Polish Mother and (Not) Her Children: Intersectional State-Violence against Minors in Poland

Abstract

This article seeks to explain the political responsibility that Polish right-wing female politicians directly associated with the 2015–2023 Polish government and the then-ruling Law and Justice Party bear in the state-sanctioned violence against minors in the context of LGBT- and immigration-related issues. Its main assumption is that, in times of the nationalist surge that has been sweeping Poland, women using anti-LGBT and anti-immigration discourses helped to legitimize discriminatory state practices and, consequently, made a significant contribution to the enactment of white, Christian, and heteronormative identity on Polish children. Drawing upon Critical Discourse Analysis, this work examines the anti-LGBT and anti-immigration political talk by female politicians who, in their narrative strategies, adopt the position of a “Polish mother” on a mission to save a “child in danger”. Through my analysis, I aim to demonstrate that anti-LGBT and anti-immigration discourses are equally significant areas of women’s political engagement. Despite the prevalent cultural norms of caring motherhood, women do exercise their agency in political struggles as supporters of discriminatory state policies directed against minors by re-politicizing a symbolic figure of the “Polish mother”.

1. Introduction

The aim of this article is to account for the political responsibility that Polish right-wing female politicians closely linked to the 2015–2023 Polish government and the then-ruling Law and Justice Party assume in the state-sanctioned violence against minors that happens in the context of LGBT- and immigration-related matters. The study supposes that, in times of nationalist revival that has been spreading across Poland, women who employ anti-LGBT and anti-immigration discourses play a prominent role in sanctioning discriminatory state practices by enacting white, Christian, and heteronormative identity on Polish children. The text builds on the existing body of literature that deals with the intersections of gender and nationalism in Europe to address yet another important manifestation of discursive crossroads between sexuality and race. It engages critically with the theoretical underpinnings of biopolitics and reproductive justice to explain the effect that the use of anti-LGBT and anti-immigration discourses has on social reality. Drawing upon Critical Discourse Analysis, this work scrutinizes parliamentary debates during which Polish right-wing female politicians adopt the position of a “Polish mother” on a mission to save a “child in danger” in support of anti-LGBT and anti-immigration political initiatives. I associate the symbolic figure of the “Polish mother” with the collective imaginary in which a woman represents a bearer of the national identity. An emblematic image of the “child in danger” is referred to as representing a child that bears the nation’s future. I analyze the interaction of these two symbols to show a discursive paradox of selective protection of minors in two different contexts. The first context is anti-LGBT campaigns. Since 2016, as a result of numerous reports on psychological problems among LGBT teenagers, schoolchildren in Poland have been participating in an annual “Rainbow Friday” to show solidarity with and support for their LGBT peers. In response to this initiative, various politicians started fueling anti-LGBT sentiment that transformed into anti-LGBT state-sanctioned proposals in the area of public education. At the same time, Members of Parliament (MPs) engaged in anti-abortion activities with the purpose of protecting an “unborn child”, which led to the successful restriction of abortion laws in 2021. Although right-wing female politicians claim that both anti-LGBT and anti-abortion campaigns aim to “save children in danger”, the contrast between a prejudiced discourse in anti-LGBT crusades that scapegoated LGBT school children and a rhetoric of love towards the “unborn child” that accompanied anti-abortion campaigns sparked wide social outrage. The second context concerns immigration. Since 2021, as a consequence of Russian-Belarussian hybrid warfare against the European Union, tens of thousands of non-European migrants, including children, have been seeking to cross the Polish border with Belarus. To resolve the crisis, Poland passed a series of laws allowing the immediate expulsion of illegal border crossers, which culminated in accusations of pushback. In contrast, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Poland welcomed millions of Ukrainians with children, granting them the same healthcare and education services as Polish citizens. On the one hand, the way Poland helped integrate Ukrainians built up a welcoming self-image of the government (then in power), but on the other, it exposed injustice towards non-European migrants at the Polish-Belarusian border. Through my analysis, I intend to show that anti-LGBT and anti-immigration discourses are of equivalent importance when it comes to women’s political activity. Despite the dominant stereotypes of caring motherhood, women weaponize the symbolic figure of the “Polish mother” to endorse the xenophobic state-sanctioned policies that affect minors and, thereby, practice their agency in political struggles.

1.1. Literature Review

Studying women’s political engagement in anti-LGBT and anti-immigration campaigns in the Polish context, I want to enrich existing research on state-sanctioned xenophobia in Europe with a geographically specific illustration of women’s role in the legitimization of exclusionary politics. Prior academic research has shed light on various forms of women’s active participation in right-wing political developments across Europe [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Also, over the past years, Polish scholars have produced a number of significant studies on prejudiced rhetoric in different contexts. A seminal contribution has been made by Maciej Duda [7], who investigated right-wing female politicians’ support for discriminatory state policies, concentrating exclusively on anti-genderism. Another insightful exploration has been offered by Monika Bobako [8], who studied examples of Islamophobia amongst liberal feminists. Although Agnieszka Graff and Elżbieta Korolczuk [9] conducted a thorough analysis of discursive entanglements of anti-gender and anti-immigration narratives as an expression of anti-EU sentiment, they left the importance of right-wing female politicians understudied. Enlarging on my previous article that investigated the centrality of women’s rights in anti-immigration discourses endorsed by Polish right-wing female politicians [10], I attempt to cover the existing gap in the literature and inform the wider debate on the prominence of right-wing women in xenophobic state practices. More specifically, I aspire to challenge a long tradition of Polish scholarship, which has claimed that the figure of the “Polish mother” is devoid of any emancipatory potential [11,12,13,14]. I intend to shift the attention from the cultural and social aspects of motherhood onto its emergent political dimensions that the current studies seem to have failed to address. I try to demonstrate that women who appropriate a symbolic identity of the “Polish mother” and weaponize it to act as defenders of the “child in danger” transgress the stereotypical femininity and exercise their agency in new political contexts. To do so, I build on Anna Zawadzka’s argument [15] that “feminized” (or, for the purpose of this article, “maternalized”) narrative strategies help to forge an idea of Polishness as a superior morality and, thereby, sanction discrimination of non-white, non-Christian and non-heteronormative minors. I hope for this article to provide a novel perspective on women’s support for state-sanctioned violence against minors and its consequences not only for the well-being of individual children but also for the social reality that surrounds them.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

