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Article

Challenges and Opportunities for the Energy Sector in the Face of Threats Such as Climate Change and the COVID-19 Pandemic—An International Perspective

by
Artur Pawłowski
1,* and
Paweł Rydzewski
2
1
Faculty of Environmental Engineering, Lublin University of Technology, Nadbystrzycka 40B, 20-618 Lublin, Poland
2
Institute of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin, Pl. M. Curie-Sklodowskiej 5, 20-031 Lublin, Poland
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Energies 2023, 16(11), 4454; https://doi.org/10.3390/en16114454
Submission received: 11 January 2023 / Revised: 21 May 2023 / Accepted: 29 May 2023 / Published: 31 May 2023
(This article belongs to the Section B: Energy and Environment)

Abstract

:
New threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic have brought forth not only threats to human health but also changes to many other sectors of the global economy. Despite strict lockdowns, the highest annual number of global renewable energy installations were completed in 2020, including onshore wind power stations and PV power stations. The development of these two types of renewables is increasing rapidly. Transformations in terms of renewable energy require both governmental and public support; thus, it is important to note that the pandemic did not weaken the public commitment to fight climate change. This article aims to evaluate the actual level of support for renewable energy sources in different countries of the world and how the pandemic has affected public opinion regarding this issue. Our analysis suggests that, regardless of the pandemic, public support for renewable energy remains strong in different regions of the world.

1. Introduction

The unexpected COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 to 2023 posed the biggest threat to human health in decades. It caused almost 7 million deaths [1] and reshaped the world in many ways. On 5 May 2023, the World Health Organisation recognized the end of the pandemic when they announced that COVID-19 “is no longer a global health emergency” [2]. It is thus an opportune time to look back over the last few years in order to analyze the consequences of the pandemic and discern possible changes in global renewable energy trends.
The ability of people to move and to distribute goods around the world is an important part of the world economy and globalization. Unfortunately, this also allows for viruses and bacteria to spread. In the case of COVID-19, a main transmission pathway was aviation. Another factor was transmission through high concentrations of people, especially in cities.
During the spring of 2020, to combat COVID-19, most countries of the world introduced full lockdowns. Staying at home for weeks or sometimes months was challenging, but continued access to electricity and water allowed some comfort and stability. Without electricity, it would not be possible to watch TV, access the Internet or order any goods to be delivered by courier. However, we must remember that in 2020, 860 million people had no access to electricity, and a further 90 million lost Internet access as they were not able to afford the cost of delivery [3,4].
In this paper we focus on energy issues in the context of climate change and the developing of renewable energy sources (RES), often also referred to as renewables. The energy industry is one of the largest branches of the world economy, adding 5 trillion dollars annually while producing 3000 gigawatts per year [3]. The production of electricity itself is a crucial factor for the future of our industrialized civilization. Our digital world requires electricity. It is estimated that in 2025, as much as 20% of the total energy use in the world will be consumed just by the Internet—the most significant digital creation in history [5].
It this paper, we will discuss important challenges for the energy sector. These include the development of renewable energy sources in the context of two global threats: climate change and the aftereffects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The research questions are as follows:
  • How did the COVID-19 pandemic influence climate change and policies counteracting climate change?
  • How did the pandemic influence the renewable energy sector?
  • Do threats such as COVID-19 change public attitudes towards energy, especially renewable energies?
  • How did the COVID-19 pandemic affect attitudes towards renewable energy?
Environmental or policy issues are not the only elements affecting decision making in energy sector. Support both from governments and ordinary citizens is also required. This social aspect is equally important at the decision-making level.

2. Materials and Methods

The methodology used in this paper is a critical review of the scientific literature. We used Web of Science and Scopus scientific databases for papers related to the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and renewable energy sources. Each of these items was used in thousands of papers; for example, climate change is a key word in 483,845 papers in Web of Science and 518,931 in Scopus. However, far fewer papers address use all three key terms. Papers from the years 2020–2023, with particular focus on the years 2022–2023, form the basis of our research. We also reviewed available strategies (such as REPowerEU) for promoting renewables and carbon neutrality, as well as data concerning recent events published in the media.
The social part of this research presents the results of our analyses (secondary analysis) using data collected in the years 2020–2022 by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) as part of their Environment module. The following research methods and techniques were used to collect the data: face-to-face interviews (PAPI), computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI), telephone interviews (CATI), self-administered web-based questionnaires (CAWI), web-based interviews, and self-administered paper questionnaires. The obtained sample is a multi-stage random sample. The measurement tool referred to in the literature and research practice as the Willingness to Pay (WTP) method was used. Measuring a willingness to pay a certain amount of money for some good or service, the WTP method can be used as an indicator of attitudes towards renewable energy. This is covered in more detail in Section 6 of this article.

3. Literature Review

The scientific literature regarding the subject of this research may be divided into two basic groups: papers from the years 2020–2021, with initial predictions regarding the pandemic, and papers including more information regarding the final stage of the pandemic, from the years 2022–2023. Although we concentrate on the papers from the years 2022–2023, it is worth highlighting some earlier works, mainly from the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, during the time of full lockdowns.
We divided this review into two parts. The first part is devoted to the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic on the energy sector and actions for counteracting climate change. Most of the papers in this subject area were written from an international perspective. The second part is connected with social research connected with people’s behavior and attitude towards renewable energy sources. Such research is often concentrated in one country. Though few works have been published in this subject area, those that do exist are extremely informative.

3.1. Literature Review on the COVID-19 Pandemic and Its Influence on Climate Change and the Development of Renewable Energy Sources

