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Review

Navigating the Greek Energy Crisis through a Multidimensional Approach: A Review Article

by
Panagiotis P. Panagiotopoulos
* and
Spyros A. Roukanas
Department of International and European Studies, University of Piraeus, 18534 Piraeus, Greece
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Energies 2024, 17(16), 3915; https://doi.org/10.3390/en17163915
Submission received: 4 July 2024 / Revised: 29 July 2024 / Accepted: 6 August 2024 / Published: 8 August 2024
(This article belongs to the Section C: Energy Economics and Policy)

Abstract

:
Following the required adjustments made by the European Union (EU) to adequately absorb the negative social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU is once again confronting a crisis. The extended fiscal instability and environmental imbalance resulting from the energy crisis, primarily caused by rising energy prices owing to geopolitical upheavals (the Russian invasion in Ukraine), have been compounded by rising inflation. The main research objective of this paper is the analysis and evaluation of the effects of the current energy crisis on the Greek economy through the perspective of energy poverty, energy dependence, and climate change. Greece has been negatively impacted by the significant rise in energy costs. In 2022, the percentage of the general population that faced difficulties in paying energy bills exceeded the European average, reaching the level of 34.1%, while almost 19% of the population could not keep their homes sufficiently warm. Additionally, in 2022, Greece was one of the countries most energy-dependent on Russia. Greece achieved most of its targets regarding climate change, with the most representative example being the reduction of GHG emissions by 42% from 2000 to 2022. However, this reduction did not come from the successful green transformation of the Greek economy, but instead was due to the reduction in overall energy consumption that came from the prolonged economic crisis, combined with the restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the majority of Greek buildings are still not considered to be energy efficient, while the transportation industry continues to rely heavily on oil, coal, and natural gas.

1. Introduction

The radical changes that have occurred in the energy sector in recent years create serious challenges, with economic and social implications. Since the autumn of 2021, the global energy system has been in severe disruption, which was further exacerbated in February 2022 following Russia’s military attack on Ukraine. Most countries are struggling because of high energy prices, while energy security concerns are intensifying, particularly in Europe, which exhibits a high energy dependence on natural gas, oil, and coal imports from Russia [1]. Fazelianov [2] emphasized the security dimension of the energy crisis and examined the supply–demand imbalances in the energy market after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of European sanctions. Boneva [3] provided us with a comparative analysis regarding the energy dependence of the EU, while Bluszcz [4] also analyzed European economies under that specific prism.
Following the same vein, Mišík and Nosko [5] focused on European energy dependence and concluded that instead of unilateral national solutions, the European Union (EU) should agree on a common energy strategy to prevent future energy crises. On the other hand, Borowski [6] highlighted the crucial negative impact of the energy crisis on achieving decarbonization. Similarly, Bharti [7]) analyzed the European climate policy, examined the commercial relationship between energy products of the EU and Russia, and illustrated the policies adopted from the EU to limit its dependence on Russian fossil fuels. One of the primary reasons why the EU still faces problems with energy dependency is that investments in renewable resources have not reached desirable levels to meet the increased demand [7,8].
The steep rise in energy prices occurred at a time when the Greek economy was in a phase of recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. The Greek economy managed to maintain a positive dynamic until the last months of 2022; however, high energy prices created conditions of economic instability [9]. Approximately 19% of the population is unable to adequately heat their homes, and inadequate heating conditions are associated with negative impacts on public health. More than 1% of deaths recorded annually are attributed to energy poverty [10,11]. At the same time, high energy dependence on Russian energy imports raises energy security issues [4]. It is therefore more important than ever to make the transition to a green economy that depends less on energy imports and fossil fuels and more on renewable sources.
Consequently, the two major challenges that have emerged due to the energy crisis are: energy poverty and energy dependency. Taking into account the negative effects of climate change in Greece, we also consider climate change as a major challenge. Although the international literature has extensively addressed issues related to energy dependency and climate change, research related to energy poverty is relatively limited. According to that point of view, the researchers of this study intend to delve deeper into this issue and create a framework for analyzing the multidimensional nature of the Greek energy crisis. The main research objective of this paper is the analysis and the evaluation of the effects of the current energy crisis on the Greek economy through the perspective of energy poverty, energy dependence, and climate change, elements that are missing from the international literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the country’s energy poverty context, Section 3 discusses the situation regarding energy dependency, while Section 4 contains the analysis regarding climate change and climate policy. Finally, the conclusions of the current study are discussed in Section 5.