To tackle the shortcomings of the available scholarship, this text engages critically with the theoretical underpinnings of biopolitics and reproductive justice. In Society Must Be Defended, Michel Foucault argued that “biopolitics deals with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem” [16] (p. 245) and discussed disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms that a state can use to exercise its power over people. For the philosopher, “sexuality represents the precise point where the disciplinary and the regulatory, the body and the population, are articulated” [16] (p. 252). A political system that is founded upon biopower—that is, a set of norms that “can be applied to both a body one wishes to discipline and a population one wishes to regularize” [16] (p. 253), can exercise its right to “make live or let die” [16] (p. 241). Moreover, according to Foucault, racism is “a mechanism that allows biopower to work” [16] (p. 258). In Foucauldian terms, through a hierarchy of species, racism establishes “a biological relationship” between different races that perceive each other as existential threats to and for their respective populations; that is, for a superior “us” to live, an inferior “they” must vanish. Therefore, racism is “the indispensable precondition” [16] (p. 256) to render “killing” a permissible political tool, predominantly through its indirect forms: “the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” [16] (p. 256).

In addition, feminist theorizing on reproduction provides a useful framework for understanding the link between women and state biopolitical practices. As Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis [17] illustrated, women can affect and be affected by a broad spectrum of state policies. Firstly, due to their role as biological reproducers, women have influence over and are subject to policies aiming at population control (e.g., forced sterilization, birth control campaigns, and child benefit systems). Secondly, as guardians of ethnic/national boundaries, women act on as well as fall victim to religious and social gatekeeping that cultivate the symbolic group identity. Thirdly, being ideological reproducers, it is predominantly women’s activity to socialize children into national collectives. Fourthly, the figure of a woman carries a symbolic meaning and transmits a national spirit in ideological discourses (e.g., wars are supposedly fought for the sake of “women and children”). Finally, women are present in the military, both through active involvement in warfare and as support to men in combat.

Last but not least, recent theories of reproductive justice that take new directions on state discriminatory practices in Europe and North America offer a vibrant array of theoretical lenses to be used in the analysis of women’s contribution to state-sanctioned violence. This study is informed by (a) a theoretical conceptualization of state-driven population control efforts in the United States [18]; (b) theoretical approaches to situated and intersectional bordering processes [19], racialized-gendered logic of “crimmigration” [20] as well as the role of street-level bureaucrats in racialization and criminalization of asylum seekers [21] in the United Kingdom; and (c) an emergent theory of reproductive racism that stems from an analysis of a “birth-rate agenda” present in Hungarian, Polish, Italian and Greek right-wing politics [22].

2. Materials and Methods

One of the main roles of the parliament is to debate issues of public importance. Parliamentary debates are a particular type of political discourse characterized by a set of rules and norms that apply to deliberation on any topic [23,24,25]. First and foremost, the debates take place in a controlled and highly regulated environment. They start with an official address and are formally closed. Agendas of parliamentary sessions are set in advance, and parliamentarians take turns to speak for as much time as defined by parliamentary procedures. Secondly, MPs are aware that their appearances are for the record, and they normally prepare their speeches in advance. Thirdly, by design, parliamentary debates are supposed to be argumentative so parliamentarians can present their political stands, interact with their opponents, and argue for or against bills. Therefore, analysis of argumentation strategies employed during parliamentary debates gives insights into social representations constructed by MPs that translate into legislation and influence public opinion.

Over the past decade, the parliament of Poland has increasingly dealt with topics related to, on the one hand, immigration and refugee crises and, on the other, LGBT and reproductive health (e.g., abortion and in vitro). Therefore, the latest social and political developments posed many opportunities for parliamentarians to display various forms of elite prejudice. This article studies parliamentary debates as a specific genre of political talk with a focus on the objectives and beliefs of MPs who take part in these communicative events. I analyze parliamentary debates as a form of social and political interaction that can serve, amongst others, to reproduce discriminatory practices. Polish right-wing female politicians directly associated with the 2015–2023 Polish government and the then-ruling Law and Justice Party are the subject of this analysis. The excerpts1 studied in this article come from parliamentary appearances of the following politicians: Agata Katarzyna Wojtyszek, Anna Dąbrowska-Banaszek, Anna Kwiecień, Anna Maria Siarkowska2, Anna Milczanowska, Anna Paluch, Barbara Bartuś, Barbara Dziuk, Barbara Socha, Beata Strzałka, Bożena Borys-Szopka, Dominika Chorosińska, Elżbieta Duda, Elżbieta Płonka, Ewa Szymańska, Iwona Kurowska, Joanna Borowiak, Józefa Szczurek-Żelazko, Katarzyna Sójka, Lidia Burzyńska, Maria Kurowska, Marzena Machałek, Mirosława Stachowiak-Różecka, Teresa Glenc, Teresa Pamuła, and Teresa Wargocka. Contrary to the majority of Polish right-wing female politicians studied in my previous article on Muslim immigration being a threat to women’s rights who progressed with their political careers after their active support for anti-Muslim crusades [10], women examined in this study have become prominent party representatives only recently—thanks to the vacancies created by their predecessors and the efforts they have been making to gain visibility with their contentious political talk. Some are very experienced politicians with long-standing political careers in both local government and the parliament, and some began their political careers in the last three terms.

The following study of parliamentary debates employs Norman Fairclough’s take on Critical Discourse Analysis, in which the scholar illuminates how relations of power and ideologies shape discourse and, at the same time, how discourse forms social identities, social relations as well as systems of knowledge and belief [26] (p. 12). The model of discourse put forward by Fairclough links language analysis to social theory and encompasses three key dimensions: “discursive practice”, “text”, and “social practice”. In line with this paradigm, critical discourse analysis of a speech act covers three aspects: the production and interpretation of a piece of text, language examination of this text as well as the institutional and societal context of the speech act itself [26] (p. 4), [27] (p. 94). Drawing upon Fairclough’s definition of ideologies as “constructions of reality (the physical world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, reproduction or transformation of relations of domination” [26] (p. 87), I start with the study of interdiscursivity that Polish right-wing female politicians incorporate in their political talk to overpower alternative constructions of meanings and, consequently, withstand hegemony through discourse [26] (p. 92), [28] (p. 17), [29] (p. 56), [30] (p. 76). Then, I look into linguistic tools used by Polish right-wing female politicians in their parliamentary appearances to discover how different social and political phenomena are framed and relationships between various participating figures produced. Finally, I explore the impact that Polish right-wing female politicians have on the intersectional state violence against minors in Poland through the social practice of discourse when they “produce and reproduce social realities through either maintaining or transforming social beliefs” [31] (p. 115).

