Feminist Values and Plumwood’s Account of Logic

Abstract

I aim to examine Val Plumwood’s feminist account of logic, as presented by Plumwood, using the frameworks developed by Elliott and McKaughan, and Intemann. Plumwood argues that relevance logic is the appropriate logical system for feminist reasoning. I intend to assess whether this constitutes a legitimate incorporation of values into logic. To this end, I evaluate the aims of Plumwood as a case study. Additionally, I trace the values embedded in my chosen case to determine whether feminist values advance the epistemic and social objectives of the research.

1. Introduction

Feminist logic is a rather ambiguous term in that it can be several ways that feminist values affect logic. As Russell suggests in ref. [1] they may be the subject matter of logic; they might serve as an end for logic; they can guide some logic; and, there might be a logic that uses the epistemic capacities of marginalized groups.1 In this paper, I examine the case given by Plumwood in ref. [3] that maintains classical logic contains misogynistic values, mainly because classical logic is bivalent.

Whether and how feminist values can relate to logic is an ongoing debate. One possible position is to believe that feminism will not add anything to logic as it also cannot add anything to physics or mathematics. Thus, there will not be a feminist logic. Yet, there are feminists like Andrea Nye who hold that logic is misogynistic and so there cannot be a feminist logic. Nevertheless, feminists such as Plumwood in ref. [3] suggest that a specific logic (relevant logic) is among the correct logics. Furthermore, Susan Stebbing thinks feminist logic is one among the several applications that logic can have [1] (p. 80).

Values in science is a more developed topic. It is clear how values find their way into various stages of the scientific method. Scientists have to make various decisions. They need to choose the methodology of the research, select data and choose among different theories and models. Their values can affect each step of the research and create biases. Non-epistemic values include social, cultural, and contextual values. On the other hand, epistemic values involve truth, belief, justification, and knowledge. There is a growing consensus that non-epistemic values are inseparable from science. Despite some who still adhere to the value-free ideal of science (the thesis that non-epistemic values have no place in science), more and more philosophers of science are willing to accept the role of non-epistemic values in science2. Elliott and McKaughan’s transparency approach and Intemann’s aim approach not only allow non-epistemic values to play a legitimate role in choosing the topic of research and applying results, as other moderate approaches do, but also permit non-epistemic values to have a legitimate role in assessing scientific models, theories, and hypotheses. The transparency approach shows that non-epistemic values can legitimately override epistemic values when scientists are pursuing practical goals. The aim approach has it that value judgments are legitimate when they promote democratically endorsed epistemological and social aims of the research.

Of course, in order to apply a method that is applicable to science we need a view that allows us to see logic as a part of science. Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the thesis that permits us to treat logic in line with science. It is the thesis that3:

Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories.

[9] (p. 631)

Anti-exceptionalists hold that analogous to science, logic utilizes abduction (in particular, inference to the best explanation) as its methodology. On the other hand, the traditional exceptionalist approach captures the a priori status of logic, usually accompanied by the view that logic is immutable.4

The main role of logic is to determine what follows from what. In other words, which kinds of inferences are good and which are not. It is presumed by many that classical logic can to a good extent model our everyday reasoning. In addition, logic is normative and it can rule out some of our reasoning as invalid or unsound. The relationship of logic with reasoning and its normativity has motivated some feminist thinkers to take a stand on logic.

This paper is divided into three main parts. In the first part, I will present Plumwood’s account of feminist logic (given in ref. [3]) and I will explain why she believes feminist values should change the dominant correct logic (classical logic). In the second section of the paper, I will introduce the methods I wish to utilize in my case study, namely, the transparency method, presented in ref. [6] and their two well-known principles, and additionally Intemann’s democratic aims method [22]. In the third section of the paper, I will determine whether Plumwood’s use of feminist values is legitimate or not.