2. Energy Poverty

The topic of energy poverty emerged in the literature in the late 1970s, when Isherwood and Hancock [12] proposed a framework for defining, monitoring, and evaluating energy poverty. Almost 45 years later, there is no commonly accepted definition of the phenomenon. Conventional theory is not able to provide a specific and robust methodological formula with which we can accurately approach and estimate energy poverty. The way in which energy poverty is explained depends on the development stage of the respective country [13]. In developing countries, energy poverty has mainly been linked with the inability to ensure access to clean (green) and affordable energy [14]. On the other hand, energy poverty in developed countries mainly refers to the inability of people to adequately meet their energy needs [15]. Initially, the concept of energy poverty was exclusively linked to the ability of a household to adequately meet its energy needs [16,17]. Later, the evolution of the above concept included the ability to meet all household domestic energy needs at a reasonable price [18,19]. Despite the variety of definitions of energy poverty, they all refer to a certain threshold of energy consumption that allows people to meet their energy needs, without acting as a deterrent to meet their remaining financial obligations [20].
The main methodological approaches focus on measuring poverty, either by introducing subjective factors into the analysis (e.g., the ability of households to ensure their energy sufficiency) or based on some objective quantities (e.g., disposable income) [21]. The first definition of energy poverty is linked to the ability of households to adequately meet their energy needs, and it is a subjective and indirect approach to the issue—subjective because it is based on the personal judgment of households about what they consider energy sufficiency, and indirect because it is based on indirect data, such as the late payment of energy bills. In addition to the subjective methods of measuring energy poverty, there is also an objective approach, which is based on tangible and direct data [22]. Based on the 10% rule, a household faces energy poverty when it spends more than 10% of its net income in order to adequately meet its energy needs [23]. The main structural weakness of the 10% measurement approach is that it quite often leads to false and unreliable conclusions. For instance, in order to avoid exceeding the budget they can afford, households may be forced to reduce their total energy consumption so that it does not exceed 10% of their net income [24]. Therefore, myriads of households are not considered to be facing energy poverty conditions, as long as they spend less than 10% of their income on energy bills, which does not accurately reflect reality [25].
In 2020, almost 6.5% of the European population was late in paying their household utility bills, a figure that rose to 6.9% in 2022 [26]. Furthermore, in 2022, 9.3% of the European population did not manage to adequately heat (in winter) or cool (in summer) their homes [11]. It was also observed that households in the lowest income decile had to face increases in energy costs that amounted to 20% of their net incomes, while the corresponding percentage for households belonging to the highest income decile was estimated at 12.1% [27]. The implication of these figures is that, although wealthier households consume more energy, they are less vulnerable and exposed to energy poverty than the poorer households.
Regarding Greece, in 2022, the percentage of the general population that faced difficulties in paying bills exceeded the European average, reaching the level of 34.1% [26]. Meanwhile, the percentage of households stating that between 2021 and 2022, their electricity supply had been interrupted due to financial difficulties stood at 5% [28]. According to Eurostat [11], 18.7% of the Greek population could not keep their homes sufficiently warm; 36% of households allocated more than 10% of their net income to cover their energy costs, while 75% of Greek households had reduced their purchases of other essentials in favor of meeting their energy needs [13,28]. Furthermore, approximately one-third of households reported health problems related to insufficient heating and/or the presence of high humidity in the home. It is worth emphasizing that as early as 2016, it was observed that 1% to 2.7% of total mortality was related to energy poverty. More specifically, 2.7% to 7.4% of total mortality related to cardiovascular diseases is due to energy poverty, whereas in terms of mortality from respiratory diseases, the corresponding percentages range from 3.1% to 8.5% [10].

