The Impact of Forestland Tenure Security on Rural Household Income: Analysis of Mediating Effects Based on Labor Migration
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Mechanism
2.1. Forestland Tenure Security and Rural Households’ Income
2.2. The Intermediary Role of Labor Migration
3. Research Design
3.1. Data Sources
3.2. Variable Selection
3.2.1. Independent Variable
3.2.2. Dependent Variable
3.2.3. Mediating Variable
3.2.4. Control Variables
3.3. Econometric Model
4. Estimation Results
4.1. The Impact Forestland Tenure Security on Rural Household Income
4.2. Mediation Effect
4.2.1. The Mediation Effect of Outside-of-County Labor Migration
4.2.2. The Mediation Effect of Intra-County Labor Migration
4.3. Robustness Analysis
4.3.1. Replacement of Core Independent Variables
4.3.2. Replacement Model
4.3.3. Shrinkage Therapy
4.4. Endogeneity Test
4.5. Heterogeneity Analysis
4.5.1. Size of Forestland Management
4.5.2. Whether or Not Labor Migration Occurs
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions
- (1)
- In terms of legal tenure security, duration does not have significant effect on lnincome. However, for each additional unit of duration, the total income of rural households grows by 3.30%. In terms of actual tenure security, an increase of one unit in the number of forestland certificates owned is associated with a 19.00% growth in rural households’ total income and a 70.80% growth in forestry income. However, there is no significant relationship between level of complexity in the process of applying for logging and signing of contractual agreements with rural households’ total income. On the other hand, a one-unit increase in level of complexity in the process of applying for logging results in a 50.60% decrease in forestry income, and an increase of one unit in the signing of contractual agreements results in a 66.70% increase in forestry income. Regarding the perceived tenure security, an increase of one unit in the degree of understanding of the “Three Rights Separation” policy results in a 23.80% increase in rural households’ total income and a 132.10% increase in forestry income. However, the expectation of forestland restructuring does not have a significant impact on income. Based on the statistical data presented in this study, it is evident that a majority of farmers own forestland certificates. However, there is still a need to enhance the implementation mechanism for issuing these certificates. Simultaneously, it is imperative to expedite the reform of pertinent supportive policies, while concurrently conducting outreach and educational initiatives to better farmers’ understanding of tenure security and legal concepts. This will facilitate the collective improvement of tenure security at the legal, actual, and perceived levels.
- (2)
- Outside-of-county labor migration can act as a mediator in the number of forestland certificates owned and degree of understanding of the “Three Rights Separation” policy to achieve an increase in rural households’ income, but the mediating effect of intra-county migration is not substantial. The migration of labor may promote the integration of the CFTR results into rural households’ income and stimulate the economic advancement of rural regions. To enhance the income growth of rural households, it is advisable to incentivize the migration of labor from farming to off-farm sectors. This will help diversify the income sources available to farm households. Simultaneously, the results of this study indicate that the involvement of intra-county labor migration as an intermediary in the process of enhancing income through forestland tenure security is not substantial. This observation partly suggests that the disparities between rural and smalltown regions are diminishing, but there is still a gap compared to economically advanced areas. To achieve the ultimate objective of forest reform, it is imperative to provide guidance to farmers to relocate to more urbanized areas. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider the investment in human capital of agricultural households. Following migration, farm households mostly engage in manual labor, which might result in migrant workers struggling to satisfy their financial needs, especially in the face of increasing living costs. To construct a sustainable and consistent method of increasing income, it is crucial to focus on the occupational skills and education of farm households, as well as the development of a robust foundation for education in rural areas.
- (3)
- The study analyzes whether there are variations in the income impacts of forestland tenure security among different groups of farm households who have different forestland management size and labor migration scenarios, in order to analyze heterogeneity. This article shows that, among farmers with a land size of 50 mu and lower, the number of forestland certificates owned significantly enhances rural households’ total income in the sample groups categorized by forestland management size. The execution of contractual agreements has a significant effect on rural households’ total income among farmers with 50–100 acres of land. The level of complexity for the process of applying for logging has a significant negative effect on rural households’ total income in the sample group with a forestland management size of 100 acres or more. The positive impact on income of the degree of understanding of the “Three Rights Separation” policy is evident among all investigated farmers who own forestland measuring 50 acres or larger. This study shows that the beneficial impacts of the number of forestland certificates owned and the degree of understanding of the “Three Rights Separation” policy on rural households’ total income are only observed in households if labor migration has taken place within the sample group. Furthermore, unlike the regression results for the entire sample, the impact of the variable signing of contractual agreements on the total income of rural households is statistically significant for households that have experienced labor migration.