I started my research by gathering data on issues related to immigration, refugee crises, LGBT, gender, and reproductive health that had become dominant topics on the parliamentary agenda due to the latest political and social developments in Poland. I decided to study the 9th term of the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish parliament that plays a governing role in the legislative process [32]) that started on 12 November 2019 and ended on 12 November 2023 because of the abundance of data available as well as the overall research gap on this period. Throughout the 9th term, there were 81 sessions of the Sejm, which amounted to 195 parliamentary transcripts (available online on the Sejm’s website) for analysis. I uploaded all the electronic text files into the MAXQDA 2022 Version 22.7.0 software that I chose as my data analysis tool and started indexing and categorizing the transcripts to identify the final data sample, which comprised a set of 50. My sampling logic [33] was purposive (driven by the research questions) and followed an iterative process (I collected and analyzed data successively). To find the relevant exemplars of parliamentary speeches, first, I had to sample the right parliamentary debates and then, to identify the most illustrative excerpts, sample inside these debates. Because my intention was to create a heterogenous data sample to integrate both variety and variation into the study, I looked for both typical and extreme examples of text. The resulting collection of deliberately selected passages constituted the corpus of empirical data for further qualitative analysis. To examine this volume of text, I defined a coding system [34] and coded all the extracts accordingly. Through systematic coding of passages that covered the same issue, I created a framework of themes that I gradually developed into a more elaborate coding frame—a structured list of different codes with a set of rules to apply consistently throughout my textual analysis. I arranged the codes hierarchically: the first level of coding marked a related electronic text file (e.g., a code “reproductive health”); the second level was used to code a relevant debate in a given file (e.g., codes “abortion” and “in vitro fertilization” contained under the first-level code “reproductive health”); and, then, I applied the third-level code to selected excerpts (e.g., a code “abortion seen as killing” nested under the second-level code “abortion”). Once I coded my data sample, I systematically retrieved passages with the same codes assigned and performed the textual analysis.

3. Results

3.1. Discursive Practice

Before scrutinizing linguistic tools that Polish right-wing female politicians use in their parliamentary speeches, I examine diverse discourse types included in their rhetoric strategies to provide a more nuanced context for the following textual analysis. The study of interdiscursivity embedded in political talk is to demonstrate how right-wing women manage to suppress the construction of alternative meanings and, thereby, arrive at discursive hegemony.

First and foremost, anti-LGBT and anti-immigration sentiments are framed in the discourse of love. The emotive language used by right-wing women in their narrative strategies creates a social reality founded upon a set of particular social beliefs. As Sara Ahmed argues in her book entitled The Cultural Politics of Emotion, “emotions are social and cultural practices” [35] (p. 9) that serve to “align some bodies with the nation, and against those others who threaten to take the nation away” [35] (p. 12) and, thereby, make language work as “a form of power” [35] (p. 195). In this article, I focus exclusively on the emotion of love and study “a narrative of love as protection” [35] (p. 123) that Polish right-wing female MPs employ in their discourses. Sara Ahmed proposes a concept of love as an example of an affective economy in which emotions of love are attributed to certain figures, move between them, and, as a result, unite them against the Other. According to Ahmed, “love functions as the promise of return” [35] (p. 131). Acting out of love means investing in the nation. Therefore, “the return of the investment in the nation is imagined in the form of the future generation” [35] (p. 124)—that is, children who will reproduce a national ideal. Nevertheless, the desired return is at risk due to the presence of the Other [35] (p. 123). The affective dynamics of Polish right-wing women’s political engagement create an affective alignment that is crucial to understanding the emotionality of the texts studied. The resulting alignment against the Other that will not reproduce the national ideal becomes a security relationship between two figures, namely the “Polish mother” and the “child in danger”.

Secondly, the cultural significance of the emotive language of love is materialized through the discourse of motherhood. For right-wing female politicians, displaying their identity as the “Polish mother” is a means to manifest their active participation in shaping the national community [13]. The skillfully applied figure of the “Polish mother” helps female parliamentarians move beyond women’s natural capacity and cultural responsibility to give birth and socialize children into the national community [36]. Acting upon motherhood as the fundamental component of their identity that determines their role in biological and cultural reproduction, women make themselves credible in politics. When right-wing female MPs apply the maternal frame to their political agenda, they blur the public/private division as they assume roles of protectors, traditionally assigned to men in the patriarchal family and, thereby, transfer the agency from men to women. Therefore, enacting a social identity of a mother that protects her risk-exposed child may become a political statement.

Consequently, anti-abortion discourse appears to be the backbone of state child protection policy. Framed as a fight for fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, the need to protect the “unborn child” is of paramount importance to the Law and Justice Party. Consequently, parliamentary debates on abortion have always been an opportunity to confront the opposition and construct polarized identities (i.e., pro-life vs. pro-choice). In 2016, the Stop Abortion pro-life coalition (steered by ultraconservative Ordo Iuris Institute) attempted to introduce a total ban on abortion through a citizens’ initiative. The resulting bill proposal triggered a massive public outcry and unprecedented street demonstrations that, at the time, made the ruling party withdraw their support for the proposed legislation [9] (pp. 78–79). Nevertheless, on 27 January 2021, Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal (an institution widely considered dependent on the Law and Justice Party), chaired by a woman, Julia Przyłębska, issued a ruling that eliminated abortion for fetal abnormalities and effectively introduced a near-total ban on pregnancy terminations [37]. According to the statistics published by the National Health Fund, the number of legal abortions has decreased by 65% within one year since then [38]. On 23 June 2022, after a heated debate, the Sejm rejected a bill proposal submitted as a citizens’ initiative that would have significantly liberalized the current abortion law [39].

