1. Introduction
Public–private partnerships (PPP) have been discussed by many researchers, and practitioners have defined PPP in various concepts [
1]. In China, identified PPPs are generally defined as ‘a long-term cooperation’ between the government at all levels and social capital [
2,
3]. Although PPP is delivered in various forms, providing public facilities or services is the core of China’s PPP. Therefore, PPP is defined in the present study as ‘a long-term cooperation between government and social capital that aims to provide public assets or services, in which both sides share risks and benefits.’ PPP has been widely applied to infrastructure development in developed and developing countries [
4]. In China, a total of 9954 projects were managed with an investment of CNY 15.3 trillion by 30 November 2020 [
5].
With the rapid development of PPP in China, the ways to finance and promote the implementation of projects are receiving an increasing amount of attention [
6]. It is difficult for PPP projects to obtain support from financing institutions because of the large investment, low profitability and unstable cash flow [
7]. The Chinese government has issued documents and policies to encourage the development of PPP asset-backed securitization (PPP–ABS). In 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission and China Securities Regulatory Commission jointly promoted qualified PPP projects to realize market-based financing through ABS [
8]. In 2017, several departments proposed to launch PPP–ABS in certain excellent projects [
9]. Afterward, with the issuing of Beijing Capital Co., Ltd., Sewage Treatment income-charging rights PPP–ABS and China Fortune Land Development Co., Ltd. and Gu’an Industrial Park Heating income-charging rights PPP–ABS, the PPP–ABS formally entered the execute phase in China. PPP–ABS is in its primary period, even if PPPs have been booming in China in the last decade. PPP–ABS in China is facing problems, such as liquidity shortage, maturity mismatch and incomplete risk isolation [
10,
11,
12]. The factors that can promote success, especially for an emerging and challenging PPP–ABS market, need to be determined.
The first definition of critical success factors (CSFs) came from Rockart, who believed that CSFs refer to a few factors affecting entrepreneurs’ actions to achieve goals; enterprises would suffer from a negative impact if those factors are not achieved [
13]. Subsequently, numerous scholars applied the CSFs theory to various research areas [
14,
15]. CSFs can be explained as a management mechanism or an effective means for enterprises to obtain core competitiveness and reach success [
16,
17]. Scholars and practitioners know little about the CSFs of PPP–ABS, even if many studies on CSFs have focused on PPP itself. For instance, one study pointed out that one of the three most critical success factors in the U.K. PPP projects is ‘available financial market’ [
18]. In another paper, the ‘availability of finance market’ is one of the top five success factors of PPP implementation in Malaysia [
19]. An available financial market is essential for the successes of PPP and PPP–ABS. Although these important factors for PPP–ABS success appeared in various literatures, a gap of systematic organization of those factors still exists. Given this, the objectives of this article are to answer the following questions:
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, success attributes are identified by way of a comprehensive literature review, and research hypotheses are developed.
Section 3 describes the research methodology, including questionnaire survey development, deployment and structural equation modeling (SEM) of collected data.
Section 4 offers a detailed discussion of results obtained through the SEM approach. Finally, conclusions and observations on the limitations of this study are given at the end.
2. Literature Review
The most representative definition of ABS was from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, which refers to it as a transformation process from assets lacking liquidity to securitized products that repaid principal and interest by future cash flow through a structured finance technique [
20]. PPP–ABS is designed as financial security backed by the PPP infrastructure project’s future receivables, such as user fees and government subsidies [
21]. In China, scholars focus on two main topics, namely, PPP–ABS pricing and risks [
22,
23]. Scholars generally believe that the issuance pricing is crucial to the success of PPP–ABS because of the long-term and highly sensitive cash flow of PPP projects as the underlying asset [
22]. An article pointed that the risk attributes of PPP assets are more complex compared with general financial instruments [
24]. The success of PPP–ABS requires rational issuance pricing and effective risk management. The low quality of a PPP asset, unreasonable design of stock product, maturity mismatch and unclear property rights may cause the failure of PPP–ABS [
23,
25,
26].
Scholars and practitioners know much about risks and failure factors, but they know little about what factors promote the success of PPP–ABS. In a 2019 study, 25 CSFs of PPP–ABS were summarized as five components by the principal component analysis method, namely, effective ABS issuance and lifetime management, clear regulatory guidance, robust PPP and concessional arrangements, supportive capital market conditions and reliable underlying asset quality [
21]. However, the neglect of certain special features in Chinese PPP projects was a downside. Such features included PPP initiators’ identity and payment mechanism [
5,
6]. In a previous study, more than 90% of PPP projects were reported to be initiated by local governments; moreover, government payment was adopted in 34% of PPP projects [
5]. The local government’s fiscal situation and ability to pay are key factors that cannot be ignored in China. The capital recovery of PPP–ABS products will be affected negatively if the local government is not in the best fiscal situation [
27]. Inappropriate subsidy commitment beyond local fiscal strength increases the risk of capital chain rupture in PPP–ABS [
28,
29].
