Marsilio Ficino and the Soul: Doctrinal and Argumentative Remarks Regarding His Use of the Elements of Physics and the Elements of Theology

Abstract

The depth and extent of Ficino’s reception and use of Proclus has already attracted much scholarly attention. The present paper builds on and tries to enrich these results, focusing specifically on Ficino’s reception of Proclus’ Elements of Physics and Elements of Theology. In the first part I discuss a marginal annotation of Ficino, in which he makes use of arguments about the circular motion of the soul from the Elements of Physics. I provide some clarifications about the annotated text (of Plotinus) and propose one additional possible echo of the Elements of Physics in Ficino’s Platonic Theology and its arguments about the immortality of the soul. The second part of the paper turns to the link between the Elements of Theology and Ficino’s Platonic Theology. Together with some further doctrinal borrowings I suggest that also the structure of the two works bears important affinities. The soul is a central case in point. To ground this claim, I compare specific sections of the two texts. Also, I selectively examine Ficino’s commentary on the Philebus, which is prior to the Platonic Theology and is strongly influenced by the early theorems of the Elements of Theology. Overall, the paper wishes to shed further light on Ficino’s multiform (and not yet fully unveiled) appropriation of Proclus.

1. Introduction

Τhe context of Ficino’s reading and reception of Proclus is of course the systematic revival of Platonism during the Renaissance. Based in Florence, Ficino (1433–1499) reintroduces Platonism in the Latin West with the financial aid of Cosimo de’ Medici. Thanks to his knowledge of Greek and his access to manuscripts through Cosimo, Ficino translates and comments on Plato’s dialogs and the greatest Platonic authorities, including Plotinus and Proclus [1] (p. xv), [2] (pp. 81–90), [3] (pp. 303–311). For instance, Leinkauf offers us a thematically organized account of Ficino’s reception and appropriation of the preceding philosophical tradition [4], while Robichaud provides us with an account of Ficino’s project and its employment by his contemporaries for the interplay between philosophy (Platonic and Aristotelian) and Christianity [5]. One factor of this reception is arguably Ficino’s chronologically misguided view about the history of Platonism (Pagan and Christian), which had important consequences in his era [6]. For instance, because of identifying the author of the Corpus Dionysiacum with the convert of the Acts, he had the impression that Proclus’ Platonism was posterior to and thereby influenced by the Christian Platonism of pseudo-Dionysius. In addition, Ficino benefited from Proclus’ systematic discussion, analysis and ordering of Plato’s dialogs. Through Proclus he was able to get into the details of the neoplatonic understanding of the Platonic corpus and develop his own very refined account of it [7]. Scholarship has already delved into his appropriation of Proclus, both in general terms [8,9] (pp. 302–309) and with regard to numerous propositions of the Elements of Theology (ET) and other works [10,11]. For our purposes, it is noteworthy that he mentions that he translated the Elements of Physics (EP) and the ET, but neither of these translations is extant [12] (p. 22), [7] (p. 358).

In the first section of the present paper, I turn to the one single textual evidence of Ficino’s use of the EP. In this annotation, Ficino mentions the perpetual circular motion of the soul while commenting on Plotinus’ account of how the cosmic soul causes the circular motion of the heavens (Enneads II.2 [13] 1). While discussing this annotation I propose some clarifications concerning the context of Plotinus’ argument and Ficino’s appeal to soul in relation to the EP. Furthermore, some additional passages are brought out, which might have also been informed by the EP. The second section discusses the general outline of the argumentative structure of Ficino’s Platonic Theology. We already know that its title is (partially) borrowed from Proclus’ Platonic Theology [1] (p. xiii), [14] (p.86) and scholarship has studied the interplay between the title and the subtitle of the work, but also the connections with and the differences from Proclus [10] (p. 119–123), [13] (pp. 647–648), [15] (p. 34]. Further, Ficino’s five ontological levels (God, Angel, Soul, Quality, and Body) and many arguments are strongly influenced, albeit now in a Christian context, by Proclus (Platonic Theology, ET and in Parmenidem), and certain propositions of the ET were used by Ficino in some of the 18 books of the Platonic Theology [16] (p. xv), [7] (pp. 370–373), [12] (p. 146), [17]. Importantly, as Robichaud recently demonstrated by studying certain notes of Ficino on Proclus’ Platonic Theology, Ficino had an excellent and fully accurate understanding of the divine hierarchy that Proclus specifies in it [18]. Beyond that, however, I would also like to suggest that, despite the huge difference in length and scope, the argumentative macro-structure of Ficino’s Platonic Theology shares certain important parallels with the structure attributed to the ET by its dialectical interpretation. Ficino accomplishes a quick ascent to God, establishes His existence, and then proceeds to the elucidation of the remaining levels of reality. Just like Proclus, he concludes with the level of Soul, and, in particular, with the issue of its vehicle and descent. While arguing for this structural parallel, I will propose certain additional doctrinal borrowings of Ficino’s Platonic Theology from the ET.

2. Ficino and the EP

2.1. The Perpetual Motion of the Soul

Although Ficino’s appeal to the ET in many of his works is, by now, well-documented, existing evidence regarding his use of the EP includes only the following marginal note in his personal manuscript of Plotinus’ Enneads (II.2), identified and translated by Robichaud as follows [19] (p. 69–71):

“dicendum perpetuum animae motum, perpetuo movetur <in> circulum quasi eius oculus. Ergo non in rectum omnino. Nullum enim spatium rectum est infinitum. Neque in rectum quodammodo scilicet revertendo per idem spatium. Cum enim inter duos illos motus oppositos sit necessaria quies non erit ille perpetuus motus. De hoc Proculus in elementatione physica”.

“It ought to be said that the perpetual motion of soul is moved perpetually as a circle as though it were its eye. Therefore it is not at all moved in a straight line. For no straight line is infinite, nor is it moved in a straight line in some way, namely by reverting through the same space. For since rest is necessary between those two opposite motions, that motion will not be perpetual. On this see Proclus’ Elements of Physics”.