Furthermore, anti-LGBT discourse that is manifested in the analyzed political talk by opposing sex education at schools is the successor of and perhaps an upgrade to anti-gender discourse that has been present in the Polish public sphere since 2012. The intensification of anti-LGBT initiatives coincides with numerous disclosures of pedophilia scandals in the Catholic Church. Many claim that it is a strategy to transfer the accusations of child abuse from actual offenders linked to the Catholic Church to international institutions that “stigmatize the traditional family model” and “sexualize children” [9,40]. The Law and Justice Party members take an active part in fueling anti-LGBT sentiments in support of state-sanctioned anti-LGBT initiatives—for example, local authorities adopting anti-LGBT resolutions to create LGBT-free zones across the country or the president publishing a “Family Charter” to ban the promotion of LGBT ideology in public institutions [41]. The widespread anti-LGBT attitude in Poland has an impact on non-heteronormative children. Since 2016, in response to alarming data on suicidal thoughts and suicide attempts among LGBT teenagers, the Campaign Against Homophobia has been encouraging schoolchildren in Poland to participate in an annual “Rainbow Friday” to show solidarity with and support for their LGBT peers [42]. To prevent pro-LGBT campaigns from gaining further popularity, the parliament passed three bills that ban organizations that “promote sexualization of children” from schools. The first two acts were vetoed by the president on the grounds of not having received enough social acceptance [43,44]. The third proposal was approved as a citizens’ initiative on 17 August 2023 [45]. If the president does not veto the legislation this time, empowering non-heteronormative children will become even more difficult.

Finally, anti-immigration discourse has been part of parliamentary debates since 2015. In the Polish case, matters related to immigration are multifaceted because the great majority of refugees and immigrants who arrived in Poland before 2015 came primarily from Ukraine, Russia (mostly Chechens), Belarus, and other post-Soviet states, not from the Middle East or Africa. The 2015 relocation proposal put forward by the European Commission that would have obliged Poland to admit 9287 refugees from the Middle East or Africa [46] resulted in public disapproval and significantly increased reluctance towards refugees in 2016 [47]. Since 2021, tens of thousands of non-European migrants, including children, have been seeking to cross the Polish border with Belarus. In response to the crisis, in September 2021, Poland introduced a 90-day state of emergency along the Polish–Belarusian border, including a ban on the media and NGOs from entering the area [48]. Subsequently, in October 2021, the Polish parliament passed a law allowing border guards to immediately expel illegal border crossers and maintaining the ban on entering the area by the media and NGOs. [49] The new legislation triggered accusations of pushback, including unlawful treatment of minors [50,51]. In the summer of 2022, the Polish government completed a border wall to keep migrants out [52]. In stark contrast, after Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Poland hosted millions of Ukrainians, including a large number of children. By passing a bill that equipped Ukrainians with the same access to healthcare and education services that every Polish citizen receives, the Law and Justice Party created a very positive self-image of a welcoming, refugee-friendly state. The warm welcome offered to Ukrainians backgrounded the ongoing crisis at the border with Belarus and, simultaneously, exposed the prejudice towards the non-European migrants and their children [53].

3.2. Text

Having examined diverse discourse types present in rhetoric strategies employed by Polish right-wing female politicians, I now turn to a vast range of linguistic tools that are used to argue either for or against LGBT- and immigration-related bills during parliamentary sessions. To find out how certain social and political phenomena are situated and relationships between discourse participants are constructed, I focus on the following features of text: clauses used to construct identities and social relations [26] (pp. 185–190); denoted (explicit) and connoted (implicit) meanings of clauses with which the relationships between participating figures and their roles in the respective processes are determined [26] (pp. 177–185); modality that expresses politicians’ affinity with the statements made [26] (pp. 158–162); and the ways in which parliamentarians manage their interaction with the opposition [26] (pp. 152–158). To allow for a logical flow, the following analysis is divided into sub-sections guided by content-related themes identified in the studied political talk.

3.2.1. Protecting Citizens in the Prenatal Stage

The discourse of protecting children remains at the center of the right-wing political agenda. In fact, for Polish right-wing female politicians, children are subject to state protection from the moment of conception: “A child is a human being from the moment of conception” (Elżbieta Płonka) [54] (p. 173); “A human being is created as a result of the fusion of female and male sex cells” (Anna Dąbrowska-Banaszek) [55] (p. 132); “From the beginning, a child is a separate being with individual rights, including the fundamental right to life” (Anna Dąbrowska-Banaszek) [55] (p. 132). The use of objective modality combined with medical terminology makes these claims sound universal and unquestionable. Moreover, parliamentarians frequently accentuate their declarative statements by alluding to their social identities: “I will repeat as a doctor” (Anna Dąbrowska-Banaszek) [55] (p. 132); “I have been a doctor for 45 years, I have seen many things and I know a lot about the human life” (Elżbieta Płonka) [54] (p. 173). Nevertheless, the debate on abortion is framed predominantly in legal (thus authoritative) terms: “The law should primarily protect citizens, with particular emphasis on the most vulnerable ones. Children in the prenatal stage are undoubtedly the most innocent and vulnerable beings” (Teresa Glenc) [56] (p. 99); “The current legal status is proof that abortion in Poland is forbidden” (Elżbieta Płonka) [56] (pp. 91–92); “We defend the constitutional right to life from conception to natural death” (Elżbieta Płonka) [57] (p. 167). Therefore, in line with this argumentation, the “unborn child” is constructed as a rightful citizen who is subject to state protection.

3.2.2. Killing “Unborn Children”

In general, the collected material shows that right-wing female MPs depict abortion as a crime against “unborn children”. They do so by demonstrating categorical and authoritative assertiveness about what abortion is: “killing a child and killing a human being”, “an intentional deprivation of a not-yet-born child’s life” (Anna Dąbrowska-Banaszek) [55] (p. 132); “an attempt on life, on a conceived child’s life, on a vulnerable child’s life”, “activities that enable killing of future generations” (Elżbieta Płonka) [55] (pp. 139–140). Even if there is a change in the grammatical mood and speakers use interrogative instead of affirmative sentences, the questions are purely rhetorical and include references to common sense: “What is abortion, if not killing? […] Abortion is the termination of pregnancy. And what is pregnancy? It is a child. It is all very logical” (Maria Kurowska) [55] (p. 139). Also, the word “abortion” is a nominalization that obfuscates agency and causality: we do not know who the agent behind the alleged killing is or why it happened. This means that the process behind abortion (e.g., why pregnancies are terminated) is put out of sight, and the outcome (e.g., no new citizens born) is exposed. Consequently, a 2022 bill proposal submitted as a citizen’s initiative that would have liberalized the abortion law in Poland was called “a project about killing unborn children” (Elżbieta Płonka) [55] (pp. 139–140) and deemed illegal.