In 2020, at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, predictions for the future of renewable energy sources were mixed. Some authors, such Nourozi et al. [6], suggested that an accelerated development of renewable energy sources was likely. In contrast, others, such as Hosseini et al. [7] or Hoang et al. [8], expected a slowdown in the transition to renewable energy owing to several issues: issues affecting production facilities, infections among workers, and—especially—frozen supply chains. For these reasons Seyed [9] wrote of a significant decline in the development of renewable energy sources as a necessary casualty. Similarly, Eroğlu [10] predicted that, in 2020, production of renewable energy would decrease by 28%. Klemeš et al. [11], focusing on the economic side of the problem, highlighted the unexpected high spending needed to fight the COVID-19 pandemic by countries, which was likely to affect spending on other items, such as the continuing development of renewable energy sources.
Borysiak et al. [12] conducted interesting research on the changes in household consumption of electricity during the pandemic, which increased by 40%. The impact of this increase was aligned with the issue of energy security in the context of the Industry 4.0 concept. Zakeri et al. [13] explored the problems connected with the growing demand for energy at home during lockdowns, specifically, job losses and issues of remote work and learning (which lasted much longer than lockdowns themselves). Streimikiene et al. [14] suggested that the matter of energy poverty (which deepened during the COVID-19 pandemic) was also relevant in the context of the pandemic. Those regions with weak energy systems and slow Internet became more apparent under these novel circumstances, raising the further issue of the exclusion of some demographic groups and areas from modern society.
There are also authors that saw some positive elements in response to the pandemic. Zhang et al. [15], taking into account that renewables are more stable to external shocks than fossil fuels, viewed COVID-19 as potentially accelerating the development of renewable energy. Renewables have lower operating costs, priority in legislation, and decentralized production (which is more flexible in situations when consumption of electricity by industry significantly declines). Czech et al. [16] pointed out the better stability of renewables in comparison to fossil fuels during pandemics. Additionally, Tian et al. [17] showed that renewable energy plants can be controlled remotely or even automatically, which again increases their stability.
Many authors, like Rita et al. [18] and Werth et al. [19], noticed that one of the important consequences of full lockdowns was an improvement in air quality. However, as Khojatesh et al. [20] proved, reduced emissions of nitrogen oxides (the main source being transport and cars) led to increased emissions of ozone connected with lower ozone titration rates. The situation with lower carbon dioxide emissions was simpler. Jawadi et al. [21] presented an analysis of changes in CO2 emissions during the last decade (also for the year 2020) for European countries. They showed a strong correlation between implementing new strategies and commitments and the growing dynamics of new renewable installations. The impressive lowering of the level of CO2 emissions during strict lockdowns starting in the spring of 2020 was temporary, but the global trend of lowering emissions of carbon dioxide seems to be stable.
The year 2022 brought more detailed analysis. Zakeri et al. [22] raised doubts on whether policymakers would strongly support renewable energy sources after the pandemic, especially in Europe, in the face of the war on Ukraine. The fossil fuel industry may ultimately become stronger than before the pandemic, as a consequence of the vulnerability of the global energy market and its supply chains’ exposure to trade shocks. Another issue, according to Yuan et al. [23], is that energy from coal is cheaper than from renewable energy sources.
Regarding policies, Khojasteh et al. [20] promoted a wider perspective of climate change during the pandemic. They called for a holistic interdisciplinary mitigation strategy covering issues like health, food, policy, economy, the environment and, of course, energy and technology. Such a strategy, according to Khojasteh et al., should be global, long-term, and include the following pillars:
decarbonization,
promotion of renewable energy sources,
integration of climate issues into environmental policies, and
support for local food production and climate-smart agriculture [20].
To achieve these goals, new technological innovations are needed, and a proper green finance system should be introduced.
Another important issue is global decarbonization. This is connected with strategies that will be discussed later in this work. An important part of new strategies is the reduction of coal production. As Aguirre-Villegas et al. [24] show, apart from renewables, we should also use energy carriers that have a lower impact on the climate, such natural gas. In 2023, the discussion regarding pandemics, energy, and climate continues.
It is worth mentioning the papers concentrated on China, as noted by Norouzi et al. [6]. China was the first country to encounter the pandemic. It is also the second biggest economy in the world and has the highest energy consumption. China is now supporting all sources of energy, but it has pledged to be carbon neutral by 2060. Stern et al. [25] showed that not only is this possible, but achieving this goal will sustain economic growth connected with the fulfillment of demand for the growing development of renewable energy sources and with the benefits of ecological restoration. The authors claim that the post-pandemic Chinese economy can support the fight against climate change. Kyriakopoulou et al. [26] also perceive the possible achievement of carbon neutrality in China as a significant advantage after the pandemic. Yang et al. [27] even suggest that China’s path to carbon neutrality is a game changer for counteracting climate change, since this country alone can reduce global anthropogenic warming up to 0.3 °C. At the same time, because of the improving air quality, 1.8 million people could be saved from death due to high levels of pollutants in the air. The possible ways to achieve carbon neutrality are presented in the paper written by Meng et al. [28], where renewables are reported as the key factor.
The same direction is taken in the legislation introduced in the European Union, as was shown by Siksnelyte-Butkiene et al. [29] and Crncec et al. [30]. They examined the situation in Europe and reported that the response of the European Community to the pandemic also stimulated the development of renewable energy and the production of hydrogen. Panarello et al. [31] confirm this thesis using the example of the European Green Deal. Ajide et al. [32] show that G20 countries are also following the same path.
As we can see, most of these papers report on the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for the renewable energy market. The connection with climate change is often indirect: the more energy from renewables, the fewer the greenhouse gas emissions, which are responsible for climate change.

3.2. Literature Review on Social Perception and Attitudes towards Renewable Energy Sources during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Public opinion on renewable energy sources can be assessed using the Willingness to Pay (WTP) method. In this section, we look at the last several years, up to but not including the pandemic period, as publications from this period will be discussed in more detail in a later part of the article.
Zalejska-Jonsson [33] conducted a WTP study for green apartments in Sweden (sample of 477 people). The results indicate that Swedes are willing to pay more for low-energy buildings, with 5% higher prices treated as a rational investment decision. In a study by Lee et al. [34], Korean consumers were found to be willing to pay an additional 3.21 USD per month for electricity generated from renewable energy sources, and 64% of respondents were willing to pay 5% more for renewables. The study was conducted with a sample of the same size as the Swedish study (477 people). In a study conducted by Portnov et al. [35] in Israel (sample of 438 respondents), consumers were willing to pay 7–10% more for green buildings. This study found, paradoxically, that financial incentives such as tax credits and subsidized loans resulted in a lower rather than higher WTP. Croatian research conducted by Matosovic et al. [36] focused not on the WTP value itself (in terms of modernization and renovation of single-family houses) but on its dependence on other variables. No difference in WTP among different income classes was found. However, WTP was dependent on the projected investment costs and the extent of support provided to homeowners. The study was conducted on a nationwide database of 4610 records.
Another interesting study was conducted by Collins et al. [37]. The authors aimed to determine the marginal WTP of energy saving measures in the Irish building sector. A calculated average marginal WTP of 0.127 pounds per kWh per year was found across all homes. The research was based on a database of over 28,000 households. A WTP survey of Italian and Czech households by Alberini et al. [38] showed the preferred estimates of WTP per tonne of CO2 emissions avoided were 133 euros for Italians and 94 euros for Czech respondents. A significant dependence of WTP on income was found. The study was conducted on samples of 1005 and 1349 respondents, respectively. In research conducted in Poland by Kowalska-Pyzalska [39] on a sample of 507 respondents, it was found that the WTP for green electricity was an additional 3.5 USD per month. It turned out that age, income, ecological attitudes, education, and knowledge are the most important WTP determinants for green electricity. Nkansah et al. [40] conducted research in the USA (West Virginia), analyzing the WTP for 10 percent of electricity generated from wind power compared to natural gas. Consumers were willing to pay 1.6 to 2.2 USD more per month for this 10 percent substitution. The survey was conducted on a sample of 3000 respondents.
Concluding the review, we should mention publications in the field of WTP methodology. The characterization of WTP has been presented, for example, by Breidert (which includes, among others, a classification of methods used in WTP) [41], Le Gall-Ely [42], Hofstetter et al. [43] and Damschroder et al. [44]; whereas methodological analyzes of the WTP for RE include articles by Buchmayr et al. [45] and Djurisic et al. [46].

