Search Results (450)

Methane emissions are responsible for approximately $0.5$$°\mathrm{C}$, or about 30%, of total greenhouse-gas-induced warming. For many countries, methane represents an even larger share of their overall warming footprint. Assessing the warming contributions of individual methane-emitting countries to global warming is not straightforward due to methane’s short atmospheric lifetime and the non-linear (convex) relationship between radiative forcing and the atmospheric concentration of this gas. This study addresses this challenge using a simple climate model in combination with a warming allocation approach derived from cooperative game theory. Applying this method, the warming contributions of several high-methane-emitting countries and regional groupings are quantified relative to the early industrial period. The analysis reveals that the commonly used marginal attribution method underestimates methane-induced warming by approximately 20%. This discrepancy is due to the substantial rise in the atmospheric concentration of methane since early industrial times. Full article

Designing fair and sustainable pricing mechanisms for health insurance requires accurate risk assessment and the formulation of incentive-compatible strategies among stakeholders. This study proposes a hybrid framework that integrates machine learning with game theory to determine optimal, risk-based premium rates. Using a comprehensive dataset of insured individuals, the XGBoost algorithm is employed to predict medical claim costs and calculate corresponding premiums. To enhance transparency and explainability, SHAP analysis is conducted across four risk-based groups, revealing key drivers, including healthcare utilization and demographic features. The strategic interactions among the insurer, insured, and employer are modeled as a repeated game. Using the Folk Theorem, the conditions under which long-term cooperation becomes a sustainable Nash equilibrium are explored. The results demonstrate that XGBoost achieves high predictive accuracy (R² ≈ 0.787) along with strong performance in error measures (RMSE ≈ 1.64 × 10⁷ IRR, MAE ≈ 1.08 × 10⁶ IRR), while SHAP analysis offers interpretable insights into the most influential predictors. Game-theoretic analysis further reveals that under appropriate discount rates, stable cooperation between stakeholders is achievable. These findings support the development of equitable, transparent, and data-driven health insurance systems that effectively align the incentives of all stakeholders. Full article

We investigate power indices for simple games with precoalitions which distribute power among players in an external and an internal step. We extend an existing approach which uses the Public Good index both on the external level in the quotient game as well as on the internal level for measuring the leverage of players to threaten their peers through departing the precoalition. We replace the Public Good index in that model by five other efficient power indices, i.e., the Shapley–Shubik index, the Deegan–Packel index, the Johnston index and two indices based on null player free winning coalitions. Axiomatizations of the novel power indices with threat partitions are presented. We also propose a slight modification to the existing framework for threat power indices which guarantees that null players are always assigned zero power. Numerical results for all power indices combined with different threat partitions are presented and discussed. Full article

This paper addresses the synergy between environmental and economic benefits in the green power trading market by constructing a collaborative game model for environmental rights value and electricity energy value. Based on this, a model for maximizing the benefits of flexible resource operation is proposed. Through the combination of non-cooperative and cooperative games, the conflict and synergy mechanisms of multiple stakeholders are quantified, and the Shapley value allocation rule is designed to achieve Pareto optimality. Simultaneously, considering the spatiotemporal regulation capability of flexible resources, dynamic weight adjustment, cross-period environmental rights reserve, and risk diversification strategies are proposed. Simulation results show that under the scenario of a carbon price of 50 CNY/ton (≈7.25 USD/ton) and a peak–valley electricity price difference of 0.9 CNY/kWh (≈0.13 USD/kWh), when the environmental weight coefficient α = 0.5, the total revenue reaches 6.857 × 10⁷ CNY (≈9.94 × 10⁶ USD), with environmental benefits accounting for 90%, a 15.3% reduction in carbon emission intensity, and a 1.74-fold increase in energy storage cycle utilization rate. This research provides theoretical support for green power market mechanism design and resource optimization scheduling under “dual-carbon” goals. Full article