3.2.3. De-Medicalizing In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)

Apart from abortion, right-wing female politicians see in vitro fertilization (IVF) as another threat to the “unborn child”. They claim that IVF should not be state-funded as it does not treat infertility and, similarly to abortion, it kills “unborn children”. Just like with the discussion on abortion, right-wing female parliamentarians use nominalization: “The beginning of today’s debate concerned the right to subsidize human production (i.e., IVF). This is not a method of fighting infertility. This is human production” (Barbara Bartuś) [58] (p. 44). Using medical terms and objective modality that dominates their declarative statements, right-wing women disregard IVF as a treatment procedure: “Unfortunately, IVF does not cure infertility. It is not a treatment. It does not improve women’s health in any way” (Elżbieta Płonka) [59] (p. 160) and compare it to eugenics: “As part of the IVF procedure, a large number of spare embryos is created and then those conceived children are subject to eugenic selection in order to decide which ones will be born. For one child to be born, others must be destroyed, not to say killed” (Elżbieta Płonka) [59] (p. 161). Right-wing female MPs consider IVF not only as a way to deny children their fundamental right to life but also as a means to objectify them: “The child is treated in an utterly objectifying way […] as if it was a commodity or a product and not a fully-fledged person” (Elżbieta Płonka) [59] (p. 161). Moreover, the Law and Justice female representatives worry that anonymous sperm donation, an allegedly frequent part of the IVF procedure, deprives children of their remaining rights: “A child conceived in this way will neither know the biological father nor even have access to key health- and life-related information, such as the history of genetic diseases in the family” (Elżbieta Płonka) [59] (p. 161).

3.2.4. Ridiculing Feminist Postulates

Right-wing female politicians do not shy away from directly interacting with their female counterparts in the opposition. One of the common strategies in discussions on reproductive health is to reverse charges and accuse their opponents of discrimination in a very explicit manner: “The ruling by the constitutional court [that introduced a near-total ban on abortion] abolished discrimination against conceived children [with serious birth defects diagnosed in the fetus] whom you allowed to kill only because they are sick” (Anna Maria Siarkowska) [59] (p. 73). The Law and Justice female party members tend to discredit their opponents’ understanding of feminism: “Women’s rights? […] Half of the children killed are also women. And where are the rights of these women who are being killed?” (Maria Kurowska) [55] (p. 139). In addition, they mock the importance of feminist postulates as regards reproductive health: “I have a feeling that you ladies have only one solution to all programs and all social challenges. […] This solution is total abortion” (Katarzyna Sójka) [60] (p. 42); “You reduced the fight for women’s rights, dear ladies, to the fight for contraception, for the right to abortion, that is, for the right to kill children that have already been conceived” (Barbara Bartuś) [58] (p. 44); “I am very sorry that you ladies treat women as objects and that when you talk about women’s health or children’s health, you only talk about abortion and the morning-after pill” (Józefa Szczurek-Żelazko) [60] (p. 45); “I am very sorry to hear that the Civic Platform and the Left female representatives reduce the quality of women’s life to IVF and abortion” (Joanna Borowiak) [58] (p. 46).

3.2.5. Reappropriating Feminism

The Law and Justice female representatives enact their own identity as “conservative feminists” to produce, on the one hand, a positive self-presentation and, on the other, a negative Other-presentation in the area of women’s rights: “Women in Poland are not only left-wing feminists. […] I consider myself a conservative feminist and I disagree with you ladies. As a conservative feminist together with my colleagues, I run government programs that address women’s situation. […] What is more—we do not fight with men. We love men and they love us dear left-wing feminists” (Teresa Wargocka) [58] (p. 42). Overall, a lot of effort is made to antagonize men in the opposition with their female colleagues: “Ladies from the Left consider men as their opponents because they think men do not have the right to express their opinion on the matters related to a child that they conceived. Only the woman should have this right. A man, a husband, a partner has no right because he is unrelated” (Teresa Wargocka) [55] (p. 137); “Pregnancy is not only a woman’s work, so I am surprised that you fight for women’s rights. Women’s rights should be the same as men’s because men and women should support each other” (Ewa Szymańska) [58] (p. 45); “Your feminism is a façade and hypocrisy. You really do not know what you are fighting for because you want to deprive your partners of responsibility” (Elżbieta Płonka) [58] (p. 49).

3.2.6. Shaming Fellow Mothers

Most importantly, however, right-wing female parliamentarians shame women in the opposition for being bad mothers: “You want to love selected children and you choose those who should be born and those who should not. […] This is not true love” (Elżbieta Płonka) [58] (p. 49); “You will not be happy if you kill your children in your wombs” (Teresa Wargocka) [55] (p. 137); “Abortion is women’s hell. There is nothing worse than a woman killing her own child. […] Being a mother is the greatest happiness and every mother who has experienced giving birth to a child knows it. […] You fight for the right to kill your own children” (Maria Kurowska) [56] (p. 102); “[A mother] cannot want to give birth to one child and not the other. How do you love your children?” (Elżbieta Płonka) [55] (pp. 139–140); “The termination of human life before birth is a brutal interference with the maternal instinct. Yes, dear ladies, you are mothers, and you should know that” (Teresa Glenc) [56] (p. 99). Furthermore, they also accuse their female opponents of conflicting interests, juxtaposing IVF and abortion, for example, when the opposition proposed a bill on IVF to increase fertility rates: “So do you want IVF or abortion because I am lost by now?” (Joanna Borowiak) [61] (p. 94). Right-wing female parliamentarians address the opposition in a very direct manner with transitive clauses (subject-verb-clause) that describe directed actions (an agent acts upon a goal). These active constructions clearly attribute agency and responsibility. Women in the opposition are presented as explicit agents who can be held accountable for their actions (i.e., allegedly killing children). This strategy serves to construct a negative image of the Other and develop positive self-presentation.

