Appendix A. Experimental Instruction 3
Welcome to this experiment and thank you for your cooperation.
The four of you are four foresters. Now, forestry infrastructure (such as a monitoring station) needs to be built in order to protect the healthy growth of trees, which is a quasi-public good. Now, we need to know how much each of you is willing to pay to build this kind of quasi-public forestry infrastructure.
You are in the same forest area. Three of you are foresters (followers) and one is a member of the Forestry Bureau (leader). Now, forestry infrastructure (such as a monitoring station) needs to be built in order to protect the healthy growth of trees, which is a quasi-public good. Now, we need to know how much each of you is willing to pay to build this kind of quasi-public forestry infrastructure. During the experiment, the leader will give priority to donation (supply) and then display their donation (supply). After that, the followers will donate (supply).
At present, there is only one public account, which is for the funds you are willing to give for the construction of forestry infrastructure. After each round of the experiment, each person will have fifty chips. You can choose to invest zero to fifty chips in the public account. After everyone decides the investment amount, each person will get some benefits from the public account, regardless of whether they invested or not, and benefits = (0.4 × Total amount of public account); 0.4 is the rate of return.
In addition, each of you has a private account for depositing your remaining funds, which are used to meet your daily needs. The experiment income of each of you in each round = the amount of private account funds + (0.4 × Total funds in public accounts). That is, if you choose to invest X chips, and the total investment amount of the other three people is Y, then your experimental income is (50 − X) + 0.4 × (X + Y), (50 − X) are the remaining funds in your private account, and 0.4 × (X + Y) is the return on investment you get from your public account.
After each round of the experiment, we will display your investment, your return for that round, and the investment and return of the other three members.
After information feedback, each of you will get ten extra chips before the next round of the experiment, and each of you will have the opportunity to reward or punish others in the previous round (note: you cannot punish or reward yourself). Each use of a chip will increase or decrease the income of the person being rewarded or punished by three chips. The maximum number of chips you can use for each target member is five, that is, you can increase or decrease the income of a target member by fifteen at most.
Finally, the final experiment income of each of you in each round = private account funds + (0.4 × Total amount of funds in public account) +(10 − amount of funds you use to reward or punish others) + 3 × (The total number of rewards you get in this round) − 3 × (The total number of penalties you get in this round).
At the end of each round of the experiment, conduct the next round of the experiment. You will initially get fifty chips from the experimenter for each round of the experiment. We will conduct ten rounds of the experiment. After ten rounds of the experiment, we will pay the respective cash amounts to each person in the experiment. The final cash income will be distributed privately, and only you know your own income. The cash income = 200 * (experimental income per person/(total experimental income of 4 persons)).
During the experiment, it is strictly prohibited to communicate with other participants, and your mobile phone must be set to vibrate. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will answer your questions separately. Your compliance with the rules is very important, otherwise we must exclude you from the experiment without paying any remuneration.
Appendix B. Tests
Before the experiment, you need to do three tests to ensure that you fully understand the rules of the experiment, so that you can make optimal decisions and maximize your benefits.
If the investment amount of the fourth person is equal to the average of the total investment amount of the other three people, then all four people will benefit. If the investment amount of the fourth person is less than the average of the total investment amount of the other three people, the fourth person will get the most income. If the investment amount of the fourth person is greater than the average of the total investment amount of the other three people, the fourth person will have the least income. As long as the investment amount of all four people is the same, the total income of each person will be more than fifty. If the investment amount of three people is the same, and the fourth person chooses not to invest, or invests less than the investment amount of the other three people, the fourth person will benefit the most. If the investment amount of three people is the same, and the investment amount of the fourth person is greater than that of the other three people, the fourth person will benefit the least.
1. If the other three people A, B, and C invest 10 chips, 10 chips, and 10 chips, respectively, in the public account, and you also invest 10 chips in the public account, with a return on investment in the public account of 0.4, the remaining funds in your private accounts will be (), (), (), and (), respectively; the incomes obtained from public accounts will be (), (), (), and () respectively; and the experimental benefits of your four will be (), (), (), and () respectively;
2. If the other three people A, B, and C invest 10 chips, 10 chips, and 10 chips, respectively, in the public account, and you invest 0 chips in the public account, with a return on investment in the public account of 0.4, the remaining funds in your private accounts will be (), (), () and () respectively; the incomes obtained from public accounts will be (), (), (), and (), respectively; and the experimental benefits of your four will be (), (), (), and (), respectively;
3. If you invested 0 chips in the public account and the other three people A, B, and C invested 5, 5, and 20 chips, respectively, in the public account, with a return on investment in the public account of 0.4, the remaining funds in your private accounts will be (), (), (), and (), respectively; the incomes obtained from public accounts will be (), (), (), and (), respectively; and the experimental benefits of your four will be (), (), (), and (), respectively.
