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Keywords = unionized oligopoly

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8 pages, 428 KB  
Article
Managerial Delegation and Conflicting Interest in Unionized Duopoly with Firm Heterogeneity
by Shih-Shen Chen, Po-Sheng Ko, Chien-Shu Tsai and Jen-Yao Lee
Mathematics 2022, 10(22), 4201; https://doi.org/10.3390/math10224201 - 10 Nov 2022
Cited by 3 | Viewed by 1650
Abstract
This paper utilized a three-stage dynamic game to analyze the conflicts of interest between stakeholders caused by firm heterogeneity. We show that the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the higher the sales delegation incentive given. The firm’s heterogeneity scale will cause industry profit, [...] Read more.
This paper utilized a three-stage dynamic game to analyze the conflicts of interest between stakeholders caused by firm heterogeneity. We show that the higher the degree of heterogeneity, the higher the sales delegation incentive given. The firm’s heterogeneity scale will cause industry profit, union utility, consumer surplus and manager bonus conflicts of interest. Furthermore, the intensity of conflict is lower between the industry and the union than between the industry and consumer and between the industry and manager if the degree of heterogeneity is relatively small. Full article
(This article belongs to the Topic Game Theory and Applications)
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14 pages, 439 KB  
Article
Union Bargaining in an Oligopoly Market with Cournot-Bertrand Competition: Welfare and Policy Implications
by Elizabeth Schroeder and Victor J. Tremblay
Economies 2014, 2(2), 95-108; https://doi.org/10.3390/economies2020095 - 25 Mar 2014
Cited by 10 | Viewed by 9810
Abstract
We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, [...] Read more.
We investigate the welfare effect of union activity in a relatively new oligopoly model, the Cournot-Bertrand model, where one firm competes in output (a la Cournot) and the other firm competes in price (a la Bertrand). The Nash equilibrium prices, outputs, and profits are quite diverse in this model, with the competitive advantage going to the Cournot-type competitor. A comparison of the results from the Cournot-Bertrand model with those found in the traditional Cournot and Bertrand models reveals that firms and the union have a different preference ordering over labor market bargaining. These differences help explain why the empirical evidence does not support any one model of union bargaining. We also examine the welfare and policy implications of union activity in a Cournot-Bertrand setting. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Game Theory and Political Economy)
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