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variables | Variable Codes | Variable Definition | Variable Type | Mean | SD |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Dependent variables | |||||
Total rural household income | lnincome | Total household income (CNY) logarithmized for the year before the research was conducted | Continuous variables | 11.021 | 1.116 |
Forestry income | lnfincome | Forestry income (CNY) logarithmized for the year before the research was conducted | Continuous variables | 4.304 | 4.280 |
Intermediary variable | |||||
Percentage of intra-county labor migration | Rin-county | Numbers for intra-county labor migration/off-farm household employment | Continuous variables | 0.399 | 0.453 |
Percentage of outside-of-county labor migration | Rout-county | Numbers for outside-of-county labor migration/off-farm household employment | Continuous variables | 0.589 | 0.454 |
Independent variables | |||||
Legal tenure security | |||||
Duration of forestland management | Duration | The mean period of management (in years) for the amount of forestland owned by rural households | Continuous variables | 54.950 | 15.321 |
Actual tenure security | |||||
Proportion of forestland certificates owned | Rcer | Whether the forestland certificates are in your possession (yes =1; no = 0) | Binary variables | 1.857 | 0.483 |
Level of complexity for the process of applying for logging | Logging | Has your household had any difficulty applying for logging targets? (Never applied = 2; yes = 1; no = 0) | Categorical variables | 1.379 | 0.882 |
Execution of contractual agreements | Wcontract | Whether the rural household has a contract (1 = yes; 0 = no) | Binary variables | 0.383 | 0.486 |
Perceived tenure security | |||||
Degree of understanding of the “Three Rights Separation” policy | Upolicy | Do you understand the “Three Rights Separation” policy? (yes = 1; no = 0) | Binary variables | 0.681 | 0.471 |
Expectation of forestland restructuring | Expected | At present and in the future, does your household intend to lease forestland? (yes = 1; no = 0) | Binary variables | 0.110 | 0.314 |
Evaluation of the “Three Rights Separation” policy | Evaluation | Do you think that the “Three Rights Separation” policy is good? (good = 3; fair = 2; bad = 1)” | Categorical variables | 2.636 | 0.572 |
Evaluation of forest logging management policy | Satisfaction | How would you rate the current forest logging management policy? (satisfied = 3; fair = 2; dissatisfied = 1) | Categorical variables | 2.375 | 0.685 |
Characteristics of the head of the household | |||||
Gender | gender | Sex of head of the household (M = 1; F = 0) | 0.944 | 0.229 | |
Age | age | Age of head of the household during year of survey (actual years) | Continuous variables | 56.805 | 10.185 |
Educational level | edu | Educational level of the head of the household (elementary school and below = 1; middle school = 2; middle or high school = 3; college or bachelor’s degree or higher = 4 | Categorical variables | 1.899 | 0.823 |
Occupation | career | Farming = 1; farming and part-time work = 2; farming and side hustle = 3; permanent work outside the home = 4; regular-wage income = 5; other = 6 | Categorical variables | 2.825 | 1.921 |
Village cadres | carde | Whether the head of the household is a village cadre (yes = 1; no = 0) | Binary variables | 0.392 | 0.500 |
Family characteristics | |||||
Number of laborers | numlabor | Number of family laborers (persons) | Continuous variables | 2.712 | 1.529 |
Whether or not there is labor migration? | labortmig | Whether or not there is labor migration in the rural household (yes = 1; no = 0) | Binary variables | 0.719 | 0.450 |
