Autonomous Mutual Authentication Protocol in the Edge Networks
Abstract
:1. Introduction
1.1. Objectives
- A novel protocol design for the mutual authentication in the edge networks: This work demonstrates an idea for the challenge–response model by establishing an authentication process within the autonomous devices performing the session key exchange as the part of valid response by the requesting party. Therefore, mutual authentication is achieved after solving challenges, which are provided by both the parties to each other. The protocol design has included use of a unique session key, different time-quarter-based PRNG random values, time-stamps, and the transitions within the group of octet’s position.
- Server-less mutual authentication within the independent devices: Authorization is selected as the basic requirement for this work. Thus, authorized devices can only initiate and implement the authentication protocol. Autonomous operations make the multiparty authentication independent of the external server. Thus, the traditional approach of using server or third-party systems within the mutual authentication protocol limitations is resolved by this work. Therefore, complete autonomy on the operations is achieved.
- Multiple IoT device authentications within the network: Multiple IoT devices exist within a network with the mobile workstation as a portable device. This work presents the communication within the autonomous edge devices that can iterate, process, and authenticate each other without any fixed system/server for achieving complete autonomous status. Successively, autonomous devices with public keys can mutually authenticate each other and can form a trusted network. The IoT devices can connect to multiple devices within the wireless local network for a single communication session.
- No additional support of infrastructure and IoT resource-constrained device utilization: Architecture of several authentication protocols consists of a service server for key distribution, ticket-granting server (TGT), for process validation and authentication server for confirming the process and declaring successful authentication. Inclusion of many servers creates a bottleneck in the system. Additionally, several calculations with different servers are not suitable for IoT resource-constrained devices. In this work, there is no need for a ticket-granting (TGT), service server and authentication server. Whereas, the need for registration server after registration phase is completely eliminated. Minimal calculations and no secret key leads to reduced overhead on resource-constrained devices.
1.2. Applications
- Secure Autonomous Cars: Recently, many car manufacturing companies are competing in the market to provide self-driving/autonomous cars and vehicle platooning. The connectivity within cars for exchanging information is authenticated for secure communication.
- Secure Drones: A drone network is usually required for smart farming; package delivery for food, products, medical vaccines at remote or higher altitude places; tracking lost people on mountains; synched drones for entertainment; etc.
- Secure Satellite Communication: The satellite network for providing region/countrywide internet access needs to be synchronized and interconnected. New satellites can join and later can reconnect using an autonomous mutual authentication protocol. Thus, dependency on third parties is reduced.
- Secure IoT and Device Communication: All the end devices within a network can connect to each other securely by authentication, i.e., IoT devices, laptop, computer, tablet, etc. The communication between these authenticated devices is secured by cryptography and has a dynamic session key instead of using a master secret key.
2. Literature Survey
Analysis of the Survey Limitations
- The need for additional infrastructure for the authentication protocol: Several recent works that are developing authentication protocols include blockchain-based operations by having dependency on the service server, ticket-granting server (TGT), and authentication server. Therefore, these authentication protocols are not suitable for the autonomous devices as they require higher dependency on the multiple systems for the purpose of authentication.
- High-calculation requirements for the IoT resource-constrained devices: The traditional cryptographic algorithms and protocols are not suitable for the autonomous devices as most of the IoT resource-constrained devices possess limited memory and processing power. Therefore, design of a new authentication process is required to avoid high calculations on the IoT devices and to perform efficiently for multiple authentications.
- Design issues limiting the protocol performance: The inclusion of popular technologies and references, i.e., blockchain, Kerberos, elliptical curve cryptography (ECC), in the protocol design without a specific objective is one of the large mistakes in many works. Such design issues lead to low performance and bottlenecks within the system, which are not suitable for the autonomous devices.
3. Methodology
3.1. Initialization Phase
3.2. Registration Phase
3.3. Authentication Phase
- (1)
- The sender S is required to initiate the authentication process by providing the “Hello” message with his public-key and the current time-stamp in seconds. The provided by the sender is actually a part of challenge 1 sent for the octet node to be selected.