2. A Case Study from Feminist Philosophy: Plumwood’s Criticism of Classical Logic

In what follows, I will explain the case that I have chosen from a feminist logician [3], which claims that classical logic is tainted with anti-feminist values, and relevance logic must be the correct logic (or among the correct logics). Note that classical logic has been traditionally considered the dominant correct logic by the majority of logicians.

Plumwood believes classical logic has a silencing role because of its normative character granted the role logic plays in correcting our everyday reasoning. Logical laws are known as norms of thought. One reason for this is the restrictive role negation plays in this logic. The following two quotes portray what Plumwood thinks of classical logic and its role in everyday reasoning:

The […] case against the possibility of a liberatory logic rests on the supposed claims of logic to authority over language, to the role of universal law, to be the monolithic core of language, and on the normative and silencing role it is alleged to play in relation to speakers and forms of speech judged less adequate. But are these really features of all possible forms of logic, or are they rather results of particular, perhaps dominant, conceptions of the role of logic?

[3] (p. 440)

What ref. [3] suggests about the role of negation is that it prompts dualism. In Plumwood’s words,

A dualism […] should be understood as a particular way of dividing the world which results from a certain kind of denied dependency on a subordinated other. This relationship of denied dependency determines a certain kind of logical structure, as one in which the denial and the relation of domination/subordination shapes the identity of both the relata.

[3] (p. 443)

Dualisms are not ordinary dichotomies. They presuppose a hierarchy. Master/slave, self/other, male/female, and culture/nature are examples of dualism in Western thought. They involve one side being inferior to the other and being defined through the other. While the inferior side is traditionally attributed to women, the superior qualities are aligned with men and those who have power. The key features of dualisms are backgrounding, radical exclusion, relational definition, instrumentalism, and homogenization. Backgrounding means the master views and treats the other as a background to his foreground. Radical exclusion involves a false polarization effect in which the differences are maximized. Through relational definition, the inferior side is solely defined using the superior side. Instrumentalism means that the lower side of dualism is a means to the upper side ends. Homogenization requires ignoring the differences among the inferior group.

As such, Plumwood claims that p/not-p (from classical logic) is an instance of dualism. Not-p is dependent on p and cannot be specified and defined without it (relational definition of p/not-p). Furthermore, Plumwood argues that not-p is homogenized and is radically excluded. Plumwood mentions:

In classical logic, negation, $(\sim p)$, is interpreted as the universe without p, everything in the universe other than what p covers, as represented in the usual Venn diagram representing p as a figure surrounded by a square which represents the universe, with $\sim p$ as the difference. […] [W]hat is important for the issue we are considering here is that $\sim p$ can then not be independently or positively identified, but is entirely dependent on p for its specification. Not-p has no independent role, but is introduced as merely alien to the primary notion p.

[3] (p. 454)

Note that we should not interpret Plumwood’s remarks about the classical negation in isolation. Plumwood’s remarks are not about logical syntax. This is a feature of our interpretation of the syntax and semantics of classical logic. The natural language interpretation of syntax and semantics is vital to the normative role logic has in correcting everyday reasoning. Since women and other oppressed groups have been marginalized because of these dualisms and there is no escape from such kinds of dualisms in neither predicate nor propositional logic, in Plumwood’s view, we should reject classical logic. But dualisms are not a necessary part of logic per se; they are a result of classical negation. Other logical systems, for example, relevance logic, do not involve dualisms as they have a different kind of negation. According to one of the semantics for relevance logic given by Dunn, a formula A can be true, false, both true and false, neither true nor false. While relevance logic does not preclude dualisms, it gives us a tool to avoid them.

Even if we ignore the role of negation, the fact that classical logic is bivalent forces binaries in natural language interpretation of the semantics. Plumwood believes that classical logic/deviant logics is also an instance of dualism and this is another reason to reject classical logic in favor of a logic that is more aligned with feminist values. There still are logics that can conform to feminist values:

There are modern logicians who see logic as playing the role of follower rather than leader in relation to natural language, who reject the idea of logic as providing universal ‘laws of thought’ […], and who would see both logic and reason as playing a much more limited role than that ascribed to them in rationalist traditions of thought.

