Search Results (5)

Advances in quantum computing have created a serious threat to modern asymmetric cryptosystems protecting heterogeneous critical information infrastructures (CIIs). During this transition period, the primary threat is the “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL) temporal strategy of attackers, which requires the forced migration of CIIs to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms. However, such migration is associated with nonlinear “technological friction.” This will manifest as a drop in the performance of legacy systems, such as SCADA. In the context of deep cross-industry integration, this can trigger avalanche-like cascading CII failures. This article presents a model of a zero-sum differential game between a CII defender and an attacker (APT group). Using Pontryagin’s maximum principle and the Forward–Backward Sweep Method (FBSM) iterative algorithm, a saddle point was found that determines the equilibrium trajectories of limited resource allocation over a given planning horizon for the CII transition to PQC. The results of the computational experiment demonstrated that isolated sectoral migration is ineffective. It is shown that optimal control requires cross-sector synchronization to prevent cascading degradation of the CII. The proposed mathematical framework provides a practical toolkit for strategic IT budget planning and national security risk management in anticipation of quantum supremacy (Q-Day). Full article

Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is critical for securing resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) devices against the “harvest-now, decrypt-later” threat. While ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber) has been standardized under FIPS 203 for general encryption, these devices often operate on unreliable networks suffering from high latency and packet loss. Our recent systematic review identified a critical gap that existing research overwhelmingly focuses on Transport Layer Security (TLS). This leaves the resilience of lightweight protocols like MQTT and CoAP under challenging network conditions largely unexplored. This paper introduces PQC-IoTNet, a novel Software-in-the-Loop (SITL) framework to address this gap. Our three-tier architecture integrates a Python-based IoT client with kernel-level emulation to test the full protocol stack. Validation results comparing Kyber and ECC demonstrate the framework’s ability to capture critical performance cliffs caused by TCP retransmissions. Notably, the framework revealed that while Kyber maintained an 18% speed advantage over ECC at 5% packet loss, both protocols experienced nonlinear latency spikes. This work provides a reproducible blueprint to identify operational boundaries and select resilient protocols for secure IoT systems. Full article

Quantum computing threatens the security foundations of global financial systems, exposing long-lived data and signed digital assets to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” attacks. While the timeline for cryptographically relevant quantum computers remains uncertain, regulatory signals from the USA, UK, EU, Canada, and Australia converge: financial institutions and payment infrastructures must begin migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) now to preserve confidentiality, integrity, and systemic stability. This paper maps emerging standards and roadmaps, contrasting binding requirements like the EU’s DORA crypto-agility provisions with non-binding guidance from NIST, ENISA, and ETSI. Despite a shared intent to secure high-risk use cases by 2030–2031 and complete migration by 2035, divergences in enforcement and milestones create uncertainty for cross-border banks and financial market infrastructures. In parallel, technical adoption is advancing: major browsers, cryptographic libraries (OpenSSL/BoringSSL), and CDNs (e.g., AWS CloudFront) have deployed hybrid PQC key exchange in TLS 1.3, proving confidentiality defenses are viable at internet scale. The paper synthesizes historical transition lessons, sector-specific regulatory drivers, and operational constraints in payment infrastructures to derive a new, principle-based migration: crypto-agility, risk-prioritized scoping, hybrid deployment, vendor and supply-chain alignment, independent testing, and proactive supervisory engagement. Acting now reduces long-tail exposure and ensures readiness for imminent compliance and interoperability deadlines. Full article

Telecommunication infrastructures rely on cryptographic protocols designed for long-term confidentiality, yet data exchanged today faces future exposure when adversaries acquire quantum or large-scale computational capabilities. This harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) threat transforms persistent communication records into time-dependent vulnerabilities. We model HNDL as a temporal cybersecurity risk, formalizing the adversarial process of deferred decryption and quantifying its impact across sectors with varying confidentiality requirements. Our framework evaluates how delayed post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration amplifies exposure and how hybrid key exchange and forward-secure mechanisms mitigate it. Results show that high-retention sectors such as satellite and health networks face exposure windows extending decades under delayed PQC adoption, while hybrid and forward-secure approaches reduce this risk horizon by over two-thirds. We demonstrate that temporal exposure is a measurable function of data longevity and migration readiness, introducing a network-centric model linking quantum vulnerability to communication performance and governance. Our findings underscore the urgent need for crypto-agile infrastructures that maintain confidentiality as a continuous assurance process throughout the quantum transition. Full article

The efficiency of Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms and the advancement of quantum computers implies that the cryptography used until now to protect one’s privacy is potentially vulnerable to retrospective decryption, also known as the harvest now, decrypt later attack in the near future. This dissertation proposes an overview of the cryptographic schemes used by Tor, highlighting the non-quantum-resistant ones and introducing theoretical performance assessment methods of a local Tor network. The measurement is divided into three phases. We start with benchmarking a local Tor network simulation on constrained devices to isolate the time taken by classical cryptography processes. Secondly, the analysis incorporates existing benchmarks of quantum-secure algorithms and compares these performances on the devices. Lastly, the estimation of overhead is calculated by replacing the measured times of traditional cryptography with the times recorded for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) execution within the specified Tor environment. By focusing on the replaceable cryptographic components, using theoretical estimations, and leveraging existing benchmarks, valuable insights into the potential impact of PQC can be obtained without needing to implement it fully. Full article