The Normative Complexity of Virtues

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Review for Philosophies: Normative Complexity of the Virtues

The primary commitments of the paper seem misguided from the start.  The Undisputed Distinction is a non-starter.  Zagzebski argues against the distinction and claims that the epistemic is a subset of the moral. The author’s main claim is so strong that this single example falsifies the main thesis of the paper. The brief footnote 1 doesn’t help here. The quote from Aristotle at line 64 simply does not support the view the author claims it does.  There is quite a lot of theorizing about virtue in general prior to this.  Proper function accounts of virtue provide definitions that are neutral between epistemic and moral virtues. Think of Plato’s old account where each part of the soul does its own work on not the work of any other.  Or definitions of virtue explained as a skopos that realize a telos.  Most virtue theorists begin with general notions of what a virtue is.  The author seems to deny this clear point.  It might be that many essays published in journals jump into the debate further downstream to engage with a limited range of virtue theoretic literature.  The author’s points about developmental priorities is true, significant or denied by virtue theorists. At line 356: “It is conceptually impossible to gain the concept of an intellectual or moral virtue as we understand it without mastering the concept of the virtue tout court.” This is not obvious, people generally begin with understanding particular cases and work up to general accounts, but often cannot explain the case-independent concept.  I doubt many regular folks could explain what a virtue tout court is.  But even if this were true, it’s far from clear this should be a concern in constructing a theory of virtue. A theory of virtue can seek to clearly separate distinct conceptual elements of the phenomenon that are not clearly separated in practice to achieve a better understanding of the nature and role of the elements involved in the practice. Prior to the very recent work in virtue epistemology, very little had been said about intellectual virtues and very much said about moral virtues - the standard view was not salient in the majority of theorizing about virtue in western philosophy.  The essay as a whole wanders in too many directions to deliver a clear and convincing account of anything. 

Author Response

Dear Reviewer,

I thank you very much for your helpful comments, which helped me improve my paper. I am now attaching a revised version of it.

The major worry you raised regarded the framing of my project. In this version, I weakened my claim, changed label from “undisputed distinction” to “fundamental distinction” and strengthened the introduction considerably. I have clarified that, although not universally unchallenged, the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues and vices is now widely accepted and the starting point of several discussions in the contemporary literature. I also added a large number of references throughout my article to address your worry that they were insufficient.

You also raised two main worries regarding my claim that “It is conceptually impossible to gain the concept of an intellectual or moral virtue as we understand it without mastering the concept of the virtue tout court” and my usage of Aristotle’s quotes. I addressed them at 403 ff and in endnote 4. I also revised considerably the last section, which was less clear than other ones, in the hope to clarify how it worked towards my overall argument and to weaken your sense that my essay as a whole “wanders in too many directions to deliver a clear and convincing account of anything”.

I thank you again for your time and attention.

Reviewer 2 Report

This is a well-written and well-organised essay. It challenges the view, which it calls "the undisputed distinction", according to which there is a distinction between moral virtues, on the one hand, and intellectual (or epistemic) virtues, on the other hand.

My only disagreement with it, as it stands, is that it's not true that the so-called undisputed distinction really is undisputed. Miranda Fricker, for example, talks of the virtue of reflexive critical openness to the word of others in several places, (see, for example, "Epistemic Injustice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing"), and is quite clear that she understands this virtue to be both moral and intellectual (or epistemic). Similarly, David Coady has argued in several places that epistemology, properly understood, is a branch of ethics, and hence that the intellectual virtues are all also moral virtues (see for example What to Believe Now pp. 23-4.)

I think there is an original contribution to be made by this paper, but, as it stands, it exaggerates its own originality.

Author Response

Dear Reviewer,

I thank you very much for your helpful comments, which helped me improve my paper. I am now attaching a revised version of it.

The major worry you raised regarded the framing of my project. In this version, I weakened my claim, changed label from “undisputed distinction” to “fundamental distinction” and strengthened the introduction considerably. I have clarified that, although not universally unchallenged, the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues and vices is now widely accepted and the starting point of several discussions in the contemporary literature. I also added a large number of references throughout my article to address your worry that they were insufficient.

I thank you again for your time and attention.