1. Introduction
Benefits are an essential factor that push the relationship between agency problems and free cash flow. Agents have a high propensity to maximize their benefit; however, if a conflict arises, the agent will prioritize their interests. Conflicts of interest appear due to significant differences in interest [
1]. Agency problems occur due to differences in the interests of managers and shareholders in using free cash flow (FCF). Easterbrook argued that there are two causes of agency problems [
2]: (a) shareholders preference for using FCF for investments with high returns despite a high level of risk, and opting to monitor the managers’ investment decisions; (b) managers dislike of risk, which prompts them to allocate FCF for investments with low risk. It is suspected that FCF is the cause of agency problems between managers and shareholders.
Based on actual data, agency problems are not limited to disagreements between managers and shareholders but also between shareholders and debtholders. A manager who concurrently acts as a shareholder would have both the rights and control over their cash flow. Thus, they are more likely to make suboptimal investments [
3]. Value transfer from debtholder to shareholder is ensued. They utilize debt to select suboptimal investment that is oriented to increasing equity value instead of company value. This situation could lead to overinvestments based on exaggerated decision [
4]; human resource management development [
5]; over confidence [
6], and underinvestment due to moral hazard and asymmetric information [
7]; the selling of additional assets [
8].
Risk shifting, resulting from overinvestment, after debt contract will transfer to the higher risk investment. Hence, the debt market value undergoes devaluation. A manager who is a shareholder and another shareholder face less debt than they should when the beta is not adjusted. Shareholders obtain equity value growth benefits from risk shifting when a project is accomplished, and share risks with debtholders when the project fails. A contradictory situation appears when companies conduct risk avoidance and rejects projects with a positive net present value (NPV), provided that it is not significantly beneficial to shareholders. As a result, debtholders will increase lending rates and reduce lending, therefore complying with funding through the capital market. This situation results in higher premium demands from new shareholders due to self-protection in manager’s behavior, and the equity value declines due to dilution. Furthermore, in a project unable to be financed with equity, there is a conflict between current shareholders and previous shareholders.
Debt usage results in increasing suboptimal investment risk, therefore debt utilization is expected to reduce discretional power in FCF, for managers’ as shareholders’ benefit. In addition, instead of debt, dividends are fruitful to reduce FCF [
1]. Research on 669 units of observation in Vietnamese concluded that debt and dividends are substitution variables that could mediate between overinvestment and firm performance [
9]. The impact of debt is more treacherous to the company, which leads to financial difficulties and bankruptcy, whereas cutting dividends will only reduce equity value. This situation encourages further understanding of substituted factors of dividends, considering weak minority investor protection in developing countries [
4], such as Indonesia.
When a manager receives an incentive for each project, having excess cashflow in investments with a positive net present value (NPV) could result in the allocation of funds to unprofitable projects [
1]. Larger FCF could potentially trigger more problems between the manager and shareholders. Therefore, it is necessary to consider the role of substitution between dividends as a bonding mechanism, and institutional ownership as a monitoring mechanism. FCF is the remaining cash within a company once all investment projects with positive NPV have been implemented [
1]. Therefore, the use of FCF has the potential to cause agency conflicts, occurring between managers (agents) and shareholders (principals). FCF can be used by companies as dividends, to reduce debt or issue equity, or as precautionary savings or additional investments [
10].
A previous study identified free cash flow as one source of agency problems between managers and shareholders [
11]. Managers of firms with high FCF and low growth opportunities tend to invest in marginal or even negative NPV projects and use income-increasing discretionary accruals to camouflage the effects of non-wealth-maximizing investments. FCF is determined by the characteristics of the industrial sector to which a given company belongs, which have differing characteristics and business scopes. FCF differences by industrial sector lead to variations in agency problems, such that dividends as bonding mechanisms differ [
12,
13].
In addition to dividends in the FCF hypothesis, institutional ownership can serve as a substitute to reduce agency problems. Companies with institutional ownership have the capability and resources to monitor agency problems [
6]. Studies that have been conducted show that monitoring could reduce agency problems. More specifically, institutional ownership as a monitoring device, has a significant positive correlation with dividends [
14,
15,
16]. In contrast, another piece of research explains that, from the signaling hypothesis perspective, institutional ownership is negatively correlated to dividends because they make it unnecessary to monitor the capital market for agency problems. Furthermore, different industrial sectors result in different FCF, agency problems, and impacts of using dividends as monitoring devices [
17]. However, based on the signaling perspective, dividends are triggered by other companies in the intra-industry.