A few remarks are in order about Ficino’s appeal to the EP. First, the context of this annotation is provided by Ficino’s reception of Plotinus, for which important studies have been published recently [20,21], and more specifically of Enneads II.2 ([13] 1). At its very beginning, Plotinus poses the question why the motion of the heavens is circular, which he answers by saying that it is circular in imitation of intellect (II.2 [13]1.1). This Plotinian answer, which follows up on the Timaeus and Alexander of Aphrodisias [22] (p. 271), [23] (p. 182), is explicitly appealed to by Proclus in his in Remp. (2.212.11-13), but Ficino could not know Proclus’ explicit reference to Plotinus here (though the imitation of intellect pops up also in other Proclean texts), since he did not have access to this part of the in Remp [19] (pp. 47–49), [24] (pp. 37–39). Plotinus stresses the distinction between spiritual motion, which is proper to the soul and intellect, and physical motion in space (τοπικῶς). This last type of motion is the topic of Proclus’ EP. In this regard, if the circular motion of the heavens is spatial, the soul could cause it only accidentally (II.2 [13] 1.7-9). As Robichaud points out, numerous Platonic and Aristotelian texts would have been relevant for Plotinus’ arguments. Ficino could have turned precisely to these texts for his annotation, rather than to the EP [19] (p. 68), [22] (pp. 267–277). The fact that he instead appeals to the EP counts as an actual use of the EP as it was designed to be used, that is, as a ‘στοιχείωσις’. Also, this is a strong, though not definitively conclusive, indication that Ficino has grasped the dependence of the EP on Aristotle Physics (VI, VII) and De Caelo (I). This dialogue of the Platonists (Plotinus, Proclus, Ficino) with Aristotle, including the annotation from the EP, is strongly appreciated by scholars who argue that Ficino successfully combines Platonist and Aristotelian material [25].

After explaining how fire, in the absence of available space to be covered, is forced to adopt circular motion, Plotinus makes a rather general point about circles and circular motion. He points out (II.2 [13] 1.31.33) that the center of the circle is fixed by nature, whereas if its circumference were also still without moving around the center it would constitute a big center [19] (p. 70). According to Merlan, Plotinus’ correlation of the circular heavenly motion with the periphery of a circle is fundamental from the perspective of the argumentative structure, since it picks up Plotinus’ introductory remark (i.e., that the heavenly motion imitates intellect) and anticipates the corresponding conclusion [23] (pp. 187–188). It serves, as it were, as the bond between them. In this context, the circular motion around the center of the circle expresses the longing for its center and, thereby, stands for its imitation [26]. Ficino’s annotation about the soul’s eye and its circular motion concerns precisely this general point of Plotinus about the circle and the periphery. Its focus is on the fact that the perpetuality of the soul’s motion, which Ficino assumes, is only compatible with circular motion, as Proclus teaches in the EP. In light of relevant passages from the Platonic Theology, Robichaud suggests that Ficino takes intellect to be the eye of the soul. In this regard, Ficino proposes an analogy between the circular motion of the soul around intellect and ‘the constant agitation of our eyes’ [19] (p. 70).

Second, what is Ficino’s exact borrowing from the EP? The EP cannot contribute the eye analogy to the annotation. Also, Proclus does not discuss the motion of the soul in the EP, since spiritual motion cannot be part of an Aristotelian account of kinematics [27] (p. 197), [28]. Still, the heart of Ficino’s annotation (‘For no…’), namely, the argument on why moving perpetually in a straight line is impossible, can be correlated with definitions from EP II about perpetual circular motion1 and with two propositions that elaborate on circular motion (e.g., EP II. 1–5 and most importantly EP II.17) [29,30]2. In EP II.17, Proclus argues that only circular motion is perpetual, contrary to all other motions. When it comes to motion in a straight line, what impedes its perpetual character is precisely the fact that the motion has to be interrupted when the available finite space has been traversed. It can, of course, start again, but it is no longer the same motion. For even if the soul could cover an infinite space in a finite straight line by reverting back every time that the finite space is covered, its motion would not be continuous because of the necessary rest between the end of the first motion and the beginning of the second. Over the course of this argument, Proclus also draws on Aristotelian teleology, appealing to an axiom (i.e., nature does nothing in vain) that Ficino is keen on using [31] (p. 74). On the contrary, only circular motion can guarantee the uninterrupted character of motion. Of course, the available space to be covered in a circular motion would again be finite. The space is not continuously renewed, but the same space is traversed again and again [32] (p. 161). In light of the absence of any rest, though, the circular motion can be one and continuous.

This is the argument Ficino finds in the EP. Unsurprisingly, this argument also informs the commentary itself of Ficino on Plotinus’ Enneads [33] (pp. 1605–1606)3. Actually, what he draws from the EP is relevant not just for the annotated passage but also for its immediate context. Indeed, shortly before the annotated passage, Plotinus explained that moving continuously in a straight line is impossible for celestial fire ‘for it has no place beyond itself; this is the last’ (II.2 [13] 1.28-29: translation Armstrong). This justification, which echoes Aristotle [22] (p.272), [23] (p. 187), is backed up by Ficino with an argumentation that is rigorously formulated in a theorematic form and enjoys a general character, without having been formulated ad hoc for the heaven. Plotinus’ content-specific claims are annotated and justified by being subsumed under the generally formulated theorems of Proclus’ EP. On the other hand, the appeal to the EP, whose concluding argument in the second Book is designed to establish the need of an unmoved prime mover [27] (pp. 197–198), entails a certain tension with Plotinus’ overall argumentative goal, to the extent that the latter is to defend the cosmic soul (against the Aristotelian unmoved mover) as the origin of the heavenly motion [34] (pp. 38–39).