[3] (p. 440)

Plumwood believes the fact that there are many different logics shows that logic per se is not the problem. Rather, accepting classical logic as the sole correct logic is what she is against:

If there is not one Logic, but in fact many different logics, if logics can be constructed which can tolerate even contradiction itself […], logic itself can have no silencing role and no unitary authority over language.

[3] (p. 440)

Once the plurality of logical systems has been acknowledged, feminist and other social critique can be more discriminating in its response to logics, and begin an exploration of the way in which different logical systems correspond to different forms of rationality.

[3] (p. 441)

Different logical systems and their interpretation allow for alternative norms and different forms of rationality and this enables feminists to choose. In addition to the role of negation, ref. Plumwood [3] is concerned about the way many adherents of classical logic think of it as the single correct logic. This fact further confirms its silencing role.

[D]ifferent logical systems correspond to different forms of rationality. We can begin to understand systems of logic and their corresponding systems of rationality as selected, in much the same way that scientific theories are selected. […] [T]he way selection has operated to privilege certain of these forms of rationality have much to contribute to an understanding of the deep roots of phallocentrism and other oppressive conceptual structures in western thought. […] These influences are to be found especially in the privileging and presentation as ‘intuitive’ or ‘normal’ of certain accounts of negation, especially the negation of classical logic.

[3] (p. 441)

To summarize, Plumwood argues that classical logic serves as a tool of misogyny, primarily because, in her view, classical negation reinforces dualisms. If we accept the orthodox position that classical logic is both normative and the only correct logic, we lose access to alternative ways of avoiding dualisms in our thought and language.

3. Value Judgments in Science

In this section, I am going to give a bit of context about the value-free vs. value-laden science and motivate the methods that I will apply later. Epistemic, cognitive, and constitutive value5 (p. 14) have been used more or less interchangeably6 to refer to values such as consistency, accuracy, scope, and simplicity which underpin the knowledge- and truth-seeking aims of science and play a necessary role in the rational and cognitive development of science [24] (pp. 13–14). Conversely, non-epistemic, non-cognitive, and non-constitutive values have also been used interchangeably. They may include social, moral, political, aesthetic, and personal values. Value judgments are shaped by such values of scientists; for instance, the judgment that the subordination of women is unjust is based on non-epistemic (feminist) values.

Those who dissent from the value-laden understanding of science use the concept of value-free science in two senses:

• Neutrality: Scientific theories do not (a) presuppose or (b) support any noncognitive (moral and political) intrinsic value judgments.
• Impartiality: The only grounds for accepting a theory are its relations to the evidence and its manifestation of cognitive values. These grounds are impartial among rival noncognitive values.

[4] (p. 50)

There are two main arguments in favor of the neutrality thesis: the psychological argument, which supports condition (a) of the neutrality thesis, and the practical reason argument, which supports condition (b). The psychological argument states that scientists who bring their value judgments into the research are not able to impartially assess the empirical theories. Moreover, according to the practical reason argument, because of the principle that we cannot conclude ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ (Hume’s law), we cannot derive value judgments from factual statements. According to this thesis, scientific facts and value judgments cannot be in evidential relation with each others.

Even the most strict believers in value-free science accept the value judgments, which involve non-epistemic values, in the context of discovery and scientific investigation (designing a study, collecting data), and in the context of the application (e.g., in the level of certainty of a theory before guiding action). In addition, they accept that science may guide people’s actions and help in making assessments of theories. Anderson [4] argues that the neutrality thesis depends on “contradictory and crude models of how value judgments work” [4] (p. 53). The main problem with the psychological argument is that it is in fact an argument against dogmatism, not against value judgments. It is seen against dogmatism7 as this argument has it that scientists’ value judgments hinder impartial assessments of scientific theories. However, value judgments are not inherently dogmatic. We can learn from experience that our value judgments are mistaken. In addition, the practical reason argument implies that “nothing could ever count as evidence that some things are good or bad” [4] (p. 54). Consequently, value judgments are considered to be held dogmatically. Therefore, the previous problem shows up again.

