3.1. Theoretical Mechanism
This paper analyzes the theoretical mechanism of the influence of digital inclusive finance on the integration of the three rural industries. This paper considers the effect of the policy on the efficiency of rural integration through three transmission channels: technological innovation, agricultural modernization, and risk-sharing.
Digital inclusive finance improves the efficiency of rural tertiary industry integration by rising technological innovation. On the one hand, the interconnection of digital inclusive finance and the improvement of infrastructure can effectively reduce the information asymmetry of the capital market and create a good financial environment for technological innovation. On the other hand, promoting technological innovation capacity is conducive to promoting the integration of rural tertiary industry. The higher the level of financial creation, the higher the efficiency of the financial screening of the funds to be invested. The greater the probability of successful financing and innovation of rural enterprises, the higher the technical level, essentially improving the efficiency of resource utilization and productivity; it plays a vital role in developing the integration of the three rural industries.
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is put forward: digital inclusive finance improves the efficiency of rural tertiary industry integration by encouraging technological innovation. Digital inclusive finance promotes rural tertiary industry integration efficiency by improving agricultural modernization. On the one hand, optimizing rural financial supply can provide necessary financial support for agricultural modernization and promote agricultural modernization. Digital inclusive finance promotes agricultural transformation and upgrading and uses new technologies to improve industrial efficiency. On the other hand, improving agricultural modernization is conducive to integrating the three rural industries. The higher the level of agricultural modernization, the more effective the inter-and intra-industry cooperation is, which helps to save production cost, improve production efficiency, give full play to scale effect and structural dividend, and support the integration of the three rural industries.
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is put forward: digital inclusive finance promotes the efficiency growth of the integration of the three industries in rural areas by improving agricultural modernization.
Digital inclusive finance helps realize the integration of rural industry and industry through the risk-sharing mechanism. On the one hand, the development of digital inclusive finance is conducive to constructing a risk-sharing mechanism. First, inclusive finance can significantly promote the development of rural inclusive insurance; second, digital finance can make it easier for consumers to use risk management tools to mitigate concerns about uncertainty in the future. On the other hand, constructing a risk-sharing mechanism is conducive to integrating rural tertiary industry. The current risk-controlled release method allows farmers to diversify management risks through multiple channels, ensure product returns, improve the possibility of farmers entering the rural three-industry integration market, and help rural three-industry integration.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is put forward: digital inclusive finance can improve the efficiency of rural integration by constructing a risk-sharing mechanism.
3.2. Theoretical Model
Based on China’s digital inclusive finance practice, this paper analyzes the resource allocation behavior of digital inclusive finance and whether it can affect the efficiency of rural tertiary industry integration.
In order to analyze the influence of digital inclusive finance on the efficiency of rural tri-industry integration, this paper uses the methods of Odedokun for reference [
39]. Starting from the traditional production function, it takes digital inclusive finance and rural labor force as input factors, and the efficiency function of rural tertiary industry integration is obtained:
Among them, represents the efficiency of the rural integration of the tertiary industry; represents the efficiency of production; represents the level of financial support of the figure Pratt & Whitney; represents the input of rural labor force.
is a neoclassical production function that satisfies the scale reward constant,
,
,
,
. Form
can be converted into per capita expression:
Among them,
and
respectively represent the per capita contribution rate and per capita available capital of rural tertiary industry integration under the support of digital inclusive finance.
. With the development of digital inclusive finance, more and more rural savings will make an innovative investment through digital finance channel. More and more funds will be invested in the rural tertiary industry, which will affect the efficiency of rural tertiary industry integration. If the saving rate is
and the investment rate is
, the total support of digital inclusive finance in rural integration is:
. Assuming that, without depreciation, the change in available capital equals investment and the total population remains the same,
, then the rate of growth of available capital per capita is:
From Equation (3), we can find that with the increase of capital brought by digital inclusive finance, the capital available rate per capita
will decrease gradually, which indicates that the growth rate of available rural capital will slow down. According to Equation (2), in the steady-state of the economy
, we can calculate that the growth rate of the per capita contribution rate of the rural tertiary industry
is:
Equation (4), by taking the derivative of the number Pratt & Whitney and the degree of innovation of finance
, we get:
Based on the above theoretical mechanism, digital inclusive finance has three transmission channels: technological innovation, agricultural modernization, and risk sharing. Based on the ideas of Acemoglu and Pischke [
40], this paper constructs an optimal model of human capital investment for rural integration. This article makes the following assumptions:
First, a large number of the rural labor force to technological innovation as a source of income, after the success of income , can be obtained, at the same time will be the output of rural integration.
