Rank and Wormhole Attack Detection Model for RPL-Based Internet of Things Using Machine Learning
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- A novel ML-based model is proposed for RPL-specific RA attack and SN-inherited WHA attack detection which is trained on a self-generated dataset. The parameters are optimized and characterized by high accuracy, a high detection rate, and high performance, which is assessed through standard ML evaluation metrics as well as multiclass classification evaluation metrics.
- A novel dataset is generated that consists of both RPL-specific and SN-inherited attacks in the static and mobile state of IoT nodes. The dataset is produced to address the lack of recent datasets in the RPL-based IoT domain.
- The light gradient boosting machine model is leveraged to perform multiclass classification for attack detection in RPL-based IoT.
- An in-depth evaluation of the MC-MLGBM model is carried out based on different evaluation metrics in the training (for learning purposes) and testing phases.
2. Related Work
3. Methodology
3.1. Network Model Setup, Simulation, and Network Scenarios for Data Collection
3.2. Simulation of Benign Network Models, Protocol-Specific Attack Models, and SN-Inherited Attack Models
3.2.1. Benign Network Model Simulation
3.2.2. Protocol-Specific (RA) Attack Model Simulation
Algorithm 1: Protocol-specific RA Scenario | |
1. | Input: rank attack building block, DIO control message |
2. | Output: DIO message with the decreased rank |
3. | Begin |
4. | True: DIO with an illegitimately decreased rank |
5. | If |
6. | RPL_Conf_Min_HopRankInc = 0, |
7. | RPL_Max_RankInc = 0, |
8. | Infinite_Rank limited to 256, and |
9. | Rpl_recalculate_ranks = null, then |
10. | Child nodes select the parent, |
11. | Attack instigated |
12. | Else |
13. | False: node = benign |
14. | Until decreased rank attack is launched |
15. | Network = attacked |
16. | End |
3.2.3. SN-Inherited (WHA) Attack Model Simulation
Algorithm 2: SN-Inherited WHA Scenario | |
1. | Input: wormhole attack building block |
2. | Output: attacked RPL network |
3. | Begin |
4. | True: malicious nodes form tunnel via probing using DIS |
5. | If |
6. | Receive route requests, |
7. | Broadcast high-level capability, |
8. | Neighbor nodes overhear fake credentials, |
9. | Join the node as child nodes, |
10. | Drop the child node packets, then |
11. | Nodes = malicious |
12. | Else |
13. | False: node = benign |
14. | Until wormhole attack launched |
15. | Network = attacked |
16. | End |
3.3. Raw Data Collection
3.4. LIoTN-RPL Dataset Creation and Data Preparation
Feature Engineering
3.5. Multiclass Classification Model
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Performance Evaluation Metrics
4.2. Results and Findings
- The results obtained from the experiments illustrate that the proposed model performs well in terms of addressing both the RPL-specific RA and SN-inherited WHA with respect to overall accuracy (99.7%), precision (99%), and detection rate (99.7%).
- The advanced metrics used for evaluating the multiclass classification show promising results where the model achieves low cross-entropy value (0.116), which indicates high accuracy. The high values of Cohn’s Kappa and MCC indicate that the model performs comparatively better.
- The above metrics also confirm the unbiased accuracy, which might have been present if only overall accuracy was used for evaluation.
- The proposed model outperforms benchmark research and classifiers in terms of accuracy, precision, and recall for two different types of attacks, that is, RPL-specific RA and SN-inherited WHA.
- The model achieves high performance during the learning phase, which is presented through the assessment of the model through the training set after fine tuning. The final evaluation conducted on the testing set shows enhanced performance in terms of attack detection through multiclass classification.
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Ref. | Dataset | Methodology | Evaluation Method(s)/Result | Limitation/Gap |
---|---|---|---|---|
[13] | Self-generated | An ML-based model for the detection of version number attacks in RPL-based IoT | Accuracy, precision, recall, F1 score, log loss | SN-inherited attacks were not considered, and mobility was not considered |
[14] | Self-generated | A DL model using a gated recurrent unit network-based method to detect hello flooding attacks in the IoT network | Accuracy, mean squared error, mean absolute error, root mean square error | Protocol-specific attacks were not considered, mobility was not considered, DL-based methods require high computation and memory, scalability issues |
[17] | Doesn’t apply/simulation study | Proposed to employ expected transmission count as a metric and developed trust-based technique for securing the routing topology | Packet delivery ratio, energy consumption, throughput, rank change | Mobility was not considered, uses security in the form of a chip with every node, and additional hardware required |
[18] | Simulation study | A framework for securing vehicular ad hoc networks from data transmission attacks | False alarm probability, missing detection probability, velocity, end-to-end delay | Routing attacks were not considered, limited to vehicular ad hoc networks |