3. Energy Dependency

The theoretical concept of energy dependence, although distinct, is directly linked with energy security. Energy security refers to the stable availability of energy, at a reasonable cost and in sufficient quantities, and is one of the most critical factors determining the developmental path of countries in the long term [29]. Although the number of natural resources is finite, the energy needs of countries are constantly increasing; therefore, if the composition of the energy consumption mix does not change, in the long-term, supply will not be able to meet demand. Additionally, geopolitical upheavals in the global power distribution system make energy security an integral part of the national strategy in relation to economic growth, development, and social well-being [30].
The first concerns about energy security appeared with the outbreak of the first oil crisis in the 1970s, when several countries had to deal with the negative effects of rising oil prices. Since then, countries have adopted various strategies to deal with this issue. However, because of the low oil prices that had prevailed since the mid-1980s, few analysts paid attention to the problem of the security of the supply, believing that the market could self-regulate and resolve the issues facing the energy industry [31]. Currently, energy security has once again become a major issue, since the EU is highly dependent on third countries for energy [32]. Until 2022, with the imposition of economic sanctions, Russia was the main supplier of crude oil, natural gas, and solid fossil fuels to the EU [32]. Regarding oil, which is the most important imported energy product, Russia was the largest supplier to the EU until the third quarter of 2021, with its share in European imports reaching 24.8%. After the implementation of the sanctions, this percentage decreased to 14.4% at the end of 2022 and to 3.9% at the end of 2023, respectively. Figure 1 shows the EU’s relationship with its trading partners in relation to oil trading.
Greece’s energy demands are mostly met by primary energy imports (crude oil and natural gas), with domestic production of solid fuels and renewable energy sources accounting for a smaller portion. Greece’s dependence on energy imports registered a sharp increase from 2013 and onwards because of efforts to phase out the use of lignite (delignitization). As Table 1 illustrates, in 2022, Greece’s primary energy import dependency index reached 79.6%, compared to 62.5% in the EU. This fact reveals the country’s high energy dependency compared to that of the rest of the union.
The reduction in the carbon intensity of electricity generation occurred when the share of lignite-fired electricity dropped from 60% to 10% between 2005 and 2021 [34]. Domestic lignite production was significantly reduced for two reasons. Firstly, during the financial crisis, Greece’s total energy consumption fell by about 30%. The austerity measures implemented resulted in a significant reduction in the disposable income of Greeks [35]. As a result, many households reduced their energy consumption to be able to meet their remaining financial obligations. Therefore, the overall reduced energy demand contributed significantly to the overall reduced supply and thus, to the reduced lignite production. Secondly, when Greece signed the first fiscal adjustment agreement to deal with the financial crisis in 2010, it was one of the member countries of the EU that already had a large proportion of its energy mix coming from lignite. It is worth emphasizing that generally, the cost of lignite-fired power generation is relatively low. However, in Greece, this does not accurately reflect reality. Because of the exceptionally poor quality (low calorific value) of Greek lignite, Greece has the most expensive lignite power generation in Europe, despite the low cost of mining [36]. Accordingly, the overall restructuring of the energy sector, with the main focus on the increase in energy generated from renewable sources and the reduction of energy generated from lignite, became a political commitment for Greece in order to comply with the European climate goals.
Moreover, the significant burden on the atmosphere played a decisive role in pushing the Greek government to adopt policies aimed at reducing lignite production. During the financial crisis, many households were forced to turn to more economical, but at the same time, more environmentally harmful, ways to meet their energy needs. For example, burning wood largely replaced the use of oil. As a result, during the financial crisis, large numbers of the urban population were exposed to high levels of air pollution. In fact, 5% of total mortality in Greece can be attributed to air pollution, a percentage which is higher than the corresponding EU average [37].
In parallel, for the same time period, solid fossil fuel use decreased, falling from 26% in 2005 to 7% in 2021 of the total Greek energy mix (all fuels for all end uses), mainly driven by lower domestic lignite production. The share of oil and petroleum products in the Greek energy mix has also decreased from 61% to 52%. Throughout the same time period, the volume of imported natural gas increased dramatically from 2.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 6.4 bcm on an annual basis [38]. The proportion of natural gas in the country’s energy mix inevitably increased, since the share of lignite in the final energy mix decreased significantly, and the increase in the share of renewable energy sources (RES) was insufficient to fill this gap. Considering that energy dependence on natural gas is higher and dependence on crude oil is lower, diversifying supply sources is of paramount importance, especially since Russia is the main exporter of natural gas.
In 2005, Greece imported 85% of its total natural gas and about 9 million tons of oil from Russia, while 16 years later, Greece imported 41% of its total natural gas and only 6.6 tons of its oil from Russia [38]. Nevertheless, in 2021, Greece remained one of the countries most energy-dependent on Russia, given that the EU imports, on average, 24% of its energy needs from Russia, Greece, respectively, imports 47%. Compared to the European Union, Greece appeared more flexible and effective in imposing sanctions on Russia, as evidenced by the significant monthly decrease in its total energy imports from February 2022 onwards. Greece’s dependence on natural gas was 39% in 2020. Accordingly, Greece reduced Russian gas imports by 68.4% until November 2022. Russian gas imports from the EU also fell, although by only 28.6% [39].
For a more comprehensive understanding of the importance of reducing Greece’s dependence on Russian energy imports, it is worth analyzing the total energy supply (TES). TES includes the total energy imported minus that stored or exported. Some of these energy sources are used directly, but most are converted into fuel or electricity for final consumption. Supplementary to TES, total final consumption (TFC) is the amount of energy consumed by final users, including households and businesses. When primary sources are transformed into final energy products, like electricity, some of their energy is lost. Because of this, the TFC may differ from the TES.
As illustrated in Figure 2, although Greece is committed to further increasing its share of renewable energy sources, the TFC is mainly based on petroleum, electricity, and natural gas and to a much lesser extent, on solar and wind energy.

