Using the Bayes Probability Model to Evaluate the Risk of Accidents Caused by the Electronic Chart Display and Information System

Abstract

The obligated implementation of the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) began ten years ago, and during this time, we could observe different types of familiarization with the system through its users. The incorrect use of the ECDIS is a problem recognized by the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), and it is caused by disparate levels of education and the quality of courses. Another aspect of the recognized problem is the unequal length of the ECDIS specific course training period through which users acquire type-specific familiarization with the system. Switching between different types of ECDISs makes users more prone to errors until they become fully familiar with the new product system. This paper analyzes seafarers’ knowledge and ECDIS usage over a 6-year period. Based on obtained data, models that enable risk analysis based on conditional probability were created. This paper presents the use of Bayesian modeling to reduce errors in maritime accidents caused by inadequate use of the ECDIS.

1. Introduction

The Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) is an information navigation system that provides navigation assistance to seafarers and is an adequate replacement for marine navigation charts. It displays cartographic data and the position of the ship and provides a lot of other information that contributes to safe navigation and helps to create a voyage plan and monitor it [1,2].

The ECDIS offers many other sophisticated navigation and safety features, including continuous data recording for later analysis. Its biggest advantage is the integration with other electronic navigation devices on the bridge and the use of safety settings that alert the user that sailing in a certain area may bring a risk of grounding. In addition to the above-mentioned advantages, there is also easy access to information that was mainly available as navigation paper publications on the bridge (tide tables, list of lights and fog signals, etc.) [3].

The ECDIS is a navigation system that is fully capable of adequately replacing paper navigation charts. The transition from paper charts to the ECDIS is considered one of the most significant changes recorded in maritime navigation in recent years [4].

The system officially began to be applied in 2012 on certain types of ships, and the transitional period of mandatory application lasted until 2018 [5]. Its benefits are unquestionable because its application has brought significant improvements in navigation and increased navigation safety. Navigation with the help of ECDISs represents a revolution in navigation that has been happening in the past 15–20 years, and if we include the date of the last mandatory implementation on board, then it has been happening in the past 6 years. The transition from paper to electronic charts was therefore a process strictly supervised by the most important maritime organizations related to safe navigation in order to adequately prepare officers to use this system for navigation and improve the system itself in accordance with the proposed norms [6].

The ECDIS is not just an electronic browser of navigation charts; it is a system that has the ability to connect to electronic navigation devices on the bridge from which it receives data and displays them on the monitor, and it has software in which security settings can be adjusted so that the system informs the user while navigating an area that is unsafe for the ship. In addition to monitoring navigation, the system also enables the function of planning voyages and making navigation routes in which the safety parameters of the ship are entered so that the navigation chart takes on a “personalized” appearance for a certain type of ship. As such, the system significantly improves the safety of navigation, enabling the software to control the planned routes based on the given parameters and to perform monitoring during navigation by alerting the deck officer if the ship approaches unsafe waters. The system greatly helps with navigation and greatly improves safety.

In order for a seafarer to properly use the ECDIS, training is required, which is instructed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO); that is, all officers should have an ECDIS training and course certificate according to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) convention—the so-called D-44 course. The system allows for significant improvements in voyage planning and navigation, but like all electronic navigation systems, it also has some possible errors. One of the most important negative perspectives of the system is the possibility of becoming over-reliant on the system and neglecting other sources for safe navigation, as well as the non-adequate use of the system, which results from inadequate knowledge about the system and its use.

There is also a possible negative effect on the perception of the environment by the deck officer, the so-called keyhole effect [7], in which only a small part of the navigation route in front of the Officer of the Watch (OOW) is available (depending on the navigation area and the chosen chart scale), while the following sections of the route and potential dangers are out of sight and out of situational awareness. Another negative issue is that the system may display too much information that could potentially have a negative impact on the OOW’s situational awareness [8].

The inadequate use of the ECDIS can directly lead to a maritime accident, and in these cases, the term ECDIS-related accidents or ECDIS-assisted accidents is used.