Third, the fact that Ficino appeals to the EP in order to develop an argument about the soul does not challenge Plotinus’ explicit introductory distinction between spiritual and physical motion. After examining whether heavenly motion could be exclusively caused by either soul or body, Plotinus concludes that the motion caused by the cosmic soul would be necessarily mixed. Importantly, Rashed and other scholars underline the dialectical and allusive character of Plotinus’ text [35] (pp. 34–38), [26] (pp. 212–213), [36] (pp. 1–2), [37] (p. 261). The possibility of a mixed spatial motion (resulting from a combination of circular and rectilinear) is also mentioned by Proclus in the second definition of the EP II. Although this definition is not part of Ficino’s annotation and is not further pursued in the EP, it could have legitimized the appeal to it. In addition, Ficino maintains the distinction between spiritual and physical motion also in the discussion of the third hypothesis of the Parmenides in his Commentary on the Parmenides. In chapter 97, whose topic partially echoes the context of Ficino’s annotation to Enneads, Ficino includes a relatively lengthy digression (8–11) about the basic terms and requirements pertaining to physical motion (i.e., divisibility, the continuum, the necessity of rest between opposite motions, etc.). These doctrines are attributed to the ‘natural philosophers’ (a physicis) and are reasonably linked by Vanhaelen with the main sources of Proclus’ EP, namely, the sixth and the eighth book of Aristotle’s Physics [38] (p. 371). Although these doctrines would question Parmenides’ account of the soul’s motion, Ficino discusses them (in XCVII, 12) exactly in order to distinguish bodily motion from the different rules that apply to the motion of the soul.

2.2. The Immortality of the Soul

A similar argument about the infinite circular motion of the soul, like the one specified in the marginal annotation above, is constructed by Ficino in the fifth book of his Platonic Theology, where he adduces fifteen arguments supporting the immortality of the soul [4] (pp. 744–745). According to the first of them, rational souls are immortal, that is, enjoy perpetual (i.e., circular) motion because, being self-moved, they are the first to be moved (5.1.1-4). For Ficino, the first motion cannot but be circular, which comes down to entail perpetuality: ‘For if they are moved in a circle they never stop moving’. To explain this equation, Ficino appeals, in a somewhat tautological way, to the power of the circular motion, which is always retained and renewed (5.1.4.). Furthermore, he compares rational souls with invisible spheres and concludes his argument about the immortality of the soul with the claim that no movement is contrary to circular motion. Here is Ficino’s relevant passage:

“At this point I will pass over (praeteream) Pythagoras’ proof demonstrating that in a sphere there is no beginning or end, and thus that movement within a sphere never begins or ends, but that rational souls are what might be called spiritual spheres and complete a spiritual orbit within themselves in that the bodies which are their shadows have just such a figure and motion. Hence the visible spheres and orbits are shadows of the invisible spheres and orbits; and if the shadows are perpetual, a fortiori will the substances be perpetual which by means of a limitless power enact a limitless motion; and nothing contrary to them exists by which they may be destroyed, just as no movement exists contrary to their movement which is circular (Sicut et motui illarum, qui circuitus est, nullus est motus contrarius)”.

In his penetrating reconstruction of Ficino’s argument, Celenza rightly remarks that “Ficino claims to pass over Pythagoras’s argument, but as often happens with praeteritiones, all is revealed” [39] (p. 683). Furthermore, after discussing potential sources of Ficino’s argument, he rightly expresses reservations about the Platonic–Pythagorean origin of the claim, proposing that in fact the language of the argument is reminiscent of Aristotle’s Physics (VIII.8 and VIII.9) and the discussion of circular motion [39] (p. 684). The establishment of this affinity between Ficino’s argumentation and Aristotle’s Physics in fact renders quite plausible a slight modification of this conclusion with the suggestion that Ficino does not turn directly to Aristotle, but to Proclus’ adaptation of the Physics in the EP and, most explicitly among other relevant passages, to EP II.4, according which there is nothing contrary to the circular motion. As we have already seen, Ficino himself, by means of his marginal annotation studied above, indicates that he used the EP in a very similar argumentative context.

3. The ET and Ficino’s Platonic Theology

Moving from the EP to the ET, my focus in the present section is exclusively turned to aspects of the relation between the ET and Ficino’s Platonic Theology. Admittedly, existing scholarship has already indicated that Ficino appeals to doctrines from the ET in order to shape his Platonic Theology. In her insightful study of Ficino’s Platonic Theology, Collins argues that the overall character of Ficino’s hierarchy of the universe is definitely Platonic in origin. She makes this claim more concrete by reconstructing particular influences from Proclus’ ET (e.g., questions about the causal power of the indivisible as opposed to that of the divisible) and by comparing numerous propositions from the ET and Proclus’ Platonic Theology [40] (pp. 20–21). Additionally, one could propose that Ficino’s discussion of Soul, Angel, and God in chapters four to six manifests influences and borrowings of axioms and argumentative patterns from ET 7 and ET 20, respectively. In the fourth chapter of the first Book, Ficino assumes (1.4.2) the axiom from ET 7, according to which “equal powers have equal effects”. Then, in the fifth chapter of the same Book (1.5.2), he justifies the necessity of positing Angel beyond Soul in a way reminiscent of Proclus’ account of perfection and production from ET 7:

“Since the perfect always takes precedence over the imperfect, it follows that, just as the perfect things in any genus are those which are such by their very nature, so the imperfect are those which are not such (otherwise they would be wholly such). If therefore the imperfect do not exist of themselves, they must exist by way of what are higher”.

