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Article

Directive 2014/95/EU: Are Italian Companies Already Compliant?

Department of Economic Sciences, University of the Salento, Lecce 73100, Italy
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2017, 9(8), 1385; https://doi.org/10.3390/su9081385
Submission received: 10 July 2017 / Revised: 24 July 2017 / Accepted: 3 August 2017 / Published: 5 August 2017

Abstract

:
According to Directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial information from 2017 onwards, large companies (exceeding 500 employees) headquartered in Member States will be required to provide a series of social, environmental, and governance statements. The Directive was transposed into Italian law by Legislative Decree 254 of 30 December 2016.The aim of this paper is to evaluate the information gap for Italian companies and, consequently, the adjustments required by the new Directive on non-financial information. In order to analyze the level of non-financial and diversity disclosure, we created an assessment model called “Non-financial information score”, which records the required information as a percentage. We apply it to a sample of 223 large companies. The results (with an average NFI score of about 49%) show that, in spite of what has previously emerged in the European debate about the application of the Directive on the part of large companies, an information gap remains, although the implementation of the directive should help to fill it in the coming years. In this sense, the potential contribution of the EU directive to non-financial disclosure in Italy appears to be greater than we had expected. Thus, in accordance with the literature, this paper appears to confirm the role of regulation in improving the quality of disclosure of non-financial information.

1. Introduction

European legislation regarding the disclosure of “non-financial and diversity information” [1,2,3,4] by large companies was adopted by the Italian Legislature on 30 December 2016 by means of Legislative Decree 254, which entered into force on 25 January 2017 (to be applied starting from the fiscal year 2017).
It should be noted that, in a break with normal practice in Italy, this decree adopted a Community norm in a not entirely faithful way, introducing modifications and additions. Specifically, these include differentiation of the degree of detail required in reporting depending on the type of entity, a mechanism for imposing sanctions on non-compliant entities, and a voluntary certification scheme for those entities that are not covered by the decree but seek to enhance their reputation.
Regarding the scope of the information to be disclosed, it should be noted that points 1 and 2 of Article 1 of this Directive amend Articles 19 and 20 of Directive 2013/34/EU on financial statements and consolidated financial statements, respectively. Specifically, point 1 adds a new Article (19a), which governs the content of non-financial statements, while point 2 adds a requirement to provide information about the undertaking’s diversity policy.
According to Directive 2014/95/EU, the non-financial information (NFI) to be included is essentially “information to the extent necessary for an understanding of the undertaking’s development, performance, position and impact of its activity, relating to, as a minimum, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters, including:
(a)
a brief description of the undertaking's business model;
(b)
a description of the policies pursued by the undertaking in relation to those matters, including due diligence processes implemented;
(c)
the outcome of those policies;
(d)
the principal risks related to those matters linked to the undertaking's operations including, where relevant and proportionate, its business relationships, products or services which are likely to cause adverse impacts in those areas, and how the undertaking manages those risks;
(e)
non-financial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business”.
Concerning diversity information, the Directive prescribes “...a description of the diversity policy applied in relation to the undertaking's administrative, management and supervisory bodies with regard to aspects such as, for instance, age, gender, or educational and professional backgrounds, the objectives of that diversity policy, how it has been implemented and the results in the reporting period. If no such policy is applied, the statement shall contain an explanation as to why this is the case”.
This clarification serves to understand the logical path followed by the Italian legislature when drawing up Article 3 of Legislative Decree No. 254/16, where, apart from the explicit reference to the type of information to be disclosed, there are some very clear indications of the principle of relevance or significance (According to Article 3 of the Decree, subparagraph 1: “To the extent necessary to ensure the understanding of the business activity, its performance, its outcomes and impact, the individual non-financial statement must cover the issues ... considered relevant to the specific business”), the well-known Community principle of “comply or explain (According to Article 3 of the Decree, subparagraph 6: “Where the undertaking does not pursue policies in relation to one or more of those matters, the non-financial statement shall provide a reasoned explanation for not doing so”)”, and the principle of comparability (According to Article 3 of the Decree, subparagraph 3: “The information referred to in subsection 1 and 2 must be accompanied by a comparison to the information provided in previous years”).
The information to be disclosed, as explained in Figure 1, is broken down by topic, scope, and type. Regardless of the reporting standards adopted, paragraph 2 of Article 3 establishes the minimum content of the non-financial disclosure.
The choice of reporting standards to be adopted reflects the performance indicators used to monitor and evaluate the activities, which must be:
  • specified by the reporting standard chosen,
  • representative of the different fields,
  • consistent with the activity being carried out and the impacts generated by it.
If the company chooses to adopt an independent reporting methodology or if the indicators provided by the standard adopted are not suitable or appropriate to represent the activities and impacts of the enterprise, it shall identify them appropriately, specifying clearly the reasons behind the choice.
In this context, this study focuses on assessing the quality of non-financial information disclosure in companies obliged to follow this decree.
In order to evaluate the state of the art of non-financial information disclosure by large Italian companies, we provide a score, based on specific items concerning the requirements of the decree.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the literature review. In Section 3 we describe the sample. Section 4 focuses on the research method and illustrates the assessment model. In Section 5 we present the results In Section 6 we present the main conclusions.