Against the backdrop of global low-carbon transition, the integrated development of electricity and carbon markets demands higher efficiency in the optimal operation of virtual power plants (VPPs) and distribution networks, yet conventional trading mechanisms face limitations such as inadequate recognition of differentiated contributions and inequitable benefit allocation. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a collaborative optimal trading mechanism for VPP clusters and distribution networks in an electricity–carbon coupled market environment by first establishing a joint operation framework to systematically coordinate multi-agent interactions, then developing a bi-level optimization model where the upper level formulates peer-to-peer (P2P) trading plans for electrical energy and carbon allowances through cooperative gaming among VPPs while the lower level optimizes distribution network power flow and feeds back the electro-carbon comprehensive price (EACP). By introducing an asymmetric Nash bargaining model for fair benefit distribution and employing the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) for efficient computation, case studies demonstrate that the proposed method overcomes traditional models’ shortcomings in contribution evaluation and profit allocation, achieving 2794.8 units in cost savings for VPP clusters while enhancing cooperation stability and ensuring secure, economical distribution network operation, thereby providing a universal technical pathway for the synergistic advancement of global electricity and carbon markets. Full article

Innovation-driven labor markets play a pivotal role in economic development, yet significant disparities exist in how efficiently countries transform innovation inputs into labor market outcomes. This study addresses the critical gap in benchmarking multi-stage innovation efficiency by developing an integrated framework combining Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Super Slack-Based Measure (Super-SBM) for static efficiency evaluation and the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) for dynamic productivity decomposition, enhanced with cooperative game theory for robustness testing. Focusing on the top 20 innovative economies over a 5-year period, we analyze key inputs (Innovation Index, GDP, trade openness) and outputs (labor force, unemployment rates), revealing stark efficiency contrasts: China, Luxembourg, and the U.S. demonstrate optimal performance (mean scores > 1.9), while Singapore and the Netherlands show significant underutilization (scores < 0.4). Our results identify a critical productivity shift period (average MPI = 1.325) driven primarily by technological advancements. This study contributes a replicable, data-driven model for cross-domain efficiency assessment and provides empirical evidence for policymakers to optimize innovation-labor market conversion. The methodological framework offers scalable applications for future research in computational economics and productivity analysis. Full article

The complex interdependencies among numerous safety risk factors influencing oil tanker loading/unloading operations constitute a focal point in academic research. To enhance safety management in oil port operations, this study conducts a risk analysis of oil tanker berthing and cargo transfer safety. Initially, safety risk factors are identified based on the Wu-li Shi-li Ren-li (WSR) systems methodology. Subsequently, a hybrid weighting approach integrating the Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP), G2 method, and modified CRITIC technique is employed to calculate indicator weights. These weights are then synthesised into a combined weight (GVW) using cooperative game theory and variable weight theory. Further, by integrating grey theory with the cloud model (GCM), a risk assessment is performed using Tianjin Port as a case study. Results indicate that the higher-risk indicators for Tianjin Port include vessel traffic density, safety of berthing/unberthing operations, safety of cargo transfer operations, safety of pipeline transfer operations, psychological resilience, proficiency of pilots and captains, and emergency management capability. The overall comprehensive risk evaluation value for Tianjin Port is 0.403, corresponding to a “Moderate Risk” level. Comparative experiments demonstrate that the results generated by this model align with those obtained through Fuzzy Comprehensive Evaluation Methods. However, the proposed GVW-GCM framework provides a more objective and accurate reflection of safety risks during tanker operations. Based on the computational outcomes, targeted recommendations for risk mitigation are presented. The integrated weighting model—incorporating game theory and variable weight concepts—coupled with the grey cloud methodology, establishes an interpretable and reusable analytical framework for the safety assessment of oil port operations under diverse port conditions. This approach provides critical decision support for constructing comprehensive management systems governing oil tanker loading/unloading operations. Full article

This paper analyzes the pricing dynamics of product warranties by developing a three-player hierarchical game model involving a manufacturer, an independent service agent, and a consumer. The model provides a scenario where the manufacturer and the agent form a coalition to coordinate pricing strategies, while interacting non-cooperatively with the consumer. In this framework, the manufacturer sets the product’s sale price, including the base warranty, while the agent determines the price of extended maintenance services. The key contribution is the application of the Shapley value to equitably distribute the coalition’s profits based on each member’s contribution—a novel approach in the warranty pricing literature. We detail the characteristic functions that define the coalition’s structure and present computer simulations to estimate the expected costs associated with maintenance services. A comprehensive sensitivity analysis is applied to report how changes in parameters influence equilibrium strategies and players’ payoffs. The results provide strategic insights into how manufacturers and agents can coordinate to optimize pricing, capture consumer surplus, and improve decision-making in warranty service markets. Full article

