The Impact of Government Official Assessment on Ecological Poverty Alleviation: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Institutional Background and Research Hypotheses
2.1. Institutional Background
2.1.1. Ecological Poverty Alleviation Policy System
2.1.2. Appraisal and Evaluation System for Government Officials
2.1.3. Corporate Approach to Ecological Poverty Alleviation
2.2. Research Hypothesis
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Sample and Data
3.2. Empirical Model
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.1.1. Sample Distribution
4.1.2. Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables
4.2. Univariate Analysis
4.3. Basic Regression Results
4.4. Robust Test
4.4.1. Propensity Score Matching
4.4.2. Changing the Criteria for the Territorial Division of Firms
4.4.3. Changing the Measurement of the Importance of Ecological Poverty Alleviation Assessment
4.4.4. Changing the Measurement of Ecological Poverty Alleviation Inputs
4.5. Testing the Effects of Ecological Poverty Alleviation
5. Conclusions and Discussion
5.1. Conclusions
5.2. Practical Implications
5.3. Limitations and Future Research
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
- 1.
- The Definition of Poverty
- 2.
- The Definition of Variables
Variable Name | Variable Symbols | Variable Measurement |
---|---|---|
Ecological poverty alleviation | Povref_eco | The variable equals 1 if the company is involved in ecological poverty alleviation in the t year and 0 if it is not involved in any form of poverty alleviation. |
Input_eco | The total amount of the firm’s ecological poverty alleviation input is added by 1 and then taken as the natural logarithm. If not involved in ecological poverty alleviation, the total amount of ecological poverty alleviation input is 0. | |
The importance of ecological poverty alleviation assessment | Poor | Number of national-level poverty-stricken counties by province for the year, combined national-level poverty-stricken counties and sub-counties in special contiguous areas, in hundreds. |
Poornum | Size of the poor population by province for the year, in millions. | |
Pooratio | Poverty incidence by province for the year, in %. | |
Nature of firm ownership | Soe | If the ultimate controller is a state-owned legal person, a state-owned government agency, and a state-controlled enterprise, such as an institution or autonomous organization, then the value of Soe equals 1 for state-owned enterprises; otherwise, it is 0. |
Firm size | Size | Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the period. |
Debt ratio | Lev | Lev = total liabilities at end of period/total assets at end of period. |
Return on assets | Roa | Roa = net profit/total assets. |
Cash ratio | Cashratio | (Monetary funds + financial assets held for trading + notes receivable)/total current liabilities. |
Equity concentration | Shrhfd | Sum of the squares of the top five shareholders’ shareholdings. |
Board size | Bsize | Natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the board. |
Provincial fiscal deficit | Decifit | Natural logarithm of fiscal deficits for the year by province. |
- 3.
- Correlation Coefficient Test
Panel A: Correlation Coefficient of Povref_eco to Size | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Povref_eco | Input_eco | Midwest | Poor | Soe | Size |
Povref_eco | 1 | |||||
Input_eco | 0.897 *** | 1 | ||||
Midwest | 0.118 *** | 0.096 *** | 1 | |||
Poor | 0.085 *** | 0.059 *** | 0.721 *** | 1 | ||
Soe | 0.160 *** | 0.128 *** | 0.164 *** | 0.117 *** | 1 | |
Size | 0.251 *** | 0.249 *** | 0.042 *** | 0.002 | 0.328 *** | 1 |
Lev | 0.118 *** | 0.111 *** | 0.088 *** | 0.054 *** | 0.265 *** | 0.480 *** |
Roa | 0.002 | 0.007 | −0.050 *** | −0.036 *** | −0.073 *** | −0.023 |
Cashratio | −0.056 *** | −0.054 *** | −0.019 | −0.016 | −0.106 *** | −0.276 *** |
Shrhfd | 0.079 *** | 0.060 *** | −0.025 | −0.026 | 0.145 *** | 0.116 *** |
Bsize | 0.071 *** | 0.066 *** | 0.091 *** | 0.069 *** | 0.258 *** | 0.222 *** |
Deficit | 0.036 *** | 0.031 * | 0.320 *** | 0.245 *** | −0.061 *** | −0.026 |
Panel B: Correlation Coefficient of Lev to Deficit | ||||||
Lev | Roa | Cashratio | Shrhfd | Bsize | Deficit | |
Lev | 1 | |||||
Roa | −0.325 *** | 1 | ||||
Cashratio | −0.556 *** | 0.188 *** | 1 | |||
Shrhfd | −0.003 | 0.173 *** | 0.026 | 1 | ||
Bsize | 0.166 *** | −0.114 *** | −0.092 *** | −0.041 *** | 1 | |
Deficit | 0.012 | −0.019 | −0.032 ** | −0.041 *** | −0.026 | 1 |
- 4.
