Is It Virtuous to Love Truth and Hate Falsehood?
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Is it Virtuous to Love Truth and Hate Falsehood?
The paper is well-written, provocative and raises important questions. I would recommend publication as I found it thought-provoking, and it is generally good to have assumptions that are often taken for granted challenged. The author is of course right that we necessarily assume that our beliefs are true, and so aiming to convince people of the truth (which sounds positive) can also be described as aiming to convert people to my beliefs (which might sound arrogant or egotistical (pp. 2-3). But aiming to convert people to my beliefs doesn’t seem wrong so long as I have thought carefully about them and have good reason to think them true. Of course, we may be subject to self-deception in that matter, and the author is right that none of us has universal expertise. But when it comes to claims that e.g. the Earth is flat, or that the Covid vaccine is an instrument of mind-control devised by Bill Gates, I think I can be pretty reasonably confident that my belief in the falsity of such claims is a reasonable one, and that it is not merely arrogant and elitist of me to wish to combat the spread of such ideas. The author is, I think, right that to simply maximise the number of true propositions I believe is not a sensible goal, since many true propositions are trivial (p. 6); but this is surely not what most people who have defended the love of truth as a virtue are proposing, so I worry that the author is attacking a straw man. I would also note that the author claims that “there is no new or growing problem of excessive falsehood” (p. 1). That is an empirical claim, and the author in fact does nothing to support it. The discussion of Example 3 may succeed in pointing out some possible pitfalls in the critique of “fake news” but it does not show that there is nothing problematic about the circulation of falsehoods on important matters, nor does it show anything, one way or another, about whether such falsehoods are becoming more prevalent. Finally, I would note that much of the argument seems to depend on a premise about the overriding value of individual freedom which is assumed rather than defended. Despite these criticisms I would still recommend publication, but (word-limit allowing) I think the paper would be strengthened if the author could expand it to respond to some of the concerns I have raised. The claim that “there is no new or growing problem of excessive falsehood” should certainly be dropped unless the author does say something to substantiate that claim.
Author Response
I thank reviewer 1 for recommending publication, and for his or her thoughtful and helpful comments.
Reviewer 1 says that "aiming to convert people to my beliefs doesn’t seem wrong so long as I have thought carefully about them and have good reason to think them true." I certainly agree, and I have rewritten the relevant passage to make that fact clear (bottom of page 4). This comment by Reviewer 1 suggests that I am arguing for a broad form of scepticism; this is similar to feedback I have already received from Genia Schönbaumsfeld. I have already rewritten several passages that she helpfully pointed out were open to such a sceptical interpretation. I am not a sceptic, and I thank both reviewer 1 and Genia for giving me the opportunity to make that clearer.
Reviewer 1 worries that I am "attacking a straw man" when I point out, as part of an argument against veritism, that some true beliefs are trivial. I don't think I am, but I won't insist upon the point, since my real point is the broader one that some true beliefs are undesirable (for a whole range of reasons which include, but are not limited to, the fact that some of them are trivial). I have rewritten that passage to make that clear (top of page 13).
Reviewer 1 says that "much of the argument seems to depend on a premise about the overriding value of individual freedom which is assumed rather than defended." My argument certainly assumes that individual freedom (especially freedom of speech and thought) is very important, but I don't hold that it necessarily overrides all other values, and I don't believe I say anything that suggests otherwise. I feel that defending the value of individual freedom (or even defending the value of free speech and thought) would be too big a task for this paper, and would be a distraction from its main argument (I note that reviewer 1 does say that defending individual freedom might not be possible, considering the word limit I'm working with). I also feel that others have defended individual freedom much better than I could. Finally, I feel that in our liberal age we can assume that readers will agree that individual freedom is a core political value, and that this can often been treated as axiomatic in political debates.
Reviewer 1 says that I should delete the claim that “there is no new or growing problem of excessive falsehood”, since I haven't argued for it. He or she is right, and I have deleted it. I thank the reviewer for pointing this out.
Reviewer 2 Report
The paper suggests that there may well be no such thing as truth (only truths or true statements) and that therefore it is not a virtue to love truth. Furthermore, the paper argues that belief in truth is likely to encourage censorship, which is bad not because it harms the truth but because it is authoritarian. The paper also takes on four alleged forms of “truth-evangelism” in academic philosophy.
The author tries to do a lot in a short paper with, I believe, mixed results. But it is interesting enough to be worthy of publication.
A few thoughts on more specific points:
On lines 33-35 the author suggests that the terms “fake news”, “echo chamber” and others all express the view that truth itself is being lost. It seems to me that each of these terms has a more specific meaning than that, not all of them having to do with truth. “Fake news”, as the author points out later, is defined differently by different people, but I would think the main meanings are a) lies (deep fakes, photoshopped pictures, straightforward lies, etc.) promoted for political purposes (e.g. by hostile foreign governments or by domestic extremists) and b) some mix of truths and lies with a deliberate spin for political purposes. Conspiracy theories might sometimes be invented for political purposes, but need not be political and might often be sincerely believed. An echo chamber need not be problematic as far as truth goes at all, I would think, but won’t help those in it understand people with different views and might hinder their ability to think for themselves. I wouldn’t, that is to say, lump all these terms together.
On lines 39-40 the author suggests that falsehood is not a problem. I find this puzzling. I suppose the idea is that there are false statements and false beliefs but not falsehood per se. If a person makes a false claim, however, surely the falsehood of the claim is (at least often) a bad thing? Scholars should try to reduce the amount of falsehood, or the number of falsehoods, in their work. This might not be a moral issue, but it is some kind of issue. In general, surely, false belief is a bad thing.
In line 85 (and again in lines 123-124) the author appears to give away their name.