Appendix C. Questionnaire
Hello!
In order to carry out the research on the “supply behavior of forestry infrastructure”, we invite you to fill in the following questionnaire. The results of the questionnaire are only for scientific research and will be kept strictly confidential. No personal information will be disclosed. Thank you for your participation!
Part I: Personal characteristics
Your date of birth:
Your gender? A. Female B. Male
Your ethnic group? A. Minority B. Han
Are you a communist? A. No B. Yes
Do you take out a loan? A. No B. Yes
Do you have any part-time job? A. No B. Yes
Have you participated in the experiment? A. No B. Yes
What is your average household income per month? A. RMB 0–3000; B. RMB 3001–6000; C.RMB 6001–9000; D. RMB 9000 or more
Part II: The attitude towards trust and risk
Will you believe the words and deeds of strangers?
5 = very trustworthy; 4 = trustworthy; 3 = fair; 2 = untrustworthy; 1 = quite untrustworthy
Do you think you can be trusted?
5 = very trustworthy; 4 = trustworthy; 3 = fair; 2 = untrustworthy; 1 = quite untrustworthy
Figure 1.
The calculation rules of income.
Figure 1.
The calculation rules of income.
Figure 2.
Supply analysis in 12 scenarios.
Figure 2.
Supply analysis in 12 scenarios.
Figure 3.
Effects of communication on supply.
Figure 3.
Effects of communication on supply.
Figure 4.
Effects of communication on free-riding behaviour.
Figure 4.
Effects of communication on free-riding behaviour.
Figure 5.
Effects of information feedback on supply.
Figure 5.
Effects of information feedback on supply.
Figure 6.
Effects of information feedback on free-riding behaviour.
Figure 6.
Effects of information feedback on free-riding behaviour.
Figure 7.
Effects of rewards and punishments on supply.
Figure 7.
Effects of rewards and punishments on supply.
Figure 8.
The impact of rewards and punishments on free riding.
Figure 8.
The impact of rewards and punishments on free riding.
Figure 9.
Amounts of reward and punishment implemented or received.
Figure 9.
Amounts of reward and punishment implemented or received.
Figure 10.
Effects of leadership style on supply.
Figure 10.
Effects of leadership style on supply.
Figure 11.
Effects of leadership style on free-riding behaviour.
Figure 11.
Effects of leadership style on free-riding behaviour.
Table 1.
The static game of incomplete information between forestry farmer and government.
Table 1.
The static game of incomplete information between forestry farmer and government.
| Foresters | Supply | No Supply |
---|
Government | |
---|
Supply | R1-C, R2-C | R1-2C, R2 |
No supply | R1, R2-2C | 0, 0 |
Table 2.
Experimental design.
Table 2.
Experimental design.
Experiments | Experiments |
---|
Experiment 1: EL × NF × NP × NC (10 rounds) | Experiment 7: EL × NF × NP × C (10 rounds) |
Experiment 2: EL × F × NP × NC (10 rounds) | Experiment 8: EL × F × NP × C (10 rounds) |
Experiment 3: EL × F × P × NC (10 rounds) | Experiment 9: EL × F × P × C (10 rounds) |
Experiment 4: CL × NF × NP × NC (10 rounds) | Experiment 10: CL × NF × NP × C (10 rounds) |
Experiment 5: CL × F × NP × NC (10 rounds) | Experiment 11: CL × F × NP × C (10 rounds) |
Experiment 6: CL × F × P × NC (10 rounds) | Experiment 12: CL × F × P × C (10 rounds) |
Table 3.
Locations of field investigation.
Table 3.
Locations of field investigation.
Forest Types | Locations of Field Investigation |
---|
Forest Park | Badaling Forest Park |
Forest Park | CuiHu National Urban Wetland Park |
Ecological forest | WaLi Agricultural Ecological Park in ChangPing District |
Ecological forest | SongShan Nature Reserve |
Ecological forest | Ecological Forest in YanQing Mountain |
Collective forest farm | LvJian collective forest farm |
Orchard | Beijing ShiXin Wowo Orchard |
Nursery | YiLi First Construction Ecological Technology Co., Ltd. |
Table 4.
Descriptive statistics of subjects’ social and demographic portrait.
Table 4.
Descriptive statistics of subjects’ social and demographic portrait.
Variables | Mean | SD | Min | Median | Max |
---|
Gender | 0.667 | 0.471 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
Ethnic group | 0.958 | 0.200 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
Communist or not | 0.542 | 0.498 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
Took out a loan or not | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Part-time or not | 0.417 | 0.493 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Participated in the experiment or not | 0.667 | 0.471 | 0.000 | 1.000 | 1.000 |
Average household income per month | 3.125 | 0.665 | 2.000 | 3.000 | 4.000 |
Self-evaluation of reliability | 4.000 | 0.707 | 3.000 | 4.000 | 5.000 |
Evaluation of strangers’ reliability | 2.542 | 0.763 | 1.000 | 3.000 | 4.000 |
Table 5.