Voyage planning and navigation using the ECDIS is not something that every user finds user-friendly, and although all officers are required to attend the General Type ECDIS course, not all officers demonstrate adequate knowledge for proper use of the system [9,10].

Official investigations of maritime accidents contributed by the ECDIS as well as subsequent recommendations addressed to the Maritime Industry and ECDIS manufacturers indicate the disproportion of ECDIS performance standards and the level of knowledge and training of deck officers as daily users of the ECDIS. Although the transition period of the introduction of the ECDIS is finished, as a part of navigation equipment, it remains a transitional subject. Accordingly, the authors’ attitude is that it is also necessary to upgrade the ECDIS training process, and conducting research is a step in that direction.

Therefore, this paper analyzed the knowledge and appropriate use of the system with regard to the officer’s age, sailing experience, the officer’s status on the vessel, and the type of vessel they work on in order to create a Bayesian network based on the data obtained and to indicate the most influential factors that may lead to an ECDIS-related accident.

1.1. Research Background

Regulations regarding the training and certification of navigation officers that will use the ECDIS were specified in the STCW conference that took place in Manila in June 2010 (IMO 2010). Masters and officers in charge of navigational watch on ships fitted with the ECDIS should, as a minimum, undertake appropriate generic ECDIS training to meet the competence requirements of the 2010 Manila Amendments to the STCW Convention (IMO 2017) [11]. They are also were required to hold a certificate of completion.

The existing courses are general, while they should be specialized depending on the user needs [12,13,14]. Improper use of the ECDIS has been recognized as a significant contributing factor to ship’s grounding. According the study on the ECDIS carried out by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) and the Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board (DMAIB), in the period from 2008 to 2017, the ECDIS configuration and utilization has contributed to 15 cases of grounding. In particular, the disproportion between the way the ECDIS was used and its performance design was identified as the main cause. The study was based on interviews with 155 deck officers and other available data [12,13].

Insufficient standardization of the ECDIS is one of the problems and requires a specialized training program [14,15].

After the ECDIS transitional implementation period ended, deck officers started planning the voyage and navigating with the use of this new system. Mandatory ECDIS training for all maritime officers began in 2012, but not all officers who took the course at that time had the ECDIS implemented on board. It took some officers several years after taking the ECDIS course to actually use the system for navigation and voyage planning.

Given the greater technological experience of the younger generation, young officers find it easier to familiarize themselves with the ECDIS. However, a study conducted in 2016 showed that—whether due to inadequate education or resistance to new technological application—a significant number of older officers who passed the General Type ECDIS course were still not well acquainted with this new technology.

Still, other older officers are not well acquainted with the ECDIS due to less need to use the software with the operation of the system, and therefore, they do not use all the parameters as they should. On other hand, today, there are active officers with 10 years of experience who have never used paper charts for navigation and voyage planning.

Officers who work on liners or off-shore vessels on short routes do not need to enter new routes and change safety parameters when using systems but merely to upload old routes, and as such, they need to use significantly fewer ECDIS functions than officers who often change ships and navigate on different and complex routes (with many shallow areas and other dangers that need to be avoided).

Today, 6 years after the mandatory implementation of the system, there has been a significant improvement in the process of educating seafarers on the use of the ECDIS. One of the reasons for this improvement is the significantly better electronic literacy of new generations, as well as easier familiarization, i.e., easier acceptance of new systems and software.

Many manufacturers of navigation equipment started developing their ECDIS earlier, so as a result, there are more than 30 different manufacturers on the market [16].

The ECDIS, therefore, is not unified. Although the functions are the same or similar, since different manufacturers develop different systems, the software within the systems differs significantly

There is a certain number of deck officers who are still active in the service and who were familiar with the ECDIS only through the mandatory general training course, the so-called MODEL course 1.27, which was based on the original versions of the ECDIS. If such an officer has only worked on one type of ship, on routes that are not difficult to navigate and are repeated, his knowledge may be inadequate, as recognized in the recommendations of the maritime industry back in 2012 [17].