In lines 64-65 the author says we cannot make the distinction between what is true and what we believe to be true. But the sense of “what is true” and “what I believe to be true” is not the same. It makes sense to say “Some of what I believe is probably not true.” So we can and so make this distinction. We just can’t immediately know which of our beliefs is false because they all appear true to us. So we can make the distinction in theory or conceptually but not in application/practice. Or rather, we can discover that one or more of our beliefs is false, but it takes time.
On line 71 the author distinguishes between one’s current beliefs and what one has believed up until now. Can this distinction be maintained? Can we slice time that thinly and still know what we are talking about?
In lines 82-84 the author says that the questions “Why do people have false beliefs?” and “Why do people disagree with me?” mean the same thing from the point of view of the person asking the question. Is this really true? Earlier the author implied, I thought, that we might all recognize that some of our beliefs are likely to be false, we just don’t know which ones. So I can wonder “Why does everyone, including me, have false beliefs?” But this does not mean “Why does everyone, including me, disagree with me on some things?”
In line 128 the word ‘aside’ occurs one time too many
In line 154 the conclusion that happiness means subjective happiness is drawn much too quickly. Maybe say something like “So we should perhaps just identify happiness with subjective happiness.”
In lines 187-188 the author presumes that if there is an implicit agreement then the parties to it would be aware of it. Isn’t it in the nature of merely implicit agreements that they might not be?
The point made in lines 195-197 is good.
The claim made about what wisdom is in lines 199-201 is dubious
The claim on line 210 that it is undemocratic to think we should ensure that voters have relevant true beliefs if we want to advance the common good also seems dubious. Doesn’t it depend on how we go about ensuring this? If only people with certain beliefs or qualifications are allowed to vote then yes, that seems undemocratic. But if public education is provided for free to all children so as to ensure that the electorate has relevant true beliefs then this does not seem undemocratic at all. As long as the education in question is education and not propaganda.
Author Response
I thank reviewer 2 for his or her useful and thoughtful comments, and for recommending publication.
Reviewer 2 begins by saying that I say "there may well be no such thing as truth". I don't actually say that, but I have rewritten the relevant passage to make sure that I won't be thought to imply it either. Reviewer 2 also says that I say "belief in truth is likely to encourage censorship". Again, I don't actually say that, though I do think that belief in an abstract entity called "the truth" could and has led to censorship; nonetheless this claim is not essential to my argument, and I have deleted the sentence in question.
In relation to lines 33-35 the author suggests that I not lump together fake news, echo chambers, and conspiracy theories, because these all require different and more detailed treatment. I have written in great detail about all these phenomena (or alleged phenomena) elsewhere. My point here is not to group the phenomena together, but to group the terms "fake news", "echo chambers" and "conspiracy theories" together, on the ground that they serve a similar function. I am confining myself here to discussing the words, not the things.
In relation to lines 39-40 reviewer 2 says that I say "that falsehood is not a problem". I didn't actually say that, though I admit I said something which is open to that interpretation. What I said was that "falsehood as such is not a problem. I certainly agree with reviewer 2 that "in general, surely, false belief is a bad thing." I have rewritten this paragraph to make this clear and been very explicit that usually it is bad to have false beliefs.
In relation to lines 64-65 reviewer 2 criticises my claim that "we cannot make the distinction between what is true and what we believe to be true." His or her criticism is the same as that I have earlier responded to from Genia Schonbaumsfeld. I have made several changes to make it clear that I am only talking about making the distinction between what is true and what I now believe to be true.
Reviewer 2 notes in relation to line 71 that I "distinguish between one’s current beliefs and what one has believed up until now", and asks how "this distinction be maintained? Can we slice time that thinly and still know what we are talking about?" I'm not sure what the problem is here. I don't think I'm committed to any claims about our ability to divide up time. I think the idea that "up until now I believed such-and-such, but no longer do" is clear enough.
Reviewer 2 says in relation to lines 82-84 challenges my assertion that the question '“Why do people have false beliefs?” and “Why do people disagree with me?” mean the same thing from the point of view of the person asking the question. He or she is right, and effectively the same point has been made earlier by Genia. I have rewritten this to try to make it clear that I am talking about particular beliefs. I think the answer to the general question "Why do people have false beliefs", is too obvious to discuss. We are fallible creatures.
I thank reviewer 2 for picking up my repetition of the word "aside". I have deleted on of them.
In relation to line 154, reviewer 2 say that I drew the conclusion that "happiness means subjective happiness" much too quickly. I didn't actually quite say that. I said that happiness was "close enough" to subjective happiness. Nonetheless I have rewritten this to make it this point clearer.
Reviewer 2 says, in relation to lines 187-188 that I "presume that if there is an implicit agreement then the parties to it would be aware of it. Isn’t it in the nature of merely implicit agreements that they might not be?" I disagree with reviewer 2 about this. An implicit agreement is unspoken, but that doesn't mean that the parties are unaware of it. It's hard to see how there could be any kind of agreement (explicit or implicit) if the parties to it don't doesn't know about it. If I sit down at a restaurant and ask for food, there is an implicit agreement, known by all relevant parties, that I will pay for it, and this requires that we know about it.
I thank reviewer 2 for saying that my point in lines 195-197 is good.
Reviewer 2 say that my claim about wisdom is in lines 199-201 is dubious, but he or she doesn't say what is dubious about it. I take it this is something we can agree to disagree about.
Reviewer 2 takes issue with what he or she says is my claim in line 210 that "it is undemocratic to think we should ensure that voters have relevant true beliefs if we want to advance the common good". This isn't actually what I said. I said that it's undemocratic for "us" to make decisions on behalf of the people about what knowledge they need to engage in public deliberation. The point is not, as the reviewer suggests, about who is entitled to vote, but about who is entitled to participate in public deliberation. I have rewritten this to make it clearer.