- Propensity Score Matching Balance Test
Unmatched | Mean | %reduct | t-Test | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Matched | Treated | Control | %bias | |bias| | t | p > |t| |
Size | U | 22.133 | 22.051 | 7 | 40.4 | 2.75 | 0.006 |
M | 22.133 | 22.084 | 4.2 | 1.29 | 0.197 | ||
Growth | U | 0.21895 | 0.19967 | 3.8 | −48.9 | 1.57 | 0.116 |
M | 0.21895 | 0.24765 | −5.7 | −1.63 | 0.104 | ||
Lev | U | 0.43957 | 0.39605 | 21.3 | 80.9 | 8.42 | 0 |
M | 0.43957 | 0.43126 | 4.1 | 1.27 | 0.205 |
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Group | Participation in Ecological Poverty Alleviation | No Participation in Ecological Poverty Alleviation | ||
---|---|---|---|---|
N | Proportion (%) | N | Proportion (%) | |
Overall | 381 | 3.31 | 11,146 | 96.69 |
Midwest Region | 193 | 7.09 | 2530 | 92.91 |
Eastern Region | 188 | 2.14 | 8616 | 97.86 |
High poverty | 166 | 7.35 | 2093 | 92.65 |
Low poverty | 215 | 2.32 | 9053 | 97.68 |
Variable | N | Mean | sd | Min | p25 | p50 | p75 | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Povref_eco | 11,527 | 0.0331 | 0.1788 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 |
Input_eco | 11,527 | 0.0902 | 0.5436 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 4.7095 |
Midwest | 11,527 | 0.2362 | 0.4248 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1 |
Poor | 11,527 | 0.0563 | 0.1404 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.88 |
Soe | 11,527 | 0.2397 | 0.4269 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1 |
Size | 11,527 | 21.9881 | 1.1663 | 19.5950 | 21.1525 | 21.8515 | 22.6523 | 26.1024 |
Lev | 11,527 | 0.3966 | 0.1988 | 0.0523 | 0.2357 | 0.3822 | 0.5359 | 0.933 |
Roa | 11,527 | 0.0355 | 0.0802 | −0.5304 | 0.0151 | 0.0401 | 0.0714 | 0.2479 |
Cashratio | 11,527 | 0.8226 | 1.1613 | 0.0206 | 0.2047 | 0.4197 | 0.9158 | 8.9238 |
Shrhfd | 11,527 | 0.1479 | 0.1012 | 0.0128 | 0.0706 | 0.1224 | 0.2011 | 0.5013 |
Bsize | 11,527 | 2.2529 | 0.2530 | 1.6094 | 2.0794 | 2.1972 | 2.3979 | 2.8904 |
Deficit | 11,527 | 7.8751 | 0.5296 | 6.2399 | 7.4535 | 8.0079 | 8.2686 | 8.8447 |
Group Standard | Group | Povref_eco | Input_eco | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
N | Mean | Difference (t-Value) | N | Mean | Difference (t-Value) | ||
whether poverty alleviation assessment apply | Midwest | 2723 | 0.0709 | 0.0495 12.7205 *** | 2723 | 0.1843 | 0.1232 10.3833 *** |
East | 8804 | 0.0214 | 8804 | 0.0611 | |||
importance of poverty alleviation assessment | High poverty | 2259 | 0.0735 | 0.0503 12.0620 *** | 2259 | 0.1871 | 0.1205 9.4878 *** |
Low poverty | 9268 | 0.0232 | 9268 | 0.0666 |
Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Povref_eco | Input_eco | Povref_eco | Input_eco | |
Midwest | 0.8936 *** | 1.9099 *** | ||
(3.9152) | (4.6716) | |||
Poor | 2.3658 *** | 4.5618 *** | ||
(4.3165) | (4.6114) | |||
Soe | 0.4654 ** | 0.8664 ** | 0.5272 ** | 1.0056 ** |
(2.0969) | (2.1613) | (2.3729) | (2.5148) | |
Size | 0.9491 *** | 1.8650 *** | 0.9235 *** | 1.8171 *** |
(9.6030) | (10.8283) | (9.5353) | (10.7643) | |
Lev | −0.4641 | −0.8186 | −0.2942 | −0.5627 |
(−0.6836) | (−0.6494) | (−0.4486) | (−0.4579) | |
Roa | 0.5552 | 1.8213 | 0.7334 | 1.8566 |
(0.4529) | (0.7868) | (0.6019) | (0.8073) | |
Cashratio | −0.0441 | −0.1264 | −0.0342 | −0.1011 |
(−0.4277) | (−0.6549) | (−0.3320) | (−0.5307) | |