Improper use of the ECDIS resulting from insufficient knowledge of the system has been verified as the cause of a number of maritime accidents [12]. Analysis of the ECDIS-related accidents leads to the conclusion that the causes were not technical but occurred mostly due to insufficient knowledge of the system [9].

1.2. Literature Review

This paper is based on the research that started at the Maritime Faculty in Split in 2016, and part of the results of the earlier research was published in 2017 in the paper entitled “Human errors in ECDIS-related accidents” [9]. In the paper, the authors concluded that their research is consistent with the research of maritime accident investigation boards and that the largest number of errors made by the tested officers refer to errors related to the system of safety and alarms settings. The research results published in the aforementioned paper show a very low level of “use and knowledge of the capabilities of ECDIS”, which directly endangers the safety of navigation.

In the 2019 paper by Car et al., based on a study of familiarization with the system among active seafarers, among 133 seafarers, 65% of them said that they assumed the duties of an officer without sufficient time to familiarize with the ECDIS [18].

The presented results from a paper by Žuskin et al. from 2016 show that most problems with the ECDIS come from insufficient and/or poor training. According to Žuskin et al., the system has great advantages over classical navigation with paper charts, and that significantly improves navigation safety, navigational safety, maritime accidents, or near misses due to operational problems. Operational problems include wrong settings for safety parameters, wrong route checking, wrong mode or scale, wrong vessel data, not updating charts correctly, using automatic identification system (AIS) presentation on the ECDIS screen as an anti-collision tool, avoiding GPS control against visual or radar position, etc. [19]. In 2018, Turna et al. investigated whether the ECDIS has a relationship with grounding accidents through case studies using the 4M Overturned Pyramid (MOP) model [11].

In 2020, Turna and Öztürk (2020) introduced an assessment concerning the use of the ECDIS in safe navigation by considering the case studies where the device played a role in grounding accidents [11]. From a total of 80 investigation reports of grounding, 22 cases related to ECDIS and Electronic Navigational Charts (ENC) accidents from 2008 to 2018 were analyzed.

1.3. Goal of This Research

Based on the obtained research results, which are incorporated into the models, it is possible to carry out a risk assessment of ECDIS users depending on their age, experience and function on the vessel. The results can be used as a measure for recommending additional education, better familiarization or the implementation of other additional measures to reduce the probability of an accident caused by the ECDIS. The aim of the research is to create models that show the probability of ECDIS-related errors in relation to officer status on board, previous experience, age of the OOW, type of vessel, education and other parameters.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Study

The work methodology consists of several stages. In the first stage, a 6-year study was conducted at the Maritime Faculty in Split, in which 105 active deck officers who were experienced seafarers participated, all of whom were of Croatian nationality. Research was completed partly in the transitional period of ECDIS usage.

2.2. Testing Equipment

For the research, we used the TRANSAS simulator Navi-Sailor/Planner 5000/4000 ECDIS. The participants were categorized based on the results of the survey questionnaire, and an analysis was based on obtained data related to the officer’s status, age, type of ship they currently work on, length of officer’s service, experience in working on the ECDIS Transas system, experience in working on different ECDIS, type of ECDIS the course they have, etc.

The participants were evaluated by experts based on an evaluation form prepared for this purpose, and the data were analyzed and used as input data to complete conditional value tables for creating Bayesian networks. The data obtained through analysis based on evaluating were the correctness of the created route, input of safety parameters, route check and thorough analysis of navigational errors.

2.3. Task and Questionnaire

Participants were instructed to create a sailing route from MASS PS (Port of Rotterdam) to Ceuta PS, Gibraltar. The second part of the task includes the marking of the area prohibited for navigation on the ECDIS chart and the deviation of the route from the specified area by 20 NM. The participants were provided with the necessary information about the ship and the specified NGA (No Go Area) area listed in

Table 1. Vessel type used for examination.