As for the question of where exactly in the scientific method the non-epistemic values may have a legitimate role besides the occasions that are already mentioned. One occasion involves inductive risk which means “the chance that one will be wrong in accepting (or rejecting) a scientific hypothesis” [5] (p. 561). In addition to the inductive risk for accepting theories, there may be an inductive risk for accepting methodologies, data, and interpretations. The inductive risk may occur at each of the three levels of science, namely, choosing a methodology, gathering and characterizing the data, and interpreting the data. At each level, an error is possible, from which consequences follow. These consequences may be non-epistemic which requires non-epistemic values in scientists’ decision-making8. Another way to frame how value judgments enter science is Quine’s under-determination thesis. The under-determination thesis has it that empirical evidence cannot determine scientific theories. As a result, there is space in choosing the background assumptions before deciding which hypotheses are supported by the evidence. It should be noted that Douglas, along with other philosophers of science such as Steel in [26] and Reutlinger in [27], assign a secondary role to non-epistemic values:

As Hempel rightly pointed out, value judgments have no direct place in the argument for what should be taken to be true. However, because error is always a possibility, we are required to consider the consequences of error alongside the arguments concerning evidence. And the consideration of the consequences of error require the consideration of values, both epistemic and non-epistemic. The role for values is there, even if it is not direct.

[5] (p. 564)

Refs. [6,7,8,22] are some of the works about case studies in which non-epistemic values override epistemic values. They believe that moral or political values are not prohibited by any logical or methodological principles and in this light, they are considered on a par with epistemic values. The way they establish their claim is by proposing actual cases. One way value judgments can override epistemic judgments is through the goals of the scientific project.

The upshot of thinking more carefully about the multiple goals that scientists have when choosing scientific representations is that it helps us to understand how scientists can sensibly prioritize nonepistemic considerations over epistemic ones in some cases. Scientists need not always maximize the fit between a model (and the world; rather, the purposes of the users determine what sort of fit with the world and therefore what balance between epistemic and nonepistemic considerations) is needed in particular contexts.

[6] (p. 5)

In the rest of the section, I will explain the methods from the science and value literature that I will use to examine my case studies. The methods I have chosen are Intemann’s aim approach and Elliott and McKagauhn’s transparency approach. According to the aims approach, a scientific model can be correct depending on what we use it for. In Intemann’s words:

Norms that govern scientific decision-making, including methodological choices, selection of data, and choice of theories or models, are widely viewed to be a function of the aims that constitute the research context. If we ask whether particular climate models are useful or reliable, it can depend on what we want to use them for…A speedometer on a car may not work well in relation to the aim of telling a driver their speed with perfect precision. But, as a tool for helping a driver avoid getting a speeding ticket, a properly functioning speedometer is quite reliable.

[22] (p. 218)

In this case, the decisions scientists make about choosing a methodology and the model will be based on the aims of the research. And, since the aims can contain non-epistemic aspects, non-epistemic values may play a legitimate role in the research.

3.1. Intemann’s Approach

Intemann’s approach is one of the significant approaches in the literature which legitimizes non-epistemic values that promote democratically endorsed social and epistemological aims of the research. The research’s aims should be determined through a democratic process by considering the verdicts of the stakeholders. In many cases, research does not have epistemic goals only. It also has social, economic, political, or environmental goals that will as a result open the gates of science to value judgments during the research. According to Intemann, scientists are the ones who have to make the value judgments and they must have the expertise suitable for that. In addition, an important aspect of the aims approach is that there are stakeholders involved. While Intemann does not fully clarify who the stakeholders are, it is clear to the point that it can include scientists, the public who are affected by the research, the government, and the private sector. Furthermore, what is required according to her, is that in following social aims we must not override the significant epistemic aims of the research. Value judgments can be involved in determining the research goals and also in methods, and practices as long as they promote the aims of the research.