Shrhfd | 1.4711 | 2.9438 | 1.3525 | 2.6513 |
(1.5351) | (1.6434) | (1.4306) | (1.5005) | |
Bsize | −0.1939 | −0.5269 | −0.1746 | −0.5336 |
(−0.6491) | (−0.9499) | (−0.5866) | (−0.9707) | |
Deficit | 0.2584 | 0.2864 | 0.2896 | 0.4221 |
(1.0429) | (0.6889) | (1.2025) | (1.0369) | |
_cons | −27.6206 *** | −52.8375 *** | −27.1475 *** | −52.5975 *** |
(−8.3377) | (−9.6013) | (−8.1590) | (−9.4798) | |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
pseudo R-sq | 0.334 | 0.250 | 0.331 | 0.246 |
N | 9712 | 11,527 | 9712 | 11,527 |
Variable | (1) | (2) |
---|---|---|
Povref_eco | Input_eco | |
Poor | 2.5743 *** | 4.7120 *** |
(3.9657) | (4.4050) | |
Soe | 0.3538 | 0.5481 |
(1.3840) | (1.2049) | |
Size | 0.8715 *** | 1.6537 *** |
(7.3283) | (8.4285) | |
Lev | 0.0821 | 0.2385 |
(0.1103) | (0.1754) | |
Roa | 1.8105 | 4.1662 |
(1.2178) | (1.5494) | |
Cashratio | −0.0814 | −0.2105 |
(−0.5970) | (−0.8491) | |
Shrhfd | 0.5886 | 0.9660 |
(0.4979) | (0.4627) | |
Bsize | −0.2094 | −0.4422 |
(−0.5449) | (−0.6558) | |
Deficit | 0.3506 | 0.5556 |
(1.0879) | (1.0875) | |
_cons | −26.2579 *** | −49.2722 *** |
(−6.6143) | (−7.9742) | |
Year FE | Yes | Yes |
Industry FE | Yes | Yes |
pseudo R-sq | 0.306 | 0.234 |
N | 3523 | 4338 |
Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Povref_eco | Input_eco | Povref_eco | Input_eco | |
Midwestw | 0.9229 *** | 1.9286 *** | ||
(4.0659) | (4.7121) | |||
Poorw | 2.3086 *** | 4.4009 *** | ||
(4.2485) | (4.3977) | |||
Size | 0.9901 *** | 1.9317 *** | 0.9670 *** | 1.8982 *** |
(10.1541) | (11.4274) | (10.2167) | (11.4898) | |
Lev | −0.2809 | −0.5026 | −0.0830 | −0.2100 |
(−0.4249) | (−0.4080) | (−0.1294) | (−0.1738) | |
Roa | 0.4063 | 1.5429 | 0.5896 | 1.5733 |
(0.3438) | (0.6919) | (0.4991) | (0.7061) | |
Cashratio | −0.0348 | −0.1102 | −0.0210 | −0.0787 |
(−0.3420) | (−0.5834) | (−0.2072) | (−0.4236) | |
Shrhfd | 1.6427 * | 3.3007 * | 1.5771 * | 3.1043 * |
(1.7677) | (1.9073) | (1.7195) | (1.8160) | |
Bsize | −0.0884 | −0.2635 | −0.0295 | −0.1799 |
(−0.2921) | (−0.4648) | (−0.0976) | (−0.3182) | |
Deficitw | 0.2464 | 0.3158 | 0.3046 | 0.5024 |
(1.0338) | (0.7791) | (1.3147) | (1.2693) | |
_cons | −28.4036 *** | −54.6466 *** | −28.2108 *** | −55.1705 *** |
(−8.6301) | (−9.9026) | (−8.5690) | (−9.9182) | |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
pseudo R-sq | 0.330 | 0.247 | 0.326 | 0.243 |
N | 9712 | 11,527 | 9712 | 11,527 |
Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Povref_eco | Input_eco | Povref_eco | Input_eco | |
Poornum | 0.3848 *** | 0.7331 *** | ||
(2.7914) | (3.0572) | |||
Pooratio | 0.1028 ** | 0.2345 *** | ||
(2.2819) | (2.8205) | |||
Soe | 0.5478 ** | 1.0026 ** | 0.5406 ** | 0.9932 ** |
(2.3290) | (2.4203) | (2.2862) | (2.3821) | |
Size | 0.8216 *** | 1.5609 *** | 0.8263 *** | 1.5830 *** |
(7.5991) | (8.3827) | (7.6251) | (8.4336) | |
Lev | 0.1741 | 0.6190 | 0.1062 | 0.3854 |
(0.2549) | (0.4941) | (0.1539) | (0.3061) | |
Roa | 1.4546 | 3.9440 | 1.3262 | 3.7580 |
(1.0779) | (1.5324) | (0.9994) | (1.4765) | |
Cashratio | 0.0332 | 0.0361 | 0.0263 | 0.0170 |
(0.2810) | (0.1628) | (0.2216) | (0.0762) | |
Shrhfd | 1.6966 * | 3.3477 * | 1.6304 * | 3.2527 * |
(1.7468) | (1.8656) | (1.6871) | (1.8087) | |
Bsize | 0.0089 | −0.0862 | −0.0106 | −0.1152 |
(0.0265) | (−0.1450) | (−0.0315) | (−0.1929) | |
Deficit | 0.5069 * | 0.7833 * | 0.6913 *** | 1.1023 ** |
