The Impact of Legal Recycling Constraints and Carbon Trading Mechanisms on Decision Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- (1)
- The variety of waste products and the total amount is huge, and the recycling work is difficult. This is a common problem that countries around the world need to face. If not dealt with promptly, the harmful substances in the waste products will not only pose threats to the environment but also be detrimental to the realization of the overall goal of carbon emission reduction and carbon neutrality. For example, in the electronics industry, the total amount of e-waste is expanding annually at a rate of 3% to 5%, mainly because, as technology advances, the continuous upgrading of products has shortened the life cycle of electronic products. Faced with the same problem, the European Community has set a higher restriction on the recycling rate of used products, which has made some European countries succeed in e-waste disposal. In contrast, the production of electronic products in Africa is increasing, but the recycling situation is not optimistic. Asia and Latin America have also continuously introduced relevant laws and regulations to deal with the growing amount of e-waste year by year [3]. Some studies have pointed out that China may generate 27.22 million tons of electronic waste by 2030. In general, the treatment of electronic waste is a task that cannot be ignored [4]. For the disposal of electronic waste and other waste products, the most feasible way is to actively take effective ways and measures to recycle waste products and conduct low-carbon treatment, so that not only can the underutilized parts or materials in waste products be recycled, but environmental pollution caused by heavy metals such as lead, cadmium, chromium, and mercury can also be reduced.
- (2)
- Low-carbon treatment of waste products after recycling is a challenging task. At the national level, because of the abundance of coal resources, the main energy consumption of China and Australia is still coal, which is a great challenge for the low-carbon transition of national energy [5]. For existing manufacturers, the implementation of the carbon trading mechanism has already increased their carbon reduction costs, resulting in a greater financial constraint, and the low-carbon treatment of waste products has put a heavier burden on them. It is very difficult for small and medium-sized manufacturers to make a comprehensive low-carbon transition. On the one hand, manufacturer enterprises of small and medium size are generally suffering from financial constraints, and a comprehensive low-carbon transformation requires high capital; moreover, the process of low-carbon transformation is subject to various risks, such as long lead times and mismatching of results with expectations, which can to a certain extent harm the economic interests of manufacturers. On the other hand, top managers play a pivotal role in the green transition. Compared with large manufacturers, top managers of small and medium-sized manufacturers have relatively weak awareness of low-carbon, environmental protection, and sustainable development, and are not inclined to join the low-carbon transition efforts from their subjective will [6]. These small and medium-sized manufacturer enterprises often need to rely on expensive external professional consultants to solve related problems at the request of their clients. Therefore, for manufacturers in the early stages of carbon reduction, it is currently feasible to reduce the environmental pollution and damage caused by used products by recycling used products and performing basic low-carbon treatment on them; for large-scale manufacturers with sufficient capital, a complete low-carbon transformation of product raw materials, production equipment, and processes is a desirable long-term plan. Siemens Infrastructure and Siemens Financial Services, a division of Siemens, announced in March 2022 that it would provide USD 100 million in ESG loans to U.S. SMEs, aimed at easing their decarbonization pressures. Within the scope of one’s ability, it is also a good choice to achieve a win–win situation by actively helping small and medium-sized manufacturer enterprises that have difficulties in reducing carbon emissions to complete the low-carbon transition.
- (1)
- Most available articles are limited to examining restrictions on either the recycling rate or carbon trading price by law [17,18,19,20], or the comparison among different recycling channels and models as well as the advantages and disadvantages of different carbon rights allocation policies [21,22,23,24,25,26,27]. Different from most of the existing studies, this paper considers both the legal constraints on recycling rates and the carbon trading mechanism and studies their simultaneous effects on the decision making and profitability of members of the two-cycle closed-loop supply chain.
- (2)
- In addition to analyzing the optimal decision-making problem from the perspective of supply chain members, this paper also puts forward policy suggestions from the perspective of government supervision. In the carbon emission reduction environment with a tight schedule and heavy tasks, it is not feasible to rely on the consciousness and responsibility of supply chain members alone, because in reality many manufacturing enterprises do not participate in recycling efforts for the sake of economic benefits, which makes carbon emissions seriously exceed the standard; moreover, the existence of a carbon trading market has also given rise to many gray industry chains. Therefore, how to effectively regulate the carbon emission behavior of manufacturers and maintain the stability of the carbon trading market is the key issue. As the lawmaker and main body regulating market order, the government is an objective factor that cannot be ignored in the decision-making process of manufacturers and retailers, and compared to existing research on the game between supply chain members, this paper studies from a tripartite perspective which has more practical significance.