3.2.7. Promoting Family-Friendly Policies

In addition, right-wing female party representatives create a positive self-image by portraying the current government as family-friendly: “Every life should be cared for and respected, just like a family. The Law and Justice government has been doing it from the very beginning” (Elżbieta Płonka) [55] (pp. 139–140). The centrality of family well-being is justified by the role that family plays in society: “Family is a priceless value. The positive impact of family upbringing is associated primarily with the family values implemented, reciprocal emotional bond, roles performed and patterns of communication. No one can replace a good family in the process of raising children and youth. […] Family is the fundamental environment for the functioning and development of a child” (Agata Katarzyna Wojtyszek) [62] (p. 57). From the nationalistic point of view, family is important because it ensures the nation’s future: “It is necessary to guarantee the conditions for the creation and functioning of families that will give birth to and raise the next generations” (Beata Strzałka) [62] (p. 58); “In the future, children from large families will join the job market and work for those seniors and their pensions that you [the opposition] worry about” (Iwona Kurowska) [63] (p. 119). To strengthen positive self-presentation, right-wing female MPs reaffirm the importance of family-friendly initiatives or programs already in place: “We have introduced the 500+ program as a basic, flagship program, [...] which is aimed at supporting families in raising children who are Poland’s future. They are the potential that we must take care of, nurture and support. […] Children, our national treasure” (Teresa Wargocka) [63] (p. 105); “Sociological research clearly shows that a significant proportion of Poles consider family to be the highest value. Family happiness is synonymous with individual happiness. […] It is important to disseminate good quality knowledge about the fundamental importance of marriage and parenthood for society. […] Therefore, the establishment of the Polish Institute of Family and Demography seems to be an extremely important matter” (Dominika Chorosińska) [62] (p. 46); “The ‘For Life’ program must result in the creation of a stable assurance of care for all children who are born with a disease or are not fully able, as well as for their families. […] There is no responsibility for social life without the responsibility for the life of a vulnerable child. [...] We must not stop to serve in defense of humanity” (Anna Milczanowska) [64] (p. 57). While enacting a positive self-image in the area of family-friendly policies, right-wing female politicians add to a negative Other-presentation and question “liberal” demands that women in the opposition purportedly make to increase fertility: “It is very difficult to increase the fertility rate by promoting a liberal lifestyle at pride parades and encouraging abortion on demand. […] I do not think we are going to increase fertility this way” (Iwona Kurowska) [63] (pp. 118–119).

3.2.8. De-Stigmatizing Traditional Values

Furthermore, right-wing women reverse any possible accusation of discrimination by claiming that initiatives that supposedly combat domestic violence aim at stigmatizing the traditional Polish family: “[The Istanbul Convention] contains a number of dubious, even harmful provisions, amongst others, it stigmatizes families […] as a source of violence” (Dominika Chorosińska) [65] (p. 118); “The National Program for Counteracting Violence in the Family should be renamed since the term ‘violence in the family’ is ideologically charged and basically stigmatizes the family […] so it should be replaced with ‘domestic violence’ instead” (Anna Maria Siarkowska) [66] (p. 42). Apart from transferring the charges to others, they provide a discriminatory justification for their defense strategies, imposing a conservative and exclusive definition of a family (i.e., a married heterosexual couple): “The essence of the problem is that this violence happens in the privacy of a household, and therefore takes place between people who have personal relationships—they are not always a family. They can be cohabiting relationships. They can be same-sex relationships” (Anna Maria Siarkowska) [66] (p. 42). To refute arguments that violence happens predominantly within families and that family members, overwhelmingly women and children, need more state protection, the Law and Justice female party members claim the opposite: “Good and permanent family ties are one of the best safeguards against violence” (Dominika Chorosińska) [65] (p. 118). The reason why right-wing female politicians claim that the traditional family model is “under attack” is linked to their perspective on the role of the Catholic Church in the state: “The shoddy, disgusting attacks on John Paul II stem from the need to weaken and even destroy the Catholic Church in Poland. Because the Catholic Church has a specific position on bioethical matters, on abortion, euthanasia, it has a specific vision of the family. The Catholic Church cares about our tradition and national identity, and this stands in the way of centralizing the European Union. Because we, Poles, are to be cut off from our roots to easily impose a new vision of Europe with the capital in Berlin” (Anna Kwiecień) [67] (p. 111). Such narratives help demonstrate the moral superiority of the traditional family model promoted by the Law and Justice female representatives.

3.2.9. Empowering Parents

Apart from the Catholic Church acting to safeguard Polish national identity, a special role is assigned to parents who are seen as irreplaceable in cultivating the “right” values in children: “Parents are to have a voice; they are to decide with what values and content their children are to be brought up” (Joanna Borowiak) [68] (p. 38); “I think that every responsible parent knows how to take care of their child, knows their capabilities and expectations, so they should have the right to decide about what is in line with their beliefs in order for the child to feel safe. […] That is why I am glad that parents will decide about the education of their children, including sex education” (Beata Strzałka) [68] (p. 36). Therefore, the support for initiatives that would ban sex education from schools, such as the “Protect Children” bill, is allegedly based on the parental right to decide what children are taught at school: “Parents have the most sacred and absolute right to decide on the upbringing of their child” (Mirosława Stachowiak-Różecka) [68] (p. 26); “Let us protect children from inappropriate content, let us support parents in their upbringing” (Joanna Borowiak) [69] (p. 53); “Ultimately, this project gives parents the right to decide what content accompanies their children’s upbringing” (Marzena Machałek) [69] (p. 56). Similarly to the traditional family model where the accusation of discrimination was reversed, parents who want to raise their children in line with the traditional values are depicted as being victimized: “Those parents who do not want sex education are stigmatized, pointed out at school and really have no chance to defend their right to raise their own children” (Teresa Wargocka) [70] (p. 63).