4. Environmental Sustainabilityand Greenhouse Emissions

The purpose of sustainable development is to meet the needs of present generations, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The three main components (pillars of sustainability) consist of the concepts of social, economic, and environmental sustainability. Environmental sustainability mainly refers to respect for the ecosystem and the prudent use of natural resources to maintain unchanged production levels, without burdening the environment [41]. The four main categories related to environmental sustainability are: energy use (energy efficiency), the extent of integration of RES, energy consumption and the volume of greenhouse gas emissions, and climate policy. Overall, in 2024, Greece is still in the medium performance category, ranking 28th in the relevant Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) [42]. Greece performed differently in each of the four main CCPI categories. Performance was high in regards energy use, medium in regards greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy use, and low in regards to climate policy [42]. Greece has met the majority of its 2020 climate and energy targets, with its energy supply now containing less fossil fuels than the amounts noted only a few years ago.
However, Greece continues to consume a lot of fossil fuels, and significant efforts are needed to reduce this consumption in order to comply with greenhouse gas emissions restrictions. The share of fossil fuels in the energy supply fell from 90% to 82% between 2010 and 2021 (from an IEA average of 78% in 2020) [34]. Nevertheless, this is mainly due to the economic recession at the outbreak of the 2008 crisis, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic, which contributed significantly to the reduction in energy demand and greenhouse gas emissions, respectively. Consequently, even though Greece’s economy became less carbon-intensive, greenhouse gas emissions rose again as a result of rising demand, as pandemic restrictions were lifted, and the financial crisis was overcome. As Santamouris et al. [43] demonstrated, the energy consumption of Greek households was directly affected by the decrease in incomes that occurred during the financial crisis. Prolonged austerity measures imposed on the Greek economy resulted in a 41.7% drop in total disposable income from 2009 to 2014. During the winter of 2011, although the weather conditions were harsher, with lower temperatures than those of the previous year, Greek households consumed 37% less energy than expected [43].
Over a 15-year period between 2005 and 2020, there was a reduction in total gas emissions from 136.4 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO2-eq) to 74.8 Mt CO2-eq. The primary sources of Greece’s energy-related greenhouse gas emissions in 2021 were oil (61%), natural gas (24%), and coal (15%) [44]. The majority of emissions related to coal (89% in 2021) originates from lignite-fired power generation. Therefore, shifting away from lignite-fired production was primarily responsible for the sharp drop in coal-related greenhouse gas emissions from 38.7 Mt CO2-eq in 2005 to 7.1 Mt CO2-eq in 2021. Oil emissions decreased significantly between 2005 and 2013, from 52 Mt CO2-eq to 33 Mt CO2-eq, mostly as a result of a decrease in road transportation, brought on by Greece’s protracted crisis [44]. Meanwhile, natural gas emissions increased from 5.2 Mt CO2-eq to a record-breaking 12 Mt CO2-eq during the same period. The main causes of growth in gas-related greenhouse gas emissions were the transition from oil to natural gas in buildings and industry, as well as the increased usage of gas-fired generation for electricity production.