[19] | Simulation study | Proposed a protocol to address jamming attacks and identify attacker nodes in vehicular ad hoc and IoT networks | Routing overhead, precision, recall, throughput | RPL-specific attacks were not considered |
[22] | Simulation study | A security model based on dynamic and parametrized trust for IoT systems | Trust accuracy, trust value convergence, model resilience to change | Not suitable for routing attacks, RPL-specific and SN-inherited attacks were not considered, and mobility was not considered |
[23] | Simulation study | Proposed two lightweight methods based on elimination and shielding strategies to address version number attacks in RPL networks | Power consumption, control message overhead, packet delivery ratio | SN-inherited attacks were not considered, and mobility was not considered |
[15] | Self-generated | An intrusion detection-based technique using neural networks to address routing attacks in RPL-based wireless sensor networks | Not mentioned | Mobility was not considered; placement strategy was not discussed; evaluation metrics were not mentioned |
[24] | Self-generated | Proposed to address RPL-specific attack called version number attack using a beacon, routing metric, and ML classification-based framework | Accuracy, precision, recall, specificity | SN-inherited attacks were not considered, and mobility was not addressed |
Network Models for Simulation | Scenarios | Dataset | Total | |
---|---|---|---|---|
No. of Nodes | Node State | |||
Benign network model | 1st case: 20 nodes; 1 sink node, 19 sender nodes, all benign 2nd case: 50 nodes; 1 sink node, 49 sender nodes, all benign | 1st case: static 2nd case: mobile | 1st case: 6250 2nd case: 7512 | 13,762 |
Protocol-specific attack network model (rank attack) | 1st case: 20 nodes; 1 attacker node, 19 benign nodes with 1 sink node 2nd case: 50 nodes; 2 attacker nodes, 48 benign nodes with 1 sink node | 1st case: static 2nd case: mobile | 1st case: 7732 2nd case: 3457 | 11,189 |
SN-inherited attack network model (wormhole attack) | 1st case: 20 nodes; 2 attacker nodes, 18 benign nodes with 1 sink node 2nd case: 50 nodes; 2 attacker nodes, 48 benign nodes with 1 sink node | 1st case: static 2nd case: mobile | 1st case: 3754 2nd case: 2357 | 6111 Total static: Total static: 13,326 |
No. | Selected Features | Feature Name |
---|---|---|
1 | src.6lowpan | Source ID |
2 | dst.6lowpan | Destination ID |
3 | dio.rank | DIO rank |
4 | dao.ack | DAO acknowledgment |
5 | ack | Acknowledgment |
6 | udp | UDP |
7 | maxrankinc | Maximum Rank Increase |
8 | minhoprankinc | Minimum Hop Rank Increase |
9 | rerr | Rank error |
10 | diointervalmin | Minimum DIO interval |
11 | dioredconst | DIO redundancy constant |
12 | protocol | ICMPv6, UDP, and IEEE 802.15.4 protocols |
13 | rank | Rank value |
14 | lost | Lost packets |
15 | hopcount | Hop count |
16 | ipv6hoplim | Hop limit |
17 | wpanseq.no | 6LoWPAN sequence number |
18 | dio.dst | DIO destination |
19 | mesgs | Message type |
20 | dis | DIS |
21 | diointervalmin | Minimum DIO interval |
Evaluation Metric | Train/Test | Result |
---|---|---|
Accuracy | Training | 0.998 |
Testing | 0.997 | |
Precision | Training | 0.997 |
Testing | 0.99 | |
Recall | Training | 0.998 |
Testing | 0.997 | |
Cross entropy | 0.116 | |
Cohn’s Kappa | 0.93 | |
MCC | 0.927 |
Model | Attack | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | Cross Entropy | Cohn’s Kappa | MCC | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Protocol-Specific | SN-Inherited | |||||||
Proposed MC-MLGBM | ✓ | ✓ | 0.998 | 0.997 | 0.998 | 0.116 | 0.93 | 0.927 |
ML-LGBM | ✓ | ✗ | 0.981 | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.1289 log loss | - | - |
GRU-DL | ✗ | ✓ | 0.99 for selective features | - | - | - | - | - |
MC-SVM | ✓ | ✓ | 0.965 | 0.95 | 0.962 | 0.159 | 0.89 | 0.90 |
GB | ✓ | ✗ | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.98 | - | - | - |
XGBoost | ✓ | ✗ | 0.988 | 0.977 | 0.983 | - | - | - |
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Zahra, F.; Jhanjhi, N.; Brohi, S.N.; Khan, N.A.; Masud, M.; AlZain, M.A. Rank and Wormhole Attack Detection Model for RPL-Based Internet of Things Using Machine Learning. Sensors 2022, 22, 6765. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22186765
Zahra F, Jhanjhi N, Brohi SN, Khan NA, Masud M, AlZain MA. Rank and Wormhole Attack Detection Model for RPL-Based Internet of Things Using Machine Learning. Sensors. 2022; 22(18):6765. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22186765
Chicago/Turabian StyleZahra, F., NZ Jhanjhi, Sarfraz Nawaz Brohi, Navid Ali Khan, Mehedi Masud, and Mohammed A. AlZain. 2022. "Rank and Wormhole Attack Detection Model for RPL-Based Internet of Things Using Machine Learning" Sensors 22, no. 18: 6765. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22186765
APA StyleZahra, F., Jhanjhi, N., Brohi, S. N., Khan, N. A., Masud, M., & AlZain, M. A. (2022). Rank and Wormhole Attack Detection Model for RPL-Based Internet of Things Using Machine Learning. Sensors, 22(18), 6765. https://doi.org/10.3390/s22186765