3.2.10. Saving Children from Sexualization

While supporting parents in upbringing children in line with their beliefs and, thus, building a positive self-image, right-wing female politicians attack the opposition for allegedly wanting to indoctrinate children with inappropriate content: “This law might not have been needed if it weren’t for the fact that when you [the opposition] were in power, LGBT-related organizations entered schools through the back door and tried to distribute so-called research based on unsubstantiated data. Yes, this bill is needed precisely because you pose a risk” (Iwona Kurowska) [68] (p. 37). Some would put forward radical arguments. For example, during one of the speeches given by a representative of the opposition who declared that, when they are in power, sex education will be taught by competent tutors, Joanna Borowiak shouted in response: “by a pedophile” [58] (p. 42). Moreover, right-wing women equate sex education with LGBT-related topics and claim that both phenomena pose a threat to children: “Therefore, the deep internal disintegration is the cause of our children’s tragedy, troubles, and suicides. There is a problem of family breakdown and there is also a problem of ideologizing children. Children really need proper care; they need love that no one or few talk about here. […] And if it was not for the Law and Justice Party, we would only be talking about suicides of LGBT children here. But it is LGBT that is the cause of children committing suicide, this very ideology” (Elżbieta Płonka) [54] (p. 173). To support their arguments, they use categorical statements and refer to the constitution: “The constitution talks about promoting the family. […] not homosexuality and LGBT movements” (Barbara Bartuś) [71] (p. 15). Being strongly against “children’s sexualization” but acknowledging the importance of the “appropriate” sex education, right-wing female MPs offer an alternative: “We reject sexualization, but we teach about sexuality, and we do it as part of the core curricula of various subjects, including family life education. And now we will start the ‘For Life’ program—if the parents agree. […] In fact, teaching about sexuality is related to shaping pro-family, pro-social and pro-health attitudes, developing an ability to make the right choices, select a lifestyle that is good for reproductive health and preparing the youth to assume future marital and parental roles” (Marzena Machałek) [69] (p. 55).

3.2.11. Taking a Test on Humanity

It is interesting to see how the family-friendly image is manifested in matters related to immigration. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the parliamentary debates on Ukrainian refugees have been dominated by the language of empathy, hospitality, care, and kindness that emphasizes the need to help women and children fleeing war: “The situation that we are in is the sudden arrival of many friends, we have a big family and we have to face it” (Elżbieta Płonka) [72] (p. 85); “Millions of people will come to us and we must take care of them. These millions expect our support. I saw women with babies in their arms. I helped them comfort the crying ones” (Teresa Pamuła) [73] (p. 39); “We are currently hosting refugees in Poland, and these refugees are mainly women and children” (Barbara Dziuk) [74] (p. 43); “Poland welcomes […] these refugees as if they were family” (Barbara Bartuś) [74] (p. 38). Additionally, the Law and Justice female representatives argue for various bills in support of Ukrainian children, highlighting the horrors of war that they are fleeing, very often separated from their parents who stayed in Ukraine to fight: “There are a lot of children among the refugees. […] Problems related to the safety of children are extremely important and need to be clarified” (Józefa Szczurek-Żelazko) [74] (p. 105); “There is a great need for the Polish government to undertake the task of registering all minor refugees who have arrived in Poland. […] These are very important changes that will protect these children” (Teresa Wargocka) [75] (p. 40); “The goal is to regulate the legal situation of children coming to Poland from Ukraine, because a large number of them are without their parents, i.e., the only legal guardians under Polish law. […] A temporary guardian is a person who will take care of the child, who will be able to represent the child, and therefore enroll them in school, go to the doctor with them or collect the benefits due to these children” (Barbara Socha) [76] (p. 66). The fact that Poland welcomes refugees from Ukraine is an opportunity for nationalist self-glorification widely expressed by many right-wing politicians: “When around 2 million immigrants arrived in Europe in 2014, the EU countries raised the alarm about the refugee crisis and demanded their relocation. We, as the Polish government, as local governments, as non-governmental organizations, act, support each other and deal with it” (Józefa Szczurek-Żelazko) [76] (p. 70); “We took on a huge responsibility, taking in over 7 million people fleeing the war, the vast majority being women and children. Accepting such a number of people without having refugee camps is a phenomenon on a global scale” (Elżbieta Duda) [77] (p. 54); “I am proud of Poles, I am proud of the Polish government, I am proud of Polish local government officials that we have opened to Ukrainians” (Ewa Szymańska) [76] (p. 80); “Poles once again passed the test, the test on humanity” (Barbara Dziuk) [74] (p. 33).

3.2.12. Denying Empathy

The empathy that dominates the debate on Ukrainian refugees is clearly missing in the discussion on refugees and immigrants trying to cross the Belarusian border. While the situation at the border with Ukraine is portrayed as an obligation to provide shelter for people fleeing war, the crisis at the border with Belarus is presented as a danger that requires taking immediate measures to protect the nation: “Poland is safe with us. Recall that when the hybrid war was proclaimed at the Polish-Belarusian border, the Polish government immediately started to build a wall between Poland and Belarus. We should act together so that our children, our fathers, our future generations are safe in Poland” (Lidia Burzyńska) [78] (p. 49). To refute different treatment given to Ukrainians and people at the border with Belarus, the Law and Justice female representatives use categorical statements: “Refugees are treated the same across the border” (Teresa Pamuła) [79] (p. 14); “Poland is a state of law, Poland has border crossings and every refugee, every immigrant who appears at the border crossing and fills in an appropriate application, can count on it to be considered. And if we have an attack on a border where there is no crossing, then we should speak with one voice” (Barbara Bartuś) [80] (p. 68). Nevertheless, the double standards are salient: “War refugees fleeing Ukraine will receive assistance regardless of where they cross the border” (Anna Dąbrowska-Banaszek) [75] (p. 34). Moreover, it is common for right-wing parliamentarians to deny the responsibility to protect the immigrant children who attempt to cross the Belarusian border. For example, in response to accusations of forcibly returning children to Belarus, right-wing female MPs launch a counter-attack against their political opponents by changing the topic to reproductive issues: “These are children, not a clump of cells?” (Anna Paluch) [81] (p. 161); “Do you also care for the unborn children?” (Joanna Borowiak) [81] (p. 148); “Will you also defend the conceived children?” (Joanna Borowiak) [81] (p. 149); “Where are the parents of these children?” (Joanna Borowiak) [81] (p. 157). When the opposition asks for a minute of silence to commemorate people who died at the Polish–Belarussian border, the Law and Justice female politicians start praying for “all the aborted babies” (Joanna Borowiak) [81] (p. 158). In addition, right-wing female party members tend to insinuate that the immigrant minors camping at the border with Belarus pose a threat. For instance, when confronted with questions about a 16-year-old teenager who was allegedly forced back over the border, Bożena Borys-Szopka retorted: “Invite him to your home!” [81] (p. 138). Overall, right-wing female politicians do not describe the immigrants trapped at the border with Belarus as victims; they present them as “intruders” (Joanna Borowiak) [82] (p. 34). While building a positive self-image, right-wing female parliamentarians try to discredit the opposition by implying that they do not represent Polish national interests: “Whose interests are you representing?” (Joanna Borowiak) [81] (p. 141). They deny the pushbacks and delegate the responsibility for the ill-treatment of immigrants trying to get to the European Union through Belarus: “This is what Belarusians do, not us” (Joanna Borowiak) [81] (p. 137).

