Search Results (955)

The value of personal data can only be unlocked through efficient circulation. This study explores a multi-party collaborative mechanism for personal-data trading, aiming to improve data quality and market vitality via incentive-compatible institutional design, thereby supporting the high-quality development of the digital economy. Symmetry enhancement refers to the use of strategies and mechanisms to narrow the information gap among data controllers, operators, and demanders, enabling all parties to facilitate personal-data transactions on relatively equal footing. Drawing on evolutionary-game theory, we construct a tripartite dynamic-game model that incorporates data controllers, data operators, and data demanders. We analyze how initial willingness, payoff structures, breach costs, and risk factors (e.g., data leakage) shape each party’s strategic choices (cooperate vs. defect) and their evolutionary trajectories, in search of stable equilibrium conditions and core incentive mechanisms for a healthy market. We find that (1) the initial willingness to cooperate among participants is the foundation of a virtuous cycle; (2) the net revenue of data products significantly influences operators’ and demanders’ propensity to cooperate; and (3) the severity of breach penalties and the potential losses from data leakage jointly affect the strategies of all three parties, serving as key levers for maintaining market trust and compliance. Accordingly, we recommend strengthening contract enforcement and trust-building; refining the legal and regulatory framework for data rights confirmation, circulation, trading, and security; and promoting stable supply–demand cooperation and market education to enhance awareness of data value and compliance, thereby stimulating individuals’ willingness to authorize the use of their data and maximizing its value. Full article

High-quality development highlights the importance of environmental protection and green low-carbon development. The high-quality development of the manufacturing industry is not only the key content for achieving green transformation, but also an important cornerstone for building a modern national industrial system. Current research focuses on companies and governments, ignoring the important value of suppliers and consumers. As a result, existing mechanisms have failed to deliver the desired results. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving manufacturing enterprises, local governments, suppliers, and consumers, and systematically analyzes the strategy selection process of the four participating populations. On this basis, the impact of exogenous and endogenous factors on the evolutionarily stable strategy is studied at the microscopic level using numerical simulation methods. The results show that (1) increasing any of the endogenous factors, such as innovative capability, organization building, and industrial resources, can accelerate the evolution of manufacturing enterprises evolve to smart upgrade strategy. (2) Increasing any one of the exogenous factors, such as policy environment, industrial cooperation, and market demand, can accelerate the rate at which manufacturing enterprises choose to adopt the strategy of smart upgrade. The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical reference for the behavioral strategies of manufacturing enterprises, and to provide a realistic reference for local governments to build a mechanism to promote the high-quality development of the manufacturing industry. Full article

Given the great proportion of CO₂ emissions from electricity generation in total energy-related CO₂ emissions, this article constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model consisting of vertical governments and power generation groups (PGGs), where the vertical governments include the central government (CG) and local governments (LGs), considering the externalities of different power generation modes on energy security and the environment. This article analyzes the stable strategies of the three players through replicator dynamics equations, draws the evolutionary phase diagrams, and analyzes the asymptotic stability of equilibrium points by using Jacobian matrices. To validate and broaden the results, this article also provides a numerical simulation. This article concludes that (1) a reduction in the supervision, enforcement, or low-carbonization costs of the CG, LGs, or PGGs motivates it or them to choose “supervision”, “enforcement”, or “low-carbonization” strategies; (2) an increase in penalty incomes or expenses encourages the CG or LGs to choose the “supervision” or “enforcement” strategies; (3) a rise in extra tax expenses motivates PGGs to choose the “low-carbonization” strategy; (4) a change in the externalities of energy security or the environment has no impact on the CG’s strategy. The above conclusions offer the CG and LGs with references for making effective low-carbon policies and provide PGGs with references for choosing an appropriate power generation mode. Full article