2. Literature Review

Over the years, the literature on non-financial disclosure has focused on the possibility of attributing a mandatory and/or voluntary character to these reporting processes. Moreover, the impact of this character on the quality of disclosure has been investigated.
The need to provide good quality non-financial information is important in order to overcome the main criticisms that have been directed at NFI, such as stakeholders’ lack of trust in the information disclosed. This lack of trust arises first of all from the tendency of managers to disclose activities in progress and their claimed results [5,6], as well as the phenomenon of greenwashing. The latter, defined as the gap between the results obtained and the results presented [7], in reference to environmental policies in particular, appears to be able to alter market conditions and consumer preferences as a result of the opportunistic behavior displayed by companies [8]. In this regard, it is therefore possible to assess the effectiveness of the information disclosed with reference to the quality of information [9].
Regarding the issue of “mandatory vs. voluntary”, it should be pointed out that most of the definitions of “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) proposed by institutions and the literature are clearly based on a voluntary approach [10,11]. The assumption of voluntariness is also found throughout the analysis of the global spread of sustainability reporting over the years. This spread has occurred in the partial or total absence of regulatory provisions.
Several studies show that the development of CSR on a voluntary basis has been encouraged over time due to managers’ recognition of its strategic value. Specifically, this recognition has arisen from the growing attention paid by managers to new topics considered useful for the development of corporate reputation, such as stakeholder engagement processes [12,13,14].
This issue takes on even greater importance for listed companies in that, as evidenced by Wang [15], the quality of the NFI is positively correlated with the equity value of the company. The analysis conducted by Godfrey et al. [16] of the importance of NFI in regulated markets shows that the adoption of CSR practices by listed companies contributes positively to the growth of shareholder value. The consolidation of shareholder value is considered a fundamental goal by listed companies, since they need trust from investors both to receive capital and to contain the effects of any financially adverse events [17]. The effect on investors of CSR practices arises from the intrinsic characteristics of CSR, which, by adopting a proactive approach to non-financial issues, generates confidence among investors [18].
Concerning compulsory adoption, the idea that only regulation could improve the quality and comparability of non-financial information disclosure was initially widely accepted in the literature [19]. In this respect, according to a segment of the literature, regulation is preferable to voluntary disclosure, as the latter may lack completeness, accuracy, neutrality, objectivity, and comparability [20,21]. It is in this context that some European countries (Spain, France, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark) have, over the years, introduced the obligation for companies to report on environmental and social issues.
Some cross-country studies have shown that in countries with regulation, such as France, disclosure is of higher quality than countries without regulation, such as the United States of America [22].
Further studies show that mandatory reporting, resulting from the imposition of specific rules by Member States, would result in the short-term standardization of practice because of its coercive nature [23]. As a consequence, there would be an increase in the number of reports produced, as well as best practices and benchmarking [24,25]. However, the quantitative increase would not be accompanied by a qualitative increase since the use of a standardized framework would penalize the use of company- and sector-specific indicators and information [26].
Indeed, other empirical studies show that regulation is not always associated with improvement in the quality of non-financial information [27,28,29], or at least that regulation alone cannot guarantee a better level of non-financial disclosure [30,31,2]. The study by Ioannou and Serafeim [32] of the Chinese and South African contexts produced controversial results.
As with regulation, the scientific debate has not led to a consensus regarding the voluntary adoption of non-financial disclosure. In order to overcome the criticisms of voluntary NFI disclosure, several studies have sought to identify the main aspects useful for measuring its degree of effectiveness. Studies have also responded by identifying solutions that can counteract the criticisms. Specifically, the literature cites the adoption of sustainability reports [33], guidelines [34], and third-party assurance [35].
Over time, the evolution of the concept of corporate social responsibility has fostered the emergence and subsequent spread of reporting models in which financial data is supplemented by other types of information to varying degrees [36,37]. The purpose of these reports is to explain to stakeholders the qualitative and quantitative aspects of specific sustainability practices implemented during the year by management [38,39]. The newer models have abandoned the classical approach, which separates financial information from non-financial aspects, in favor of integrated models (such as Integrated Reports) that contain both types of information in order to provide stakeholders with summary data on the various aspects of business performance [40].
Over time, the increasing attention paid by shareholders to non-financial KPIs has generated a need to make business performance measurable and comparable through the use of common standards [41]. An analysis of the literature also shows that, similar to studies of the application of international accounting standards, harmonization of non-financial reporting has a high strategic value as part of investors’ decision-making processes [42,43]. In this regard, over the years, paradigms aimed at bringing such practices into the mainstream have been developed, including the standard Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). This standard has recently been modified in order to incorporate key aspects related to the various facets of sustainability and to make its coverage more complete [44]. The current version (GRI G-4) includes anti-corruption policies and gender policies and places great emphasis on materiality.
The issue of gender policies can be analyzed both internally, by introducing diversity policies, and externally, by analyzing relationships with communities [45,46,47]. As regards the internal aspect, the literature shows how the implementation of these practices is one of the most effective moves in terms of value creation thanks to the positive correlation between board heterogeneity and results [48,49].
Lastly, the literature emphasizes assurance procedures in sustainability reporting in order to grant credibility to non-financial disclosure. Indeed, it shows that assurance of sustainability reporting is comparable, in terms of its effects on stakeholders, to the financial statements certification process [50,51]. According to Bagnoli et al. [52], by means of the assurance process, managers determine ex ante their level of social responsibility, entrusting the assurer with the certification of the actual level achieved. Via these activities, managers aim to eliminate negative perceptions, for example arising from greenwashing, thus reinforcing the confidence and loyalty of shareholders [44,53].