The tethered space net robot offers an effective solution for active space debris removal due to its large capture envelope. However, most existing studies overlook the evasive behavior of non-cooperative targets. To address this, we model an orbital pursuit–evasion game involving a tethered net and propose a game theory-based leader–follower tracking control strategy. In this framework, a virtual leader—defined as the geometric center of four followers—engages in a zero-sum game with the evader. An adaptive dynamic programming method is employed to handle input saturation and compute the Nash Equilibrium strategy. In the follower formation tracking phase, a synchronous distributed model predictive control approach is proposed to update all followers’ control simultaneously, ensuring accurate tracking while meeting safety constraints. The feasibility and stability of the proposed method are theoretically analyzed. Additionally, a body-fixed reference frame is introduced to reduce the capture angle. Simulation results show that the proposed strategy successfully captures the target and outperforms existing methods in both formation keeping and control efficiency. Full article

Non-cooperative games in normal form are specified by a player set, sets of player strategies, and payoff functions. Cooperative games, meanwhile, are specified by a player set and a worth function that maps coalitions of players to payoffs they can feasibly achieve. Although these games study distinct aspects of social behavior, this paper proposes a novel attempt at relating the two models. In particular, cooperative games may be represented by a non-cooperative game in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When these coalitions play against one another, the equilibrium payoffs for each coalition coincide with what is predicted by the worth function. This paper proves sufficient conditions under which cooperative games can be represented by non-cooperative games. This paper finds that all strictly superadditive partition function form (PFF) games can be represented under Nash equilibrium (NE) and rationalizability; that all weakly superadditive characteristic function form (CFF) games can be represented under NE; and that all weakly superadditive PFF games can be represented under trembling hand perfect equilibrium (THPE). Full article

With the rapid development of energy transformation, the proportion of new energy is increasing, and the efficient trading mechanism of multi-microgrids can realize energy sharing to improve the consumption rate of new energy. A distributed multi-microgrid cooperative energy sharing strategy is proposed based on Nash bargaining. Firstly, by comprehensively considering the adjustable heat-to-electrical ratio, ladder-type positive and negative carbon trading, peak–valley electricity price and demand response, a multi-microgrid system with wind–solar-storage-load and combined heat and power is constructed. Then, a multi-microgrid cooperative game optimization framework is established based on Nash bargaining, and the complex nonlinear problem is decomposed into two stages to be solved. In the first stage, the cost minimization problem of multi-microgrids is solved based on the alternating direction multiplier method to maximize consumption rate and protect privacy. In the second stage, through the established contribution quantification model, Nash bargaining theory is used to fairly distribute the benefits of cooperation. The simulation results of three typical microgrids verify that the proposed strategy has good convergence properties and computational efficiency. Compared with the independent operation, the proposed strategy reduces the cost by 41% and the carbon emission by 18,490 kg, thus realizing low-carbon operation and optimal economic dispatch. Meanwhile, the power supply pressure of the main grid is reduced through energy interaction, thus improving the utilization rate of renewable energy. Full article

In UGC-based knowledge trading platforms, the abundance of personalized content often leads to varying quality levels. By incorporating embedded advertising, platforms can incentivize knowledge producers to produce high-quality content; however, the uncertainty in managing embedded advertisements increases the complexity of pricing knowledge products. This paper examines the impact of embedded advertising on the pricing of knowledge products, aims to maximize the profits of both knowledge producer and the platform. Based on Stackelberg game theory, two pricing decision models are developed under different advertising management modes: the platform-managed mode (where the platform determines the advertising intensity) and the advertiser-managed mode (where the advertiser determines the advertising intensity). The study analyzes the effects of UGC product quality, consumer sensitivity to advertising, and power structure on knowledge product pricing, and derives threshold conditions for optimal pricing. The results indicate that (1) When the quality of UGC knowledge product exceeds a certain threshold, platform-managed advertising becomes profitable. (2) Under the platform-managed mode, both the platform and knowledge producer can adopt price-increasing strategies to enhance profits. (3) Under the advertiser-managed mode, the platform can leverage differences in power structure to optimize revenue, while knowledge producer can actively enhance his pricing power to achieve mutual benefits with the platform. This study provides theoretical support and practical guidance for advertising cooperation mechanisms and pricing strategies for knowledge products in UGC-based knowledge trading platforms. Full article