Results of the Mann–Whitney U test for the effects of communication on supply.
Table 5.
Results of the Mann–Whitney U test for the effects of communication on supply.
Contrast Groups | p Values | Contrast Groups | p Values |
---|
Experiment 1 and Experiment 7 | 0.544 | Experiment 4 and Experiment 10 | 0.820 |
Experiment 2 and Experiment 8 | 0.649 | Experiment 5 and Experiment 11 | 0.847 |
Experiment 3 and Experiment 9 | 0.045 | Experiment 6 and Experiment 12 | 0.570 |
Table 6.
Mann–Whitney U test of the effects of information feedback on supply.
Table 6.
Mann–Whitney U test of the effects of information feedback on supply.
Contrast Groups | p-Values | Contrast Groups | p-Values |
---|
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 | 0.321 | Experiment 7 and Experiment 8 | 0.496 |
Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 | 0.128 | Experiment 10 and Experiment 11 | 0.221 |
Table 7.
Mann–Whitney U test of the effects of rewards and punishments on supply.
Table 7.
Mann–Whitney U test of the effects of rewards and punishments on supply.
Contrast Groups | p-Values | Contrast Groups | p-Values |
---|
Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 | 0.321 | Experiment 8 and Experiment 9 | 0.001 |
Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 | 0.001 | Experiment 11 and Experiment 12 | 0.000 |
Table 8.
Mann–Whitney U test of the effects of leadership style on supply.
Table 8.
Mann–Whitney U test of the effects of leadership style on supply.
Contrast Groups | p-Values | Contrast Groups | p-Values |
---|
Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 | 0.790 | Experiment 7 and Experiment 10 | 0.570 |
Experiment 2 and Experiment 5 | 0.673 | Experiment 8 and Experiment 11 | 0.238 |
Experiment 3 and Experiment 6 | 0.130 | Experiment 9 and Experiment 12 | 0.226 |
Table 9.
Factors influencing supply in different experimental scenarios.
Table 9.
Factors influencing supply in different experimental scenarios.
Independent Variables | Dependent Variables |
---|
Experiment 1 | Experiment 2 | Experiment 3 | Experiment 4 | Experiment 5 | Experiment 6 |
---|
PDF | | − | − | − | − | − |
ELF | 0.008(0.032) | −0.032 **(0.009) | 0.223(0.828) | −0.001(0.014) | −0.049 ***(0.008) | −0.539(0.654) |
LD | −0.405(0.088) | −0.198 ***(0.025) | −0.869 **(0.237) | | | |
RFL | | | 1.440(2.106) | | | −3.045(1.945) |
PFL | | | −1.835(2.966) | | | 2.195(2.121) |
EFL | | | −0.075(0.676) | | | 0.490(0.544) |
LCD | | | | −0.442 ***(0.039) | −0.118 ***(0.021) | 0.029(0.145) |
Constant | 10.734 ***(15.823) | 7.305 ***(0.438) | 15.360 ***(2.607) | 12.415 ***(0.705) | 6.169 ***(0.375) | 2.702(1.582) |
F | 16.240 *** | 93.310 *** | 10.150 ** | 103.720 *** | 96.410 *** | 2.31 |
R2 | 0.823 | 0.964 | 0.927 | 0.967 | 0.965 | 0.743 |
+ | + | + | + | + | + | + |
Independent Variables | Dependent Variables |
---|
Experiment 7 | Experiment 8 | Experiment 9 | Experiment 10 | Experiment 11 | Experiment 12 |
---|
PDF | 15.2176(12.4284) | 1.234(4.001) | 6.003(9.442) | 18.085(11.321) | −1.472(6.408) | −0.022(0.053) |
ELF | −0.0191(0.02605) | −0.031 **(0.009) | −2.984(1.436) | −0.030(0.024) | −0.035 *(0.014) | 5.003 ***(0.017) |
LD | 4.579(4.171) | 0.248(1.343) | 1.774(3.199) | | | |
RFL | | | −7.048(3.006) | | | 0.002(0.003) |
PFL | | | 8.382(4.106) | | | −0.001(0.001) |
EFL | | | 2.605(1.215) | | | 0.000(0.000) |
LCD | | | | 5.611(3.799) | −0.596(2.176) | −2.009 ***(0.017) |
Constant | −188.652(165.990) | −9.819(53.442) | −73.436(126.399) | −228.641(151.196) | 24.669(85.839) | −249.867 ***(1.286) |
F | 43.970 *** | 76.000 *** | 9.080 ** | 42.620 *** | 23.720 *** | 83690.430 *** |
R2 | 0.957 | 0.974 | 0.948 | 0.955 | 0.922 | 0.963 |