This paper investigates how industrial sectors and institutional ownership affects dividends. We use logistic regression to discover how agency problems and signaling hypothesis variations in the industrial sector affect dividends. Furthermore, we also test the role of institutional ownership. Previous studies have predicted dividends using ordinary least square (OLS) and generalized least squares (GLS), techniques used for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model when there is a certain degree of correlation between the residuals in the regression model. The research proposes that the differences between industrial sectors impact the differences in the propensity to pay dividends. Companies with low institutional ownership have an increased propensity to pay dividends and vice versa.
4. Findings and Results
In terms of the institutional ownership percentage based on propensity to pay cash dividends, the current findings reveal that, among companies with institutional ownership, as many as 1448 of them (53.78%) did not pay dividends while the remaining 1148 companies (44.22%) paid dividends.
Table 3 depicts the differences in standard deviation, interquartile, and mean relative between the percentage of institutional ownership in companies that did not pay dividends and paid dividends.
The data description of the percentage of institutional ownership by the manufacturing sector is as follows: (a) 34.78% comes from the manufacturing sector; (b) 65.22% comes from the non-manufacturing sector.
Table 4 shows the variations in the average flat, interquartile, and standard deviation of the percentage of institutional ownership between the manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies (see
Table 1).
Most companies, both those share DPS or not, have similar characteristics. Namely, the proportion of institutional ownership is greater than the average. As such, the ownership proportion tends to vary. The number of companies that distribute DPS has a proportion of institutional ownership that is greater than the average and more than those that do not distribute dividends. Similarly, companies that distribute DPS are more homogeneous in institutional ownership proportion than those that do not share DPS. Proposed provisional evidence is that companies tend to share DPS if they have sizeable institutional ownership and more concentrated institutional ownership structures. Further elaboration exploring the impact of institutional ownership concentration on DPS is provided [
20].
The percentage of institutional ownership in the sectoral (manufacturing or other) category was more diverse than the propensity to pay dividends (or not) category. The background of the percentage of ownership of companies in the category of propensity to pay (or not pay) was relatively more homogeneous, with a more variable percentage of ownership intervals.
Central tendency, kurtosis, and skewness of manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies show coefficients with negative signs in
Table 4. Both have several companies with institutional ownership compared to the average institutional ownership. Additionally, the proportion of institutional ownership is more widespread. In comparison, manufacturing companies have more institutional ownership than non-manufacturing companies and more concentrated ownership.
The FCF hypothesis has explained that dividend payments will reduce agency problems and limit overinvestment, thereby creating EPS growth. The correlation results (
Table 5) show that EPS and DPS have a positive and significant correlation, so to eliminate this effect, EPS is used as a control variable.
Testing the first model: Let
p be the proportion to pay dividend and
X be the percentage of institutional ownership. The equation and yield model for propensity is a logistic regression equation in
Table 5, as follows:
Dividends, as the control variable, are divided into two: positive and negative EPS. An increase in institutional ownership will reduce the propensity to pay dividends. The results show that institutional ownership, with EPS as a control variable, has a significant negative effect on dividend payment propensity; the greater the institutional ownership, the smaller the proportion to pay dividends.
Table 6 show odds ratios coefficients are 0.815 when the EPS is 4.307. This result indicates that companies with institutional ownership have a lower propensity to pay (or not pay) dividends. When the control and ownership functions are separate (agent-owner), managers will solely act based on their interests, therefore shareholders interest is not performed. However, when managers concurrently are shareholders, hence common interest appears and it will negatively affect debtholders. This situation encourages better market monitoring, according to the signaling hypothesis, and impact on non-institutional expected dividends [
4].