3. The Sample

The analysis was carried out on a sample of 223 large companies considered entities of public interest in accordance with Article 16 subparagraph 1 of Legislative decree 39/10, including listed companies, banks, and insurance companies with more than 500 employees. Specifically, there are 168 listed companies (source: www.borsaitaliana.it), 41 banks (source: bankscope) and 14 insurance companies (source: www.ania.it).
Our analysis is based on non-financial information disclosed in consolidated or individual financial statements on 31.12.2015 (the Decree stipulates that public-interest entities have to disclose non-financial information in an individual statement (or a consolidated statement in the case of a group)), or, where present, in social, sustainability, and integrated reports available on websites. The analysis did not consider other information on sustainability present on specific sections of company websites. For comparison, Table 1 presents the sample divided into national and multinational companies and by business sector as follows: basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financial, health care, industrial, oil and gas, and telecommunications.
The sampling distribution is not uniform in terms of national and multinational companies. Eighty-two percent of national companies in our sample have fewer than 10,000 employees, and about 76% have fewer than 5000, whereas multinational companies tend to be much larger. However, we decided to include multinational companies in our sample in order to better understand the effect on disclosure quality in companies belonging to different social and cultural contexts.

4. The Methodology Used: The Non-Financial Information Score

The present study focuses on the non-financial information disclosed in the mandatory and voluntary reports of the companies in the sample. The quality of NFI disclosure is assessed by means of content analysis, an established method used to analyze disclosure quality. However, the content analysis was performed manually, without the use of specific software, because of the need to interpret certain aspects of non-financial information. Indeed, the analysis was essentially of a qualitative nature, based on the interpretation of information presented in the reports. We decided not to use common content analysis tools since the information to be evaluated is highly heterogeneous and, as such, is not always present in the standard sections of the analyzed reports. In contrast, we performed an integral reading of the documents, with subsequent interpretation of the information present.
In order to analyze the level of non-financial and diversity disclosure, we created an assessment tool, called a “Non-financial score”, which records fulfilment of the specific requirements set out in the guidelines of the CNDEC (the Italian National Institute of Accountants), published in June 2016, as a percentage. To this aim, five different assessment grids were developed for the following categories (or dimensions) of information:
business model
sustainability policies
sustainability risks
KPIs (key performance indicators)
diversity.
Each grid specifies the content required by Legislative Decree 254/16. For each grid, a compliance percentage is calculated by evaluating the presence of specific items.
The Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6 below detail the content of the information grids used to determine each company's score.
The disclosure level was verified for each section and points were assigned to reflect the degree of completeness of disclosure found in the related reports. A rating scale from 0 to 2 (where 0 indicates the absence of disclosure, 1 indicates incomplete disclosure, and 2 indicates full disclosure) was used to assign a specific score to each section and generate an overall completeness rating for the non-financial disclosure in each of the three types of report (annual report, sustainability report, and integrated report). The overall rating was calculated as a percentage by dividing the point score for each specific disclosure section by the maximum possible score for the section. This generated an overall compliance level based on five different dimensions of measurement (Figure 2).
The compliance level calculated for each dimension of disclosure (business model, policy, sustainability risks, KPIs, and diversity) is an aggregation of the scores assigned to each specific disclosure section listed above and is expressed as a percentage.