The case that Intemann illustrates her approach with, namely climate modeling, involves significant social, political, and environmental aims. The stakeholders in climate modeling research are the public, the government, and the scientists (the private sector might be involved, as well). Depending on the context of each research, scientists must decide which goals to choose, and what methodologies, theories, and models would be suitable for those goals. That said, non-epistemic value judgments will be legitimate in climate research to the extent that they advance its epistemological and social goals.

The parts of research in which scientists may rely on non-epistemic values include but are not limited to judgments about model adequacy, decisions about epistemic trade-offs, assessing causation, employing normative concepts, and selecting evidential categories and interpretation of data. For instance, if the context of the research involves the ethical aim of considering the worst-case scenarios as the goal of the research, then scientists will need to use models which help them with predicting extreme weather conditions. As [22] mentions in this context, scientists may legitimately appeal to their non-epistemic values in selecting the right kind of their models to advance their aim [22] (p. 220).

In addition, as Intemann mentions in [22], scientists may appeal to non-epistemic values provided that the scientific claims or hypothesis of the research are normative and value-laden. For instance, when the research on climate contains claims that include phrases such as “dangerous”, “climate change impacts”, and “vulnerabilities”, scientists will need value judgments in their background assumptions, for selecting data and producing adequate models.

Intemann’s approach can be distinguished from other aims approaches as it holds that social and non-epistemic aims of science may be inseparable from the epistemic aims. Moreover, non-epistemic aims can affect the epistemic virtues scientists select.

The benefits of Intemann’s account include identifying various ways in which value judgments influence modeling decisions, justifying the legitimacy of incorporating non-epistemic values, offering strategies to mitigate cases where values could negatively affect science, and, integrating stakeholder input when determining which values should be upheld [22] (p. 218).

3.2. Elliott and McKaughan’s Approach

Scientists may use various scientific representations based on the particular context of the research and their several particular purposes. A chosen model might not always have the maximum conformity with the world, yet the decision to use it might nonetheless be appropriate depending on the context and the goals of the scientists. Elliott and McKaughan [6] offer a method for distinguishing the cases in which values have an illegitimate role in assessing scientific theories from the cases that are legitimate. Their approach allows non-epistemic values to play a more significant role than epistemic values in scientific representations with practical purposes.

In the expedited risk assessment case they examine, accuracy, which is an epistemic value, is overridden by non-epistemic values, like how quickly the experiments take place. They give two general principles to determine cases in which non-epistemic values legitimately override epistemic values: First, scientists must be explicit about the role of non-epistemic values and the aims of the research in assessments of theories, models, and hypotheses. Second, non-epistemic values can override epistemic values solely in so far as they advance the goal of the research. The first rule is significant, as the objectors to a particular assessment of a scientific representation or specifically to use a specific non-epistemic value can backtrack and instead endorse their own chosen method of assessment. Moreover, the second principle is important as it helps us determine the cases in which non-epistemic values are erroneously overriding epistemic values in cases in which the scientific representations become faulty to fulfill the goals. They mention “one can argue that non-epistemic values are inappropriately trumping epistemic values when the methods and models used by these agencies become too epistemically crude to fulfill that goal.” [6] (p. 16). Yet, it will depend on the context to decide which models are epistemically crude. If the two principles are held in a research non-epistemic values may be prioritized over epistemic ones in the context of research.

4. Analysis

In this section, I will test Intemann, and Elliott and McKaughan’s methods on the feminist logic case I suggested. In this case, the feminist and political values of the author have led her to choose the research topic of [3]. So far as choosing a subject for a research project, non-epistemic values can certainly legitimately play a role. Yet, we have to see whether her use of feminist values in other complicated steps of the research is also legitimate.

