Search Results (4)

This study focusses on non-adverbial uses of lá in European Portuguese, whose exact meaning contribution still remains an open research question. Applying a multidimensional semantics framework, the central claim is that non-adverbial uses of lá represent use-conditional items. Passing the standard tests suggested in the literature, they thus do not contribute to the truth conditions of an utterance but specify particular use conditions. It is argued that they are felicitously used if a speaker wants to convey illocutionary modification, which pragmatically leads to mitigation or reinforcement effects. Diachronically, substantiated by historical data from the Corpus do Português, use-conditional lá is argued to be a product of a pragmaticalization process that led to so-called pragmatic fission at some point, i.e., to the polysemy of two synchronically available configurations of a truth-conditional and a use-conditional lá. Full article

This paper describes the lexicalization processes of the expositive adverb yijing in Chinese, taking the view that the lexicalization of yijing has been achieved by both syntactic and semantic–pragmatic contexts. There are two key processes: the grammaticalization of jing is the key factor for reanalysis of the structure yijing. Originally, jing could only be combined with NP. In the structure “yi + jing + NP experiences”, jing acquired the context in which it was possible to combine with VP. When the VP was an active situation, jing was grammaticalized into a manner adverb, while when VP was a semelfactive situation, jing, the same with yi, became a state adverb for the past tense and perfect aspect. The lexicalization of yijing contains two processes, namely reanalysis and cohesion. In the structure “yi_{[relative time]} + jing +VP”, when there were complex elements, it was reanalyzed as “[yi + jing] + VP”, where yijing functioned as a coordinate structure. If the structure “[yi + jing] + VP” was in a sufficient conditional clause and the VP was an accomplishment situation, “yi + jing” in this context acquired the pragmatic function to confirm that an event has happened, but it was still expressing the tense–aspect meanings of the sentence. In the 7th century, when VP was an achievement situation and had a perfective verb in it, yijing no longer bore the tense–aspect function and was specialized into a confirmative expositive adverb for pragmatic function, and the lexicalization processes finished. Full article

Ontology is a part of metaphysics; it concerns what there is. Is it possible to consider being and reality not in a traditional metaphysical way—that is, not as a ground, an origin, a cause, but as a movement, a flux, a dynamogenic principle? I will set out from a seminal aphorism by Nietzsche, occurring in Human, all too Human (§2): “A lack of the historical sense is the hereditary fault of all philosophers. But everything has evolved; there are no eternal facts, as there are likewise no absolute truths. Therefore, historical philosophising is henceforth necessary, and with it the virtue of diffidence”. I will then move on to explore Peirce’s late thought, starting from a passage in a letter to W. James, where the author supports a “futurist” interpretation of reality—as he had in the juvenile writings—and speaks of “the reality of the public world of the indefinite future as against our past opinions of what it was to be.” This can be defined as a process of “mellonization,” that operation of logic by which what “is conceived as having been is conceived as extended indefinitely into what always will be”. Similarly, in the Preface to Human, all too Human Nietzsche writes: “Our destiny rules over us, even when we are not yet aware of it; it is the future that makes laws for our today”. I will try to read some Peirce’s statements in a Nietzschean perspective within the context of the plan to develop a dynamic and historical ontology; and I will try to read the “enigma” of Nietzsche’s Eternal recurrence from a Peircean perspective. Full article

Peirce’s view of science and religion differs from the received view and therefore has interesting consequences for how we see the connections between the two [1]. Peirce was like Karl Popper a fallibilist opposing the logical positivist epistemology of possibility of verification of scientific theories and models. The end of research in a certified truth is an ideal far away in the future [2]. Furthermore he was not a physicalistic material mechanists but a process philosopher and an evolutionary synechist [3]. This means that he thought that mind and matter was connected in a continuum and that matter has some internal living qualities, because he did not believe that the world is ruled by absolute precisely determinable laws that somehow existed before the manifest universe in time and space came to be [4]. A further problem with the mechanicism of classical physics was that the time concept in Newton’s theory of motion was reversible. Time had no arrow. But in Peirce’s cosmogony change is at the basis as Firstness is imbued with the tendency to take habits and time therefore has an arrow and is irreversible and therefore what the laws manifested as the universe develop. This was unthinkable from a mechanical point of view. But Prigogine and Stengers [5]—in there development of non-equilibrium thermodynamics based on Boltzmann’s probability interpretation of thermodynamics—got irreversibility accepted as the basic process in physical ontology and in 2013 the recognized physicist Lee Smolin published the book Time Reborn [6] where he accepts Peirce’s as well as Prigogine’s views on the nature of time, change and law, which was a big change in foundational conception og physics. In contrast to Smolin and Prigogine Peirce also grounds his philosophical framework in phenomenology. He is inspired by German idealism and Naturphilosophie especially Hegel and Schelling though he is also a kind of empiricist. This makes him a kind of process objective idealist; but a very special one. In the tradition of Aristoteles, Hegel and Kant he worked out system of basic categories that had deep influence on his Cosmogony [4]. Full article