Low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology serves as a crucial pathway for developing a low-carbon circular economy and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In order to achieve the diffusion of low-altitude UAV technology in sustainable development, a dynamic model of technology adoption decisions within enterprise clusters is constructed. This model is based on complex network evolutionary game theory. The present study investigates the mechanism through which government policies influence the diffusion of low-altitude UAV technology. The research findings indicate that government subsidy mechanisms and diffusion constraints play critical roles in the diffusion process of low-altitude UAV technology. Core Enterprises and Marginal Enterprises within clusters exhibit different responsiveness to subsidies, with Core Enterprises demonstrating higher sensitivity. The intensity of government subsidies is positively correlated with the diffusion rate of low-altitude UAV technology, while the penalty from constraints is negatively correlated with the diffusion rate. These findings establish a foundation for governments to devise pertinent subsidy mechanisms, establish and enhance the management system of the low-altitude economy, and cultivate a policy ecosystem conducive to the diffusion of low-altitude UAV technology, thereby propelling sustainable societal development. Full article

Aligning with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 11 and 13), this study examines how dynamic subsidy thresholds steer environmental resilience, social inclusion, and fiscal sustainability in China’s urban renewal. Using evolutionary game theory (EGT) and system dynamics (SD), stakeholder strategies are modeled under varying policy interventions, with key parameters calibrated through Chongqing’s LZ case and MATLAB simulations. These include government subsidies (M₁, M₂), penalties (S₂), and stakeholder benefits (R₁–R₅). The results reveal the following two distinct types of critical thresholds: a universal and robust fiscal warning line for developers (M₁ > 600 k RMB) and a threshold for residential subsidies that is moderated by psycho-social factors (M₂), with its value fluctuating within a certain range (approximately 550 k RMB to 850 k RMB). A sequential synergy pathway is proposed: “government-led facilitation → developer-driven implementation (when R₃ > 450 k RMB) → resident participation (triggered by R₂ > 150 k RMB).” The study advocates differentiated incentives and penalties, prioritizing early-stage governmental leadership to foster trust, promote inclusive participation, and align with environmental, social, and economic sustainability goals. This integrated framework reveals critical policy leverage points for enhancing social and fiscal resilience, providing a replicable model for sustainable and resilient urban governance in the Global South. Full article

This study develops a multi-agent evolutionary game model that incorporates both retailers and heterogeneous logistics providers, extending beyond prior dyadic models that typically isolate either channel choice or logistics competition. By comparing scenarios with and without the BOPS channel, the framework captures the dynamic interactions between retailers and logistics providers. The results show that introducing In-Store Pickup significantly increases market demand and retailer revenue by reducing consumer waiting time, but it also produces a revenue crowding effect for slow logistics providers. For fast providers, the impact depends on their ability to adjust service quality: lowering service levels helps retain market share, while efficiency improvement enhances profitability. Furthermore, consumer product valuation plays a critical role in driving retailers toward dual-provider or hybrid strategies. The methodological innovation lies in integrating heterogeneous logistics service differentiation with channel strategy selection into a unified evolutionary game framework. The study contributes by proposing a dynamic “efficiency threshold–channel selection” mechanism, offering both theoretical advancement in omnichannel retailing research and managerial insights for retailers and logistics providers seeking to optimize logistics capabilities and channel collaboration. Full article

The integration of renewable energy into the grid has led to problems such as low utilization rate of energy storage resources (“underutilization after construction”) and insufficient system stability. This paper studied the co-evolution mechanism of power market entities empowered by shared energy storage. Based on the interaction among power generation enterprises, power grid operators, and government regulatory agencies, this paper constructed a three-party evolutionary game model. The model introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism as well as a random interference mechanism, which makes it more in line with the actual situation. The stability conditions of the game players were analyzed by using stochastic differential equations, and the influences of key parameters and incentive mechanisms on the stability of the game players were investigated through numerical simulation. The main research results showed the following: (1) The benefits of shared energy storage and opportunistic gains had a significant impact on the strategic choices of power generation companies and grid operators. (2) The regulatory efficiency had significantly promoted the long-term stable maintenance of the system. (3) Dynamic incentives were superior to static incentives in promoting cooperation, while the deterrent effect of static penalties is stronger than that of dynamic penalties. (4) The increase in the intensity of random disturbances led to strategy oscillation. This study suggested that the government implement gradient-based dynamic incentives, maintain strict static penalties to curb opportunism, and enhance regulatory robustness against uncertainty. This research provided theoretical and practical inspirations for optimizing energy storage incentive policies and promoting multi-subject coordination in the power market. Full article