Membership in farmer forestry cooperatives | wcooperation | Are you a member of a farmers’ forestry cooperative? (joined = 2; yes but have not joined = 1; no local cooperatives = 0) | Categorical variables | 0.280 | 0.624 |
Forestland characteristics | |||||
Forestland fragmentation | frafor | Household forestland area/number of forestland plots | Continuous variables | 25.338 | 50.149 |
Village characteristics | |||||
Level of labor migration at the village level | Vmig | Number of permanent migrant workers in the village/total population of the village | Continuous variables | 0.546 | 0.226 |
Level of village-level forestry income | Vfincome | Average per capita income from forestry in the village/average total per capita income | Continuous variables | 0.197 | 0.187 |
Village population | Vnum | Logarization of the population of the village (persons) | Continuous variables | 7.239 | 0.643 |
Instrumental variables | |||||
Understanding of the “Three Rights Separation” policy among other farmers in the village | Vupolicy | Are other farmers in the village aware of the “Three Rights Separation” policy? (yes = 1; no = 0) | Binary variables | 0.364 | 0.482 |
Understanding of the “Three Rights Separation” policy by other farmers in the village | Vevaluation | Do other farmers in the village think that the “Three Rights Separation” policy is a good idea? (good = 3; fair = 2; bad = 1) | Categorical variables | 2.268 | 0.555 |
Variables | Dependent Variables: lnincome | Dependent Variables: lnfincome | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | |
Duration | −0.006 (0.004) | — | — | 0.033 *** (0.013) | — | — |
Rcer | — | 0.190 * (0.108) | — | — | 0.708 * (0.388) | — |
Logging | — | −0.080 (0.064) | — | — | −0.506 ** (0.224) | — |
Wcontract | — | 0.052 (0.114) | — | — | 0.667 * (0.402) | — |
Upolicy | — | — | 0.238 ** (0.110) | — | — | 1.321 *** (0.394) |
Expected | — | — | 0.038 (0.165) | — | — | −0.875 (0.590) |
Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cons | 8.515 *** (0.877) | 8.853 *** (0.950) | 8.436 *** (0.856) | 9.310 *** (3.156) | 11.420 *** (3.353) | 8.039 *** (3.061) |
R2 | 0.159 | 0.144 | 0.157 | 0.126 | 0.139 | 0.131 |
Variables | lnincome | Rout-County | lnincome | lnincome | Rout-County | lnincome |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 | Model 10 | Model 11 | Model 12 | |
Rcer | 0.181 * (0.108) | 0.044 ** (0.031) | 0.038 * (0.118) | — | — | — |
Upolicy | — | — | — | 0.238 ** (0.110) | 0.043 ** (0.040) | 0.150 * (0.114) |
Rout-county | — | — | 0.214* (0.120) | — | — | 0.210 * (0.119) |
Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cons | 8.279 *** (0.872) | 0.262 (0.420) | 8.673 *** (0.969) | 8.423 *** (0.853) | 0.326 (0.409) | 8.655 *** (0.942) |
R2 | 0.154 | 0.077 | 0.071 | 0.157 | 0.076 | 0.075 |
Variables | lnincome | Rin-County | lnincome | lnincome | Rin-County | lnincome |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model 13 | Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 | Model 17 | Model 18 | |
Rcer | 0.181 * (0.108) | −0.050 (0.051) | 0.037 * (0.118) | — | — | — |
Upolicy | — | — | — | 0.238 ** (0.110) | −0.025 (0.050) | 0.158 * (0.115) |
Rin-county | — | — | −0.187 (0.121) | — | — | 0.210 * (0.119) |
Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cons | 8.279 *** (0.872) | 0.588 (0.422) | 8.961 *** (0.981) | 8.423 *** (0.853) | 0.506 (0.412) | 8.945 *** (0.954) |
R2 | 0.154 | 0.077 | 0.065 | 0.157 | 0.075 | 0.069 |
Variables | Dependent Variables: lnincome | Dependent Variables: lnfincome |
---|---|---|
Model 19 | Model 20 | |
Evaluation | 0.088 ** (0.054) | 0.337 ** (0.177) |
Satisfaction | 0.034 (0.070) | 0.305 (0.290) |
Control | Yes | Yes |
cons | 9.252 *** (0.902) | 9.088 ** (4.098) |
R2 | 0.173 | 0.098 |
