-19 pandemic, an anemic appeal to an ecclesiastical version of negative liberty on merely jurisdictional grounds will not be enough to defend religious organizations from an increasingly strong temptation and tendency on the part of political authorities—often acting on the basis of understandable intentions—to subject such organizations to sweeping interference even in the most internal matters. In contrast, the article offers an articulation of why both the internal and external freedoms of religious institutions require maximum deference if they are to offer their indispensable contributions—indeed, their “essential services”—to the shared public good in the United States and other countries throughout the world. Underscoring the external and public dimensions of institutional religious freedom, the article follows the work of law and religion scholar W. Cole Durham in that it analytically disaggregates the freedom of religious institutions into three indispensable components: “substantive”, or the right of self-definition; “vertical”, or the right of self-governance; and “horizontal”, or the right of self-directed outward expression and action. Full article