Vessel type		Chemical tanker
Max draught		9 m
Max speed open waters		14 kn
Cb coefficient		0.8
Min UKC	Coastal waters	1 m
	Open waters	2 m
NGA	Position (center)	Coordinates (ϕ, λ)
	Dimension	Diameter (115 M)
Min XTD	Pilotage	0.2 M (if applicable)
	Open sea	1 M

.

The route creation depends on the characteristics of the vessel. The type of vessel (a chemical tanker in this case) determines which part of the traffic separation scheme (TSS) will be used during navigation (it is necessary to choose a route provided for the passage of ships with dangerous cargo (dangerous cargo route) within the TSS). Data of maximum speed, draft, Cb coefficient and the given minimum under keel clearance (UKC) are used to determine the basic safety parameters: shallow contour, safety contour, safety depth and deep contour. The values of the mentioned parameters determine navigable waters from non-navigable waters for each individual ship and represent the basic navigational parameters of each ship.

The second part of the task involves the use of available tools to enter temporary information on the ECDIS electronic chart (in the form of a circular no-navigation area which participants should mark on the electronic chart). In addition to mandatory function of the ECDIS for the manual correction of data on navigation charts, there is also the function of entering a temporary character mark that can be removed from the chart arbitrarily (maps notes). It is the function that can be used to mark a temporarily prohibited area for navigation. Since this ECDIS function allows the entry of temporary marks and notices on an electronic chart identical to corrections on paper charts (such as temporary and preliminary corrections), it is included in the research.

In order to achieve as realistic results as possible, the participants were not aware of the purpose of the mentioned research, which had the character of an anonymous single blinded research study. In addition to providing the necessary information about the ship, the route and the NGA, the respondents were instructed to approach the task with due professional attention without a time limit for completing the task. The Admiralty Nautical Publication of the area of the planned route, including guide to port entry, associated sailing directions publications, list of radio signals—pilot services, vessel traffic services, port operations, etc., were available to the participants. All safety and navigational alerts, including IMO and additional areas alerts necessary for route check, were previously set identically on all ECDIS simulator workstations. Since all respondents did not have work experience with the Transas ECDIS, they had the option to contact the instructor for additional information about the ECDIS interface. In addition to completing the task on the Transas ECDIS, the respondents filled out an anonymous survey with personal and professional data, as shown in Figure 1.

Questions related to the ECDIS include the possession of a generic ECDIS course (all respondents possessed it) and a question about the possession of a specific ECDIS course. Specific ECDIS authorization implies that the examinee has undergone training for a specific ECDIS of a particular manufacturer, which is a condition required by most flag states and shipping companies according to their own rules. In the conducted research, because the examination was made using a Transas system, having a specific ECDIS certificate meant having a Transas ECDIS certificate. In that case, the respondents were required to enter the period of work with the Transas ECDIS during their previous sea time.

In order to analyze the achieved results, an evaluation form with a set of control elements of the route was created. Route check elements are divided into four groups: accurate determination and entry of safety parameters (safety contour, safety depth, safety frame and cross-track distance (XTD)), elements related to the assumed NGA (position and radius), elements related to route check (carried out route check at first place, carried out track control mode, corrected safety alarms if noticed) and navigational elements: (chosen dangerous cargo route where mandatory, crossing shallow depth area, crossing TSS, and whether the route was created in accordance with rules and positive practice of route planning), as shown in Figure 2.

The safety parameters of vessel type used for this examination are based on the data presented in Table 1. The participants were required to accurately determine the values of safety contour, safety depth, safety frame and XTD and then enter their values into the alarm functions of the ECDIS. The given NGA (circular area defined by the coordinates of the center and the diameter) had to be marked on the navigation route and the route corrected according to the given instructions. The control elements of the performed route check include the activation of the route check function after the completion of the route. A part of the route check is the presence of alarms (ECDIS shows where on the route the error is present and its type) and their immediate removal after the alarm occurs. Another element included in the route check is track control mode check (check whether the autopilot system can independently execute the route navigation, whereby the input elements are XTD and turn radius whose values were given by the ECDIS for the chosen ship).