Furthermore, in the culminating (sixth) chapter of the first Book, Ficino posits the precedence of God over Intellect in a way that echoes Proclus’ method in ET 20. At the very end of the latter (ET 20, 22.25-26; cf. ET 101, 90.26; ET 138, 112.12-13), Proclus wishes to show that the One/Good is prior to Intellect and proceeds to argue that “while all things, whatsoever their grade of reality, participate unity, not all participate intelligence” [41]. Since, then, all things share in unity but not all in intelligence, the One must precede intellect. Ficino confirms the priority of God in a similar way, the main difference being that God’s primacy over Intellect does not relate to participation but is rather framed in terms of desire. Remarkably, he assumes a fundamental axiom about the desire of the good from ET 7 and enriches it as follows: “all things desire the good, but all things do not desire mind”. Then, he adds that this is so because “not everything is capable of attaining mind and wisdom, and so there are many things that do not desire it, or else they would desire it to no purpose”. Furthermore (1.6.8), according to Ficino, “if all things in desiring are turned towards the good, but not all towards mind, and if all things turn back in the direction whence they departed, then all things come from the good and not from mind. So the good rather than mind is the first cause of things”. Apart from the fact that Ficino extracts from ET 7 two axiomatic assumptions and uses them as such, it is noteworthy that, in line with Proclus’ practice, he manipulates the axiom about the desire for the good in order to specify the levels of the hierarchy. As we will see in the last section of this chapter, his appeal to ET 20 is far from surprising. In the first draft of his Platonic Theology, which is his commentary on Plato’s Philebus, Ficino appeals to ET 20 precisely to this end.

It is equally important to explore whether the macro-structure, and especially the beginning, of Ficino’s Platonic Theology bears affinities with the division and overall understanding of the structure of the ET that results from the latter’s dialectical interpretation. When it comes to potential links between Proclus and Ficino’s Platonic Theology, the most reasonable connection to be drawn would be between Proclus’ Platonic Theology and Ficino’s counterpart. Vanhaelen [42] has also reconstructed argumentative and structural affinities between Proclus (Platonic Theology and Parmenides-Commentary) and Ficino’s Parmenides-Commentary. Although both Platonic Theologies are equally large-scale original projects sharing the same title [43] (p. 265), [44] (pp. lix-lx), there is no doubt that their structure and content significantly vary [45] (p. 14). Proclus’ project is not complete, but we can safely say that he follows the tripartite structure he promises at its very beginning. First, he elaborates on the divine attributes he extracts from Platonic dialogs, then discusses the divine orders and their procession and, finally, turns to individual gods mentioned in the Platonic corpus [44] (pp. lxi-lxxv). On the other hand, as Ficino’s subtitle (“on the immortality of the soul”) proposes, his attention is mostly turned to the status of the human soul and the conditions of its immortality [45] (p. 14), [46] (pp. 14–16). Then, the six chapters of the first Book of the Platonic Theology are wholly committed to the establishment of the fivefold ontological hierarchy of the work, starting from Body and culminating with God. Indeed, after arguing, in the first chapter, for the misery of our soul if it were not immortal, Ficino takes as a starting point the level of Body and proceeds to Quality in the second chapter. Then, in chapters three and four he establishes Soul, in the fifth he subordinates the mobile soul to the motionless plurality of Angels and, finally, in the sixth chapter, he subordinates the motionless plurality to the motionless unity of God. Within this structure of the levels of reality, the soul is the “divine bond”, constituting the “third and middle essence”, being, in Ficino’s words, “the mean for all and the third from both directions” (3.1.1.; 3.2.6).

3.1. The Macro-Structure of Ficino’s Platonic Theology

Unsurprisingly, scholarship has shown that the soul is an indispensable entry point for any discussion of the structure of the Platonic Theology. This is the case regardless of whether one examines the work as a whole or a specific section of it. Its centrality is confirmed, for instance, in Robichaud’s insightful study of the Platonic Theology 1–4, in which he shows (among numerous other findings it would be impossible to do justice to here) that Ficino’s account of the soul deserves an even more nuanced approach, since the real mean term of the whole system is not merely its mean term, namely, the human soul, but rather “the mean term of the mean term, i.e., the soul of the spheres” [47] (p. 390). The soul is the entry point of the Platonic Theology also literally. Although the work is not presented as being about ethics, Ficino starts as if human happiness were at stake. His very first lines in the first chapter of the work introduce as axioms some quite discouraging, though fully accurate, anthropological remarks about the fragility and misery of our earthly life. Since humans are bodily weak, lack resources and, most importantly, have a never-resting soul, if the latter were mortal, that is, if the project of the Platonic Theology failed, “no animal would be more miserable than man” (1.1.1). The immortality of the soul will finally secure beatitude, thus making up for all the trouble and pain caused in this life by our soul’s inquietudo. This negative anthropological exceptionalism of inquietudo is counterbalanced by its positive counterpart at the very end of the work, where Ficino declares (18.12.1), alluding to beatitude, that “God has not given us the same goal in life as He has given the rest of living beings”.

If one turns to the macro-structure of Ficino’s Platonic Theology, it could be proposed that the work bears some crucial affinities, admittedly in general terms, with the basic division of the ET, as conceived by its dialectical interpretation. This commonality is mostly evident at the beginning of the two works. According to the dialectical reading of the ET, at the very beginning Proclus accomplishes a quick ascent to the One (ET 1–4), which is the God of Neoplatonists, taking as his starting point the notion of multiplicity and showing the necessity of the One itself as a condition of possibility of its existence. On this reading, the One itself is not posited nor assumed in the very first proposition of the ET, but rather discovered [48,49,50]. This is precisely how Ficino himself conceives of, frames, and presents his own project, according to the language he uses. The five ontological levels he identifies accomplish this process of ascent, as the title of his first Book testifies: “The first Book ascends up to God” (ascendit usque ad deum). The language of “ascent” is used quite a few times over the course of the first Book (1.1.3; 1.3.1: “So far we have ascended from body to quality”; 1.3.25; 1.5.2: “But we must ascend further”). Also, Ficino’s titles serve as a reading guide, showing how he expects the reader to conceive his project. Our appeal to the commentary on the Philebus later on will further establish the suggestion that this ascending process is inspired by the beginning of the ET. The connection between the macro-structure of the ET and the Platonic Theology of Ficino (mostly at their beginning) is further justified by the way the editors of the latter sum up Ficino’s project. In a particularly informative note, they underline that in a traditional medieval summa the primacy of God in the ontological hierarchy would also be reflected in the order of exposition. A summa would start with God and would then proceed to the lower levels of reality. It is not surprising that a Byzantine critic of Proclus, Nicholas of Methone, starts his refutation of the ET precisely on these grounds [51]. Ficino does not follow this approach. Rather, he starts “with what is known quoad nos” and gradually ascends to God, after exploring the five grades of reality before Him. The editors qualify this methodology as “phychological or heuristic” as opposed to the “ontological or generative”, which corresponds to the traditional one [52] (p. 319).