- (3)
- On the premise of studying the impact of legal constraints and the existence of carbon trading mechanisms on the decision making and profitability of members of the supply chain, this paper also analyzes the impact of carbon emission reduction, the influence coefficient of carbon emission reduction on the cost of remanufactured products, carbon trading price and carbon emission reduction coefficient on the profitability of the supply chain system. The conclusions supplement some of the existing studies, which not only provide a reference for the strategic choices that manufacturers and retailers should make based on different market environments, but also provides a research basis enabling the government to regulate the carbon emissions of manufacturers from different perspectives and regulate the order of the carbon trading market.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Impact of Legal Constraints on Recycling in the Supply Chain
2.2. Impact of Carbon Trading Mechanism on Supply Chain Decision Making
2.3. Decision Making of Low-Carbon Closed-Loop Supply Chains Based on Regulatory Policy
3. Problem Statement
- (1)
- In the supply chain model, the manufacturer is assumed to be the core dominant firm and the retailer is the subordinate firm.
- (2)
- Assumption that the manufacturer conducts rigorous testing of the used products recycled after the first cycle to ensure that the recycled used products have a certain utilization value and can be processed into remanufactured products in the second cycle [59].
- (3)
- Drawing on the assumptions of the literature [44,55,56,57], the remanufactured products are of the same quality as new products, and are sold to the market at the same price to meet consumer demand. For example, the remanufacturing of products such as glass bottles and jars does not result in any loss of quality.
- (4)
- Assumption that the processing of remanufactured products adopts a low-carbon process, which makes the carbon emissions of remanufactured products smaller than those of new products, i.e., ; it also results in the remanufactured products costing more to produce than new products, drawing on the assumptions of the literature [60]. The processing cost of remanufactured products is assumed to be proportional to carbon emission reduction savings (), i.e., .
- (5)
- Since the recycling rate of the product may not actually reach 100% [61] (for example, many people who once used old cell phones do not want them to be recycled because they are worried about safety), it is assumed that the maximum possible recycling rate of the waste product is (), thus the actual recycling rate of used products needs to meet .
- (6)
- Remanufactured products cannot fully meet consumer demand for products, so, in the second cycle, the manufacturer not only processes remanufactured products but also produces new products, i.e., .
- (7)
- Free carbon allowances for the current period are allocated through a grandfathering system, that is, the initial amount of carbon allowances is based on the total carbon emissions of the previous period [62]. The manufacturer receives free carbon allowances for a single cycle only and these cannot be carried over to the next cycle.
4. Model Construction and Solution
4.1. Model without Considering Legal Recovery Constraints (F-Model)
4.2. Model with Legal Recovery Constraints (L-Model)
5. Model Comparison and Analysis
- (1)
- increase as the cost influence coefficient increases, market demand decreases as the cost influence coefficient increases, and the manufacturer, the retailer, and the supply chain system profits decrease as the cost influence coefficient increases.
- (2)
- decrease with increasing carbon emissions of remanufactured products , increases with increasing carbon emissions of remanufactured products , and increase with increasing carbon emissions of remanufactured products .
- (3)
- are not affected by the remanufactured product cost influence coefficient and the carbon emission per unit of remanufactured product , but are related to the total production cost per unit of the new product which equals the sum of the production cost and carbon emission cost per unit of the new product. This is due to the manufacturer producing both new and remanufactured products which will be sold by the retailer at the same price in the second cycle. If the second-cycle price of products is determined based on the cost of remanufactured products (where ), the products will be sold at a higher price than new products in the first cycle. In the long run, prices will gradually increase, which will not only affect consumers’ consumption experience but also break the equilibrium state of the market.
- (1)
- decrease as the unit carbon allowance trading price increases, and increases as the value of increases. This is because the carbon allowances obtained by the manufacturer in the second cycle are related to the production of products in the first cycle, and as increases the manufacturer tries to make the demand for the products in the first cycle greater to obtain more carbon trading revenue; therefore, as increases, the manufacturer joins with the retailer to lower prices, thus increasing the demand for their products.
- (2)
- decrease with increase in , and increases with increase in . Because when is larger the manufacturer gets higher carbon allowances , in the second cycle, in order to be able to sell the excess carbon allowances in the second cycle to get more carbon trading revenue, the manufacturer will reduce the product price in the first cycle jointly with the retailer to promote product sales.
- (1)
- When the value of is high (), the wholesale price and retail price of new products in the first cycle are lower and market demand is higher when legal recycling constraints are not considered, i.e., , , .This is because when is higher, the cost of the manufacturer’s investment in carbon emission reduction equipment and the process is also higher. Compared to the case where legal constraints are considered, the manufacturer will choose not to do the recycling work when legal constraints are not considered, so the manufacturer is not required to pay the high cost of remanufacturing the used products; therefore, the market demand for products can be increased by reducing the price of the product. Under the two conditions with or without legal constraints, there is no difference in or the market demand for products in the second cycle. This is because the price of the products in the second cycle relates only to the production cost of the new products and the cost of carbon emission, which are all determined after the production process and equipment are built in the first cycle. Thus, the decision variables in the second cycle are not affected by legal constraints. By comparing the magnitude of profits, we find that , , and , i.e., the profits of the members of the supply chain system and the total profits of the supply chain system under the legal recycling constraint are lower than those without the legal constraint, which indicates that the legal constraint set to facilitate the development of low-carbon production by promoting the reduction of carbon emissions affects the economic interests of each member of the supply chain to some extent.