4. The COVID-19 Pandemic and Climate Change

In this section, first we will briefly characterize climate change and the greenhouse gases connected with GHG emissions. Then, we will focus on carbon dioxide and the policies that were introduced to lower the emissions of greenhouse gases.
Climate change is not a new phenomenon. It is one of the consequences of the industrial revolution, which begun in the 18th century. In the middle of the 20th century, it became a global threat, escalating to dangerous progression in the first two decades of the 21st century [47].
Climate change is the consequence of high anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, ozone, nitrogen oxides, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs, which are also responsible for the ozone hole) [48]. There is also water vapor, but this is a component of the Earth’s environment and part of a natural climate system [49].
It is worth mentioning that in 2007 The Montreal Protocol on CFCs was signed. This agreement paved the way for a substantial reduction in emissions of CFCs, with the goal that the world should be CFC-free by 2030 [50]. Similarly, in 2021, The Global Methane Pledge was signed to reduce methane emissions by at least 30% by 2030 in comparison to 2020 levels [51]. Especially noteworthy is the fact that this agreement was issued during the second year of the COVID-19 pandemic. With regard to carbon dioxide, commitments to become carbon neutral became binding after the signing of 196 parties to the Paris Agreement of 2015 [52]. There is a lack of such an agreement for nitrogen oxides.
When considering the energy sector and climate change, we must concentrate on carbon dioxide, the gas emitted mainly from coal burning energy plants. However, it is worth mentioning that there are other sources of pollution of greenhouse gases. Transport is a factor for nitrogen oxides; in agriculture, methane; in industry, CFCs [4].
Carbon dioxide has a 50% share in the present anthropogenic global warming [4]. In the 18th century, in the beginning of Industrial Revolution, the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere was 280 p.p.m. In November 2022, it was 417.51 p.p.m., which is 47% higher [53]. Moreover, if we take into account the period of time covering the last 300 years, we find that 50% of the emissions of CO2 occurred in just the last 42 years (since 1980), with half occurring in the first two decades of the 21st century [54].
Regarding the COVID-19 pandemic, we must mention that during the lockdowns of the spring of 2020, an impressive decrease in air pollution in cities was apparent. Unfortunately, the effect was only temporary, and it vanished when restrictions were loosened [55].
The world’s 10 greatest emitters of carbon dioxide are presented in Table 1. The data is for the year 2021 (the second year of the pandemic, when the situation had generally been normalized). Topping the list is China. At the same time, however, China is also the world leader in the development of solar and wind power. We will come back to these issues later in the paper.
In the case of countries from the European Union, we see Germany in the seventh position. However, the table only includes individual countries. If we add up emissions from the entire EU, the resulting figure would be 2774.93 MTon, putting the EU near the top of the table, between the United States and India.
On the other hand, as assessed by The Global Carbon Project, there are 24 economies in the world that sustained economic growth during between 2012 and 2021 but at the same time significantly reduced carbon dioxide emissions. These economies are (alphabetically): Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, The Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA, and Uruguay [57]. As we can see, although American emissions are still high, future trends may be encouraging. Even now, the American Climate Alliance accounts for over 60% of the value of the American economy [3].
High global emissions of carbon dioxide translate into record-breaking high temperatures, which have become noticeable in recent years. The hottest-ever July was recorded in 2016, 2019, 2020, and 2021 [58]. Thus, there were new records almost every succeeding summer, including during the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. An important illustration of this comes from China. In August 2022, the Yangtse River—the longest in Asia—almost disappeared in some sections because of the extreme heat (and 23% less rainfall compared to the previous years). This represented a disaster on many different levels. First of all, the Yangtse provides drinking water for 400 million people. Secondly, the lack of water significantly reduced agricultural crops. Thirdly, local hydropower stations had to be shut down owing to a lack of water, which resulted in energy shortages. Fourthly, since 80% of energy demands in Sichuan Province is usually generated by the hydropower from the Yangtse River, many companies in this region (especially those connected with the production of electronic components, steel, and fertilizers for agriculture) had to temporarily suspend production, which meant significant economic losses [59].
To fight climate change, we must lower the emissions of greenhouse gases. However, there are additional factors influencing climate change, such as the mass cutting of forests, especially tropical forests. Forests stabilize the climate; thus, their role in fighting climate change is very important. Excessive logging of forests on the one hand and increasingly severe droughts on the other hand are very destructive to the climate. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic did not stop excessive tree logging [60,61,62]. In many regions, forests are dying because of increasing temperatures and a lack of rainfall. One of these regions is California in the USA. In the summer of 2021, the precipitation and also the snowpack in the region were around 40% lower than the average for the second year in a row. There were also years, such as 2015, where there was no rainfall during the summer at all [63]. Droughts also mean higher possibilities for long-lasting fires [63].
Another important factor connected with climate change is the melting of glaciers and ice caps from the poles. The consequences of such will be flooding of many lowland areas in coastal zones all over the world. The melting of glaciers is especially dangerous in Asia, where large rivers such as the aforementioned Yangtze, the Ganges, and the Mekong are fed by glaciers. Without the water from glaciers, millions of people will be deprived of access to drinking water [64].
There are other and more dangerous weather anomalies affected by progressive global climate change, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods. These events are becoming more frequent and more intense and are appearing increasingly more often in areas where they were previously rare or even unknown. To take just one example, consider the small city of Hodonin in the South Moravian part of the Czech Republic, which was struck by a deadly tornado on 24 June 2021. Most of the buildings in this city were damaged; six people were killed and 200 injured. It was the strongest tornado in the entire history of the Czech Republic and also the strongest in Europe since 2001 [65].
Some scientists believe that it is too late to avoid the threats connected with climate change; however, this does not mean that we cannot do anything to address it. At least some of the possible negative changes can be mitigated, especially in the energy sector. Among the most important are the following:
lowering the emissions of GHGs (not only carbon dioxide), not only in the energy industry, and
the further development of renewable energy sources [66].
There are many initiatives driving in this direction. The two most important ones have already been mentioned: The Paris Agreement and The UN Sustainable Development Goals. Of the latter, the especially relevant ones are goal 7: Affordable and Clean Energy; goal 11: Sustainable Cities and Communities; goal 12: Responsible Consumption and Production; and goal 13: Climate Action [67,68]. The EU’s Climate and Energy Policy goals are also important. Besides the commitments of EU and many other countries to become carbon neutral, the developing of renewable energy sources also fits into the latest Industry 5.0 strategy, which supports green and digital transitions [69]. Regarding the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic for climate change, we conclude that they were mainly connected with a temporary lowering of the level of air pollution during the spring of 2020. People spending more time in their homes meant that road traffic was markedly reduced as well as industrial production. The danger arose that unexpected spending on fighting the virus would come at the cost of lowered spending toward protection of the environment and fighting climate change. However, the commitment of the global society has not decreased. In fact, there was a new pledge regarding methane emission reduction made in 2021. In addition, none of the countries that had previously committed themselves to become carbon neutral withdrew their pledge. However, we must be aware that, independently of recent actions and agreements, climate change is progressing (as examples from China and the Czech Republic during the pandemic show). At the forefront of progress in fighting climate change is the further development of renewables. This subject will be discussed in the next section.