The title of the second Book further confirms that Ficino’s Platonic Theology treats of God as now found and discovered. What has been secured through the first Book is God’s existence, which was not assumed beforehand: “The second book discusses God who has now been discovered” (de deo iam invento). Now that God is discovered, Ficino discusses various divine attributes, starting with unity, truth, and goodness in the first chapter. As Dillon confirms, Ficino follows here the beginning of Proclus’ Platonic Theology [45] (p. 14), [47] (390).

If we stick for a moment to the question of God’s unity, I think it is legitimate to suggest that Ficino also draws on ET 5, where Proclus shows why multiplicity cannot but be posterior to the One. Ficino frames the problem in somewhat more general terms. While Proclus explicitly juxtaposes the One to multiplicity as the two candidates for the highest principle, Ficino (2.1.2) does not examine multiplicity as such a candidate, but an anonymous aliquid, which would be above unity. However, the consequences of such a hypothesis are examined, just like in Proclus, with reference to the One and the manifold. Moreover, Ficino adduces two arguments for why there can be no principle above unity. The first is that “if unity were subject to some higher principle, it would surely participate in this higher principle”, thus, not being unity anymore: “Thus it would not be unity itself, but something compounded of a unity and a force received from on high”. The second is that what is made to precede unity will not participate in any unity. For a superior principle of its own nature receives nothing from an inferior. Therefore, it will be either nothing or a plurality utterly robbed of all union. None of its parts will be one something, nor will the plurality as a whole be one, nor will any communion inhere in the parts with regard either to themselves or to the whole (2.1.2).

These two arguments are perfectly summarized, in the very same order, at the very beginning of Proclus’ ET 5. After supposing “a manifold prior to the One”, Proclus argues in ET 5 (4.20-21), drawing on ET 1 and ET 2, that “the One will then participate the manifold, but the prior manifold will not participate the One”. Over the course of ET 5, Proclus adds details that fit with Ficino’s arguments. Concerning the loss of the One’s unity, he explains (ET 5, 6.7-9) that, if the One participates plurality, “then the One will be pluralized” just like “the manifold is unified because of the One”. As for the implications regarding the existence itself of the manifold, Proclus repeats (ET 5, 4.30-32) that if the manifold does not share in unity (either because it is prior to it or “coexistent” with it), then “the manifold will be in itself not-one, and each of its parts not-one, and so to infinity”.

After the first chapter, in the second and third chapter of this second Book, Ficino baldly rejects the existence of a plurality of gods. Dillon points out that these arguments are not found in Proclus’ Platonic Theology, but reflect Ficino’s concern about polytheism. From Ficino’s Christian perspective, it is absolutely important to secure the unquestionable singularity of God and take a clear position against any hint at polytheistic tendencies [45] (pp. 14–15). One may add to Dillon’s accurate remark that a study of these two chapters (three and four) indicates certain interesting parallels with the ET. For instance, in ET 11 (12.8) Proclus wishes to show that “all that exists proceeds from a single first cause”. He first demonstrates that there must be a cause in the first place and then adds (12.32-34) that the fact that this cause needs to be numerically one is demonstrated in ET 5, “inasmuch as the subsistence of any manifold is posterior to the One”. Since the One itself precedes all manifolds as the condition of their possibility, the cause of all, that is, the One, cannot but me numerically one. Thus, Proclus does not need a separate proposition for the establishment of the claim that the cause of all is one. For Ficino, though, this equation is not so obvious, precisely because he uses the language of “God” and needs, from a Christian perspective, an explicit refutation of polytheism. This, however, does not prevent him from using to this end argumentative threads that Proclus adduces for other purposes.

Proclus does have a proposition (ET 22) claiming that “all that exists primitively and originally in each order is one and not two or more than two, but unique”. It is, I think, on the basis of ET 22, that Ficino articulates his argument roughly in the first half of the second chapter of his second Book (2.2.1-4). His chapter has the following title: “That there is no plurality of gods equal to each other”. In this first half, he follows Proclus not only in terms of content, but also in terms of the argumentative structure. Although Ficino’s focal point is the possibility of equal gods, he starts by examining whether there could be two principles, A and B, one of which is subordinate to the other [F1]. He wishes to quickly settle this hypothesis of subordinate gods before focusing on the hypothesis of their equality. Indeed, Ficino proceeds to an outright rejection of F1, since “if either one is subordinate to the other, the dominant one is clearly the principle, the other not” (2.2.1). Then, Ficino examines whether gods A and B could be equal, discerning three options: “If they are equal, we should ask whether they are entirely different from each other [F2], or entirely similar (an omnino conveniant) [F3], or partly different, partly similar [F4]” (2.2.1). Although the language of “entire similarity” might be somewhat surprising, Ficino just means that gods A and B are the same. If they are the same, there is only one god. Obviously, he promotes F3 as true, qualifying it as “what we want” (2.2.1). He also has to refute F2 and F4. Ficino directly rejects [F2], because these two gods definitely share the commonality that “they both exist and act and are described alike as universal principles” (2.2.1).