5. Results

In Appendix A we present the compliance levels of the Italian companies analyzed. Specifically, we present the NFI score, which is the result of compliance in the areas of business model, policy, sustainability risks, key performance indicators, and diversity.
The results show (Table 7) an average NFI score of about 49%. The highest scores were achieved with regard to the business model; this result confirms a market orientation towards the shareholder and rarely towards other stakeholders (as required by the IIRC framework).
The poor quality of information in the field of diversity is due to the reluctance of company management to engage with diversity, especially compared to other countries [54].
Similarly, the negative results for performance indicators are due to the lack, in most companies in the sample, of a sustainability control system.
The breakdown of disclosure compliance by sectors (financial vs. non-financial), by kinds of disclosure (mandatory vs. voluntary) and by the presence/absence of independent assurance is also interesting.
The data in Table 8 show a better score in the financial sector, where the diversity, risk, and KPI values are higher than those for the sample as a whole. The result is not surprising given the greater “risk culture” in banking companies and the greater confidence in financial risk assessment compared to non-financial risk.
Table 11 highlights the higher degree of disclosure compliance in multinational companies than in national ones for all variables. This result seems to confirm the responsible approach of multinational companies to sustainability issues, probably because these companies are more likely to consider the effects of these aspects on their reputation.
The Student’s t-test performed on the comparison of means shows significant differences for the data in Table 8 regarding the business model and diversity variables, for Table 9 regarding all variables except the business model and NFI score, for Table 10 regarding all variables except the business model and policy, and for Table 11 regarding all variables.
We analyzed the correlations between the five disclosure dimensions, NFI score and four independent variables: type of report (mandatory/voluntary), number of employees, assurance/non-assurance of non-financial information, and relative experience in sustainability reporting. The analysis shows a statistically significant positive correlation between all the independent variables except assurance and all five disclosure dimensions in addition to the NFI score itself.
The quality of voluntary information disclosure is much higher than the mandatory, while the quality of assured reporting is higher than non-assured. This is because companies that have not embraced the theme of sustainability reporting are at a disadvantage.
In the light of these results, six different regression analyses were performed (Table 12), where the NFI score and the percentage data for the five disclosure dimensions (dependent variables) were correlated with the following independent variables:
  • mandatory or voluntary reporting
  • number of employees
  • presence of independent assurance
  • experience of ESG reporting.
In all regressions, the very low value of the first parameter of significance (attributed to the regression model) confirms the statistical significance of the results and is supported by the high R2 values (adjusted), which specify the ability of a regression model to explain the variance of the results. Specifically, the results show that the significance of the voluntary reporting variable can be found in all six models, while the assurance variable affects all models except for sustainability risks. The data on experience seem to have no direct relation to the level of information: this result is not aligned with what is shown in Table 13. Lastly, the importance of business size (number of employees) is in line with the literature [55,56,57,58], according to which large companies have a higher quality of non-financial information disclosure than smaller ones.

6. Conclusions

This research represents a preliminary critical analysis of the impact of the EU Directive in Italy. European debate has highlighted the limited utility of the directive if applied only to large companies [59], which are already considered sensitive to the issue of non-financial information. However, the results of this study show that there is still an important information gap to fill even among large entities, with the exception of multinational companies. From this perspective, the potential contribution of the EU directive to non-financial disclosure in Italy appears to be greater than we had expected.
This allows us to assume, in contrast to part of the literature, that regulation could improve the quality of information disclosure by large companies, which at this time stands at unsatisfactory levels.
The Public Interest Entities’ pathway towards ESG reporting needs action in the field of governance, specifically policy, risk assessment, and diversity, and in the field of social and environmental accounting, specifically KPIs. These actions need to be combined with best practices in CSR.
Indeed, the best results in terms of NFI score and all dimensions of this study were achieved by companies already involved in CSR practices, such as assured and voluntary sustainability reports.
Indeed, these approaches to CSR explain the results of multinational companies, whose large size and weight in international markets encourage them to pay more attention to their global reputation deriving from the quality of their non-financial information.
Future studies should on the one hand investigate the evolutionary path of non-financial information from the 2016 to the 2017 reports, when Public Interest Entities will be called upon to adhere strictly to Legislative Decree 254/16, and on the other hand determine the qualitative differences in terms of information disclosure between Italy and other Member States that have adopted Directive 2014/95.

Author Contributions

All authors wrote the paper, but their primary individual contributions are reflected as follows: Section 1 and Section 6 are to be ascribed to Simona Cosma; Section 2 is to be ascribed to Rossella Leopizzi; Section 3 is to be ascribed to Simone Pizzi; Section 4 is to be ascribed to Andrea Venturelli and Section 5 is to be ascribed to Fabio Caputo.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A.