5. COVID-19 Pandemic Development of Renewable Energy Sources

In this section we will discuss the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on the energy sector, with a specific focus on renewable energy sources. First, we must acknowledge how the COVID-19 pandemic shifted many of our activities from the real world to the Internet: to remote learning, remote working, remote shopping, and even remote medical visits. In most countries, people have since returned to their places of work, yet Internet use is still growing. It is worth noting that part of this growth is connected with e-commerce, which flourished in 2020 [70]. After lockdowns were eased in 2020, 52% of consumers still avoided shopping centers and crowded places and continued to shop online [71]. Generally, in 2020, 17.8% of sales were connected with online transactions. In 2023, such shopping is expected to rise to 20.8% (which would be worth more than 5.7 trillion USD) [71].
Even more important is how COVID-19 affected global supply chains. Before the pandemic, supply chains generally utilized the most efficient options available to them. Taking advantage of lower costs, parts and products were often produced far from the original companies and often in poorer countries. Poorer societies, however, had relatively worse outcomes from the virus, especially during 2020. This effected supply chains and led to shortages of parts and various products. In response, larger, more international companies decided to consider the stability of their suppliers rather than basing procurement options on price. The costs of parts/products thereby became more expensive [72].
COVID-19 also changed domestic supply chains, which is especially important for the largest economies, such as China. This country has many of the largest industrial factories in the world, which manufacture parts/products 24 h a day, 7 days a week. Full lockdowns forced production to be stopped for weeks or even months. With regard to the energy market, such disruptions mainly affected the factories producing electric cars. In November 2022, delivery times for Tesla’s most popular Model 3 varied from 6 to 12 months; in the case of Models X and S, delivery schedules extended up to two years. Such a situation was unheard of before the pandemic. However, for most electric cars, the situation was better, and delivery times varied between 3 and 6 months [73]. Such a situation is hardly opportune for either producers or consumers. Supply chain deficiencies were involved, particularly material supplies that were previously imported. Chinese factories, to compensate for this, decided to speed up their “substitute exploitation and inventory improvement for critical parts” [73]. This will make the production of electric cars in China much less dependent on foreign suppliers.
The first year of the pandemic, i.e., 2020, was also the last year of the EU’s climate and energy policy introduced in 2009. It had three main goals:
  • 20% better energy efficiency,
  • 20% lower emissions of greenhouse gases,
  • 20% of energy of the member states to be obtained by renewables [74].
All three objectives had indeed been achieved by the end of the 2020 [75]. Particularly interesting is that this strategy’s specific goals for various countries were different, taking into account local possibilities. Most EU countries were expected to have reductions greater than 20%. The highest expectations were for Sweden (49%), Latvia (40%), and Finland (38%). In all three countries, higher values were achieved: 60.1%, 42.1%, and 43.8%, respectively. The lowest expectations were for Malta (10%) and Luxembourg (11%). In these cases, the actual achievement was higher, at 10.7% and 11.7%, respectively [75].
Additionally, a policy supporting renewable energy sources in Europe was also introduced in countries that were not members of the EU. In the case of Iceland, by the end of 2020, the share of renewables in their energy mix was 83.7%, and in Norway 77.4%. Such percentages were possible because of those countries’ extensive resources of hydropower, and in the case of Iceland, also geothermal energy [76].
Taking into account the global perspective, in 2019, just before the COVID-19 pandemic, 72% of all new energy added to the network was from renewables [9]. The most popular renewable energy source in 2019 (in terms of global installed capacity) was hydropower, at 16.3% (all other renewables accounted for 10.2%) [77]. The biggest hydropower plant is the Three Gorges Dam in China, with an installed capacity 22,500 MW, (as of 2012) [78]. The development of hydropower during the pandemic did not stop (18 GW of new energy was added in 2020, 32 GW in 2021, and 36 GW in 2022 [77], but other sources expanded at a greater rate. In 2020, two other renewable energy sources (solar and wind power) witnessed record numbers of new installations. In the case of other sources of energy, progress could also be observed.
In the case of photovoltaics, the top 10 list for the year 2020 of the largest PV power plants in the world illustrates this: four were put into operation in the year 2020, a further three in 2019, and the oldest one in 2016 (see Table 2).
It is important to reiterate that pandemic restrictions were introduced in most countries between late March and May 2020 [79]. Some of the solar plants opened in 2020 were opened before restrictions were issued. They are Bhadla and Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Parks [80,81]. Construction of the biggest installations is time consuming and is not possible within a year. For example, the construction of the Bhadla Solar Park was initiated in 2016 [80]. In the case of the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park, the construction began in 2012, and it continue until 2030 [80]. What is also important is that all of the largest solar installations have been/are being constructed in large desert environments; this is an important advantage, since weather conditions are always favorable in such areas.
Global solar PV capacity reached 760 GW in 2020, 18% higher than in 2019. China has the most solar capacity, at 254,355 MW, including 49,655 MW added in 2020. Following in second place is the United States of America, at 75,572 MW, with 14 890 MW created in 2020. In third place is Japan, at 67,000 MW, with 4000 MW added in 2020. In fourth place is Germany. The European Union as a whole would have the second place (152,917 MW in total, including 18.788 MW added in 2020); however, if we compare single countries, Germany has the largest capacity in the EU: (53,700 MW, with 4583 MW put into use in 2020 alone) [82].
In the case of wind power, of the top 10 largest wind power plants in the world (as of 2020) four were put into operation in that year (see Table 3). This indicates that while COVID-19 stopped much in the world in 2020, it did not arrest the development of two important renewable energy sources: wind and solar.
Global wind capacity reached 774 GW in 2020, 12.5% higher than in 2019. The data from Table 3 show that China again held first place with a wind capacity of 290,000 MW, with 52,000 MW added in 2020. In second place was the United States: 122,328 MW, with 16,895 MW added in 2020. In third place was Germany: 62,784, with 1427 MW added in 2020. India is also worth mentioning here (fourth on the list). This country has good conditions for harnessing solar power and already has two of the largest installations in the world (places 5 and 7 in Table 2). In 2020, India had a total solar capacity of 38,625 MW, of which 1096 was installed in 2020 [76].
As in the case of solar energy, wind power development appears to have not been greatly hampered by COVID-19. Construction projects continued into and beyond 2020. In the case of the Gansu Wind Farm (the world’s largest), construction began in 2009 and was completed in 2020 without any delays [83].
Looking at the presented tables, it is clear that the largest installations are in mainly in Asia. Four of the largest ones in the case of solar power and two in the case of wind power are from India. In the case of solar power, three of the largest are located in China, and in the case of wind power, seven of the largest (out of ten) are likewise from China.
During the pandemic and lockdowns of 2020, both solar and wind energy development also grew rapidly in the regions with more variable weather conditions, such as Europe and Japan. In the case of solar energy, it should be added that large installations are not the only important developments. Solar dispersed energy prosumers have small installations but are large in numbers. This is so not only because they are subsidized by many countries, but owing to two other reasons: between 2010 and 2020, photovoltaic installations became much more efficient and at the same time almost ten times less expensive [3].
2021 also witnessed global records in the development of both solar and wind energy (133 GW of solar energy and 93 GW of wind energy added) [84]. In 2022, another record was set by new solar energy capacity (191 GW was added) [85]. The pandemic did not halt the development of renewables, but it did have negative consequences for the shale oil and gas market in the USA. In 2020, demand declined and prices collapsed, and as a consequence, America suffered from many bankruptcies [86]. However, in 2021, the market in these sectors recovered to a large extent [87].
All of these achievements for renewables are in compliance with recent programs connected with promoting carbon neutrality and the further development of renewable energy sources.
The European Commission announced in 2019 that the community will be carbon neutral by 2050 (Sweden and Finland pledged to achieve this goal earlier, by 2045). This is in compliance with a United Nations call, and more than 100 countries have followed this path. In Europe, Norway has the most ambitious plan: to achieve carbon neutrality by 2030. Great Britain plans to achieve it by the year 2050. In Asia, China pledged to be carbon neutral by 2060; in the case of Japan and the Republic of Korea, it is 2050 [88]. Such pledges of carbon neutrality are also in line with the Paris Agreement of 2015 [52].
The most ambitious climate and energy policy has been introduced in the European Union. We mentioned that in 2020 the EU achieved the first goal connected with supporting renewables, with more than 20% of energy in the EU as a whole being produced from renewable energy sources. In 2019, the European Green Deal was introduced, with the next goal on the way to carbon neutrality: lowering emissions of greenhouse gases by 55% (using 1990 as a base year) by 2030 [89].
The most ambitious plan was announced by the European Commission on 18 May 2022; it was named REPowerEU: Joint European action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy [90]. It built upon a program (Fit for 55) that was introduced just one year earlier. This policy not only signaled stronger support for renewables, but also was driven by the war on Ukraine and from the resultant common consent of EU countries that there is a need to—as quickly as possible—end Europe’s dependence on fossil fuels from Russia [90].
There are four pillars of this program [90]:
energy savings (aided by fiscal incentives, such as reductions of VAT on ecological heating systems or better insulation of buildings),
diversification of suppliers of fossil fuels,
smart investments for promoting innovation and faster permitting in the case of investments in renewable energy sources,
decarbonizing of industry and increases for the target for renewable energy in the community to 45% (more than twice as high as in 2020).
The strategy also includes many more detailed goals, such as doubling the EU’s production of biomethane as well as investments in hydrogen technologies, especially ports and storage facilities [90]. Such an ambitious program comes with great expense. It is estimated that it will require investment of at least 210 billion euros [90].
As we can see, renewable energy sources are expanding rapidly, though not all of them. The biggest progress is being made by wind and solar energy development, followed by hydropower; however, in this case, new energy developments are far fewer. The pandemic did lead to a cessation in development. This is because of the strong commitments of many countries to become carbon neutral and also to introduce policies that will lead in this direction. Although renewables have become much more affordable in the last few years, the number of new installations needed remains very high. So, we are witnessing an unusual situation; a great amount will be spent not on business as usual, but for the sake of the future of our planet. Apart from energy transformation, new commitments regarding reduction of greenhouse gases have also been made. The most important has already been mentioned—The Global Methane Pledge from 2021.

