Value Feelings: A Defense
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Duisburg-Essen, 45141 Essen, Germany
Philosophies 2023, 8(4), 69; https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040069
Submission received: 19 April 2023
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Revised: 17 July 2023
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Accepted: 18 July 2023
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Published: 26 July 2023
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Moral Perception)
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to provide an initial defense of a neglected epistemology of value according to which a fundamental mode of access to evaluative facts and properties is constituted by a distinctive kind of feeling, sometimes called ‘value feeling’. The paper defends the appeal to value feelings against some objections that have been leveled against it, objections intended to show that it is a nonstarter. The paper argues that these objections can be met and that the view that there are such value feelings constitutes a reasonable hypothesis.
Keywords:
emotions; feelings; value feelings; emotion theory; moral epistemology
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MDPI and ACS Style
Naar, H. Value Feelings: A Defense. Philosophies 2023, 8, 69. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040069
AMA Style
Naar H. Value Feelings: A Defense. Philosophies. 2023; 8(4):69. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040069
Chicago/Turabian StyleNaar, Hichem. 2023. "Value Feelings: A Defense" Philosophies 8, no. 4: 69. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040069
APA StyleNaar, H. (2023). Value Feelings: A Defense. Philosophies, 8(4), 69. https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies8040069