Table A1. The non-financial score: composition.
Table A1. The non-financial score: composition.
FirmBusiness ModelPolicySust. RisksKPIsDiversityNFI Score
10.83330.85710.83330.10000.50000.6248
20.90000.92860.66671.00000.77780.8546
30.60000.57140.66670.20000.00000.4076
40.33330.14290.00000.00000.00000.0952
50.76670.85710.66670.40000.00000.5381
60.70000.64290.66670.10000.00000.4219
70.76670.64290.83331.00000.77780.8041
80.26670.00000.33330.00000.22220.1644
90.96670.85710.75001.00000.83330.8814
100.93330.85710.75001.00000.83330.8748
110.20000.28570.08330.00000.00000.1138
120.26670.28570.08330.00000.00000.1271
130.63330.50000.66670.60000.44440.5689
140.33330.35710.33330.00000.00000.2048
150.40000.07140.00000.00000.00000.0943
160.50000.07140.16670.00000.00000.1476
170.46670.07140.00000.00000.00000.1076
180.40000.14290.00000.00000.00000.1086
191.00000.42860.66670.60000.55560.6502
200.53330.07140.00000.00000.00000.1210
210.40000.00000.66670.00000.00000.2133
220.66670.00000.00000.00000.00000.1333
230.70000.57140.66670.20000.66670.5610
240.33330.57140.33330.00000.00000.2476
250.33330.07140.33330.00000.00000.1476
260.80000.57140.66670.60000.00000.5276
270.26670.07140.08330.00000.00000.0843
280.26670.07140.08330.20000.22220.1687
290.96670.71430.66671.00000.66670.8029
300.56670.00000.00000.00000.00000.1133
311.00000.85710.75001.00000.94440.9103
320.93330.71430.75000.80000.77780.7951
330.53330.71430.41670.00000.00000.3329
340.36670.71430.41670.00000.22220.3440
350.36670.57140.58330.00000.00000.3043
360.36670.57140.58330.20000.00000.3443
370.46670.00000.00000.00000.00000.0933
380.86670.00000.41670.00000.00000.2567
390.86670.57140.41670.60000.44440.5798
401.00000.85710.75001.00000.88890.8992
410.53330.07140.00000.00000.00000.1210
420.53330.42860.25000.00000.00000.2424
430.46670.14290.00000.00000.00000.1219
440.93330.85710.66671.00001.00000.8914
450.73330.71430.66670.50001.00000.7229
460.93330.92860.66671.00001.00000.9057
471.00001.00000.83331.00000.94440.9556
480.93330.64290.66671.00000.77780.8041
490.63330.64290.58330.20000.77780.5675
500.56670.00000.00000.00000.00000.1133
510.56670.57140.66670.00000.00000.3610
520.53330.00000.00000.00000.00000.1067
530.46670.00000.00000.00000.00000.0933
540.80000.64290.66671.00000.55560.7330
550.56670.42860.00000.00000.00000.1990
560.63331.00000.66670.00000.00000.4600
570.46670.00000.00000.00000.00000.0933
580.63330.71430.16670.00000.00000.3029
590.66670.28570.16670.00000.00000.2238
600.60000.21430.00000.00000.00000.1629
610.83330.71430.66670.00000.22220.4873
620.86670.71430.66671.00000.77780.8051
630.86670.71430.66671.00000.94440.8384
640.83330.71430.66671.00000.88890.8206
650.66670.64290.50000.00000.22220.4063
660.86670.85710.66671.00000.61110.8003
670.33330.07140.00000.00000.00000.0810
681.00000.78570.66671.00000.77780.8460
690.53330.00000.00000.00000.00000.1067
700.53330.57140.00000.00000.00000.2210
710.93330.57140.66671.00001.00000.8343
720.56670.71430.33330.00000.00000.3229
730.80000.71430.58331.00000.00000.6195
740.43330.14290.00000.00000.22220.1597
751.00000.92860.75001.00001.00000.9357
760.96670.85710.66671.00000.83330.8648
770.53330.21430.00000.00000.22220.1940
780.50000.21430.00000.00000.22220.1873
790.50000.64290.33330.20000.22220.3797
800.26670.07140.00000.00000.00000.0676
810.46670.07140.00000.00000.00000.1076
820.60000.71430.66670.20000.44440.5251
830.60000.78570.66671.00001.00000.8105
840.60000.71430.66670.00000.00000.3962
850.96670.71430.66671.00000.77780.8251
860.96670.71430.66671.00000.72220.8140
870.43330.00000.00000.00000.00000.0867
880.50000.00000.00000.00000.16670.1333
890.50000.00000.00000.00000.38890.1778
900.26670.00000.00000.00000.00000.0533
910.60000.21430.50000.20000.44440.3917
921.00001.00000.66671.00000.88890.9111
930.53330.35710.33330.00000.00000.2448
940.46670.00000.00000.00000.00000.0933
950.66670.71430.66670.00000.00000.4095
960.66670.00000.00000.00000.00000.1333
970.93330.64290.66671.00000.77780.8041
980.70000.64290.00000.00000.00000.2686
990.40000.28570.00000.00000.00000.1371
1000.46670.57140.66670.00000.00000.3410
1010.40000.57140.66670.00000.00000.3276
1020.40000.42860.00000.00000.00000.1657
1030.60000.57140.41670.00000.00000.3176
1041.00000.71430.66671.00000.66670.8095
1050.50000.57140.33330.00000.00000.2810
1060.90000.71430.66671.00000.77780.8117
1070.96670.57140.66671.00000.77780.7965
1080.96670.71430.66671.00000.88890.8473
1091.00000.71430.66671.00000.77780.8317
1100.53330.71430.33330.00000.00000.3162
1110.96670.71430.66671.00000.55560.7806