6. Social Support for Renewable Energy Sources

The discussed REPowerEU program calls not only for technological change but also for social change by European citizens. It is true that even the best strategy introduced by politicians may not be effective without the support of the public [91]. In this section we will explore the influence of the pandemic on perceptions concerning renewable energy sources in different regions of the world.
To assess if threats such as COVID-19 can change public attitudes towards energy and especially renewable energy sources, comparable data from the period preceding these events and current data, or at least data from after stabilization of the pandemic, are required. Few such studies exist; however, those that address this topic are a strong starting point for addressing the above question. This is not to suggest that earlier studies for which we do not currently have comparative material will be omitted herein. From the latter group, we have selected a few studies for comparison (for the remainder, we refer to literature reviews) [92].
In assessing the perspectives on renewable energy, social factors are important and are often underestimated while economic and political aspects are emphasized. Energy consumers are not only industrial facilities but also individual consumers who, through the sum of their individual decisions, significantly shape the energy supply and demand market. Their attitudes towards renewable energy are an important factor influencing economic and political decisions in this area. Thus, they cannot be ignored.
The nature of people’s assessments, opinions, and motivations is complex; a relatively simple and easily measurable indicator expressing attitudes towards renewables (additionally strongly related to the market) is Willingness to Pay (WTP). “The willingness to pay is the highest price an individual is willing to pay for a good or service” [41]. More on this topic can be found in other studies [93].
It should be noted that WTP is not the only indicator of attitudes towards renewable energy. There are also other indicators of this type; for example, willingness to change one’s lifestyle for a green future [45] related to consumer decisions (“During your last purchase of an electric appliance/device, you considered primarily its energy efficiency”, “When buying or building a home, you gave importance to the level of energy efficiency”) [46]. The importance of WTP results primarily from the high frequency of using this indicator in research, thanks to which research results can be compared. Also important is the universal nature of this indicator, as applicable wherever households use paid energy sources.
This synthetic indicator expresses the potentially high complexity of motives, including those that are difficult to measure—and they remain outside the scope of our research. On the other hand, it expresses the disposition toward a specific consumer behavior. This aspect cannot be overlooked when assessing the perspectives on renewable energy sources. Determining the willingness to pay for products and services from the customer’s perspective is central to contemporary approaches to pricing decisions. Of course, this method has its limitations (as in the case with many other data collection methods). Other methodological studies have been devoted to this issue [94].
We attempt to answer the research question “how did the COVID-19 pandemic affect the attitudes towards renewable energy sources?” based on several studies conducted from mid-2020 to the present. It should be emphasized that the most valuable studies are ones that facilitate the possibility of comparing public opinion immediately before the COVID-19 pandemic with similarly collected public opinion data from subsequent years, such as 2021 or 2022. However, such studies are few in number—they will be discussed first. The results of the latest research will also be presented, and a few slightly earlier studies will be assessed. The analyses will therefore focus mainly on the impact of COVID-19.
One study tested the stability of environmental preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) values [95]. The Discrete Choice (DCE) experiment was used in three countries (Canada, Scotland, and Norway) before and after the peak of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first part of the study was conducted in late 2019 and then repeated in early May 2020 (shortly after the officially recognized COVID-19 peaks in these countries). The same sequence of choices was tested in all studies, using different but representative samples in each case. The initial hypothesis that the WTP for environmental variables would decrease due to increased uncertainty and concerns about future income caused by the global pandemic was not supported by these studies. The authors of the research proposed the following interpretations: (1) the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic may have led people to become sensitized to the needs of the environment as well as changed the perception of the value of ecosystems, neutralizing the potential income effect; (2) people may have also become more aware that humanity’s next great challenge is related with the commonly observed climate change and the deepening crisis of biodiversity; (3) it is also possible that the WTP for renewable energy remains stable because people have established attitudes towards the environment that do not change significantly even under the influence of events such as a pandemic or war. Research has shown that even in extremely difficult and stressful circumstances (mentally, economically, and socially), environmental attitudes remain relatively stable [95].
Interesting conclusions come from Romanian studies. These show that creating new jobs, increasing the country’s energy independence, and reducing air, water and land pollution are benefits that would convince households to pay higher bills to support renewable energy sources. Those with incomes higher than average and those living in urban areas have a higher WTP for renewable energy. These studies show that consumers are willing to pay more for an electricity supply contract if it brings a range of social benefits, such as increasing local jobs, reducing fossil fuel imports, and relation to reducing environmental pollution. However, increased budgets for local communities as a result of the taxation of new energy production companies is perceived as having a negative utility. It was also noted that WTP is influenced by income, level of education, and one’s living environment (i.e., urban, rural, etc.) [96]. Data collection and analysis were carried out at the end of 2020 and at the beginning of 2021, i.e., during the COVID-19 pandemic. Research shows that despite the pandemic, the WTP for renewables was generally high, although varied due to socio-demographic characteristics as well as the assessment perspective (short term vs. medium or long term). Other research on WTP for renewable energy was conducted in 2021 in Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The results of such suggest that although the inhabitants of these countries are willing to pay extra for renewable energy sources, the WTP is not high. The WTP amount for renewable energy is in most cases only a few percent in Thailand and Malaysia and around 10% in the Philippines, with the highest number around 20% for solar energy in the Philippines. These results are mostly consistent with those indicated for developing countries; that is, consumers are willing to pay more for renewable energy, but the amount is not significantly large [97].
In a study conducted in the Netherlands, the WTP for renewable energy sources was found to be associated with an attitude of optimism about future environmental changes. The people who manifest this type of optimism are willing to pay more for green energy; however, this optimism is not associated with a denial of the seriousness of the problem. The WTP for renewable energy is related to the understanding of the seriousness of the situation and concerns about the further effects of actions that do not take the environment into account. On the other hand, an optimistic attitude—but related to the denial of the seriousness of environmental problems—is reinforced by the lack of understanding of WTP for renewable energy. These findings underscore the importance of fostering realistic attitudes about climate change to encourage pro-environmental behavior and help shape appropriate policies and measures [98].
