This section demonstrates the analysis and results of the implemented methodology. It also presents a breakdown of ethanol and gasoline consumption dynamics across Brazil.
4.1. Ethanol–Gasoline Market by Price Ratio Clusters
Each Brazilian state was classified according to a range corresponding to the average price ratio of fuels in 2023. The decision to use only 2023 for the calculation was made to ensure consistency in the analysis. By focusing on the most recent year, the data reflect current market conditions, capturing recent fluctuations in fuel prices, production, and distribution factors. This approach avoids potential distortions from historical price variations, especially those caused by the pandemic, which severely disrupted fuel markets through supply chain interruptions, reduced demand, and price volatility.
The First Range includes states where the price ratio is below 68.8%. The Second Range encompasses states with a price ratio between 68.8% and 78.8%. Finally, the Third Range comprises states where the price ratio exceeds 78.8%. The categorization of each state by its price ratio can be seen in
Table 3.
This type of classification allows for a granular analysis of the regional variations in fuel pricing, facilitating targeted policy interventions and economic assessments. Therefore, this stratification is imperative to understanding the dynamics of fuel economics in different states, aiding in the formulation of strategies to address disparities and enhance the efficiency of the fuel market.
Moreover, by categorizing states into these pricing ranges, the methodology provided an overview of the regional understanding of fuel and the economic factors influencing consumer behavior. This categorization is helpful for policymakers aiming to design targeted interventions that promote ethanol usage and reduce dependence on fossil fuels. In addition, understanding these consumption patterns also helps stakeholders in the energy sector forecast demand, plan supply logistics, and develop strategies to enhance the adoption of more sustainable fuel options.
To this extent,
Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of three distinct ranges across the Brazilian territory. The ranges are categorized into First Range (green), Second Range (yellow), and Third Range (red).
The First Range is primarily focused on the central and southern regions, encompassing states like Goiás, Mato Grosso do Sul and São Paulo. The Second Range covers a wider area, including parts of the North, Northeast, and Southeast, such as Bahia, Tocantins, and Minas Gerais. The Third Range is mainly distributed across the northernmost and southernmost states, including Roraima, Acre, and Rio Grande do Sul.
This type of distribution is responsible for emphasizing the regional disparities and offers a geographical overview for further examination in this study. It is also possible to address the fact that the concentration of the First Range in the central and southern regions implies a level of uniformity in these areas, which could indicate shared economic, social, or environmental characteristics. Moreover, the coverage of the Second Range and the nature of the Third Range may signify varying levels of development and local circumstances.
Conversely, pertaining to the ethanol production in Brazil,
Figure 3 shows the map distribution of it in the country. This map utilizes a gradient color scheme to represent varying ethanol production levels across different states. Darker shades indicate higher production volumes, while lighter shades signify lower ones.
Notably, the states of São Paulo, Goiás, and Mato Grosso exhibit the highest levels of ethanol production, as indicated by the darkest shades on the map. In contrast, states in the northern and southern regions, such as Roraima and Rio Grande do Sul, display lower production volumes, characterized by the lightest shades.
This distribution highlights the concentration of ethanol production in the central and southeastern regions of Brazil and suggests the presence of favorable conditions for ethanol production, such as climate, soil quality, and agricultural infrastructure. Also, these geographic disparities in ethanol production are critical to comprehend regional economic dynamics, the distribution of ranges in Brazil, and the formulation of policies aimed at optimizing ethanol output across the country, as the lack of proper supply structure inflates the price in certain locations further from production centers.
The analysese in
Figure 2 and
Figure 3 reveal a geographic correlation between the distribution of the ranges and ethanol production in Brazil, where the central and southeastern regions align with the highest ethanol production areas, particularly in states like São Paulo, Goiás, and Mato Grosso. This reinforces the major role played by the lack of proper distribution from production centers to distant states, despite other regional socioeconomic characteristics.
In addition, this overlap suggests that regions with higher development indicators, as implied by their classification in the First Range, are also leading in ethanol production. Conversely, states in the Third Range (red), which are spread across the northernmost and southernmost parts of Brazil, show lower ethanol production levels and thus need to have it transported from Ribeirão Preto’s distribution center, leading to a higher cost for the consumer since there is no governmental subsidy for its logistics.
Figure 4 shows how expensive it is to transport liquid bulk to each Brazilian state, departing from São Paulo. The states that are shown in white belong to the list from
Table 2 and are able to meet their demand internally. It is also possible to refer to
Figure 4 to prioritize which states would need a higher subsidy for ethanol transportation to make the ethanol–gasoline price ratio reasonable.