- (2)
- The receiver first checks for the validity of the sender’s public key and takes the last value of the time-stamp sent by the sender with modulus 8. The receiver then sets the PRNG parameters based on the time-quarter and generates the pseudo-random numbers for 8 octets. Therefore, the value obtained from the time-stamp with modulus 8 of the sender is taken to select the first octet’s value and the same value from consecutive octets. Successively, the combination by average from Equation (1) obtained from random numbers is a solution to the first challenge and is returned to the sender for confirmation as transition . The second message is formed by the octate group as multidimensional matrix, transition value, as receiver’s public key, as time-to-live for this message’s validity, and as the session key, which is encrypted by the public key of sender .
- (3)
- The sender, after receiving the response, decrypts it by his private key . Optionally, the sender then checks the transition value , and calculates it from the consecutive octates. Thus, the hash calculation of the session key achieves the challenge 1 confirmation. Challenge 2 is initiated by the next value by the previous challenge in the first octet, and then collects the value incremented every time in the consecutive octets, as shown by green in Figure 2. The transition value obtained by XOR is . Successively, the session key with the current time-stamp is calculated and sent to the receiver as the challenge 2 with device address. It is encrypted by the public key of receiver . This message has to be responded to before the time-to-live given by the receiver.
- (4)
- The receiver decrypts the received encrypted message by his private key and obtains the challenge 2 response by the sender. The decrypted message is confirmed to be correct by calculating the transition value and by the hash value of the session key . The device address received is kept for the purpose of device identification. The final session key is . This session-key-combining process is already known by the sender; when he or she decrypts the final message with a symmetric key to know about authentication from the receiver, then the mutual authentication is succeeded.
3.4. Communication Phase
3.5. Revocation Phase
4. Analysis of Hardness of Autonomous Protocol
5. Protocol Verification Logic
5.1. Message Exchange
5.2. Idealized Protocol
5.3. Protocol Analyzed
5.4. Final Beliefs
6. Autonomous Protocol Defense for Attacks
- Impersonation: In case of autonomous authentication, a malicious user needs to validate himself or herself to the server or third-party system by spoofing his identity. Therefore, can directly take the identity of some valid user and can try to validate . in the first message. If the identity belongs to an interstate user and he or she is not updated in the current state/region’s user list, then he or she will be rejected. Nevertheless, bypassing the identity validation, will not be helpful to possess the authentication protocol steps to move further.
- Wormhole: ’s presence can cause it to reroute the packets from different systems. In such a case, the sender can bypass step 1 but will fall short of the time to live (ttl) in protocol step 2. In step 2, the challenge 1 with is initiated, which provides the required group of parameters in the encrypted message. Even though can receive the message, unaware of the encryption and ttl, he or she will be rejected and blocked after two unsuccessful attempts.
- Sinkhole: In case of selective modification performed by , the autonomous protocol will be discontinued due to the hash-function calculation and its usage in the session key generation. The sender can attempt to change the transition key , if he or she succeeds in cracking the encryption, the same as sender’s private key . Nevertheless, the ttl and new transition value with the attempted hash for the generation of session key will be rejected further on.
- Eavesdropping (man in the middle attack): The attempt of to perform the MITM attack is performed by intercepting reading and modification of message contents. As autonomous protocol consists of encryption/decryption ,. by user’s public/private key , will be very hard to break. Later, the communication event within users is secured by the session key’s , which is unique for every event. These three different groups of keys make the MITM attack fail in the autonomous protocol.
- Replay: The purpose of replay attack is to repeatedly send similar messages with some modification. The public key can be thought of as valid, but the time-stamp needs to be applicable. As discussed earlier, the decryption of the encrypted messages will be a challenge. A small modification will not be beneficial as the response guessing to challenge 1 and 2 would be incorrect. Therefore, a random guessing of the message parameters and replay consisting of time-stamps and will be unacceptable.