Secondly, those engaged in integrating the three rural industries need to carry out the agricultural modernization reform according to the real possibility of obtaining higher income. Still, the excessive cost may cause the rural laborers to stop carrying out the agricultural modernization reform, thereby reducing the probability of achieving agricultural modernization. If a random income shock followed successful selection and agricultural modernization, the cumulative distribution function would be . At this point, the real profit of the rural labor force is , if and only if the rural workers are willing to continue agricultural modernization reform, otherwise the rural workers withdraw from the three-production integration market. The probability that rural workers will continue the agricultural modernization reform is . Because it is a non-decreasing function, the more advanced the enterprise technology, the higher the cost of using advanced technology and the lower the probability of continuing agricultural modernization reform.
Third, there are risks involved in integrating the rural tertiary industry, which will have a certain degree of utility damage to the rural workers. As a result, rural integration workers have to pay for insurance and other services to reduce risk. It is further assumed that access to risk-sharing services entails costs and that without the purchase of risk-sharing services , the level of risk exposure can not be reduced to the greatest extent possible , but only the cumulative distribution of the level of risk exposure can be known.
Fourth, the benefits of purchasing risk-sharing services come from two aspects: reducing the loss when the risk occurs. The risk mitigation effect is
. Among them,
measures the risk-sharing mechanism to reduce the risk negative utility function. If
,
, the rural laborer entirely bears the negative utility of the risk; if
,
and
, the more investment in the risk-sharing mechanism, the more the loss can be reduced. Second, through the purchase of risk-sharing services to promote the integration of rural tertiary industry, that is
, and
. Under the assumptions mentioned above, workers engaged in the integration of the three rural productions following the expected market conditions decide whether to continue technological innovation and promote agricultural modernization and risk-sharing:
Among them,
represents the utility of the workers engaged in the integration of the three rural industries,
represents the risk threshold of labor participation. When the risk of those engaged in the rural integration is higher than
, they will withdraw from the rural integration because of the high risk. The first-order conditions of the optimization problem are:
Since
, simultaneous Equations (7) and (8) can obtain the optimal level of technological innovation
, and risk-sharing expenditures
, they must satisfy:
Among them, represents the average value of the risks faced by the personnel engaged in the rural integration of the tertiary industry, indicates the proportion of the rural integration labor force that meets the threshold of participation risk. In general, it can be assumed that the overall workforce and is independent of the individual level of technological innovation and that risk-sharing mechanisms are in place. According to Formula (9), under certain conditions, for example , the optimal risk-sharing expenditure , and the optimal level of technological innovation , are positively correlated (); that is, individuals who expect higher levels of technological innovation tend to spend higher risk-sharing expenditure. It is necessary to reduce the negative utility caused by the failure and increase the integration efficiency of the three rural industries through risk-sharing.
The optimization problem Equation (6) does not consider the budget constraints faced by individuals. In Equation (6), the subsidy provided by the government to engage in the rural integration of the three industries
is introduced, and Equation (6) is rewritten as:
In theory, if the government subsidy income can increase the individual’s risk-sharing expenditure by stimulating technological innovation and popularizing insurance and other services, must be established; otherwise, the laborers will withdraw from the rural triple-industry integration market. The choice does not carry on the countryside three production fusion. On behalf of the probability of agricultural modernization , given the budget constraints , the probability of agricultural modernization will increase, encouraging workers to increase risk-sharing expenditure and try higher levels of technological innovation. The development of digital inclusive finance involves increasing government subsidies and increasing the rural population’s access to financial support and risk-sharing through the optimization Equation (10).
In addition to the two mechanisms of technological innovation and agricultural modernization, the independent risk-sharing mechanism can also improve the rural integration of the three industries. Under the condition of not considering the level of technical innovation and realizing agricultural modernization, the choice problem that the rural three-industry amalgamation laborer faces becomes:
Among them, is engaged in the rural three-industry integration of workers that can obtain income, at this time budget constraint is . The first-order condition is: . Optimal risk-sharing expenditure level is . As we assume , then is and therefore an increasing function of . Before the introduction of the subsidy policy, . If , households spend the most on the purchase of risk-sharing services, then the exogenous income growth can certainly raise the level of rural tertiary integration; if , household income is sufficient to purchase the optimal risk-sharing services; the growth of exogenous income is unlikely to lead to an increase in risk-sharing expenditure.