Erev, I. et al. A Choice Prediction Competition for Market Entry Games: An Introduction. Games 2010, 1, 117-136

Table 2. The 40 market entry games that were studied in the estimation experiment. At each trial, each of 4 players has to decide (individually) between “entering a risky market”, or “staying out” (a safer prospect). The payoffs depended on a realization of a binary gamble (the realization at trial t is denoted G_t, and yields “H with probability Ph; and L otherwise”), the number of entrants (E), and two additional parameters (k and S). The exact payoff for player i at trial t is: ${{\displaystyle V}}_i(t)=\left\{{}_{{\text{round(G}}_{\text{t}}\text{/S) with p=}{\text{.5; -round(G}}_{\text{t}}\text{/S) otherwise if i does not enter}}^{{\text{ 10-k(E)+G}}_{\text{t}}\text{ if i enters}}\right\}$ The left hand-columns present the exact value of the different parameters in the 40 games, the right hand columns present the equilibrium predictions, and the main experimental results in the first and second block (B1 and B2).

Table 3. Summary of correlation analyses that examine the possibility of consistent individual differences. The summary scores are based on 180 correlation analyses (180 pairs of games) for each of the four variables.

Table 4. The baseline models, the estimated parameters, and the implied normalized MSD scores by statistic and block.

Table 5. The predictions of the best baseline models (I-SAW): The lowest row presents the correlation with the experimental results by statistic.