4.2. Competitiveness of Ethanol in the Fuel Market
A further distinction was made to analyze the competitiveness of ethanol using the FFV fleet as the threshold trigger for classifying each Brazilian state in either a competitive or dominant ethanol market. For a state to be considered competitive, the ethanol market share should cross the line that denotes half of the FFV fleet in the state at least once. If the ethanol market share crosses the line that represents the whole FFV fleet, it is considered to have a dominant ethanol market. It is important to highlight that this threshold was chosen because the FFV fleet is calculated considering only the vehicles that have the possibility of chosing between these two fuels.
Therefore,
Figure 5 demonstrates the representation of how variables have evolved over time and endorses the interplay between ethanol market share, fuel prices, and the adoption of FFVs in states where the price ratio of ethanol to gasoline is below 68.8%. The blue line represents ethanol’s market share, while the green line shows the price ratio between ethanol and gasoline. The red line indicates half of the participation of FFVs within Otto cycle vehicles, and the dashed green line denotes the price mean, which is 0.673.
In this context, the FFV fleet serves as a threshold for categorizing a state’s ethanol market as either competitive or dominant. For a state to be classified as having a competitive ethanol market, the ethanol market share must cross the line, indicating half of the FFV fleet at least once. If the ethanol market share exceeds the line representing the entire FFV fleet, the state is considered to have a dominant ethanol market. To this extent, the threshold discovery is an earnest analysis because the FFV fleet is calculated based on vehicles capable of utilizing both ethanol and gasoline.
Moreover, for
Figure 6, the FFV fleet is a benchmark for categorizing the Second Range of aggregated states’ averages. In the Second Range, with a price ratio between 68.8% and 78.8%, the ethanol market share is slightly higher and more variable than in the Third Range.
The price ratio fluctuates around this range and reflects a balanced fuel price dynamic. As can be observed, the FFV participation continues to grow and suggests an increasing flexibility of fuel choice. In addition, this range indicates that the states exhibit a competitive ethanol market, where ethanol begins to gain a foothold.
For
Figure 7, in cases where the price ratio is 78.8% or above, the market share of ethanol continues to exhibit low levels consistent with the elevated price ratio. The price ratio surpasses 78.8%, which indicates an increased cost of ethanol in comparison to gasoline. Despite the prevalence of FFV adoption, it does not result in a substantial surge in the market share of ethanol. This implies that even with the existence of FFVs, ethanol remains a minor player, possibly due to unfavorable pricing circumstances.
Therefore, the results derived from
Figure 7 demonstrate that ethanol’s market share may not increase in accordance with the decay in the ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio. This underscores the notion that various other variables play a role in determining ethanol’s competitiveness and market dominance. The existence of FFVs hints at the potential for expansion in the ethanol market, especially in regions where the price ratio is more advantageous. Nevertheless, the dominance appears to hinge on factors beyond the presence of FFVs, as the chart indicates that for the analyzed range, the average price ratio is 86.2% and the area between the red and blue lines is greater than the one seen in
Figure 6, which has an average price-ratio of 78.1%.
Consequently, the dominant Brazilian states for the ethanol market are Goiás, Mato Grosso, and São Paulo, which demonstrate the highest production levels and market influence. Admittedly, these states have favorable conditions, such as suitable climates, advanced agricultural infrastructure, and robust supply chains, which contribute to their dominance in the ethanol industry.
Conversely, competitive Brazilian states, including Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, Paraná, and Rio de Janeiro, exhibit material but relatively lower production levels. In general, these states play a crucial role in the market and provide contributions while facing competition from the dominant states. This reiterates the interplay between the state production and its price for the final consumer.
4.2.1. States with Dominant Ethanol Markets
The states with dominant ethanol markets are the ones encompassed in the First Range, which are Goiás, Mato Grosso, and São Paulo. Therefore, the following figures were generated with the objective of understanding the behavior of the price ratio curve, which enables the delineation of an ideal scenario to assess the impact of the price ratio on market share behavior. In these states, ethanol presents a more attractive alternative to gasoline, even when efficiency differences between the two fuels are not factored in. Local production and distribution dynamics create an environment where FFV owners have the flexibility to choose between ethanol and gasoline, driven largely by personal preference rather than cost. This is due to a balanced price ratio and comparable fuel efficiency, making the two fuels nearly perfect substitutes. By analyzing these markets, we can better understand whether the limited adoption of ethanol as the dominant fuel is primarily a matter of consumer preference or if it stems from economic factors, such as pricing.
To this extent,
Figure 8 illustrates the temporal evolution of fuel dynamics in the state of Goiás from 2014 to 2024. The green line represents the price ratio of ethanol to gasoline (Eth./Gas.), with the dashed horizontal line indicating the average price threshold at 0.660, considering only the values where the blue line is above the red line. The dashed lined was included as a reference point to provide a clearer understanding of the magnitude of changes in the price ratio. Additionally, the red line signifies the involvement of FFVs within the Otto cycle vehicle fleet, displaying a consistent upward trajectory.