- (2)
- When the value of is low (), the profit of remanufacturing a used product is higher than processing a new product, and the manufacturer is motivated to choose the maximum recovery rate to remanufacture used products. At this time, the minimum recovery rate stipulated by law has little effect. In other words, without legal constraints, the manufacturer will actively engage in recycling to maximize not only its interests but also the interests of the entire supply chain system. In this case, the minimum recycling rate stipulated by law is weak for large manufacturer enterprises with perfect carbon reduction processes; however, for some small and medium-sized manufacturer enterprises with insufficient green recycling conditions, the law can appropriately increase the minimum recycling rate to regulate their recycling of used products in order to respond to the national policy of a low carbon and circular economy, which is a more ideal situation for all parties to win.
6. Numerical Analysis and Discussion
6.1. Numerical Analysis
- Assuming , , , , , , , , , , letting and be the independent variables (, , at this point ), draw graphs of the variation of the decision variables and system members’ profits with and , as shown in Figure 2.
- 2.
- Assuming , , , , , , , , , , letting and be the independent variables (, , at this point ), draw graphs of the variation of the decision variables and system members’ profits with and , as shown in Figure 3.
- 3.
- Assuming , , , , , , , , , , letting and be the independent variables (, , at this point ), draw graphs of the variation of the decision variables and system members’ profits with and , as shown in Figure 4.
- 4.
- Assuming , , , , , , , , , , letting and be the independent variables (, ), draw graphs of the variation of the decision variables and system members’ profits with and , as shown in Figure 5.
6.2. Discussion
7. Conclusions and Managerial Implications
7.1. Conclusions
- (1)
- Legal constraints on the minimum recycling rate are necessary. When the carbon reduction per unit of remanufactured product is low, the manufacturer tends to choose a higher recycling rate. Most manufacturer enterprises will then try to achieve the highest recycling rate to maximize profits, and the minimum recycling rate by law can restrain some small and medium-sized manufacturer enterprises whose low-carbon process is not up to standard. When the carbon reduction per unit of remanufactured product is high, the manufacturer needs to pay some price to achieve carbon emission reduction as well as minimize losses. It will thus choose a lower recycling rate and, at this point, it is extremely important to legally regulate the minimum recycling rate, which can not only ensure the recycling of used products to advance steadily but also effectively avoid the phenomenon of manufacturer enterprises avoiding taking social responsibility, which is conducive to the early achievement of carbon emission reduction targets.
- (2)
- Legal constraints are not always conducive to increasing the profits of supply chain system members. When carbon emissions are below a certain threshold, manufacturer enterprises who have the ability to achieve low-carbon production will choose the highest recycling rate to achieve maximum profits, which is a more favorable aspect from the standpoint of achieving carbon reduction goals. At this time the minimum recycling rate of the legal constraint is used to restrain those manufacturer enterprises who avoid undertaking the task of carbon emission reduction. When carbon emissions are above a certain threshold, manufacturer enterprises will choose the lowest recycling rate to achieve maximum profit because the legal constraints at this time will hurt their interests to a certain extent.
- (3)
- Under the carbon trading mechanism, the relationship between carbon trading price and profits of members of the supply chain system depends on the size of carbon reduction per unit of remanufactured product. When the carbon emission reduction amount is small, the carbon trading price is negatively correlated with the profits of supply chain system members and the smaller the is, the stronger the negative correlation is; conversely, when the carbon emission reduction amount is large, the carbon trading price is positively correlated with the profits of supply chain system members and the larger the is, the stronger the positive correlation is. These indicate that the more perfect the carbon reduction process is, the higher the profit of carbon trading will be, and compared to the traditional mechanism of limiting fixed carbon quotas, the carbon trading mechanism using the grandfathering allocation method can allocate carbon quotas to each manufacturer more flexibly and reasonably, which is more beneficial to environmental benefits.
- (4)
- Achieving carbon emission reduction targets requires policy support from the government. To reach the goal of carbon neutrality, limiting carbon emissions will inevitably harm the interests of some manufacturer enterprises. To motivate them to actively take social responsibility for carbon emission reduction, the government should establish a sound reward and punishment mechanism to reward manufacturers with excellent carbon emission reduction efforts and punish manufacturers with excessive carbon emissions. In addition, it is also hoped that the government can give certain subsidies and policy assistance to manufacturers who have difficulties in carbon emission reduction while planning low-carbon industries rationally, so as to promote the low-carbon transformation of manufacturers with high carbon emissions and accelerate the achievement of carbon emission reduction targets.