The analysis of several studies comparing the WTP before and after (during) the pandemic leads to the very cautious conclusion that WTP has not fundamentally changed as a result of the pandemic. This conclusion is based on currently available research results; however, it cannot be ruled out that future studies may show this issue in a different light, and this conclusion will have to be revised. If this is the case, it is also worth looking at some relatively new research produced before the pandemic.
In countries with weaker economies, the WTP for renewable energy sources encounters stronger economic barriers. Pakistan is such an example. It is a country that faces a perpetual energy shortage. Research conducted in Pakistan shows that Pakistani households are sensitive to spending on alternative energy sources. The probable cause is their poor financial situation and the significant burden of energy expenditure. A poor household may not be able to finance an alternative energy source without government assistance [99].
However, even in much wealthier societies, attitudes towards renewables vary. Australia is a good example. On the basis of several criteria, three types of attitudes were identified: “concerned”, “protesting”, and “willing to pay”. In total, as many as 83% of respondents in the entire sample indicated that they were willing to pay for electricity from renewable energy sources through a voluntary fee. However, the amount of these additional fees depended on the type of attitude: the “willing” ones were the most willing to pay, followed by the “concerned” ones; the “protesting” were the least willing [100].
The issue of WTP for renewable energy looks different in developing countries that are on the path of rapid economic growth with large energy needs, such as Turkey. Turkish residents are willing to pay about 1 USD more per month for renewable energy. Several variables affecting the WTP (such as income and environmental awareness) modify this amount [101].
From the research (2010–2020) conducted by E. Karasmanaki in some EU countries [102], we find that in Germany in 2019, the average WTP for renewable energy was estimated at 23.8 cents per kWh for a tariff with 20% renewable energy, while this rate would increase to 28.3 cents per kWh for a tariff with 100% renewable energy. An earlier study indicated that German consumers would pay an additional 3.72 cents per kWh, provided that the renewable energy was supplied by regional suppliers.
We can compare other countries with Germany using Karasmanaki’s data; the WTP data presented below for Poland, Lithuania, Italy, Finland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece are drawn from Karasmanaki [102]. Consumers in Poland declared a fairly low level of WTP for renewable energy sources—a willingness to pay an additional 3.5 USD monthly for green electricity. Other studies have shown that 42% of Polish respondents are not willing to pay any amount, and only 8% would pay an additional 5.29 to 7.56 USD monthly.
A low level of WTP for renewable energy was also recorded among Lithuanians, as the vast majority of respondents were not willing to pay any amount for electricity from RES. In Italy, the majority of consumers were willing to pay more for green electricity, but this WTP translated into low amounts, as Italians would pay just €2 more for a renewable energy contract. Nevertheless, higher WTP levels for renewable energy sources were noted in another study, which found that 45% of Italian consumers would be willing to pay an additional €6 a month for renewable electricity, and 19% were even willing to pay €10 more a month.
Consumers in Finland would only pay 10–20% more for renewable energy. However, another study showed that if renewables were produced from wood-based bioenergy, Finns would be willing to pay up to €20 more per month.
The majority of Spanish energy consumers would be willing to pay from 1 to even approx. €40 more per month.
In Portugal, consumers would pay an average of €1.6 more for hydroelectricity and €0.6 for wind power.
A significant proportion (28.9%) of Greek respondents would pay an additional €6–10 per month on their electricity bill [102].
Summarizing the factors influencing the WTP for renewable energy sources in EU countries, Karasmanaki indicates that the socio-demographic characteristics of individuals (mainly income and level of education) and attitudes related to the environment have a significant impact on their WTP. People with higher incomes and higher levels of education show higher WTP for renewable energy (the importance of age and gender is unclear, however, as studies come to quite divergent conclusions about the impact of these variables). Greater care for the environment and better understanding of RES also increases WTP [102].
Comparative studies in the USA and Japan suggest that RES have been accepted by both US and Japanese consumers, who are willing to pay USD 0.71 (USA) and USD 0.31 (Japan) more per month for each 1% increase in the use of energy from renewable energy sources [103].
In China, the WTP of Beijing residents for renewable electricity was estimated using the contingent valuation method (CVM) (Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is based on surveys conducted among respondents interested in a given good or service, so it is an indicator similar to WTP (although WTP can be obtained not only as a result of a survey, but also by other methods, e.g. experiments), but additionally may contain WTP (Willing to Accept Compensation)). The average WTP of Beijing residents for renewable energy sources was estimated to be 2.7–3.3 USD per month. The main factors influencing respondents’ WTP were income, electricity consumption, offer of energy, and method of payment [104]. In another study in Beijing, it was shown that Beijing residents are willing to pay an average of an additional 0.86 USD per household per month for the research and development of solar energy in Beijing. The level of education, household income, and opinions on energy issues had a significant and positive impact on their decisions [105].
On the basis of the analyses above, the following conclusions can be drawn: (1) in many countries in Europe (but not limited to those), there is a greater or lesser WTP for renewable energy, and this often depends on household income, level of education, and pro-environmental attitudes; (2) it seems (having only a small number of relevant studies to go by) that the COVID-19 pandemic may not have significantly affected the WTP for renewables.
The second conclusion should be treated as a hypothesis for now. Relevant studies have been conducted in only a few countries and some only during the pandemic. Other factors may be involved (in addition to the recent pandemic) that influence WTP.
Notwithstanding this, it is worthwhile to look at studies before the pandemic regarding consumers’ WTP for renewable energy sources despite this having no bearing on how the pandemic may have influenced people’s behavior. The general attitude of people on this issue is important, as well.
Information on consumers’ willingness to pay additional costs for renewable energy sources can be obtained not only by directly asking respondents about this issue but also indirectly by analyzing the broader issue of willingness to pay higher prices to protect the environment, as a fairly close relationship can be assumed between these issues. Table 4 contains information based on the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) Environment [106] data collected in 2020–2022.
Table 4 shows the declared willingness to spend more to protect the environment for seven European countries. If the positive answers (very willing and fairly willing) are summed up, the percentage in all surveyed countries amounts to at least 30% and even reaches approx. 56% (in the case of Switzerland). The following ranking can be made from these data: (1) Switzerland 56.1% positive responses, (2) Germany 45.4%, (3) Iceland 44.2%, (4) Denmark 41.7%, (5) Austria 32.7%, (6) Finland 31.5%, and (7) Slovenia 29.6%. The correlation coefficient between the percentage of positive responses and GDP (PPP) (in USD) per capita by country was calculated. The Pearson correlation is 0.89 (p < 0.008), which indicates a strong correlation between willingness to spend on environmental protection and per capita income in individual countries.
The research results show that pro-environmental attitudes seem to be relatively durable and resistant to the impact of disasters such as a pandemic. We know this from the first studies that were conducted on this subject—mainly during (or after) the COVID-19 pandemic. Whether this trend will continue over the long term is something that cannot be predicted; however, based on current data, there is no reason to think that it will not. What is also clearly visible from earlier studies is the link between pro-environmental attitudes and income, both at the scale of households and at the level of prosperity in individual countries.