1120.96670.71430.66671.00000.88890.8473
1130.36670.28570.33330.00000.00000.1971
1140.73330.57140.66671.00000.77780.7498
1150.80000.71430.66671.00000.88890.8140
1160.60000.71430.00000.00000.00000.2629
1170.86670.57140.66671.00000.77780.7765
1180.50000.07140.00000.00000.00000.1143
1190.96671.00000.66671.00001.00000.9267
1200.43330.14290.00000.00000.11110.1375
1210.43330.42860.00000.00000.00000.1724
1220.33330.71430.16670.00000.00000.2429
1231.00001.00000.66671.00001.00000.9333
1240.96670.92860.75001.00001.00000.9290
1250.43330.28570.00000.00000.22220.1883
1260.36670.14290.00000.00000.00000.1019
1270.60000.57140.08330.20000.11110.3132
1280.30000.07140.00000.00000.00000.0743
1290.33330.57140.33330.00000.11110.2698
1300.33330.14290.00000.00000.00000.0952
1311.00000.85710.75001.00000.94440.9103
1320.50000.71430.50000.00000.27780.3984
1330.43330.21430.00000.00000.00000.1295
1340.23330.07140.00000.00000.00000.0610
1351.00000.92860.91671.00000.94440.9579
1361.00000.85710.91671.00001.00000.9548
1371.00000.85710.91671.00000.88890.9325
1381.00000.85710.83331.00000.94440.9270
1391.00000.85710.83331.00000.88890.9159
1401.00000.85710.91671.00000.66670.8881
1411.00000.85710.83331.00000.61110.8603
1420.96670.78570.83331.00000.83330.8838
1430.93330.92860.75001.00000.72220.8668
1440.93330.71430.66670.80000.66670.7562
1450.90000.71430.83331.00000.55560.8006
1460.90000.57140.25001.00000.38890.6221
1470.86670.78570.66670.80000.66670.7571
1480.83330.85710.66670.70000.94440.8003
1490.76670.92860.83331.00000.50000.8057
1500.73331.00000.83331.00000.44440.8022
1510.70000.28570.58330.60000.22220.4783
1520.66670.85710.66670.80000.88890.7759
1530.60000.28570.16670.60000.55560.4416
1540.50000.28570.50000.40000.27780.3927
1550.36670.57140.33330.00000.66670.3876
1560.33330.14290.16670.00000.44440.2175
1570.33330.00000.16670.10000.00000.1200
1580.33330.00000.16670.00000.00000.1000
1590.30000.35710.58330.00000.11110.2703
1600.30000.00000.16670.00000.22220.1378
1610.30000.00000.16670.00000.00000.0933
1620.26670.14290.16670.20000.33330.2219
1630.26670.28570.16670.00000.33330.2105
1640.26670.28570.16670.00000.00000.1438
1650.26670.00000.16670.00000.22220.1311
1660.26670.00000.16670.00000.00000.0867
1670.26670.00000.16670.00000.00000.0867
1680.23330.07140.16670.00000.00000.0943
1690.23330.00000.16670.00000.00000.0800
1700.20000.00000.16670.00000.33330.1400
1710.20000.00000.16670.00000.22220.1178
1720.20000.00000.16670.00000.00000.0733
1730.20000.00000.16670.00000.00000.0733
1740.00000.00000.16670.00000.11110.1222
1750.63330.42860.33330.80000.22220.4835
1760.86670.85710.83330.90000.94440.8803
1770.80001.00000.83330.80000.94440.8756
1781.00000.71430.83331.00000.77780.8651
1790.96670.71430.66671.00000.72220.8140
1800.90000.71430.83331.00000.55560.8006
1810.73330.71430.83330.40000.55560.6473
1820.60000.71430.33330.60000.50000.5495
1830.66670.42860.66670.40000.55560.5435
1840.80000.64290.66670.20000.33330.5286
1850.46670.42860.33330.60000.22220.4102
1860.36670.00000.33330.00000.00000.1400
1870.26670.00000.33330.00000.00000.1200
1880.26670.00000.16670.00000.00000.0867
1890.16670.00000.16670.00000.00000.0667
1900.80000.92860.66670.80000.55560.7502
1910.93330.92860.75001.00000.83330.8890
1920.70000.78570.66670.80000.00000.5905
1931.00000.92860.66671.00000.88890.8968
1941.00001.00000.75001.00000.83330.9167
1950.96671.00000.75001.00000.94440.9322
1960.86670.78570.75000.80000.77780.7960
1970.86670.85710.66671.00001.00000.8781
1980.76670.71430.33330.00000.11110.3851
1990.90000.85710.66671.00001.00000.8848
2000.73330.64290.66670.10000.55560.5397
2010.93331.00000.66670.80001.00000.8800
2020.80000.71430.66671.00000.77780.7917
2030.96670.71430.66671.00000.66670.8029
2040.56670.14290.08330.00000.00000.1586
2050.80000.71430.58331.00001.00000.8195
2060.66670.71430.50000.20000.77780.5717
2071.00001.00000.66671.00001.00000.9333
2080.96670.85710.66671.00000.77780.8537
2090.63330.85710.66670.60000.22220.5959
2100.96670.78570.66670.90000.77780.8194
2110.60001.00000.66671.00001.00000.8533
2120.93330.71430.66671.00000.77780.8184
2131.00001.00000.75001.00000.94440.9389
2140.96670.71430.66671.00000.77780.8251
2150.50000.57140.66670.00000.44440.4365
2160.96670.57140.66671.00000.77780.7965
2171.00001.00000.75001.00001.00000.9500
2180.90000.78570.66670.80000.55560.7416
2190.93330.71430.66671.00001.00000.8629
2200.33330.57140.33330.00000.00000.2476
2211.00001.00000.75001.00000.88890.9278
2221.00001.00000.83331.00001.00000.9667
2230.73330.71430.66670.00000.83330.5895

