The Monty Hall Problem as a Bayesian Game
AbstractThis paper formulates the classic Monty Hall problem as a Bayesian game. Allowing Monty a small amount of freedom in his decisions facilitates a variety of solutions. The solution concept used is the Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), and the set of BNE relies on Monty’s motives and incentives. We endow Monty and the contestant with common prior probabilities (p) about the motives of Monty and show that, under certain conditions on p, the unique equilibrium is one in which the contestant is indifferent between switching and not switching. This coincides and agrees with the typical responses and explanations by experimental subjects. In particular, we show that our formulation can explain the experimental results in Page (1998), that more people gradually choose switch as the number of doors in the problem increases. View Full-Text
Scifeed alert for new publicationsNever miss any articles matching your research from any publisher
- Get alerts for new papers matching your research
- Find out the new papers from selected authors
- Updated daily for 49'000+ journals and 6000+ publishers
- Define your Scifeed now
Whitmeyer, M. The Monty Hall Problem as a Bayesian Game. Games 2017, 8, 31.
Whitmeyer M. The Monty Hall Problem as a Bayesian Game. Games. 2017; 8(3):31.Chicago/Turabian Style
Whitmeyer, Mark. 2017. "The Monty Hall Problem as a Bayesian Game." Games 8, no. 3: 31.
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.