4.1. Energy Efficiency

The term energy efficiency (elimination of energy waste) refers to the ability to accomplish the same activity while consuming less energy. Reduced greenhouse gas emissions, less demand for imported energy, and lower energy costs for households are the most influential benefits of energy efficiency. Greece has vast prospects for efficiency improvements, whether it is in the building, transportation, or industrial sectors. Measuring the total energy supply per unit of economic production (adjusted for purchasing power parity) is one method of assessing a nation’s overall energy efficiency. This reflects both the economy’s structure and energy efficiency, with economies focused on heavy industry typically exhibiting higher energy intensity than those based on services. In Greece, the total energy supply per unit of GDP amounted to 1522 MJ/thousand in 2022, while a decrease of 29% was observed between 2000 and 2022 [34]. This does not mean that the Greek economy was transformed from an economy based on heavy industry to one based on services. Instead, it suggests that per capita energy consumption fell significantly due to the austerity measures imposed on the Greek economy during the protracted financial crisis, combined with the restrictions that followed the COVID-19 pandemic.

4.1.1. Industrial Sector

Total energy consumption in the industrial sector showed a sharp decline from 2007 until 2013, when this trend was reversed. Since then, the average amount of energy used by industry has stabilized at 172 PJ [34]. The industry sector’s TFC stood at 159 PJ in 2021 and accounted for 25% of the TFC, distinguishing this sector as the one with the lowest TFC share since 2007 [34]. Compared to that of 2000, the industrial sector’s technical energy efficiency index increased by 39% in 2019 [44]. The decrease in the chemical (−67%), textile and leather (−58%), paper, pulp, and printing (−54%), and steel (−25%) industries contributed to the improvement in the energy efficiency index [44]. Overall, the manufacturing sector’s energy efficiency has improved, as its energy intensity per value added dropped from 6.0MJ/USD in 2016 to 4.4 MJ/USD in 2019, while the IEA average is 5.3 MJ/USD [34].

4.1.2. Building Sector

Between 2010 and 2014, there was a drop in the total final consumption of buildings, whereas in 2021, it stood at 246 PJ, or represented 39% of the TFC. Given that there are about 4.8 million buildings in Greece, of which 4,560,000 are residential, the latter’s energy demand is more than twice that of service sector buildings, accounting for 71% of building TFC in 2021 [44]. The total amount of energy used by households has dropped by 10% between 2000 and 2019. Electricity was the primary energy source in buildings from 2007 to 2021 (50% in 2021), with a significant share in residential structures (36%) and in service sector buildings (83%). Between 2000 and 2019, the technical energy efficiency index (ODEX) for the residential sector in Greece decreased by 30%, while in 2021, it was lower than the EU average. This is mainly explained by the fact that 55% of all residential buildings and 39% of total service sector buildings were built prior to the 1980 implementation of thermal insulation rules [44].
It is worth mentioning that although the legislation was implemented in the 1980s, many houses were built without meeting the necessary quality criteria according to the law. A new, stricter legislative framework was implemented in 2008, with the aim of correcting this structural weakness. From 2011 to 2018, 1.5 million energy performance certificates were issued, which revealed that almost 2/3 of homes have an energy class between E and H, which constitutes the lowest rank [44].