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Figure 1. Information to be disclosed.
Figure 1. Information to be disclosed.
Sustainability 09 01385 g001
Figure 2. Compliance level in non-financial scores.
Figure 2. Compliance level in non-financial scores.
Sustainability 09 01385 g002
Table 1. Sampling.
Table 1. Sampling.
SectorsNationalMultinationalNationalMultinational
Number of CompaniesAverage Number of Employees *
Basic materials411372155,407
Consumer goods134965889,628
Consumer services2241974105,832
Health care11512,38762,818
Industrial52167466426,075
Oil & Gas143992992,331
Telecommunications18117,8994880
Banks and Financial services41085600
Insurance14024,6600
Total189349821133,839
* date 31 December 2015.
Table 2. The business model
Table 2. The business model
Disclosure
Clear identification of the key elements of the business model
Diagram highlighting key elements
Logical descriptive flow for specific aspects of the company
Identification of key stakeholders and factors influencing the internal and external contexts
Links between strategic aspects, risks, opportunities and performance
Management declaration on the sustainability of the company
Description of key impacts of the company regarding sustainability
Description of main processes adopted to achieve performance aims and relevant changes
Description of main risks and opportunities regarding sustainability issues and their trends
Hierarchy of key aspects regarding sustainability
Concise description of governance mechanism adopted by company to manage risks and opportunities
Principal brands, products and services of the company
Countries where the company operates or which are relevant to it in terms of sustainability
Markets served, including the kinds of clients and beneficiaries of the company
Description of the supply chain
Table 3. Sustainability policies and processes.
Table 3. Sustainability policies and processes.
Disclosure
Description of sustainability policy (regarding economic, environmental, social and employee matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery issues
List of all entities affected by sustainability policy
Identification of subjects/committees responsible for decision-making on sustainability policy
Reference to specific rules and standards concerning sustainability policy
First-time adoption or revision of sustainability policy
Qualitative and quantitative proxies able to represent specific targets in sustainability policy
Period within which the organization aims to meet its targets
Table 4. Sustainability risks.
Table 4. Sustainability risks.
Disclosure
Explanation of sustainability risks
Probability of risk situations occurring
Internal and external impacts
Policies and procedures required
Role of the board and other company bodies in risk management
Business risk appetite
Table 5. Performance indicators.
Table 5. Performance indicators.
Disclosure
Environmental indicators
Social indicators
Personnel indicators
Human right indicators
Anti-corruption and bribery indicators
Table 6. Diversity.
Table 6. Diversity.
Disclosure
Explanation of diversity policy
List of all entities involved in diversity policy
Identification of subjects/committees responsible for decision-making on diversity policy
Reference to specific rules and standards concerning diversity policy
First-time adoption or revision of diversity policy
Qualitative and quantitative proxies able to represent specific targets in diversity policy
Period within which the organization aims to meet its targets
Representation of diversity on the board
Representation of diversity in the organization as a whole
Table 7. The non-financial score.
Table 7. The non-financial score.
MinimumMaximumMeanStandard Dev.
Business Model0.00001.00000.6529160.2632303
Policy0.00001.00000.5166550.3374185
Sustainability risks0.00000.91670.4446990.3014955
Performance Indicators0.00001.00000.4376680.4605304
Diversity0.00001.00000.4018430.3884941
NFI SCORE0.05330.96670.4910540.3199115
Table 8. Financial sector vs. non-financial sector.
Table 8. Financial sector vs. non-financial sector.
Business ModelPolicySustainability RisksPerformance IndicatorsDiversityNFI SCORE
Non-financialMean0.6765890.5412410.4325460.4279760.3968250.495034
N168168168168168168
St Dev.0.24044270.32262720.30205060.46762560.40435050.3162082
FinancialMean0.5806060.4415580.4818180.4672730.4171720.478897
N555555555555
St Dev0.31464210.37219370.29947270.44098150.33841680.3336526
TotalMean0.6529160.5166550.4446990.4376680.4018430.491054
N223223223223223223
St Dev.0.26323030.33741850.30149550.46053040.38849410.3199115
Table 9. Mandatory vs. voluntary reports.
Table 9. Mandatory vs. voluntary reports.
Business ModelPolicySustainability RisksPerformance IndicatorsDiversityNFI SCORE
MandatoryMean0.4397570.2627770.2056580.0431190.0784890.206573
N109109109109109109
St Dev.0.17204340.27214700.22978830.15357890.17043140.1460331