7. Future Outlook

The scenarios for the future assume stable annual growth of renewable energy sources at the level of 10% for at least the next decade [107]. We must be aware, however, that it is impossible (mainly due to climate limitations) that world renewable energy production will ever reach 100% globally. Nuclear power, consequently, will still need to be relied on to some extent. On the other hand, most countries want to become carbon neutral by 2050. As this is nearly 30 years in the future, there is much time for new technologies and improvements.
Perhaps the most ambitious new technology is being developed in Japan. In 2014, Japan’s Aerospace Exploration Agency announced that they plan to build a solar power plant that would be able to orbit the Earth. The main benefits as follows:
  • such a plant could produce energy 7 days a week, 24 h a day, because of the additional mirrors deployed in space,
  • solar radiation in space is 40% stronger than on the surface of the planet,
  • since energy is going to be transmitted in the form of microwaves, it may be sent to many different locations without traditional power lines,
  • such an installation would not be susceptible to earthquakes and various other natural and human-made dangers,
  • the price of the energy would be stable [108].
Such installations would be a real revolution in the energy market; however, as there are still many technical challenges to overcome, they are not likely to be in operation soon [108].
This idea from Japan illustrates how we can address challenges in unconventional ways. One of the problems regarding renewable energy sources is how much land they require (especially in the case of the largest installations). To overcome such limitations, new ideas are needed. Some interesting technology is coming out of China. Imagine if highways were not only roads but also solar power plants. There are thousands of kilometers of highways worldwide. The first solar highway was built in Shandong in China in 2015. It is 1 km long and it is capable of producing 1 GW of electricity every year [109]. The panels are protected by a triple layer of transparent concrete, which is durable enough to withstand use by heavy trucks [109].
It may also happen that new source of energy, so far unknown, will be discovered and change the situation. As for the foreseeable future, the further development of renewables (especially wind and solar power) appears promising.