(1.8625) | (1.7081) | (2.5824) | (2.4899) | |
_cons | −26.9328 *** | −50.5075 *** | −28.5009 *** | −53.8464 *** |
(−7.1941) | (−8.3350) | (−7.7963) | (−9.0303) | |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
pseudo R-sq | 0.313 | 0.236 | 0.311 | 0.235 |
N | 7291 | 8768 | 7291 | 8768 |
Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Povref_asset | Povref_asset | Povref_sale | Povref_sale | |
Midwest | 14.9279 * | 23.7309 * | ||
(1.8056) | (1.8056) | |||
Poor | 34.3875 * | 54.6652 * | ||
(1.8178) | (1.8178) | |||
Soe | 7.3219 | 8.3566 * | 11.6385 | 13.2834 * |
(1.6414) | (1.7085) | (1.6413) | (1.7084) | |
Size | 12.3344 ** | 11.9336 ** | 19.6080 ** | 18.9707 ** |
(1.9907) | (1.9921) | (1.9908) | (1.9921) | |
Lev | 0.6302 | 2.5085 | 1.0009 | 3.9869 |
(0.0675) | (0.2646) | (0.0675) | (0.2645) | |
Roa | 10.9163 | 11.1117 | 17.3253 | 17.6321 |
(0.6411) | (0.6582) | (0.6400) | (0.6569) | |
Cashratio | −0.6010 | −0.4211 | −0.9554 | −0.6694 |
(−0.4092) | (−0.2927) | (−0.4091) | (−0.2926) | |
Shrhfd | 26.6023 | 24.0436 | 42.2898 | 38.2224 |
(1.3925) | (1.3382) | (1.3925) | (1.3382) | |
Bsize | −6.6696 | −6.7045 | −10.6008 | −10.6559 |
(−1.1001) | (−1.1098) | (−1.1000) | (−1.1096) | |
Deficit | 1.2443 | 2.3926 | 1.9780 | 3.8034 |
(0.4331) | (0.8383) | (0.4331) | (0.8382) | |
_cons | −361.6119 ** | −359.5072 ** | −574.8584 ** | −571.5113 ** |
(−2.0530) | (−2.0502) | (−2.0530) | (−2.0502) | |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
pseudo R-sq | 0.149 | 0.147 | 0.141 | 0.138 |
N | 11,527 | 11,527 | 11,526 | 11,526 |
Variable | (1) | (2) | (3) |
---|---|---|---|
SolidWaste | Dioxide | WasteWater | |
Input_eco | −0.0791 *** | −0.0531 *** | −0.0372 * |
(−3.5585) | (−2.7530) | (−1.7143) | |
Size | −0.0167 | −0.0239 ** | −0.0115 |
(−1.2347) | (−2.1623) | (−0.9983) | |
Lev | 0.1441 * | 0.0973 | −0.3382 *** |
(1.6918) | (1.4328) | (−4.5244) | |
Roa | 0.1738 | 0.0547 | 0.3245 *** |
(1.5761) | (0.5966) | (3.0031) | |
Cashratio | −0.0234 ** | −0.0206 ** | −0.0401 *** |
(−2.2392) | (−2.5068) | (−3.8089) | |
Shrhfd | −0.1490 | −0.0296 | 0.1806 * |
(−1.2621) | (−0.2960) | (1.7361) | |
Bsize | 0.0899 ** | 0.0385 | −0.1166 *** |
(2.2702) | (1.1679) | (−3.3337) | |
Deficit | 1.5237 *** | 1.4755 *** | 0.7455 *** |
(61.1830) | (75.0264) | (32.1157) | |
_cons | −2.8803 *** | −7.7875 *** | 6.5105 *** |
(−7.8249) | (−26.2382) | (20.0854) | |
Year FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry FE | Yes | Yes | Yes |
adj. R-sq | 0.595 | 0.667 | 0.362 |
N | 11527 | 11527 | 8133 |
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Huang, Y. The Impact of Government Official Assessment on Ecological Poverty Alleviation: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 3470. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19063470
Huang Y. The Impact of Government Official Assessment on Ecological Poverty Alleviation: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(6):3470. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19063470
Chicago/Turabian StyleHuang, Yujing. 2022. "The Impact of Government Official Assessment on Ecological Poverty Alleviation: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies" International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, no. 6: 3470. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19063470