The last part of research is the checking of route elements that are not directly related to the safety aspect of the voyage (unlike crossing shallow depth areas or incorrect crossing TSS) but weather the route was created according to navigation rules and best navigation practice. As an illustration, an example would be where the route was created in an unnecessarily wide area and distance from the coast in order to avoid a series of consecutive TSS in the navigation area between the wider area of the island of Ushant (as a part of the end of the English Channel) and the area of Gibraltar. Although the safety parameters can be accurately adjusted and the level of application of the ECDIS can be adequate, the route created in this way is not satisfactory from the point of view of economy and navigation practice.

Although the main goal of the research was not determination of the economy and optimization of the created routes, this parameter is also included in the elements of the route check with the purpose of gaining a deeper insight not only into the knowledge of the application of the ECDIS but also the adopted approach to the creation of navigation routes. Since the respondents were advised to create the route with the same level of professional attention and approach as during their work on the ship, it is justified to evaluate and consider the element of optimization and economy of the navigation route.

It is important to point out that the research did not include the testing of route execution, but only the accuracy and integrity of the process of route creation. Therefore, it cannot be compared to other types of simulators, such as airplane simulators where personal skills, reaction speed and decision-making speed come to the fore. The sea route is created using the ECDIS and, once validated and confirmed by all navigation officers, represents the planned path of the ship. Since the rules of route creation should be known to every navigation officer, their potential personal tendency to risk (taking risky maneuvers in conditions of high traffic density, passing by reduced distances, etc.) was not the subject of an assessment. Such behavioral elements would be potentially visible during execution of the sailing route. If the route is created beyond the known principles of safety as a result of the subject’s preference for risky and bold behavior during navigation (in terms of maneuvering by ship), it represents a rough violation of fundamental safety principles and direct threat to the safety at the sea. Since the route must be approved by the ship master (and often by the designated person ashore), all active navigation officers clearly understand the importance of adequately created sea routes for the safety of the ship and their own sea career. Additionally, the control of the navigation routes is a mandatory part of the bridge inspection conducted by port control during the vetting process or in-house vetting. Therefore, it is justified to assume that the respondents have approached the completion of a task with a fully professional approach.

2.4. Bayesian Network Modeling

Bayesian networks were chosen for modeling conditional probabilities because they offer the possibility of inserting missing data into the network based on expert knowledge. This feature allowed a team of experts to be involved in creation of these models. The Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) framework for ECDIS error is presented in Figure 3. Bayesian networks are graphical structures for representing conditional probabilities between a large number of variables (attributes) and for making conditional inferences regarding variables [20]. By using Bayesian networks, it is possible to identify the most sensitive factors in the network as well as the strongest links between influential factors. It is also possible to identify which combinations of factors have the greatest influence on the likelihood of ECDIS-related marine casualties.

3. Results

All participants were deck officers and participants in alternative studies for active deck officers organized by the Maritime Faculty of University of Split. Their education is mostly secondary maritime school.

The survey was made by ECDIS Transas simulator, and the participants had to create a route from PS Mass to Ceuta with the given information about draught and speed. Specifications of a vessel were provided, and participants had to create the route and to mark the restricted area as well.

Knowledge was assessed by checking: the accuracy of safety settings, the selection of an appropriate route, the number and type of navigational errors, XTD parameters, autoload function independently switched on and the route-checking performance.

The composition of respondents in terms of current officer experience is presented in Figure 4. Most of the participants had between 6 and 10 years of OOW experience. Out of the 105 officers, 40 of them had up to 5 years of OOW experience. Another 16 officers had between 11 and 20 years of OOW experience, and 5 of them had more then 20 years. A total of 42 participants had specific (Transas) types of ECDIS certificates.

Figure 5 presents the distribution of the respondents regarding their current OOW status, and it shows that 78 participants held the position of second officers. Thus, by definition of their position, they should be fully familiar with performance of the ECDIS given the fact that the second officer is responsible for voyage planning. Meanwhile, 13 participants held the position of first officer up to 3000 BT, and 13 participants held the position of master up to 3000 BT. One participant served as third officer.