8. Conclusions

In this work, we found that even in the case of important threats like the COVID-19 pandemic, the road to a green energy revolution remains clear.
With reference to our research questions, the following conclusions can be drawn.
Although COVID-19 created serious health threats and severely impacted the global economy, its consequences for climate change and energy markets were not nearly so devastating.
In the context of climate change, the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic seems to have been neutral. Reductions in the level of air pollution during the lockdowns in 2020 were impressive but temporary. Many negative practices, such as forest logging, did not stop. On the positive side, despite the pandemic, the global commitment to polices counteracting climate change and commitments toward the decarbonization of the world economy remained steadfast. Also very encouraging was the rollout (in 2021, during the second year of the pandemic) of a new and ambitious strategy concerning the reduction of a very important greenhouse gas—methane.
In the context of the development of renewable sources of energy, the COVID-19 virus did not affect the rapid growth of solar and wind energy, both in number of new installations and with regard to their capacity. It also did not halt progress with regard to new hydropower installations (less significant, but still important). The above is even more interesting in light of the fact that most other industrial sectors suffered heavily from the pandemic. Growth in the development of renewables, moreover, seems to be stable also for post-COVID times, at least for the next decade.
The COVID-19 pandemic also did not threaten the commitment of most countries to become carbon neutral. This indicates that climate and energy issues are identified and treated seriously by the world’s authorities. This trend seems to be steady, since it is receiving strong support from new policies, such as RePowerEU, with the ambitious goal to achieve 45% of energy from renewable sources in the EU by 2030.
Analyzing the results of research on public support for renewable energy sources (which we decided to examine using the Willingness to Pay for Energy indicator), we come to the conclusion that such a phenomenon existed before the pandemic, is still present, and is continuing. The extent of willingness to pay additional fees for renewable energy varies from country to country (as evidenced by the results of previous research) and is also dependent on the wealth of the society as a whole (as shown by our analyses of International Social Survey Program data). It is likely related to the financial possibilities of supporting national or regional pro-environmental policies.
The results of the conducted research also indicate a clear relationship between willingness to pay for renewable energy and socio-demographic variables, especially those such as income and level of education, and attitudes that (in the most general terms) can be called pro-environmental. Willingness to pay for renewable energy is most often associated with higher income, higher levels of education, and stronger pro-environmental attitudes.
However, the issue of continuity or change of willingness to pay for renewable energy in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic needs to be discussed. Some studies (unfortunately not many) suggest that we may be dealing with a continuation of earlier trends—a kind of resistance to the impact of this type of unfavorable (in many dimensions) phenomenon on the scope of social support for renewable energy sources. The research available seems to indicate this; however, considering the limited nature of the current research, this warrants considerable caution. Therefore, it is better to treat this type of preliminary observation as an interesting hypothesis, requiring testing in light of future research.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, formal analysis, investigation and writing: Sections 1–3 and 8: A.P., P.R.; Section 4, 5 and 7: A.P.; Section 6: P.R. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

Data supporting reported results can be found in books, articles, and Internet links presented in the References. No new sets of data were created.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Table 1. The greatest emitters of carbon dioxide in the world in 2021 [56].
Table 1. The greatest emitters of carbon dioxide in the world in 2021 [56].
No.CountryEmissions in 2021 (MTon)Share in Global Emissions (%)
1.China12,466.3232.9
2.USA4752.0812.6
3.India2648.787.3
4.Russian Federation 1942.547.0
5.Japan1084.695.1
6.Iran710.832.9
7.Germany665.881.9
8.South Korea626.801.7
9.Saudi Arabia586.401.6
10.Indonesia602.591.5
Table 2. The largest PV power plants in the world in 2020 [77].
Table 2. The largest PV power plants in the world in 2020 [77].
No.NameCountryCapacity (MW)Year of Completion
1.Bhadla Solar Park, IndiaIndia22452020
2.Huanghe Hydropower Golmud Solar ParkChina22002020
3.Pavagada Solar ParkIndia20502019
4.Benban Solar ParkEgypt16502019
5.Tengger Desert Solar ParkChina15472016
6.Noor Abu DhabiUnited Arab Emirates11772019
7.Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park 1013 12020
8.Kurnool Ultra Mega Solar ParkIndia10002017
9.Datong Solar Power Top Runner BaseChina1000 22016
10.NP KuntaIndia900 3 2020
1 Planned final capacity (MW): 5000; 2 planned final capacity: 3000; 3 planned final capacity: 1500.
Table 3. The largest onshore wind power plants in the world in 2020 [82].
Table 3. The largest onshore wind power plants in the world in 2020 [82].
No.NameCountryCapacity (MW)Year of Completion
1.Gansu Wind Farm (Jiuquan Wind Power Base)China6800 12020
2.Zhang JiakouChina30002020
3.UratZhongqi, Bayannur CityChina21002020
4.Hami Wind FarmChina20002013
5.Damao Qi, Baotou CityChina16002013
6.Jaisalmer Wind ParkIndia16002020
7.Alta (Oak Creek-Mojave)USA15482011
8.Muppandal Wind farmIndia15002001
9.Hongshagang, Town, Minqin CountyChina10002013
10.Kailu, TongliaoChina10002013
1 Planned final capacity (MW): 20,000.
Table 4. Willingness to protect the environment and pay higher prices by country [64].
Table 4. Willingness to protect the environment and pay higher prices by country [64].
Country Very WillingFairly WillingNeither Willing Nor UnwillingFairly UnwillingVery UnwillingTotal
AustriaCount683413393002021250
%5.4%27.3%27.1%24.0%16.2%100.0%
DenmarkCount883903751931021148
%7.7%34.0%32.7%16.8%8.9%100.0%
FinlandCount483033382781461113
%4.3%27.2%30.4%25.0%13.1%100.0%
GermanyCount1226283613851551651
%7.4%38.0%21.9%23.3%9.4%100.0%
IcelandCount654283131841251115
%5.8%38.4%28.1%16.5%11.2%100.0%
SloveniaCount212894471751141046
%2.0%27.6%42.7%16.7%10.9%100.0%
SwitzerlandCount44219108796463154192
%10.5%45.6%21.0%15.4%7.5%100.0%
TotalCount854428930522161115911,515
%7.4%37.2%26.5%18.8%10.1%100.0%
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Pawłowski, A.; Rydzewski, P. Challenges and Opportunities for the Energy Sector in the Face of Threats Such as Climate Change and the COVID-19 Pandemic—An International Perspective. Energies 2023, 16, 4454. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16114454

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Pawłowski A, Rydzewski P. Challenges and Opportunities for the Energy Sector in the Face of Threats Such as Climate Change and the COVID-19 Pandemic—An International Perspective. Energies. 2023; 16(11):4454. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16114454

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Pawłowski, Artur, and Paweł Rydzewski. 2023. "Challenges and Opportunities for the Energy Sector in the Face of Threats Such as Climate Change and the COVID-19 Pandemic—An International Perspective" Energies 16, no. 11: 4454. https://doi.org/10.3390/en16114454

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