On the other hand, Proclus assumes that there are two things that exist “primitively and originally in each order” and distinguishes two possibilities: “Either, then, each of these two is primitively what it is called [P1], or the combination of both is so” [P2]. Furthermore, he specifies two alternatives for P1. The first [P1a] has it that “if each severally, then one is derived from the other, and so only one is primitive”. Proclus’ P1b states that “if each [of the two existing primitively and originally] severally […], the two are on a level”. Even though Proclus talks about a specific order, Ficino generalizes, as it were, the same argument and uses it for the principle of the whole universe. Ficino’s rejection of F1 comes down to the same conclusion as Proclus’ P1a. Ficino assumes that god A is subordinated to god B (or vice versa) and concludes that, in such a case, the real principle cannot but be one, whereas Proclus takes as a starting point that each is severally what “exists primitively and originally” and concludes that, therefore, “only one is primitive”.

Furthermore, Proclus’ P2 has no corresponding argument in Ficino, but the main commonality appears between F4 and P1b, on which Ficino and Proclus focus the most. F4 is concerned with whether gods A and B could be “partly alike, partly unlike”. Their likeness relates to their status as principles, in addition to which they also have a certain “peculiar property” that differentiates them. Proclus and Ficino develop the same argument as to why it is impossible for both to be principles. Ficino’s argument (2.2.2.) draws on their common nature:

“That common nature, which A and B each possess in like measure and by virtue of which both of them equally are principles, will be the principle rather than the two of them. Or rather, what gives the common nature to these mutually different principles will be the principle. For this one nature, which lies at ease in some and is cramped within the bounds of others, flows from that unity, which depends upon itself and is confined by no limit. That one common nature, therefore, comes to both A and B from elsewhere and comes from a higher principle”.

Proclus, in ET 22 (26.11-15) argues along the same lines: “If, then, they differ, but not in respect of their primitive quality […], the primitive existent will be not the pair, but that by participation of which both are described as existing primitively”.

Immediately after arguing that “the primitive existent will not be the pair”, Proclus proceeds to a corollary. This is the last paragraph in Dodds’ division of ET 22, where Proclus moves away from the general account of each order and applies the conclusion that “primal Being is one only” to certain specific orders. Thus, he offers various examples (primal Intelligence, primal Soul, primal Beautiful, primal Equal, primal Form of animal, primal Form of man). The application of this conclusion entails that there is only one primal Intelligence, one primal Soul, one primal Beautiful, etc. Ficino does the same. As we have seen, Ficino initiated this discussion, which he carried out in alignment with ET 22, as a discussion about God, generalizing in a way what Proclus argued for in the context of an account of orders. But now, after refuting F4, Ficino allows himself a reference to genera and imitates Proclus’ argumentative strategy in ET 22. Indeed, in the Platonic Theology (2.2.4), just after his account of F1–F4, Ficino briefly refers to natural genera, remarking that “in any natural genus what is the highest of that genus is solely one”, offering as examples the genera of heat and light. This practice is reminiscent of Proclus’ argumentative structure, where he first articulated his point in general terms and then applied it to different orders. Although Ficino talks about genera rather than orders and brings out different examples, he follows the basic thread of Proclus’ thought and grounds the divine attribute of unity following Proclus’ ET 22 both doctrinally and structurally. Overall, then, the broader borrowing of the macro-structure of the beginning of the ET is here followed by the faithful reproduction of the micro-structure of one specific proposition.

3.2. Descent from God

After the establishment of God and a systematic account of God’s attributes in the second Book, Ficino returns again to the dialectical language of ascent and descent. He now signals the beginning of descent [47] (pp. 380–381). Ficino’s title of the first chapter of his third Book is telling: “We descend (Descensus) through the five levels by which we ascended (ascensus) and set up an appropriate comparison between them”. Immediately afterwards, he recapitulates what has been achieved so far and transcribes the five levels he has identified into the language of one and many. In fact, he argues (3.1.1.) for an ascending movement from multiplicity to the One:

So far we have made our ascent from body to quality, from quality to soul, from soul to angel, and from angel to God, the one, the true and the good, author and ruler of all things. The Pythagoreans describe body as “the many”, quality as “the many and the one”, soul as “the one and the many”, angel as the “one-many”, and God as “the one”.

From this point onwards and until the end of the whole Platonic Theology, Soul, the middle level of his scheme, is Ficino’s main focal point, along with its reversion to God. In addition to the individual significance of this position of Soul within Ficino’s philosophical and theological reflections [53] (pp. 47–54), one should not overlook that this placement also echoes Ficino’s systematic study and appropriation of the ET. Robichaud stresses that Ficino’s conception of self-reversion and conversion is fundamentally shaped by ET 15 and is not formed by other neoplatonic texts he could have access to (as, for example, Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades) [12] (p. 90). Then, at the very beginning of his fourth Book (4.1.1.), which is dedicated to the specification of the species of soul, Ficino repeats how he conceives of the argumentative structure of the work:

“We started by recognizing five levels of being in ascending order (ascendendo). Next, we took them in descending order (descendendo) and compared them together. Thirdly, we placed rational soul on the middle level. Now we will examine the levels of rational soul […]”.

A somewhat different formulation appears in the so-called Argumentum, which was sent by means of introduction to Lorenzo de’ Medici. In this text, Ficino presents the “three steps of Platonic contemplation” in these terms: “There are three principal steps to Platonic contemplation. The first ascends from the body through the soul to God. The second comes to a halt in God. The third finally descends to the soul and the body” [52] (p. 221). Roughly speaking, according to this reconstruction the first step corresponds to the first Book, the second step to the second Book, and from the third Book until the end of the whole Platonic Theology Ficino focuses on the Soul. After specifying its species in the fourth Book, in Books 5–14 Ficino furnishes proofs of all kinds and sources concerning the immortality of the soul, before addressing five concrete questions about the very same topic in Books 15–18 [52] (pp. 320–324).