Urban community renewal is an important direction for sustainable urban development in the era of building stock. Unlike traditional construction projects, the deeper involvement of residents in community renewal leads to more complex stakeholder relationships and new conflict-of-interest issues, requiring collaboration for the development of sustainable human settlements. Grounded in collaborative governance theory, this study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model and employed simulations to analyze the evolutionary paths and key influencing factors to improve collaboration. The findings suggest that there are three main scenarios of urban community renewal: government-led, market-led, and multi-participation, and that the realization of sustainable collaboration is determined by the creation of collaborative advantages, the magnitude of speculative benefits for companies, and the regulatory costs incurred by the government. In conclusion, this study reveals the strategic choices and necessary conditions for each subject under different scenarios. It is necessary to improve the top-level design of the collaborative governance of urban community renewal, strengthen the construction of information sharing and feedback channels of urban community renewal, and establish the whole process supervision system of urban community renewal. Full article

In the severe context of global warming and the energy crisis, the low-carbon economy has become an inevitable trend in global development. This paper focuses on the logistics industry, a significant domain of carbon emissions, and regards the promotion of new energy logistics vehicles as a crucial breakthrough for the industry to achieve energy savings and emission reductions. From the perspective of an evolutionary game involving the government, logistics vehicle enterprises, and logistics enterprises, a practical and feasible strategy for promoting new energy logistics vehicles is proposed. Firstly, a tripartite evolutionary game model was developed under the dual-credit policy and auxiliary policies, and its strategy of asymptotic stability and Jacobian matrix analysis was conducted. Then, system dynamics (SD) was employed to simulate the model, aiming to explore the impact of key decision variables on the evolutionary outcomes. The results show that: (1) Appropriate auxiliary policy support can encourage logistics vehicle enterprises to produce new energy logistics vehicles and promote the transformation of the logistics industry to a low-carbon direction; (2) Through the optimization of the dual-credit policy and the enhancement of the value of points trading, logistics enterprises can be motivated to produce more new energy vehicles; (3) The promotion of cost reduction of new energy logistics vehicles and the enhancing of market competitiveness can improve the willingness of logistics enterprises to use new energy logistics vehicles; (4) The government should encourage logistics enterprises to use new energy logistics vehicles in multiple dimensions. Full article

A complex network topology marked by co-competitive relationships between manufacturing enterprises can meaningfully influence low-carbon technology selection, thereby affecting the low-carbon technology diffusion process. This study develops a small-world network game model based on an optimal update strategy involving the government and manufacturers with co-competitive relationships, and then uses it to assess the evolutionary dynamics of low-carbon technology selection and diffusion among manufacturers. The results indicate that the government should identify the critical threshold for subsidies based on the carbon tax to optimize the regulatory and incentivizing effects of government subsidies. The topological structure of manufacturers’ small-world networks is the key to low-carbon technology selection and diffusion. In favorable conditions, when a small-world network approaches a regular network in terms of structure, the extent of low-carbon technology diffusion is maximized; in unfavorable conditions, diffusion is minimal. Thus, the government can tighten or relax market access restrictions on the manufacturing industry and encourage the development of manufacturing clusters to change the structure of market competition. Compared with the random selection, the optimal update strategy can increase the probability density of low-carbon technology diffusion among manufacturers and rapidly achieve a balanced, stable state. Full article