Figure 6 presents the number of navigational errors according to officer experience, and it shows that out of the 105 participants, 84 made navigational errors. For 25, the error was “route passing over insufficient depth area”; for 34, the error was “incorrect entry/passing TSS Area”; for 24, the error was “route not created according to the navigational practice of route planning”.

The distribution of correctly set safety parameters according to officer status is presented in Figure 7. Overall, 19 of the 105 participants correctly set the safety depth and contour parameters, 8 participants correctly set the safety frame parameters, and 8 set the correctly XTD parameters.

The model presented in Figure 8 presents the Bayes conditional probability model of making Error 1, Error 2 and Error 3 in regard to officer experience (years) and officer status. Error 1 is route created over area with insufficient depth, Error 2 is crossing at the TSS area and Error 3 is route created against the navigational rules (Appendix A). The Bayes network and conditional probability tables were made based on research and our evaluation of the results. The results show that a second OOW with up to 5 years of experience had a 22% probability of making Error 1 (route created over area with insufficient depth), a 29% probability of making Error 2 (crossing at TSS area) and a 22% probability of making Error 3 (route created against the navigational rules). In the group of young OOWs with up to 5 years of experience, the worst results were achieved by first officers with a 57% probability of making Error 2. In the group with 6 to 10 years of experience, the worst results were achieved by first officers with a 90% probability of making all 3 errors. The best results in this category were achieved from second officers. Their probability of making errors was the smallest.

In the category of 11–20 years’ experience, the masters up to 3000 BT had the highest probability (71%) of making Error 2. Second officers in this category had a 60% probability of making Error 1, a 20% probability of making Error 2, and a 60% probability of making Error 3. Second officers were the deck officers with the highest probability of making the most errors in this category. Analyzing all combinations, it is evident that first officers with 6 to 10 years had the highest probability of making all three errors. Figure 9 presents the model for probability of error in safety parameters input made through incorrectly set safety depth, safety frame function or wrongly set XTD parameters.

Table 2. Probability of making error in safety ECDIS parameters input.

OOW Experience	OOW	Safety Depth [%]	Safety Frame [%]	XTD Parameter [%]
up to 5	third	50	50	50
	second	77	81	90
	first	71	50	90
	master	50	90	50
6 to 10	third	50	50	50
	second	82	97	92
	first	90	90	90
	master	90	90	90
11 to 20	third	50	50	50
	second	80	90	80
	first	75	90	90
	master	90	85	90
above 20	third	50	50	50
	second	66	90	90
	first	50	50	50
	master	50	90	90

presents the probability of making these three types of errors. Third officers had the least probability of error because of the small number of participants. The second and first OOWs with 6 to 10 years of experience had the highest probability for wrong input of safety depth and safety frame.

The models presented here provide information on which rank of officer, depending on their seniority, is most likely to commit certain errors in connection with the use of ECDIS and thus possibly put the ship at risk.

In order to illustrate the influence of possible factors that can lead to errors when using ECDIS devices, a qualitative model of the influence factors was created, as shown in Figure 10.

The following variables were entered as input variables:

• Changing type of vessel;
• Function on board, type of education;
• Experience on vessel;
• Type of vessel; and
• Age of respondent.

The changing type of vessel variable refers to the fact that the officer is likely to come into contact with different types of ECDIS devices and change navigation routes and navigation methods more often.

A change of ECDIS produced from different manufactures may result in better knowledge of different ECDIS and ultimately an easier adaptation of the different systems, but it also includes an increased risk during the transition from one system to another, especially when this transition occurs for the first time. That is, it is assumed that the period of adaptation to the system itself poses a greater risk to safe navigation.

The function on vessel refers to the actual rank on vessel regardless of the certificate of competence held. Second officers and chief officers have better knowledge of using ECDIS; second officers are responsible for voyage plans, so this variable is directly related to variable familiarization. The variable experience of vessel refers to the amount of time being an officer on a vessel in general, and it also influences variable familiarization. The variable type of vessel is important for the influence on safety culture. According to the study results, passenger vessels and tankers have better safety culture, as their officers showed better knowledge in ECDIS use. The age of participants is the root variable, and it is implemented in such a way that the data obtained in the model are based on the research that shows that younger officers are more able to handle the ECDIS. Therefore, they can switch from one system to another more easily because they belong to the computer-educated generation.