Moreover, many studies have focused on CSFs in PPP [
18,
30,
31]. Those factors play an important role in PPP implementation and are also acting on PPP–ABS in some way. For instance, a complete legal framework and mature accounting and tax standards comprise the crucial exterior environment for a PPP infrastructure project and a PPP–ABS program [
32,
33,
34]. Reasonable risk allocation and proper PPP contracts arrangement are also critical to the issuance of PPP–ABS [
35,
36]. Qualified underlying asset is a prerequisite for the success of ABS, and PPP–ABS is no exception [
37,
38]. However, the same factors are of different importance to PPP and PPP–ABS. Therefore, the relationship between those CSFs and success in PPP–ABS is a research gap. Various CSFs in PPP and relevant research area were ranked by various scholars [
39,
40]. Previous studies were similar in identifying those factors in the first place. The initial success attributes list of PPP–ABS from the literature is presented in
Table 1.
The various success attributes can be consolidated as four success factors [
21]. The four success attribute groupings, numbering from SA1 to SA13, from SA14 to SA17, from SA18 to SA24 and from SA25 to SA28, can be described as underlying asset quality (UAQ), original equity holder credit (OEHC), rationality of security design (RoSD) and maturity of relative institutions (MoRI), respectively. The continued success of securitization depends on the efficiency of resource usage and ensuing competitiveness. That is, underlying asset quality (UAQ) has a positive influence on the success of PPP–ABS programs [
70,
78]. Given the conflict of interests that may arise among investors, trustees and other entities within ABS, stakeholders ought to take practical steps in order to maximize asset recovery and value [
79]. This may be why original equity holder credit (OEHC) impacts the success of ABS since ABS depends, at least partly, on recovered asset value [
80,
81]. Additionally, investors should pay attention to the security structure, as a rational security design can help improve credit standing [
64,
71,
81]. At the macro level, the asset securitization market in China is policy driven and regulation-segmented [
82]. Consequently, the maturity of relative institutions affects the success of PPP–ABS significantly. To sum up, some hypotheses are developed, as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). The underlying asset quality (UAQ) has a positive influence on the success of PPP–ABS.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The original equity holder credit (OEHC) has a positive influence on the success of PPP–ABS.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The Rationality of security design (RoSD) has a positive influence on the success of PPP–ABS.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The maturity of relative institutions (MoRI) has a positive influence on the success of PPP–ABS.
4. Results and Discussions
4.1. Path Analysis among Latent Variables
As shown in
Table 7, the main research finding is that UAQ and OEHC positively influence (have a positive influence on) the success of PPP–ABS. Additionally, H10, H11, H12, H13, H14 and H15 hypotheses are supported, which means that there are significant correlations between UAQ, OEHC, RoSD and MoRI. In addition, the hypotheses other than H6, H5, H7, H8 and H9 hypotheses are supported, i.e., UAQ, RoSD and MoRI have a positive influence on issuance characteristics (IC), and IC positively influence the success of PPP–ABS.
The UAQ is the greatest CSF with a path coefficient of 0.381. This factor consists of the following subfactors: (1) rationality of PPP implementation plan (UAQ1), (2) stability of cash flow (UAQ2), and (3) capability of local government (UAQ3). The private sector protection clause existing in the PPP plan is important for the success of PPP–ABS. Private sector protection clauses include the minimum demand protection from the government and an exclusive clause from administrative power [
7,
43,
44]. A government minimum demand guarantee means that if the actual use of infrastructure delivered by the PPP project is lower than the break-even point agreed on in the PPP contract, then the local government shall pay the insufficient section below the appointed minimum demand [
95]. Moreover, the exclusive clause means that the local government cannot approve a new similar infrastructure project in the area of the existing PPP project. The purpose of the above clauses is to protect the private sector in the background of the Chinese strong government [
96]. The protection of the private sector would be interpreted as a sign of the stable returns of the PPP–ABS product. It is important to boost the confidence of the PPP–ABS market investors who arrange the private sector protection clause. Many scholars believe that such clauses are important to the success of PPPs not listed in a marked position [
30,
91]. In some studies, these clauses are incorporated in the factor of strong government commitments rather than listed separately [
32,
33,
40]. Stable cash flow of underlying assets is a strong guarantee for market investors in nearly all ABS products [
65]. If the potential demand of a PPP project is deficient or fluctuant, then the solvency of the ABS product will probably face a crisis. This result is explained by the importance of a prospect in the financial market [
67,
75]. Measures of remediation still exist, even though potential demands are deficient for a certain PPP project, which includes a government guarantee. However, for an ABS product, an adverse prospect may cause disastrous consequence when the relief measures possess uncertainty.