4.1. Is Plumwood’s Use of Feminist Values in Logic Legitimate?

Plumwood’s aim is to assess the claim of whether classical logic is an anti-feminist theory that prompts dualisms in our thinking, and because this aim consists of normative concepts, she has to make value judgments in her background assumptions. For example, judgments like dualisms should be condemned, as they will lead to oppression, or we should fight the means of oppression against women and minorities. Based on her preferred background assumptions, Plumwood has selected the data which is more aligned with her non-epistemic values. In this context, the data is inferences that do not involve classical negation. Consequently, she has chosen a logical theory based on the data, which is relevant logic. In the following sections, I will discuss Plumwood’s steps in detail in light of the methods I have chosen.

4.1.1. Elliott and McKaughan’s Method

Let us see what Plumwood’s evaluation amounts to according to Elliott and McKaughan’s transparency approach. Plumwood’s assessment seems to be transparent enough to let us backtrack and find where she uses feminist values. Her aim is to evaluate classical logic, and her non-epistemic values play an important role in her assessment. Recall that the first principle of their approach was “those engaged in practically assessing models, theories, or hypotheses need to be as explicit as possible about the goals of their assessments and the roles that nonepistemic values played in the assessments as a result.” [6] (p. 15). As we saw Plumwood has assessed and critiqued classical logic in an utterly conspicuous manner such that we could backtrack and detect her aim and her value judgments. So I believe the first principle of the transparency approach holds.

The second principle of Elliott and McKaughan’s approach states that "nonepistemic values should receive priority only to the extent that they advance the goals associated with those assessments.” [6] (p. 15). As Elliott and McKaughan mention, the second principle catches the methods that are epistemically crude. Therefore, while the non-epistemic values will promote the goals of the assessment, they should do it in a way that is not epistemically crude. I will show that Plumwood’s assessment is not epistemically crude. One way to determine epistemic crudity is by analyzing the objections to an account. For this means, I am going to look at some of the objections that have been suggested or may be suggested against her account: Russell [1] has criticized Plumwood’s account9, claiming that classical p/not-p does not necessarily involve dualisms (for example, imagine odd/even numbers). She writes:

I think this is false: there is no special relationship between dualisms and classical logic. Standard classical model theory does build in some assumptions—e.g. that domains of quantification are non-empty, that terms have referents, and even that predicates have determinate extensions, but these fall far short of dualisms, and specifically the $p/\sim p$ distinction, where ∼ is classical negation, needn’t be a dualism. If, we take the set of natural numbers as our domain, we might interpret the non-logical 1-place predicate E with the set of even numbers, and then identify the odd numbers as those of which $\sim Ex$ is true. But this doesn’t result in a pernicious even/odd dualism. There are no consequences in terms of homogeneity, backgrounding, hierarchy, or instrumentalisation.

[2] (pp. 11–12)

The problem with this criticism is that Russell’s critique [2] does not target what Plumwood [3] claims. It is an uncharitable reading of Plumwood’s account to claim that she means every instance of $p/\sim p$ in every interpretation is a dualism. Instead, we should read her as saying some instances of $p/\sim p$ are dualisms in natural language interpretations and some laws of classical logic have a silencing role.

Another possible objection to Plumwood’s account comes from the fact that we do not need classical negation to have classical logic. In fact, we can have all the entailments of classical logic using only one operator, for example, the Sheffer stroke (nand, |) that means ’not both’ in natural language. Of course, $p|q$ is equivalent to $\sim (p\wedge q)$. Thus, Plumwood might respond that this operator has the problems that negation has. Both of them allude to anti-feminist values. But, I think this at the very least will show that negation is not the culprit, it is rather the fact that classical logic is bivalent or binary. In other words, we only have $True$ and $False$ as truth values in classical logic. This does not eradicate the problem of negation. Because classical logic with nand operator is not the dominant way of doing syntax.