Addressing the challenges of insufficient incentives, weak constraints, and superficial adoption in promoting human–robot collaboration (HRC) in the construction industry, this study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model among government, contractors, and on-site teams under bounded rationality. Lyapunov stability analysis and numerical simulation are employed to conduct parameter sensitivity analyses. The results show that a strategy profile characterized by flexible regulation, deep adoption, and high-effort collaboration constitutes a stable evolutionary outcome. Moderately increasing government incentives helps accelerate convergence but exhibits diminishing returns under fiscal constraints, indicating that subsidies alone cannot sustain genuine engagement. Reducing penalties for contractors and on-site teams, respectively, induces superficial adoption and low effort, whereas strengthening penalties for bilateral violations simultaneously compresses the space for opportunistic behavior. When the payoff advantage of deep adoption narrows or the payoff from perfunctory adoption rises, convergence toward the preferred steady state slows markedly. Based on the discussion and simulation evidence, we recommend dynamically matching incentives, sanctions, and performance feedback: prioritizing flexible regulation to reduce institutional frictions, configuring differentiated sanctions to maintain a positive payoff differential, reinforcing observable performance to stabilize frontline effort, and adjusting policy weights by project stage and actor characteristics. The study delineates how parameter changes propagate through behavioral choices to shape collaborative performance, providing actionable guidance for policy design and project governance in advancing HRC. Full article

The insect gut contains a complex and diverse microbial community, and the composition of the insect gut microbial community is influenced by multiple factors such as the host’s genetics, dietary habits, and the external environment. The host’s immune system maintains the stability and balance of the microbial community through a number of mechanisms. The microorganisms in this community play key roles in the nutrient metabolism, detoxification, immune regulation, development, and behaveior of insects. In recent years, the relevant literature has reported advances in the study of insect gut microbes, indicating the potential applications of insect gut microbes in several fields. The aim of this review is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current information on the structure of insect gut microbial communities and complex host–microbe–environment interactions. The diversity of insects’ gut microbial communities and the functions of their gut microbes are revealed. By studying insect gut microbial communities, we can gain insights into the functions of these microbes in the host and explore the causal relationships between them and the host’s physiology and behavior. This will not only help us to understand the mechanism of action of the microbiome, but also provide a basis for the development of innovative biotechnology based on insect gut microbes. This research has significant theoretical value in academia and also has a wide range of applications in agriculture, environmental protection, industrial production, and healthcare. Full article

Vertical alliances within agricultural supply chains serve as critical institutional vehicles for deepening triple-sector integration (primary–secondary–tertiary) in rural economies, driving agricultural modernization, and advancing rural revitalization. However, sustaining alliance stability constitutes a complex dynamic process wherein inadequate stakeholder engagement and collaborative failures frequently precipitate alliance instability or even dissolution. Existing scholarship exhibits limited systematic examination of the micro-mechanisms and regulatory pathways through which multi-agent strategic interactions affect alliance stability from a dynamic evolutionary perspective. To address this gap, this research focuses on China’s core agricultural innovation vehicle—the Agricultural Industrialization Consortium—and examines the tripartite structure of “Leading Enterprise–Family Farm–Integrated Agricultural Service Providers.” We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model to systematically analyze (1) the influence mechanisms governing cooperative strategy selection, and (2) the regulatory effects of key parameters on consortium stability through strategic stability analysis and multi-scenario simulations. Our key findings are as follows: Four strategic equilibrium scenarios emerge under specific conditions, with synergistic parameter optimization constituting the fundamental driver of alliance stability. Specific mechanisms are as follows: (i) compensation mechanisms effectively mobilize leading enterprises under widespread defection, though excessive penalties erode reciprocity principles; (ii) strategic reductions in benefit sharing ratios coupled with moderate factor value-added coefficients are critical for reversing leading enterprises’ defection; (iii) dual adjustment of cost sharing and benefit sharing coefficients is necessary to resolve bilateral defection dilemmas; and (iv) synchronized optimization of compensation, cost sharing, benefit sharing, and value-added parameters represents the sole pathway to achieving stable (1,1,1) full-cooperation equilibrium. Critical barriers include threshold effects in benefit sharing ratios (defection triggers when shared benefits > cooperative benefits) and the inherent trade-off between penalty intensity and alliance resilience. Consequently, policy interventions must balance immediate constraints with long-term cooperative sustainability. This study extends the application of evolutionary game theory in agricultural organization research by revealing the micro-level mechanisms underlying alliance stability and providing a novel analytical framework for addressing the ‘strategy–equilibrium’ paradox in multi-agent cooperation. Our work not only offers new theoretical perspectives and methodological support for understanding the dynamic stability mechanisms of agricultural vertical alliances but also establishes a substantive theoretical foundation for optimizing consortium governance and promoting long-term alliance stability. Full article