Interestingly, the end of Ficino’s Platonic Theology manifests certain (admittedly not complete) thematic and structural congruence with the end of Proclus’ ET. Ficino concludes the work with remarks about particular (human) souls, just as Proclus turns exclusively to particular (μερικαὶ) souls in ET 205–211. More in particular, in chapters 4–7 of the last Book, Ficino discusses the descent of the soul in relation to its vehicle, whereas its ascent after death is discussed in chapters 8–12 [54]. As for Proclus, in ET 205–211 he discusses the vehicle of the soul in relation to its descent and ascent. Already in ET 196 he mentions the soul’s body, and in ET 206 (180.15-16) he merges in one single proposition the descent of “every particular soul into temporal process” and its ascent. Ficino’s fourth chapter (18.4.1) starts with a question: “From where does the soul descend into the body?” He, thus, argues for the necessity of “a simple and immortal body” through which the soul will be able to join “a composite and mortal body” (14.8.1). In addition to other sources cited or hinted at by Ficino [55] (pp. 218–222), [56], the editors of the text have already pinpointed the strong doctrinal dependence of Ficino on Proclus with regard to the vehicle of the soul and the descent–ascent of the soul [57]. Concerning the beginning of this account (18.4.3), they mention Marcel’s suggestion in the French edition of the Platonic Theology, according to which Ficino draws on Proclus’ commentaries on the Timaeus (2:72, 3: 298–299 in Diehl’s edition) and the Republic (2:145–146, 154–155), but also on ET 196–209 [58] (p. 193), [52] (p. 304). They add, however, the important caveat that of these texts, Ficino only had access to the commentary on the Timaeus (2:72) and to the ET, whereas with regard to the end of Ficino’s account of the vehicle (18.4.7), they point the reader to Proclus’ Platonic Theology (3:18.24–19.15) and to ET 196, 205, 207–210 [52] (p. 305). Given the caveat about the Proclean texts actually accessible to Ficino, the fact that of these sources only the end of the ET manifests a partial thematic and structural overlap with the end of Ficino’s Platonic Theology further supports the hypothesis concerning the role of the ET in the formation of the macro-structure of Ficino’s Platonic Theology and, in particular, of its beginning and end.

3.3. Ficino on ET 1

After providing this general scheme, let us note the important indications that Ficino shares the dialectical reading of the ET and does not take its first proposition as positing the existence of the One. To bring this out it is necessary to turn to Ficino’ commentary on the Philebus, which has a close link with his Platonic Theology. Michael Allen, the editor of the former, early in his introduction underlines that this text shaped Ficino’s subsequent philosophical development and pre-eminently his Platonic Theology. This is because, just before discussing the details of the Philebus, Ficino briefly outlines by way of introduction the basic structure of neoplatonic metaphysics. He spells out the basic levels of the hierarchy and assigns God or the One the first place. According to Allen, this metaphysical structure is further elucidated in the “early books of the Platonic Theology”. The commonalities that he reconstructs between Ficino’s Platonic Theology and the commentary on the Philebus are so striking that he considers the latter as the ‘rough draft’ of the former [59] (pp. 10–11).

Before starting the discussion of the Philebus itself, Ficino offers us a neoplatonic metaphysical outline. Structurally, this outline echoes, among other sources, the very beginning of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics [59] (p. 538). It also features a strong teleological overtone, which is inspired from the Aristotelian camp and is now transposed for Platonizing purposes [31,60] (pp. 142–145), [61] (pp. 330–361), since the end is not immanent in nature, as Aristotle would have it, but comes through nature “ab eo quod est naturae et speciei principium, id est Deus” [59] (p. 85). Indeed, Ficino first shows, in the first chapter, that “there is some end in all actions” and then, in the second chapter, that “there is an ultimate end to all actions”. Subsequently, in the third chapter, he identifies the end of all actions with the good. The fourth chapter is the longest and most important for our purposes, since it is in it that Ficino specifies four levels of reality (Body, Soul, Intellect, One itself/Good): “What the good is; or that above the body is the soul, above the soul the intellect, above this the one itself and the good”. Then, in the fifth chapter, he shows the identity of the one and the good as well as that this is the principle of all. Carlos Steel has meticulously compared these chapters with Proclus’ ET, showing that the specification of this hierarchy in the fourth and the fifth chapter is carried out by means of extensive borrowings from the beginning of the ET. More in particular, Ficino grounds his account of the fourth chapter on ET 1–5 and ET 20. Then, Ficino’s fifth chapter is based on ET 12–13 [62] (p. 74). A careful comparison of the texts suffices to show that these are verbatim borrowings from the ET, though Ficino does not mention Proclus as his source nor follows exactly the order of his propositions.

In these chapters, then, Ficino systematically borrows lengthy passages mostly from the very beginning of the ET. These include ET 1–5, 12, 13, 20 [62] (pp. 73–75). One first point would be that, in light of the dependence of Ficino’s Platonic Theology on the commentary on the Philebus and the documented use of the early ascending part of the ET for the hierarchy of the commentary on the Philebus, the hypothesis concerning the commonalities in the macro-structure between the ET and Ficino’s Platonic Theology is further reinforced. More importantly, however, one should focus on the exact argumentative context of Ficino’s appeal to the ET in the commentary on the Philebus. Unitas is a key notion in this respect. The starting point of Ficino’s fivefold ontological hierarchy is a discussion about the “entire structure of the world” in the very first paragraph of his fourth chapter. According to Ficino, this structure consists of multiplicity and unity (unitate), because it consists of many things that have been bound together (unitae sunt) by continuity, contiguity, similarity, equality, and suitability. If there were no union in the world’s many parts, they wouldn’t remain together but instead be scattered in all directions; nor would there be any conformity in shape or quality or in anything else. So, there is unity in the plurality of things. Because the unity is in another, it is also from another. It does not come from a compound thing, because it is the function of the simple and the one to give unity [59] (pp. 88–90).