The last possible objection to Plumwood’s account stems from denying logical laws as laws of thought. If there is no relationship between logical laws and principles of belief revision, the laws of classical logic must not be blamed for dualisms and logic cannot have a silencing role. Harman famously writes:

Logical principles are not directly rules of belief revision. They are not particularly about belief at all. For example, modus ponens does not say that, if one believes p and also believes if p then q, one may also believe q. Nor are there any principles of belief revision that directly correspond to logical principles like modus ponens. Logical principles hold universally, without exception, whereas the corresponding principles of belief revision would be at best prima facie principles, which do not always hold. It is not always true that, if one believes p and believes if p then q, one may infer q. The proposition q may be absurd or otherwise unacceptable in the light of one’s other beliefs, so one should give up either one’s belief in p or one’s belief in if p then q rather than believe q. And, even if q is not absurd and is not in conflict with one’s other beliefs, there may simply be no point to adding it to one’s beliefs. The mind is finite.

[29] (pp. 107–108)

While I do not believe that humans think in a way that always conforms to the laws of classical logic, classical logic has a close relationship with the principles of belief revision. Indeed, we do not follow the principles of classical logic on all occasions. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that in meticulous reasoning, like the process of argumentation in a court, what shapes the way we argue are some laws from classical logic10.

I think this shows that Plumwood’s feminist values can advance her goal of assessing classical logic, as her method, is not epistemically crude, and because of that, it succeeds in satisfying the second principle of Elliott and McKaughan, that is, her non-epistemic values will promote her aim of showing that classical logic is not a suitable logic for feminist aims and it should be revised. Therefore, it is a case of the legitimate use of non-epistemic values in the assessment.

4.1.2. Intemann’s Method

As I mentioned in the previous section, according to Intemann, if Plumwood’s account is a legitimate case of using non-epistemic values in logic, we should see if her feminist values promote the democratically endorsed aims of the research. The stakeholders in this case, namely the ones who are affected by the research, are the feminists, women and marginalized groups, and the logicians. Plumwood’s research claims that women and marginalized groups have been mistreated as a result of the dualisms that are present as a result of classical logic.

The aim of the research according to Intemann should be set democratically, and if the values are not democratically held, they will be illegitimate. In this case, feminist values, such as women and men are equal, we should not let dualisms in our thinking, can be democratically held. There is nothing undemocratic about the general feminist values that Plumwood assumes in her research. Hence, she is not violating the democracy requirement of Intemann’s approach. Furthermore, her goal to evaluate logic to see if it is in line with feminists’ values does not seem to be undemocratic, as well. It is a pretty legitimate goal and it is not alike the undemocratic goals that Intemann points to, e.g. stalling regulatory policies.

The remaining requirement is to see whether Plumwood is successful in promoting her aim both epistemologically and politically. As I have argued in Section 4.1.1, Plumwood’s method at least partially succeeds in promoting the epistemological aim of her research in the context of her aim. For this matter, we should not see logic as a formal system in this case; it must be seen within the purview of natural language interpretations. Consequently, according to Intemann’s method, Plumwood’s account is a legitimate case of non-epistemic values in science.

5. Conclusions

We have seen that the transparency and the democratic aims approach, in spite of having been designed for more empirical science seem to similarly work for more abstract science like logic. They can help us determine cases in which non-epistemic values of logicians are legitimately or illegitimately affecting their research. Whereas Douglas and Anderson (refs. [4,5]), and some other approaches that prioritize epistemic values, the methods I have chosen allow for non-epistemic values to override epistemic values in different stages of the scientific process.

Intemann and Elliott and McKaughan’s approaches show that Plumwood’s research is a legitimate case of feminist values in logic. We can backtrack and find how she has used her feminist values, and her feminist values will not advance her goal. Thus, her research obeys the principle of transparency. Moreover, values are democratically held and her aim is democratic. Her feminist values support her aim epistemically. So Intemann’s approach shows that Plumwood’s non-epistemic values are legitimate in her research. Whether we can generalize my argument and prove the new claim that Plumwood’s claims are correct independent of the methods I have used, requires a separate argument.