The variable ECDIS error represents all possible errors when using the ECDIS device that can directly lead to a maritime incident or maritime accident.

4. Discussion

To improve the models, it is recommended to extend the study area to include more respondents of different nationalities.

Furthermore, in order to quantify the model more adequately, it is necessary to increase the total number of respondents and in particular extend the study to more respondents over the age of 50 and to more third officers with less than 5 years of experience to confirm the obtained research results.

In future research, it is necessary to analyze the knowledge of masters and officers on ships over 3000 BT, who were not included in the previous research.

Since the study was carried out on a Transas Navi Sailor ECDIS, the research should be extended to other systems in order to compare and test how much time the users need to adequately familiarize themselves with the new system during the transition.

Tests should be carried out with other systems to explore whether some systems are easier to operate than others.

The analysis of the respondents’ knowledge about the ECDIS leads to the conclusion that the users are not sufficiently familiar with the operation of the system and its possibilities, and that inadequate use of the system can lead to undesirable consequences for the ship.

According to the study conducted for this paper, a large percentage of respondents do not know how to use the ECDIS security settings appropriately, and their knowledge depends on various influencing factors.

During the testing, the respondents’ reluctance to ask for assistance was noticed. This means that they believe that assistance is not necessary, which may be due to two possible reasons:

• They are familiar with Transas completely and know all the necessary functions to complete the task; or
• They are not aware that there are functions that they should use, so they do not ask for assistance.

Only a small number of the respondents asked for assistance—they knew that there was a function they needed, but they could not find it because they had no experience working with Transas ECDIS. A small percentage of respondents with working experience with Transas ECDIS mostly used the necessary functions (mainly with errors in the NGA diameter). Others who solved the task incorrectly did not even ask for assistance, showing the lack of awareness of procedure for creating routes properly and unawareness for the all necessary functions.

5. Conclusions

Although the benefits of the ECDIS in terms of safety and ease of navigation are undeniable, working with the system may have undesirable consequences for the ship, the crew and the environment, or it can lead to a maritime incident or a maritime accident. To use the system correctly, adequate knowledge of the system and experience in its use are required. New technologies can give some users a false sense of security due to the amount of data and possibilities they offer, while for others, they create a feeling of repulsion, and users find it difficult to adapt.

One of the causes of errors related to the ECDIS is the difference between the systems of different manufacturers, which presents a problem for users when changing systems. Users find it difficult to accept another manufacturer’s ECDIS because they are not familiar with it or it is not user friendly for them.

In practice, it often happens that the time available to become familiar with the system is significantly reduced due to the nature of the work, and users are not provided with adequate on-board training with a different system.

Our research was conducted over 6 years among active seafarers, and their knowledge and correct use of the ECDIS was tested. By creating a model in which variables related to years of experience, ship type and officer status were investigated, we were able to present the probability of making errors using the ECDIS. These results enable these errors to be addressed through education, training and familiarization, which are also variables that may be studied in future research. The research results presented in this article show that it is necessary to change the approach to ECDIS training and familiarization. The period of 5 days of training is not sufficient to master all the possibilities provided by ECDIS, especially if trainees are officers with extensive navigation experience using navigation paper charts. The ECDIS is still a compromised approach to the replacement of paper charts rather than a completely new system fully focused on the user. Therefore, we intend to continue research of this type (anonymous blinded research study), where the test task can be modified by the introduction of new elements regarding the navigation route (such as an emergency anchorage, impact of tides, etc.). At the same time, it is necessary to introduce changes to the content of ECDIS training with the aim of providing a deeper insight into the functioning of the system (integration with other navigation devices, reliability and layering of bathymetric data, etc.). Such an approach should result in a noticeable change in the ECDIS training results.