*3.4. Post-Soviet Transitions in Postsecondary Education*

With the breakdown of the USSR, the Soviet system ended in Eastern Europe. The Soviet model centralized planning and control. This approach to institutional development did not emphasize markets and students' freedom to choose institutions. Marketization using loans to expand access was not a preferred method of finance.

The Soviet central control approach during the Cold War allowed for coordinated expansion in "factory-like" institutions. The Soviet model also created research institutions separate from universities, inhibiting the development of globally competitive research capabilities in post-Soviet universities during globalization [100]. The transformation from central control to market systems was not easy. There was no "Marshall Plan" for building institutions during the Cold War or after the transition to democratic forms of governance, complicating the transition to the post-Soviet era in higher education systems competing in economic and educational spheres with Western Europe and the US [99].

The OECD data reveals variabilities in programs through the early transition period, and scholarly research reveals some of the challenges facing post-Soviet nations. Like the Western European nations noted above, post-Soviet countries were low on the privatization scale in the mid 2000s [73]. However, they were also lower in enrollment rates, indicating they were slower to adapt to the push toward universal access in the early globalization period.

One of the problems has been corruption in the administration of institutions, with wealthy families buying access [101,102]. A mixed-methods study of 14 Ukrainian universities before the current war illuminates the risks facing post-Soviet nations:

*Local reform efforts are viewed as being anchored in the outdated 'factory-model' of higher education and generate more losses than gains in regional and global competitions. The discussion focuses on the argument that a failing higher education system is likely to lead to a failed state. One of the contributors to this failure is the lack of a globally conditioned set of indicators, independent of local politics. The world-class university model could become a major reform driver, but it could also be thwarted by a legacy of entitlements, corruption, and poor performance.* [102] (p. 249)

Chankseliani argues that post-Soviet universities face a "double disadvantage" caused by "Russian imperialism and Western academic colonialism" [103] (p. 265). These insights touch the core issue. In contrast, the US' higher education system has weathered tuition and admissions scandals in the past decade [104,105] because of the US' independent court system. The weaknesses of democratic institutions slowed the transition in Eastern European universities, but other factors contributed to the challenges they faced.

US standards became the basis of the global ranking of universities. At the same time, most high-ranking global universities have local (state or community) links and support. The 'bean counting' in academic indicators—publishing in highly ranked journals, for example—was never the core value of Soviet academic life. The older Soviet factory model produced graduates but did not generate knowledge to support local democratic institutions, a core value in the American universities. If a factory-like emphasis on producing journal articles prevails over reason, the global system of democratized institutions is at further risk. The journal rankings often marginalize critical thinking when these bean-counting norms are dominant in US universities.