7.2. Managerial Implications
7.3. Study Limitations
- (1)
- The article study is based on the carbon trading mechanism using the grandfathered allocation method, but in reality many countries and regions also adopt the benchmark carbon quota allocation method. The research in this paper fails to consider the impact of the benchmark quota allocation method on the recycling of used products.
- (2)
- The article assumes that consumers’ perceptions of new and remanufactured products are consistent, but in reality many consumers have dissimilar consumption preferences between new products and remanufactured products. Therefore, if the influence of consumer preferences is considered, a more in-depth study using the article’s model will lead to more conclusions with more realistic guidance value.
Author Contributions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
- (A)
- The solution process for the F-model without legal recycling constraints is as follows:
- When , the solution can be obtained as:
- 2.
- When , the solution can be obtained as:
- 3.
- When , the solution can be obtained as:
- 4.
- When , it is obtained from that . The minimum recovery rate is equal to the maximum recovery rate, so the relevant discussion at this time is meaningless.
- (B)
- The solution process for the L-model with legal recovery constraints is the same as the F-model. Due to space limitations, it is omitted here.
Appendix B
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Literature | Low Carbon Policy | Legal Constraints on Recovery Rates | Waste Recycling | Carbon Trading | Closed-Loop Supply Chain | Game Theory |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
[18] | √ | √ | √ | |||
[31] | √ | √ | √ | |||
[50] | carbon cap | √ | √ | √ | ||
[30] | √ | √ | √ | √ | ||
[48] | carbon subsidy | √ | √ | √ | ||
[52] | carbon tax/subsidy | √ | √ | √ | ||
[40] | cap-and-trade | √ | √ | √ | √ | |
[46] | cap-and-trade | √ | √ | √ | ||
[37] | cap-and-trade | √ | √ | |||
[38] | cap-and-trade | √ | √ | |||
[53] | carbon trading | √ | √ | |||
This paper | carbon trading | √ | √ | √ | √ | √ |
Decision Variables | |
---|---|
Wholesale price per unit of new product in the first period, the manufacturer’s decision variable. | |
Wholesale price per unit of product (including new and remanufactured products) in the second period, the manufacturer’s decision variable. | |
The market recovery rate of used products, the manufacturer’s decision variable. | |
Retail price per unit of new product in the first period, the retailer’s decision variable. | |
Retail price per unit of product (including new and remanufactured products) in the second period, the retailer’s decision variable. | |
Model parameters | |
Potential maximum market demand per period. | |
Market demand for products in the first period, assuming , where represents the price elasticity coefficient of the first period. | |
Market demand for products in the second period (including new and remanufactured products), assuming , where represents the price elasticity coefficient of the second period. | |
Unit production costs of new and remanufactured products, respectively, . | |
Unit production carbon emissions of new and remanufactured products, respectively, . | |
Carbon emission reduction coefficient, . | |
The unit trading price of carbon allowances in the carbon trading market. | |
Minimum recovery rate required by law. | |
The maximum recovery rate of used products, . | |
The minimum processing cost of remanufactured products, that is, the cost of processing using ordinary processes, and . | |
Influence coefficient of carbon emission reduction savings on the processing cost of remanufactured products, and . | |
The manufacturer’s profit. | |
The retailer’s profit. |
Model | Condition | Optimal Recovery Rate | Optimal Decisions and Corresponding Optimal Profits |
---|---|---|---|
F-model | 0 | , , , , , , , . | |
, , , , , , . | |||
L-model | , , , , , , , , . | ||
The optimal decision is the same as the F-model when . | |||
Remarks | , , , , , , i.e.; , , , . |
Condition | Optimal Recovery Rate | Optimal Decisions and Corresponding Optimal Profits |
---|---|---|
, , , , , , , , | ||
, , , , , , , , |
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Wang, Y.; Yu, T.; Zhou, R. The Impact of Legal Recycling Constraints and Carbon Trading Mechanisms on Decision Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 7400. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19127400
Wang Y, Yu T, Zhou R. The Impact of Legal Recycling Constraints and Carbon Trading Mechanisms on Decision Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(12):7400. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19127400
Chicago/Turabian StyleWang, Yuyan, Tingting Yu, and Rui Zhou. 2022. "The Impact of Legal Recycling Constraints and Carbon Trading Mechanisms on Decision Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 12: 7400. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19127400
APA StyleWang, Y., Yu, T., & Zhou, R. (2022). The Impact of Legal Recycling Constraints and Carbon Trading Mechanisms on Decision Making in Closed-Loop Supply Chain. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 19(12), 7400. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19127400