The notion of “unitas” functions in our passage rather as an umbrella term. Ficino brings under it five types of unity (continuity, contiguity, similarity, equality, suitability). Furthermore, the passage encapsulates two fundamental claims. The first concerns the existence of some kind of unity in the plurality of things, and the second is concerned with the origin of this unity from “the simple and the one”. It is in order to unfold and establish these two claims that Ficino turns to ET 1–4 and ET 5, respectively. Indeed, just after the passage cited above, Ficino [59] (p. 90)]turns to the manifold’s participation in unity (ET 1):

“Again, all the multiplicity (multitudo) of things which we see participates in some unity (unitatis alicuius). For, if it didn’t, this, the universal genus of things, wouldn’t be one, nor any part of it one. It would be made from various things and these in turn from other things and so on to infinity; and any of the things would be an utterly infinite multiplicity, for, since each would not participate in the one itself in any way (neither the whole of each nor any part of each), each would be utterly and entirely infinite. Next, any individual thing you take will either be one or not one. If it isn’t one, it will either be many or nothing. But if it’s many, anything will consist infinitely of infinities. However, these are impossibilities; for nothing consists infinitely of infinities for nothing is bigger than the infinite. But what is made from all things is bigger than individual things. Nor is something made from nothing. Consequently, the entire plurality of things participates in unity”.

With the exception of one single hint at the One itself from ET 4 (text in italics), Ficino exclusively draws (and indeed very faithfully) on ET 1. Since the passage is preceded, as we saw, by Ficino’s own views on the interplay between multiplicity and the five types of unity, it is reasonable to take his appeal to “some unity” (from the beginning of ET 1) as smoothly continuing this discussion of the types of unity. This discussion is now framed with an abstract argument about unity in general and not with an argument about God or the One. In this regard, Ficino does not consider the “one” of ET 1 as identical with God or the One. Instead, Ficino distinguishes the conception of the “one” as “unity” in ET 1 from its source, the “One itself”, in ET 4. He does not think, in other words, that the existence of God or the One is merely assumed at the very beginning of the ET.

In the next paragraph, after drawing on ET 1 and hinting at the One itself from ET 4, Ficino literally cites the whole ET 5, starting with the conclusion (igitur) that “the one exists above all multiplicity” [59] (p. 90). At the end of the paragraph, Ficino declares that “there is something which is one because of itself and outside the multiplicity of all things; from it all multiplicity proceeds. In fact, this is the principle of all things” [59] (p. 92). Towards the end of the chapter, as Steel shows, Ficino will turn to ET 20. Following Proclus, he specifies on the basis of the criterion of motion that above all bodies is the essence of the soul itself, above all souls is the intelligence, above all intelligences is the one itself […]. So, the one itself is above the intelligence. And there is not anything beyond the one that is higher than it; for the one and the good itself are the same, but the good itself is the principle of all [59] (pp. 98–102).

This digression to Ficino’s commentary on the Philebus, justified by Steel’s textual findings, show that the metaphysical order in the draft of Ficino’s Platonic Theology is fully aligned with the argumentative structure at the beginning of the ET. The ontological hierarchy of the commentary on the Philebus depends on the ascending propositions of the ET and culminates in the specification of the levels of reality on the basis of ET 20. Ficino finds in Proclus’ ET a model of metaphysical ascent.

4. Conclusions

The two parts of this paper focus on Ficino’s reception of the EP and ET, with the aim to provide some more details about the contribution of these two works in Ficino’s project. With regard to the EP, we saw that Ficino uses doctrines of Aristotle’s Physics, mediated through their theorematic transcription by Proclus in the EP, in order to make sense of the way Plotinus accounts for the mixed heavenly motion caused by the cosmic soul. It was further proposed that Ficino’s appeal to the EP for the perpetual motion of the soul could indicate that he turned to the same source for arguments in support of its immortality. The second part of the paper reconstructs doctrinal affinities between the ET and Ficino’s Platonic Theology, while arguing for substantial argumentative parallels between them, including their final sections on the soul. Pre-eminent among these affinities is their conception of the first principle. Ficino, like Proclus, does not treat God or the One as a posited axiom. In this regard, his reading anticipates the latest developments in Proclus’ scholarship, which do not take ET 1 as assuming God from the very beginning. With a helpful digression to the commentary on the Philebus, it is suggested that Ficino agrees that in ET 1–4 Proclus carries out a transition from unity to the One itself (in ET 4), which is then declared to be prior to all manifolds in ET 5. These remarks clarify Ficino’s own conception of the ET and further substantiate the suggestion that it is the macro-structure of Proclus’ ET, and especially the dialectical ascent to the One at its very beginning, that shapes the early macro-structure of Ficino’s Platonic Theology.

Throughout the paper it is proposed that Ficino follows the texts of Proclus; he works very closely and on many levels. He follows them doctrinally, despite the adaptations that, say, Proclus’ polytheism necessitates, and in terms of the argumentative sequence and structure. Apart from the textual findings themselves in support of the doctrinal and argumentative parallels between the ET and Ficino’s Platonic Theology, one could also appeal to Ficino’s marginal note, according to which Proclus “reduced” (reduxit) his whole Platonic Theology into the ET [11] (p. 168). On this reading, Ficino provides us with a very advanced model of literal imitation (well beyond the doctrinal and structural borrowings): In addition to the imitation of Plato’s lecture on the Good, as proposed by Allen [63], Ficino performs a reverse imitation of Proclus, namely, the “expansion” of the ET into the Platonic Theology. Regarding the EP and ET, one may further wonder whether their inherent educational mission of “elementation” (στοιχείωσις) prompts Ficino not just to use them, in imitation of Proclus, for similar purposes (in order to “elementate” his readers into Platonism), but also not to consistently cite them, to the extent that they could be considered as doctrinal repositories whose “elementary” content invites an unacknowledged use. We can appreciate Ficino’s skillful and flexible appropriation of the ET if we recall Alain de Libera’s qualification of it (while speaking for Berthold of Moosberg) “as a really living organism that is capable of assimilating, integrating, and filtering all the texts and doctrines of the tradition” [64] (p. 388). As we have seen, Ficino was in position to masterfully maximize this doctrinal and methodological potential of the ET by injecting it into the large-scale philosophical and theological narrative that Proclus’ Platonic Theology could accommodate.