Monkeypox virus (MPXV) experienced an unprecedented global outbreak in 2022, characterized by a significant departure from historical patterns: a rapid spread of the epidemic to more than 110 non-traditional endemic countries, with more than 90,000 confirmed cases; a fundamental shift in the mode of transmission, with human-to-human transmission (especially among men who have sex with men (MSM)) becoming the dominant route (95.2%); and genetic sequencing revealing a key adaptive mutation in a novel evolutionary branch (Clade IIb) that triggered the outbreak. These features highlight the significant evolution of MPXV in terms of host adaptation, transmission efficiency, and immune escape ability. The aim of this paper is to provide insights into the viral adaptive evolutionary mechanisms driving this global outbreak, with a particular focus on the role of immune escape (e.g., novel mechanisms of M2 proteins targeting the T cell co-stimulatory pathway) in enhancing viral transmission and pathogenicity. At the same time, we systematically evaluate the cross-protective efficacy and limitations of existing vaccines (ACAM2000, JYNNEOS, and LC16), as well as recent advances in novel vaccine platforms, especially mRNA vaccines, in inducing superior immune responses. The study further reveals the constraints to outbreak control posed by grossly unequal global vaccine distribution (e.g., less than 10% coverage in high-burden regions such as Africa) and explores the urgency of optimizing stratified vaccination strategies and facilitating technology transfer to promote equitable access. The core of this paper is to elucidate the dynamic game between viral evolution and prevention and control strategies (especially vaccines). The key to addressing the long-term epidemiological challenges of MPXV in the future lies in continuously strengthening global surveillance of viral evolution (early warning of highly transmissible/pathogenic variants), accelerating the development of next-generation vaccines based on new mechanisms and platforms (e.g., multivalent mRNAs), and resolving the vaccine accessibility gap through global collaboration to build an integrated defense system of “Surveillance, Research and Development, and Equitable Vaccination,” through global collaboration to address the vaccine accessibility gap. Full article

With the rapid development of data technologies, the high privacy sensitivity of big data in healthcare imposes higher demands on its security supervision. This paper analyzes the interactive dynamics between the behaviors of regulators and regulated entities, aiming to explore the symmetry and balance between the utilization and protection of big data in healthcare in China. A two-party evolutionary game model between regulators and regulated entities is constructed and refined by incorporating herding preference utility coefficients, and simulation analyses are performed using MATLAB. Furthermore, the main models and differences in health data regulation among the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and China are discussed for broader relevance. This study finds that the fine amount imposed on regulated entities during process supervision has a significant impact on their behavior, yet it cannot eliminate unstable fluctuations in the system. Reducing the prevention costs of regulated entities is the fundamental approach for the system to achieve an equilibrium state of maximum social welfare. Herding preference utility enhances system stability, and when this utility is sufficiently strong, it may even eliminate unstable fluctuations in the system. It is suggested that regulators should carefully consider the prevention costs of regulated entities when proposing prevention requirements, implement subsidy policies when necessary, explore a new model of multi-stakeholder collaborative supervision, enhance the risk awareness of relevant organizations, and strengthen publicity and guidance, thereby achieving the goal of big data security supervision in healthcare. Full article