Distinctly, the market share of ethanol encounters notable variability, characterized by peaks and troughs that point to responsiveness to diverse factors like price changes, policy adjustments, and consumer inclinations. The ethanol-to-gasoline price ratio remains in proximity to the average threshold, influencing ethanol’s competitiveness in the marketplace. The increasing pattern in FFV participation implies a rising acceptance of vehicles capable of utilizing ethanol, potentially steered by technological progressions and regulatory encouragements for alternative fuels.
To this extent, it is possible to address in
Figure 9 the temporal evolution of fuel dynamics in the state of Mato Grosso from 2014 to 2024. The dashed green line marks the price threshold mean at 0.620.
The graph reveals that the ethanol market share fluctuates over the period, with peaks around 2019 and subsequent decreases thereafter. On the other hand, the price ratio exhibits substantial volatility, generally staying above the price threshold mean of 0.620, particularly in periods around 2015 and 2023. The participation of FFVs shows a steady upward trend, which indicates a prevalence of these vehicles in Mato Grosso’s vehicle fleet over the years since the ethanol market share is 56.4% of the time above the FFV line.
Moreover,
Figure 10 represents the state of São Paulo. The depiction also showcases the development of the market dynamics of ethanol in the region of São Paulo from 2014 to 2024.
The blue line denotes the ethanol market share, which illustrates major fluctuations throughout the timeframe. However, despite the instability, there is an evident downward trajectory until the middle of 2022, followed by a modest rise towards 2024. The red line, which represents the FFVs’ participation among Otto cycle vehicles, displays a consistent upward pattern, indicating a gradual escalation in interest in these types of vehicles.
The green line corresponds to the price ratio between ethanol and gasoline, while the green dashed line corresponds to the mean value of the months at which the market share surpasses the whole FFVs’ participation among Otto cycle vehicles. The involvement rate seems to exhibit an inverse correlation with the ethanol market share, as higher market shares align with periods of reduced price ratio.
To this extent,
Table 4 shows the percentage of time each dominant state had its ethanol market share above the entire FFV along the analyzed years.
Mato Grosso led, with ethanol surpassing the FFV threshold 56.91% of the time, which indicates a strong market presence. São Paulo followed with 45.53%, showing significant but slightly lower ethanol dominance. On the other hand, Goiás had the lowest percentage at 32.52% and reflects more frequent fluctuations below the FFV threshold and suggests a less consistent ethanol market share compared to the other states.
Therefore,
Figure 11 presents the comparison between ethanol markets and price ratio in the dominant states. These states are Goiás, Mato Grosso, and São Paulo, representatives of the southwest and midwest of Brazil. Each data point represents a unique observation within these states.
The ethanol market share is plotted on the y-axis, while the price ratio of ethanol to gasoline is plotted on the x-axis. The scatter plot shows a negative correlation between the ethanol market share and the price ratio across all three states, indicating that as the price ratio of ethanol to gasoline increases, ethanol’s market share tends to decrease. The data points for Goiás are marked in blue, for Mato Grosso in green, and for São Paulo in teal.
Subsequently,
Figure 11 underscores the variability in the dominant market and reflects the economic and consumer dynamics in these three states: the number of data points above the green line and to the left of the red line is significantly higher than the ones on the right of the red line, indicating that ethanol market is stronger when the price ratio is lower than the average in these states. To this extent, it is possible to note that the average value for the price ratio in these three states was 67.3%, which suggests that this could be a lower bound for the price ratio between these fuels in order to make ethanol dominant in a state.
4.2.2. Competitive Market States
Regarding the competitive states, an analysis was conducted wherein these states were meticulously scrutinized and ultimately selected based on the intersection point between the red and blue lines, as depicted in the visual representations provided below. In the context of this particular category, the benchmark utilized for this evaluation was determined to be equivalent to fifty percent of the total number of vehicles within the FFV fleet.
Figure 12 shows that the ethanol market share (blue line) remains relatively low throughout the period, with minor fluctuations and no significant upward trend. The price ratio (green line) remains consistently above the threshold mean of 0.693, indicating a relatively high cost of ethanol compared to gasoline over most of the period. The participation of FFVs (red line) shows a gradual but steady increase, suggesting a slow adoption rate of these vehicles in Paraíba.
Also,
Figure 12 shows the persistent challenges in increasing ethanol market share in Paraíba, despite the rise in FFV adoption, mainly due to the unfavorable price ratio of ethanol to gasoline. Similarly, the ethanol market share is above the FFV line 2.4% of the time. Therefore, the average value for the ethanol–gasoline price ratio in the state, in which the ethanol market share is above half of the FFV, was 69.3%.