Research highlights a growing demand for active, experiential learning methods in higher education, especially in teacher education. While the benefits of parental involvement (PI) are well-documented, Hungary lacks tools to effectively prepare teacher trainees for fostering family–school cooperation. This study addresses this gap by introducing a custom-designed board game as an innovative teaching tool. The game simulates real-world challenges in PI through a cooperative, scenario-based framework. Exercises are grounded in international and national research, ensuring their relevance and evidence-based design. Tested with 110 students, the game’s educational value was assessed via post-gameplay questionnaires. Participants emphasized the strengths of its cooperative structure, realistic scenarios, and integration of humor. Many reported gaining new insights into parental roles and strategies for effective home–school partnerships. Practical applications include integrating the game into teacher education curricula and adapting it for other educational contexts. This study demonstrates how board games can bridge theory and practice, offering an engaging, effective medium to prepare future teachers for the challenges of PI. Full article

In the context of achieving low-carbon goals, building low-carbon energy systems is a crucial development direction and implementation pathway. Renewable energy is favored because of its clean characteristics, but the access may have an impact on the power grid. Microgrid technology provides an effective solution to this problem. Uncertainty exists in single microgrids, so multiple microgrids are introduced to improve system stability and robustness. Electric carbon trading and profit redistribution among multiple microgrids have been challenges. To promote energy commensurability among microgrids, expand the types of energy interactions, and improve the utilization rate of renewable energy, this paper proposes a cooperative operation optimization model of multi-microgrids based on the green certificate and carbon trading mechanism to promote local energy consumption and a low carbon economy. First, this paper introduces a carbon capture system (CCS) and power-to-gas (P2G) device in the microgrid and constructs a cogeneration operation model coupled with a power-to-gas carbon capture system. On this basis, a low-carbon operation model for multi-energy microgrids is proposed by combining the local carbon trading market, the stepped carbon trading mechanism, and the green certificate trading mechanism. Secondly, this paper establishes a cooperative game model for multiple microgrid electricity carbon trading based on the Nash negotiation theory after constructing the single microgrid model. Finally, the ADMM method and the asymmetric energy mapping contribution function are used for the solution. The case study uses a typical 24 h period as an example for the calculation. Case study analysis shows that, compared with the independent operation mode of microgrids, the total benefits of the entire system increased by 38,296.1 yuan and carbon emissions were reduced by 30,535 kg through the coordinated operation of electricity–carbon coupling. The arithmetic example verifies that the method proposed in this paper can effectively improve the economic benefits of each microgrid and reduce carbon emissions. Full article

The integration of renewable energy into power grids is imperative for reducing carbon emissions and mitigating reliance on depleting fossil fuels. In this paper, we develop symmetric and asymmetric evolutionary game-theoretic models to analyze how user–grid cooperation in peak shaving can be enhanced by incorporating whole-process democracy (deliberative governance) into decision-making. Our framework captures excess returns, cooperation-driven profits, energy pricing, participation costs, and benefit-sharing coefficients to identify equilibrium conditions under varied subsidy, cost, and market scenarios. Furthermore, this study integrates the theory, path, and mechanism of deliberative procedures under the perspective of whole-process democracy, exploring how inclusive and participatory decision-making processes can enhance cooperation in renewable energy systems. We simulate seven scenarios that systematically adjust subsidy rates, cost–benefit structures, dynamic pricing, and renewable-versus-conventional competitiveness, revealing that robust cooperation emerges only under well-aligned incentives, equitable profit sharing, and targeted financial policies. These scenarios systematically vary these key parameters to assess the robustness of cooperative equilibria under diverse economic and policy conditions. Our findings indicate that policy efficacy hinges on deliberative stakeholder engagement, fair profit allocation, and adaptive subsidy mechanisms. These results furnish actionable guidelines for regulators and grid operators to foster sustainable, low-carbon energy systems and inform future research on demand response and multi-source integration. Full article