4.1.3. Transport Sector

The transport sector’s TFC decreased from 306 PJ in 2005 to 232 PJ in 2021, representing 36% of the TFC. In 2021, transport energy demand decreased by 65% compared to that in 2019 as a result of travel restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The largest energy demand comes from road transport, which accounted for 85% of the energy used in the transportation sector in 2019. The energy consumption per passenger-kilometre (pkm) of passenger automobiles has decreased by nearly half, from 1.7 MJ/pkm in 2005 to 0.96 MJ/pkm in 2019, which is less than that of Portugal, Spain, Germany, and France [44]. However, this is largely due to the economic crisis that significantly affected the transport sector, when many people were forced to abandon their vehicles, as they could not afford to drive them. The average age of Greek passenger cars is 16.6 years, compared to 10.7 years for the EU. Because of the high energy consumption per tonne kilometre (tkm) (which is not expected to decrease in the short term), freight transport exhibits significantly low energy efficiency. Greek freight vehicles have the oldest average age in the EU, i.e., 21.4 years, compared to the EU average age of 13.9 years [34]. Greece’s low energy efficiency in freight transportation is especially concerning because the country has one of the highest percentages of road freight energy consumption (40%) among IEA member nations [34].

4.2. Renewable Energy and Climate Plan

Escalating concern about the consequences of Greece’s dependence on conventional fossil fuels, combined with pollution and climate change, have contributed to increasing interest in renewable energy sources. Unlike fossil fuels, which are in limited supply and whose use is harmful to the environment, renewable energy sources are the optimal solution to achieve the green transition [45]. Therefore, to meet their growing energy needs and at the same time, limit the emission of harmful pollutants, countries are turning more and more often to the use of electricity [46]. The issue that emerges from this is that most countries, including Greece, largely rely on the use of conventional fuels and fossils for electricity generation. In Greece, more than half of the total electricity generation is derived from fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas). Consequently, if the demand for electricity continues to increase, the share of fossil fuels in electricity production may also increase. Renewable sources generate electricity without producing greenhouse emissions, and they are considered the most affordable source of electricity generation as a result of the rapid reduction in the cost of wind turbines and solar panels. Considering all this, the switch to electricity will only be beneficial to the environment in the long run if the additional amounts of electricity come from renewable energy sources and not from fossil fuels.
Figure 3 demonstrates the main sources of domestic electricity generation in Greece for 2022. The share of renewable electricity generation in Greece increased by 483%, from 8% in 2000 to 45.5% in 2022, a percentage that is much higher than the global average of 28%. This is mainly due solely to the domestic upgrade of renewables sources, since the net electricity imports correspond to only 7% of the 2022 total electricity supply [40].
Although Greece has committed to a further reduction of pollutant greenhouse emissions and to a greater participation of energy from renewable sources in the final energy mix consumed, in 2022, only 20% of the TFC came from renewables. This rate is higher than the global average of 12.48%, but lower than that of countries with similar population, weather conditions, and fiscal capabilities, such as Portugal (31.22%). Greece’s climate and energy policies are focused on protecting vulnerable customers, enhancing economic competitiveness, and strengthening energy security while reaching net zero emissions by 2050. The National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) is the primary document defining energy and climate policy until 2030, and it was adopted in 2019. It contains goals and mitigating actions to move the Greek economy towards net zero emissions. Achieving net zero emissions by 2050, with 80% fewer emissions by 2040, and 55% fewer by 2030, are the goals put forth in the strategy for reducing overall greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions [34].
However, the 2019 plan proved insufficient for Greece’s transition to a climate-neutral economy by 2050. Thus, a revised version of the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) was presented in 2023, highlighting the need for the additional reduction of greenhouse gases emissions by 2030 and the necessity of an additional increase in the share of renewable energy sources in the TFC and electricity production, respectively. The major structural weaknesses of the new revised plan are the high carbon budget and the low expectations regarding the energy savings and energy efficiency targets. Moreover, the significant growth of the gas infrastructure in response to the energy crisis, including plans for additional fossil gas power plants, represents another major failure because it creates further reliance on fossil fuels and is inconsistent with a long-term strategy to achieve carbon neutrality before 2050.