Managers, as shareholders, will make suboptimal investments to raise equity values without regard to company value. In this situation, the company prefers equity selection with less risk than debt. This evidence shows that companies can effectively monitor their finance with large and concentrated institutional ownership. Thus, there is no need to increase the role of dividends as a capital market monitoring mechanism. Marginal propensity to pay dividends based on institutional ownership (see
Table 7) shows the difference between negative and positive EPS control variables. Marginal propensity to pay dividends is greater in the positive EPS than negative EPS. The marginal DPS probability is greater in the middle, because institutional ownership plays a more effective role in monitoring agency problems, compared to lower or larger levels of the middle. Managers take opportunistic actions to support overinvestment [
20]. Consequently, even though large amount of institutional ownerships were recorded, the number of companies that distributed dividends remained small. This situation allows managers as shareholders and institutions to collaborate in reducing the propensity to pay dividends, even at a low level. Evidence of suboptimal investment through risky debt collaboration is performed between shareholders and managers to transfer the value of debtholders to shareholders.
Developing countries, such as Indonesia, show a high asymmetry of information, resulting in dividends as signals sent to the capital market [
53,
54]. This shows that institutional ownership support can replace the role of dividends. Most companies are owned by finance companies, invested in the form of shares. This situation results in a reduction in dividends to the market. Dividends can be used to reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders by conveying information about the company’s future prospects.
Second Model Testing: Let
p be the proportion to pay dividends and
X indicate the industrial sector (
X = 1 is manufacturing and
X = 0 is other or non-manufacturing) and
X = success is pay dividend and
X = failure is other. The equation model for propensity is a logistic regression equation, as follows:
Both sectors (i.e., manufacturing and non-manufacturing) have a smaller cash dividend proportion, compared to those that do not pay dividend. Companies originating from the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors have a greater tendency to not pay cash dividends (coefficient smaller than 1, as shown in
Table 8). Inference tests show that these results are significant.
The odds coefficient shows the ratio of probability of propensity to pay, or not pay, dividends. Propensity to pay dividends, compared to not paying dividends, in manufacturing companies was 1.3057 or 1.31 times greater than in non-manufacturing companies. This indicates that the propensity of manufacturing companies to pay dividends is 31% more than non-manufacturing companies. Free cash flow for manufacturing companies was greater than that of non-manufacturing companies. This is because the availability of free cash flow is higher than the working capital requirements; thus, increasing the propensity to pay cash dividends. Manufacturing companies in Indonesia originate from the basic industry and chemical, miscellaneous, and consumer goods industrial sectors in the 2011–2018 observation period, which had higher average earnings compared to the non-manufacturing sectors.
Free cash flow is the result of a reduction in capital expenditure and operational cash flow. Free cash flow increases with increased revenue, increased efficiency, and reduced costs. Therefore, we used the measurement of earnings per share (EPS) annually. This result was in line with previous research, which stated that each sector has different characteristics, and consequently differing free cash flows and dividend policies [
12,
22]. This finding shows support for the FCF agency theory, which states that companies in different industrial sectors have FCF variations. Hence, the agency problems that occur are also different. Therefore, the use of dividends as a bonding mechanism also differs with respect to the industrial sector.
The agency theory hypothesis of free cash flow explains that with FCF’s availability, managers can act in their own interests and put aside the nexus contract with shareholders. The company’s industrial sector has different characteristics that result in different suboptimal investment opportunities, where overinvestment can be caused by the level of risk, underinvestment in asset ownership, and investment opportunities, which in further research is developed in other company characteristics. Manufacturing companies have a propensity to pay a dividend of 31% more than non-manufacturing.
Data from manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies with institutional ownership show evidence of differences in propensity to pay dividends. This situation proves that manufacturing companies have greater suboptimal investment problems, so that the opportunity to distribute dividends as a mechanism for monitoring capital markets is greater. Manufacturing companies having greater propensity is an indication of preferring monitoring from the capital market compared to non-manufacturing. Firm characteristics affecting the FCF agency problem; because there is no equity and concentrated ownership, agency problems are not found in SMEs [
49].
