Search Results (2)

Land Value Capture (LVC) is increasingly being emphasized as a key mechanism for financing mass transit systems, promoted as a sustainability-oriented policy tool amid tightening public budgets. China has adopted a development-led approach to value capture through the “Rail plus Property (R + P)” model, drawing inspiration from the Hong Kong experience. The Shenzhen Metro’s “R + P” strategy has been widely acclaimed as the key to its reputation as “the only profitable transit company in mainland China without subsidies.” This paper questions this assumption and argues that the Shenzhen model is neither sustainable nor replicable, as its past performance depended on two exceptional conditions: an ascending phase of a real-estate cycle and unique institutional concessions from the central state. To substantiate this argument, we contrast Shenzhen’s value capture strategy with that of Nanjing—a provincial capital operating under routine institutional conditions, with governance and spatial structures broadly reflecting the prevailing urban development model in China. Using a comparative framework structured around three key dimensions of LVC—urban governance, risk management, and the transit company’s shift toward real estate—this paper reveals how distinct urban political economies give rise to contrasting value capture approaches: one expansionary, prioritizing short-term profit and rapid scale-up while downplaying risk management (Shenzhen); the other conservative, shaped by institutional constraints and characterized by reactive, incremental adjustments (Nanjing). These findings suggest that while LVC instruments offer valuable potential as a funding source for public transit, their long-term viability depends on early institutional embedding that aligns spatial, fiscal, and political interests, alongside well-developed project planning and capacity support in real estate expertise. Full article

Property development around transit stations has been viewed by many governments as a considerable way of financing public transportation. However, despite mounting evidence of the positive relationship between transport investment and proximate land value, the stakeholder relationship in enabling complex property–transit development has received relatively scarce attention. In this study, we analyze the railway financing strategies in two cities (Shenzhen and Hong Kong) connected by the first cross-border high-speed rail (HSR) network in China. Using a holistic power approach, this study presents power direction, power strength, and power mechanism as the critical factors for each case. The results reveal that different stakeholder relations arising from different social and institutional contexts have led to varying land value capture practices. The findings of this study contribute to sustainable railway financing in three phases: First, it unravels the relationship between railway financing and property development under the context of an intercity railway program, with the intervention of state power. Second, it sorts out critical elements in the implementation of the land value capture mechanism, especially institutional factors such as the role of the transit agency. Third, it directs a flexible development of the land value capture theory to cope with foreseeable problems such as land resource scarcity, institutional complexity, and interest divergence. Full article