The OEHC received a path coefficient of 0.204. The attributes under this factor are (1) ownership attribute, (2) private sector with good reputation, (3) private sector with operating capability, (4) private sector with financial capability, and (5) private sector with capability of technical progress. In China, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are permitted to participate in PPP projects and account for a large proportion in PPP investment [
5]. SOEs are more convenient in financing than other companies, such as private enterprises and foreign companies [
97,
98]. SOEs have obvious advantages in terms of receiving financial support, which consists of conveniences in financing cost, debt guarantee and credit enhancement, compared with other companies that find it difficult to obtain support from financial institutions. The ‘ownership discrimination’ still exists in the Chinese financial sector, which depends on the rigid financial support of SOEs [
97]. Investors of PPP projects with strong financing capacity can cope with difficulty and can bring more stable cash flow. Therefore, the ownership attribute of the original equity holder has an important impact on the success of PPP–ABS. Many studies share this view to varying degrees. A strong consortium is an integral part of the success of PPP projects [
40,
74]. Financing ability rising from a favorable ownership attribute plays an indispensable role in forming a strong consortium [
27,
91]. Strong financing ability naturally enhances the ability to withstand risk and to create a stable cash flow, which are particularly important for ABS products [
53].
However, H3, H4 and H6 hypotheses are not supported by the model estimation. Hypothesis H3 is not supported, which may be due to the following reasons. Firstly, the key to ABS design is through the structural adjustment of credit to spread or transfer risks. Therefore, the positive effect of RoSD on the success of PPP–ABS was underestimated. Secondly, the regulatory authority required high underlying asset quality, which may lead to part of the respondents ignoring the effect of RoSD. There is a possibility that explains why H4 was not supported. Some respondents may believe that MoRI has an indirect or even negative effect on the success of PPP–ABS because of the complexity of PPP–ABS products, the difficulty of acquiring risk-related information and the uncertainty of the legality, accounting, and taxes. There is a reason why hypothesis H6 is not supported. The pursuit of the PPP–ABS is financing based on credit of assets instead of assets’ owners, but this has not happened completely in practice. Market investors keep their eyes on the credit of original equity holders, which will affect the credit rating and issuing interest rate of the PPP–ABS products.
4.2. Mediating Effect of Issuance Characteristics (IC)
According to the estimation of the path coefficient above, the RoSD and MoRI cannot directly influence the success of PPP–ABS (
p value is 0.578 and 0.937, respectively) and the path coefficient of OEHC on IC is also not estimated to be significant (
p value is 0.162). Therefore, the first two paths were considered possibly with full mediation and tested. The third path was not accounted for in this part. The standardized total, direct and indirect effect were analyzed to determine whether there is an obvious indirect effect between each variable. As shown in
Table 8, the total, direct and indirect effect values of UAQ on the success of PPP–ABS are 0.505, 0.381 and 0.124, respectively. Similarly, 0.227, 0.204 and 0.023 represent the total, direct and indirect effects of OEHC on the success of PPP–ABS. Thus, UAQ and OEHC have indirect effects on the success of PPP–ABS certainly [
99]. Path effects after adding a mediating variable (i.e., IC) illustrated that IC mediates the relationship between the success of PPP–ABS and UAQ, RoSD and MoRI, respectively, which means that, except H17, hypotheses H16, H18 and H19 are supported.
The issuance characteristics not only have an impact on the success of PPP–ABS, but also play a mediating role between CSFs and PPP–ABS success. This finding is similar to that of previous studies. For example, Chu et al. (2017), believed that the issuing duration, issuing scale and other characteristics have a significant impact on the success of ABS products. This partly explains the positive effect of issuance characteristics on the success of PPP–ABS [
22]. Furthermore, repayment characteristics are subject to the underlying asset quality and security design [
66,
81]. The results reveal the mediating effect to be more nuanced and comprehensive.
4.3. Contribution to Existing Literature
Based on questionnaire survey data, a theoretical model was developed using a SEM approach. Through factor analysis and path analysis, the relationship between CSFs and the success of PPP–ABS was tested. As a result, fifteen hypotheses were supported while four hypotheses were not supported. This analysis reveals the mechanism by which CSFs influence the success of PPP–ABS, which in turn is helpful in distinguishing the many factors affecting the success of PPP–ABS. Moreover, a further finding is the mediating effect on the relation between CSFs and the success of PPP–ABS. Consequently, mediating variables should not be neglected when analyzing the influence of CSFs on the success of PPP–ABS.
4.4. Managerial Implications for Practice
From the perspective of practice, the implications are as follows. Firstly, the theoretical model can be transferred to an assessment system for evaluating PPP–ABS projects in practice. For example, whether or not a PPP project is equipped with these success factors can be a criterium for assessing the feasibility of using ABS for financing. Secondly, regulatory authorities may formulate policy in line with the relation between CSFs and the success of PPP–ABS, and thus exert approval criteria on that basis. Finally, the findings of this study are useful for the management of enterprises engaging in PPP investment, financing and financial institutions. On the one hand, PPP investors will be aided by in-depth knowledge regarding PPP–ABS success in matters of project selection, bidding quotation and project financing. On the other hand, financial institutions will benefit from an understanding regarding PPP–ABS projects’ asset quality and risk profiles.