5. Conclusions

This paper explored the Greek energy crisis under the prism of energy dependency, energy security, and climate change. The effects of the current crisis in the energy sector are particularly damaging to the overall economy because of the extent to which the Greek economy relies on energy imports, with Russia being one of its main suppliers. The energy dependence on Russia for natural gas and oil has several negative effects on social and economic activity. As a result, increased energy prices, combined with high inflation, burdens households, especially the most vulnerable. Energy poverty is considered a social problem of increasing importance, with serious health implications for thousands of citizens. In 2022, the number of people in Greece facing difficulties in paying bills related to energy consumption exceeded the European average, reaching the level of 34.1%. Meanwhile, 5% of households reported that their energy supply had been disrupted between 2021 and 2022 due to financial issues.
Greece’s energy supply now contains fewer fossil fuels, mostly as a result of the declining use of lignite in the production of electricity. Greece achieved most of its 2020 targets regarding climate change and green transition, with the reduction of the GHG emissions by 42% from 2000 to 2022 being the most representative example. However, it is worth highlighting the fact that this reduction did not come from the successful green transformation of the Greek economy, but instead was due to the reduction in overall energy consumption resulting from the prolonged economic crisis, combined with the restrictions of the COVID 19 pandemic.
The drop in lignite-fired electricity generation was mostly compensated for by an increase in gas-fired generation, along with a respective growth in the wind and solar generation of power. In 2023, Greece was considered to be a global leader regarding the use of thermal solar systems for residential energy consumption (mainly for hot water). Notwithstanding, this accomplishment is not sufficient to fully support the delignitization of the Greek economy, resulting in an increase in the use of natural gas. Greece still uses fossil fuels for energy. In terms of lignite production, Greece is third in the EU-27 and eighth worldwide; however, Greece produces low-quality lignite, which despite cheap mining costs, raises the price of energy production. In parallel, greater emphasis must be placed on the promotion of policies aimed at upgrading the energy efficiency of all sectors of the Greek economy. The majority of Greek buildings are still not considered to be energy efficient, while the transportation industry continues to rely heavily on oil, coal, and natural gas.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, P.P.P.; investigation, P.P.P.; resources, P.P.P.; data curation, P.P.P.; writing—original draft preparation, P.P.P.; writing—review and editing, P.P.P. and S.A.R.; supervision, S.A.R.; project administration, S.A.R. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This article has been supported in part by the University of Piraeus Research Center.

Data Availability Statement

The data are contained within the article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Figure 1. EU imports from petroleum oils by trading partner. Source: Eurostat [32].
Figure 1. EU imports from petroleum oils by trading partner. Source: Eurostat [32].
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Figure 2. Greek TES and TFC. Source: IEA [40].
Figure 2. Greek TES and TFC. Source: IEA [40].
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Figure 3. Largest sources of electricity generation (GWh) in Greece, 2022. Source: IEA, [40].
Figure 3. Largest sources of electricity generation (GWh) in Greece, 2022. Source: IEA, [40].
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Table 1. Energy imports dependency, Greece and EU.
Table 1. Energy imports dependency, Greece and EU.
2016201720182019202020212022
EU 27 countries(from 2020)56.02857.34757.84360.47557.46455.51762.502
Euro area, 20 countries (from 2023)61.69962.79462.95465.12862.02660.39367.964
Greece72.91171.28270.68174.10381.41573.81979.601
Source: Eurostat [33].
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Panagiotopoulos, P.P.; Roukanas, S.A. Navigating the Greek Energy Crisis through a Multidimensional Approach: A Review Article. Energies 2024, 17, 3915. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17163915

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Panagiotopoulos PP, Roukanas SA. Navigating the Greek Energy Crisis through a Multidimensional Approach: A Review Article. Energies. 2024; 17(16):3915. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17163915

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Panagiotopoulos, Panagiotis P., and Spyros A. Roukanas. 2024. "Navigating the Greek Energy Crisis through a Multidimensional Approach: A Review Article" Energies 17, no. 16: 3915. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17163915

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