VoluntaryMean0.8567260.7593980.6732540.8149120.7110150.763058
N114114114114114114
St Dev.0.14867320.17682670.14246950.31685190.26732270.1672621
TotalMean0.6529160.5166550.4446990.4376680.4018430.491054
N223223223223223223
St Dev.0.26323030.33741850.30149550.46053040.38849410.3199115
Table 10. Assured vs. non-assured reports.
Table 10. Assured vs. non-assured reports.
Business ModelPolicySustainability RisksPerformance IndicatorsDiversityNFI SCORE
Non-assuredMean0.5557290.4497770.4492230.3984380.3567710.443029
N646464646464
St Dev0.27333620.34823000.24560860.41804240.32421610.2862375
AssuredMean0.6920350.5435750.4428770.4534590.4199850.510385
N159159159159159159
St Dev0.24940070.33026520.32195480.47690720.41109060.3313904
TotalMean0.6529160.5166550.4446990.4376680.4018430.491054
N223223223223223223
St Dev0.26323030.33741850.30149550.46053040.38849410.3199115
Table 11. National vs. multinational companies.
Table 11. National vs. multinational companies.
Business ModelPolicySustainability RisksPerformance IndicatorsDiversityNFI SCORE
NationalMean0.6185200.4652300.4087360.3798940.3445030.443728
N189189189189189189
St Dev0.26263370.33337460.30873310.45019850.37308320.3141655
MultinationalMean0.8441180.8025210.6446080.7588240.7205880.754131
N343434343434
St Dev0.16951520.18279320.14110680.38306390.31441410.2051018
TotalMean0.6529160.5166550.4446990.4376680.4018430.491054
N223223223223223223
St Dev0.26323030.33741850.30149550.46053040.38849410.3199115
Table 12. Regression analyses.
Table 12. Regression analyses.
Regr. 1Regr. 2Regr. 3Regr. 4Regr. 5Regr. 6
Dependent variableNFI ScoreBusiness modelPolicySustainability risksKPIsDiversity
Adjusted R square0.8210.7590.6120.6460.7410.715
Sign.0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.000
VariablesBetaSign.BetaSign.BetaSign.BetaSign.BetaSign.BetaSign.
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mandatory or voluntary reporting0.0260.493−0.0660.128−0.1110.0420.0870.9800.0810.0700.0770.104
Size (employees)0.1230.0010.0860.0350.1440.0050.1210.0150.0810.0510.1340.003
Assurance0.1620.0000.2650.0000.1010.0500.0700.1600.1570.0000.1630.000
Experience0.0020.966−0.0640.1810.1070.0740.1700.774−0.0530.2810.0070.891
Table 13. Correlation matrix.
Table 13. Correlation matrix.
Business ModelPolicySRKPIDiversityNFI ScoreReport TypeSizeAssuranceExperience
Business ModelPearson’s correlation10.787 **0.768 **0.856 **0.795 **0.912 **0.794 **0.316 **0.235 **0.537 **
Sign. 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.000
PolicyPearson’s correlation0.787 **10.831 **0.742 **0.729 **0.886 **0.737 **0.366 **0.126 *0.575 **
Sign.0.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0300.000
SRPearson’s correlation0.768 **0.831 **10.777 **0.757 **0.897 **0.777 **0.315 **−0.0100.559 **
Sign.0.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.4440.000
KPIPearson’s correlation0.856 **0.742 **0.777 **10.872 **0.943 **0.840 **0.303 **0.0540.571 **
Sign.0.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.0000.2100.000
DiversityPearson’s correlation0.795 **0.729 **0.757 **0.872 **10.920 **0.816 **0.365 **0.0740.593 **
Sign.0.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0000.1360.000
NFI scorePearson’s correlation0.912 **0.886 **0.897 **0.943 **0.920 **10.871 **0.364 **0.0950.623 **
Sign.0.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0000.0780.000
Report typePearson’s correlation0.794 **0.737 **0.777 **0.840 **0.816 **0.871 **10.287 **−0.1050.681 **
Sign.0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0000.0590.000
SizePearson’s correlation0.316 **0.366 **0.315 **0.303 **0.365 **0.364 **0.287 **10.1090.268 **
Sign.0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.000 0.0520.000
AssurancePearson’s correlation0.235 **0.126 *−0.0100.0540.0740.095−0.1050.10910.048
Sign.0.0000.0300.4440.2100.1360.0780.0590.052 0.238
ExperiencePearson’s correlation0.537 **0.575 **0.559 **0.571 **0.593 **0.623 **0.681 **0.268 **0.0481
Sign.0.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.0000.238
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

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MDPI and ACS Style

Venturelli, A.; Caputo, F.; Cosma, S.; Leopizzi, R.; Pizzi, S. Directive 2014/95/EU: Are Italian Companies Already Compliant? Sustainability 2017, 9, 1385. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9081385

AMA Style

Venturelli A, Caputo F, Cosma S, Leopizzi R, Pizzi S. Directive 2014/95/EU: Are Italian Companies Already Compliant? Sustainability. 2017; 9(8):1385. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9081385

Chicago/Turabian Style

Venturelli, Andrea, Fabio Caputo, Simona Cosma, Rossella Leopizzi, and Simone Pizzi. 2017. "Directive 2014/95/EU: Are Italian Companies Already Compliant?" Sustainability 9, no. 8: 1385. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9081385

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