- Byzantine: Replaying the intercepted message multiple times and using a nonoptimal path for communication will not be applicable in the autonomous protocol. The replaying will be invalid due to expiry of time-stamps and , whereas the nonoptimal path does not exist in the direct communication protocol. Thus, multiple unsuccessful attempts will lead to blocking of the malicious device.
- Location Disclosure: The autonomous protocol process accepts the device/system location only after the successful completion of challenges 1 and 2. The location disclosure attack performs the multiple device location and message exchange recording. As the autonomous systems are dynamic and do not frequently communicate, then the location information will be useless. Additionally, the message recorded will not be useful later due to the update in time-stamps , , session keys , and challenge–response transitions and .
7. Experiments
7.1. System Configuration
7.2. Results Analysis
8. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Notation | Meaning |
---|---|
S | Sender |
R | Receiver |
AS | Registration Server |
Device Address/Unique Identity (UID) | |
Validity of the message/time to live | |
Timestamp of x | |
Public key of x | |
Private key of x | |
Transition taken by x | |
Encryption performed by x’s public key | |
Decryption performed by x’s private key | |
Session key from x to y | |
Malicious user x | |
XOR bitwise operator |
System | Mobile Workstation (Laptop) | IoT Device 1 | IoT Device 2 |
Model | MacBook Pro | Raspberry Pi 3B | Raspberry Pi 3B+ |
Processor | Intel Core i7 @ 2.6 GHz | Broadcom Quad Core @ 1.2GHz | Broadcom, Cortex-A53 (ARMv8) 64-bit SoC @ 1.4GHz |
Main Memory | 16 GB | 1 GB SDRAM | 1GB LPDDR2 SDRAM |
Programming Language | Python 2.7 (Libraries: random, hashlib, datetime, sys, pandas, base64, and getnode.) |
LCG | GCC | Borland | Turbo |
---|---|---|---|
Total Time (s) | 0.14100 | 0.11000 | 0.09400 |
LCG/Key | Session Key 1 | Session Key 2 | Session Key 3 | Total Time |
---|---|---|---|---|
GCC | 0.548990965 | 0.000441074 | 0.001973867 | 0.551431894 |
Borland | 0.089758873 | 0.001000166 | 0.00190115 | 0.092696905 |
Turbo | 0.41444993 | 0.000444174 | 0.001885176 | 0.41680479 |
Reference | User Device | Gateway | Sensor Node | Total |
---|---|---|---|---|
Cloud–IoT [39] | ||||
Ad hoc wireless sensors [40] | ||||
Edge–IoT [41] | ||||
IoT devices [42] | ||||
Autonomous protocol |
Performance Metric | [43] | [44] | [45] | [46] | [47] | [48] | Autonomous Protocol |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Number of messages exchanged | 8 | 9 | 3 | 6 | 11 | 7 | 4 |
Security of message exchanged | Y | - | - | Y | N | Y | Y |
IoT Device computation efficiency | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y |
Lightweight cryptography | N | Y | N | Y | N | N | Y |
Autonomous authentication | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y |
Automated key exchange | Y | _ | Y | Y | - | N | Y |
High-range authentication statistics | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y |
Infrastructure independent | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y |
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Sheu, R.-K.; Pardeshi, M.S.; Chen, L.-C. Autonomous Mutual Authentication Protocol in the Edge Networks. Sensors 2022, 22, 7632. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22197632
Sheu R-K, Pardeshi MS, Chen L-C. Autonomous Mutual Authentication Protocol in the Edge Networks. Sensors. 2022; 22(19):7632. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22197632
Chicago/Turabian StyleSheu, Ruey-Kai, Mayuresh Sunil Pardeshi, and Lun-Chi Chen. 2022. "Autonomous Mutual Authentication Protocol in the Edge Networks" Sensors 22, no. 19: 7632. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22197632
APA StyleSheu, R. -K., Pardeshi, M. S., & Chen, L. -C. (2022). Autonomous Mutual Authentication Protocol in the Edge Networks. Sensors, 22(19), 7632. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22197632