3.3. Social Practice

This section explores the contribution that Polish right-wing female politicians make to reinforce the intersectional state violence against minors in Poland and demonstrates how the social practice of discourse shapes social dogmas.

Having scrutinized the interplay of different discourse types in their speeches as well as the linguistic toolkit, I argue that right-wing women bear a lot of political responsibility in the enactment of white, Christian, and heteronormative identity on Polish children. By glorifying the traditional family model, allegedly under attack and in decline, they operate on a myth that supports their desired social reality. The myth, symbolized by a patriarchal society with its religious and authoritarian norms and crowned with women’s sacred roles as mothers, is depicted as seemingly under threat from secularism and liberalism. The traditional family model is used, therefore, to impose a moral authority that determines what today’s society should be like and what future generations should be socialized into. This analysis reveals that the politics of sexual anxiety is the basic mechanism to exercise power over people [83,84,85]. The threats posed by the Other help secure the role of the traditional family as the guardian of morality. Furthermore, these imagined and sexualized threats stand as examples of liberal values. The right to abortion is seen as a menace because it frees a woman from her dependence on a man while pregnant and during maternity leave. Sexual minorities are allegedly dangerous because LGBT people exercise their freedom to love and marry whomever they desire, possibly seeking “unconventional” ways of biological reproduction. Migrants pose an apparent threat because they corrupt the “purity” of the national stock through potential intermarriage. People who utilize their right to self-determination, who escape “tradition” and live their lives according to their own paradigms, and who remain intellectually independent generate a perceived loss of patriarchal hierarchy. To endorse a shared understanding of social reality, it is necessary to make the national community members stop deviating from the imposed ideal. And, as this article intends to demonstrate, the ideal is white, Christian, and heteronormative.

Finally, anti-LGBT and anti-immigration attitudes promoted through various speech acts need to be put in the context of Polish–EU relations. Having established that secular and liberal values are the main hazards for the traditional family model, the EU is considered their embodiment. Therefore, anti-EU sentiment is a frequent theme in Polish political discourse. The animosity towards the Union stems from its apparent image as an imperialistic endeavor by Western elites who plot to control Poland politically and culturally. The anti-LGBT and anti-immigration policy proposals are, therefore, state-driven manifestations of Euroscepticism that many academics regard as symbolic attempts to change Poland’s semi-peripheral status inside the Union [86,87,88,89]. Moreover, due to concerns about the rule of law, media freedom, and minority rights, while the Law and Justice Party was in power from 2015 to 2023, the relationship between Warsaw and Brussels steadily deteriorated. Even though the government had never stated any intention to exit the EU, the ruling by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in October 2021 that declared the primacy of national legislation over the EU treaties [48] incited a public debate on the erosion of democratic norms in Poland and a possibility of the country planning a “Polexit”.

4. Discussion

As this article seeks to explain, anti-LGBT and anti-immigration discourses are important areas of right-wing women’s political activity. The interplay of sexual and racial prejudice that female parliamentarians employ in their narrative strategies enables the enactment of white, Christian, and heteronormative identity on Polish children. Acting as supporters of state-sanctioned policies directed against certain groups of minors, the Law and Justice female party members legitimize discriminatory practices and, consequently, add to a xenophobic social reality.

Women’s political emancipation could be seen as acknowledging their ability to participate in the public sphere on equal terms with men. The wide array of speeches made by right-wing female MPs during parliamentary debates on LGBT- and immigration-related issues is a good indication of women’s active engagement in the political domain. This study shows that by framing their anti-LGBT and anti-immigration political talk in a maternal discourse and acting upon their social identity of the “Polish mother” in their narrative strategies, the Law and Justice female representatives successfully exercise their political agency in a novel way and in a new political context. Their rhetoric relies on a concept of motherhood that conventionally confines women to the private sphere. Instead of limiting women’s possibility to practice agency, the emblem of the “Polish mother” escapes the domestic domain and becomes a means to political emancipation. Women who assume responsibility to protect the “child in danger” transgress the cultural norms of passive femininity. The discursive transfer of agency traditionally assigned to men not only empowers women but also emancipates the “Polish mother” as a political subject. The strategic re-politicization and weaponization of motherhood entrusts women with a new political role in the defense of the nation’s future and, as a result, allows for the “feminization” of nationalism.

With this study having scrutinized the prominence of Polish right-wing female politicians in endorsing intersectional state violence against minors, future studies could investigate attempts to “feminize” the nationalistic discourse on accepting large numbers of refugee women fleeing the war in Ukraine. Contesting the universality of women’s rights from a “conservative feminist” perspective in view of emerging anti-Ukrainian attitudes might prove an important area for future research.

5. Conclusions

The rhetoric of maternal love filled with denoted and connoted meanings that Polish right-wing female politicians use to create a positive self-image and negative Other-presentation adds to the codification of the difference between “us” and “them”. While “we” is legitimized as “normal”, “they” is constructed as “deviant” and, hence, poses a threat to mitigate. As we demonize the difference between “us” and “them”, we fail to remember the universal human dignity and start to valorize human worth instead. Once our society is organized hierarchically, we normalize the marginalization and exclusion of others only because “they” are not “us”. While a white, Christian, and heteronormative “we” is offered protection, a disabled, non-heteronormative, and non-European migrant “they” is abandoned. The resulting delusional superiority, wrapped in the warmth of a mother’s womb, makes us immune to the disabled children not having access to high-quality healthcare, to the steadily rising rates of suicide attempts among LGBT teenagers or to non-European migrant minors brutally pushed back to a country where they would face further mistreatment. Perhaps exposing the strategic re-politicization and weaponization of motherhood and the subsequent “feminization” of public permission to socialize future generations to become indifferent to the suffering of the Other could offer at least a partial remedy to the ongoing xenophobic trends.