For the eight competitive states (Goiás, Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Minas Gerais, Paraíba, Paraná, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo), the average ethanol–gasoline price ratio was 67.8%, which suggests that this could be an upper bound for the price ratio between these fuels in order to make the market competitive.
4.2.3. Dominant Gasoline Market States
The dominant gasoline states were filtered based on the intersection between the red and blue lines in the figures below. For this class, the threshold considered was also half of the FFV fleet.
Figure 13 illustrates that the ethanol market share (blue line) remains extremely low throughout the period, exhibiting almost no fluctuations and no significant upward trend. This suggests a persistent lack of consumer preference for ethanol in Amapá. The price ratio (green line) consistently stays above the threshold mean of 0.788, indicating that ethanol is more expensive than gasoline for the entire period. Therefore, the high relative cost is a likely deterrent to ethanol adoption among consumers.
Meanwhile, FFV participation shows a slow increase. This suggests that while the fleet of vehicles capable of using ethanol is growing, albeit slowly, it is not translating into increased ethanol usage, likely due to the unfavorable price dynamics.
The consistent gap between the price ratio and the threshold mean shows the economic barrier that prevents a shift towards ethanol in the region. Additionally, the low volatility in ethanol market share further underscores the strong influence of price on fuel choice and emphasizes the need for price incentives or policy interventions to enhance ethanol’s competitiveness in Amapá and other states that pertain to the last range.
Table 5 shows the percentage of time each competitive state had its ethanol market share above half of the FFV during the analyzed years.
4.3. States’ Price Threshold for Consumer Preference
For the states where any number of crossings occurred between the ethanol market share and half the FFV fleet, the threshold condition was used. In these cases, the price ratios were collected to estimate an ideal average price ratio between ethanol and gasoline in each of these states, as shown in
Table 6. In this scenario, this number shows the inflection point at which consumers began choosing ethanol over gasoline, indicating the average price ratio at which ethanol becomes the preferred fuel option for a significant portion of the state market.
Mato Grosso exhibits the lowest threshold at 0.646, which indicates that ethanol needs to be necessarily cheaper than gasoline to gain market share in this state. In contrast, Paraná has the highest threshold at 0.707, which suggests a higher tolerance for ethanol prices compared to gasoline.
Other states, such as Goiás and Rio de Janeiro, have thresholds close to 0.688 and 0.686, respectively, and indicate a moderate competitiveness of ethanol. Sao Paulo, one of the largest and economically significant states, has a threshold of 0.685, reflecting its balanced fuel market dynamics.
Moreover, the cross-elasticities are presented in
Table 7. To address the issue of some states having an infinite average cross-price elasticity, the calculation method was adjusted. For instance, when the variation in the average price was less than BRL 0.01, the cross-price elasticity was set to zero. This decision was taken to avoid distortions in the data caused by minimal price fluctuations that do not meaningfully reflect consumer behavior. Furthermore, states where the average cross-price elasticity remained infinite after this adjustment were excluded from the analysis, ensuring that the final dataset only included values that are interpretable for the study.
The Distrito Federal exhibits the highest average cross-price elasticity at 13.23, which indicates a strong substitutability between the two goods. Espírito Santo follows with a value of 6.99, and Piauí registers an average of 3.08. Other states, such as Bahia (2.60), Mato Grosso do Sul (2.53), and Acre (2.47), also show positive but moderate substitutability. Paraná, Minas Gerais, Alagoas, Pernambuco, Paraíba, and Amazonas display lower positive elasticities, ranging from 2.20 to 1.18, suggesting weaker substitution effects. Rio de Janeiro, with an average cross-price elasticity of 0.19, shows minimal substitutability, perhaps because this state has a significant supply of natural gas for vehicles, which might inhibit ethanol’s substitutability potential.
On the other hand, Sergipe and Tocantins exhibit negative average cross-price elasticities, with values of −1.88 and −3.93, respectively. These negative values typically suggest complementarity, where an increase in the price of one good would lead to a rise in the demand for another. However, in these states, the expected complementarity is not observed. Rather, the effects of crop seasonality are strongly observed, as the price ratio rises between January and April and decays right after the harvest. For these states, it was observed that the price ratio increases a little while the demand has a negative variation. This leads to a highly negative cross-elasticity for these months, shifting the annual time series down. If these months are excluded from the calculation, the cross-elasticity for these states is positive, indicating a substitutability relationship between these goods. This discrepancy suggests that other factors may influence consumer behavior in these regions, preventing the typical complementary relationship from being verified.