Third Model Testing: Let
p be the dividend payment propensity,
X1 be the percentage of institutional ownership, and
X2 be a sectoral indicator (
X2 = 1 indicates manufacturing and
X2 = 0 indicates otherwise). The equation and yield model and results (
Table 9) for propensity is a logistic regression equation, as follows:
The test results show that the probability of paying dividends was significantly negatively influenced by institutional ownership and significantly positively influenced by the sectoral indicator. The higher the percentage of institutional ownership, the lower the propensity to pay dividends (with an odds ratio close to 1). Companies with institutional ownership had the same probability of propensity to pay dividends or not. Companies in the manufacturing sector had a probability of paying cash dividends (compared to not paying) 1.33 times greater than that of the non-manufacturing sector. Therefore, a decrease in institutional ownership and sector status (i.e., manufacturing or non-manufacturing) could increase the propensity to pay cash dividends. In the manufacturing sector, propensity odds were greater than in non-manufacturing sectors, and higher institutional ownership implied better monitoring resources, compared to the capital market. Therefore, manufacturing companies with institutional ownership characteristics had a lower propensity to pay a cash dividend.
Non-manufacturing sector companies with increasingly large and concentrated institutional ownership had a lower propensity to pay dividends. As shareholders, managers tend to make suboptimal investments that can pose a problem in the manufacturing sector by increasing the proportion to pay dividends. A large proportion of concentrated institutional ownership simultaneously reduces dividends, where in Indonesia, they have the resources to monitor. This research concludes that institutional ownership and industrial characteristics are an alternative mechanism to restrict managerial power discretion over FCF through equity. Institutional ownership in Indonesia has excessive resources for monitoring, therefore, it does not require a capital market. However, manufacturing companies with suboptimal investment problems, which are greater than non-manufacturing, always need a capital market monitoring mechanism, through dividends.
The result of the research indicates that open innovation potential acquires long-term shareholder value relationships. Companies that apply open innovation can distribute dividends continuously, therefore shareholder and company relationships able to exist for more than 60 years [
45]. Research findings show that listed companies in the manufacturing sector on the Indonesia Stock Exchange tend to obtain greater benefits of open innovation adoption, therefore the propensity to pay dividends is greater than non-manufacturing companies [
44]. However, companies with institutional ownership are not positively related to dividend, as a result of open innovation adoption. Companies with institutional ownership the propensity to pay dividends decreases. Institutional ownership focuses on short-term compared to long-term R&D activities, and innovation depends on financial constraints [
55]. This situation encourages companies with institutional ownership to restrict long-term funding, in contrast, external cooperation requires financing to adopt open innovation, the impact is a decrease in the propensity to pay dividends. Innovation is prominent in the organization due to the existence of open innovation that can improve company performance. Open innovation facilitates companies to achieve goals based on their vision and mission, through a business strategy that can achieve production efficiency and effectiveness. The change from close innovation to open innovation involves an inter-organizational network of the organizational structure, evaluation process, and knowledge system management [
56]. Culture has an important role in the organization’s improvement, especially in innovation to deal with a company dynamic environment phenomenon, therefore encouraging businesses to adapt through innovation. Open innovation expedites the achievement of corporate culture goals in an organization which consists of three aspects, namely entrepreneurship, intrapreneurship, and organization entrepreneurship for open dynamics innovation [
57]. The organizational change mechanism, towards open innovation, should appropriate several stages, namely the need for a balance in changing innovation. When the company can balance determining aspects of the organization, this will lead to the success of conducting open innovation [
58]. There is a paradox that arises when open innovation is performed by companies. When the company is successful in conducting open innovation, theoretically it will facilitate the company to achieve its goals. However, open innovation is contrary to the commercialization of innovation which requires protection to fortify oneself. When innovation is not protected it can be imitated by other companies, therefore innovations executed openly have advantages and disadvantages [
59].
The results of this study indicate that open innovation is capable of increasing company revenue due to cost reduction. The company cost of innovation requires a large investment, therefore company profit that should be distributed through dividends to shareholders is reduced [
49]. The problem of lessening a portion of dividends due to open innovation can be overcome through the relationship between the company and external parties [
50]. The organizational environment includes the company, government, and the community. Open innovation can be conducted with the collaboration of a quadruple helix. The cooperation of a quadruple helix is able to reduce research costs in open innovation, and therefore able to increase the percentage of dividend distribution. Open innovation is beneficial, both for the company and shareholder, to achieve targets and goals, and to obtain higher profit [
48]. Open innovation is a company’s effort to increase revenue and profit. Open innovation is a company’s effective strategy to obtain consistent profits. Open innovation has broad and positive implications for the quadruple helix.