Variables | Dependent Variables: lnincome | Dependent Variables: lnfincome | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model 21 | Model 22 | Model 23 | Model 24 | Model 25 | Model 26 | |
Duration | 0.005 * (0.003) | — | — | 0.033 *** (0.012) | — | — |
Rcer | — | 0.190 * (0.105) | — | — | 0.708 * (0.388) | — |
Logging | — | −0.080 (0.056) | — | — | −0.506 ** (0.224) | — |
Wcontract | — | 0.052 (0.110) | — | — | 0.667 * (0.402) | — |
Upolicy | — | — | 0.238 ** (0.117) | — | — | 1.321 *** (0.394) |
Expected | — | — | 0.037 (0.141) | — | — | −0.875 (0.590) |
Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cons | 8.515 *** (1.022) | 8.853 *** (1.190) | 8.436 *** (1.052) | 9.310 *** (3.156) | 11.420 *** (3.353) | 8.039 *** (3.061) |
R2 | 0.159 | 0.144 | 0.157 | 0.126 | 0.139 | 0.131 |
Variables | Dependent Variables: lnincome | Dependent Variables: lnfincome | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model 27 | Model 28 | Model 29 | Model 30 | Model 31 | Model 32 | |
Duration | 0.005 * (0.003) | — | — | 0.031 ** (0.012) | — | — |
Rcer | — | 0.182 * (0.096) | — | — | 0.642 * (0.385) | — |
Logging | — | −0.071 (0.057) | — | — | −0.494 ** (0.223) | — |
Wcontract | — | 0.011 (0.102) | — | — | 0.587 (0.399) | — |
Upolicy | — | — | 0.180 * (0.100) | — | — | 1.316 *** (0.393) |
Expected | — | — | 0.023 (0.148) | — | — | −0.842 (0.585) |
Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cons | 9.092 *** (0.789) | 9.483 *** (0.852) | 9.015 *** (0.772) | 9.046 *** (3.142) | 11.00 *** (3.339) | 7.681 ** (3.044) |
R2 | 0.185 | 0.167 | 0.178 | 0.134 | 0.147 | 0.141 |
Variables | Dependent Variables: lnincome | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Model 33 | Model 34 | Model 35 | Model 36 | |
Duration | −0.004 (0.004) | −0.007 (0.005) | 0.004 (0.007) | −0.006 (0.008) |
Rcer | 0.161 (0.122) | 0.205 * (0.117) | 0.151 (0.123) | 0.202 * (0.117) |
Logging | −0.195 ** (0.079) | −0.108 (0.081) | −0.100 (0.131) | −0.095 (0.122) |
Wcontract | 0.042 (0.131) | 0.001 (0.125) | 0.003 (0.139) | −0.009 (0.124) |
Vupolicy | 0.686 * (0.473) | 0.814 ** (0.466) | — | — |
Vevaluation | — | — | 1.950 ** (0.706) | 0.809 ** (0.625) |
Expected | 0.081 (0.187) | 0.074 (0.176) | 0.029 (0.197) | 0.071 (0.176) |
Control | No | Yes | No | Yes |
cons | 11.490 *** (0.704) | 9.274 *** (1.453) | 10.180 *** (1.597) | 9.024 *** (2.439) |
R2 | — | 0.110 | — | 0.138 |
Variables | Areatype = 1 | Areatype = 2 | Areatype = 3 | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model 37 | Model 38 | Model 39 | Model 40 | Model 41 | Model 42 | Model 43 | Model 44 | Model 45 | |
Duration | −0.004 (0.005) | — | — | −0.003 (0.007) | — | — | −0.012 (0.008) | — | — |
Rcer | — | 0.229 * (0.129) | — | — | 0.295 (0.214) | — | — | 0.016 (0.297) | — |
Logging | — | −0.067 (0.090) | — | — | 0.009 (0.122) | — | — | −0.249 * (0.135) | — |
Wcontract | — | 0.202 (0.162) | — | — | 0.367 * (0.217) | — | — | 0.244 (0.247) | — |
Upolicy | — | — | 0.046 (0.145) | — | — | 0.419 * (0.222) | — | — | 0.401 * (0.242) |
Expected | — | — | 0.217 (0.211) | — | — | 0.027 (0.375) | — | — | −0.309 (0.366) |
Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cons | 8.794 *** (1.288) | 9.481 *** (1.400) | 9.029 *** (1.259) | 9.028 *** (1.634) | 10.15 *** (1.732) | 9.164 *** (1.585) | 8.603 *** (2.101) | 8.476 *** (2.241) | 7.623 *** (2.044) |
R2 | 0.247 | 0.236 | 0.242 | 0.158 | 0.181 | 0.176 | 0.216 | 0.223 | 0.213 |
Variables | Labortransfer = 0 | Labortransfer = 1 | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model 46 | Model 47 | Model 48 | Model 49 | Model 50 | Model 51 | |
Duration | −0.010 (0.008) | −0.003 (0.004) | ||||
Rcer | 0.039 (0.123) | 0.461 ** (0.221) | ||||
Logging | −0.229 (0.167) | −0.030 (0.066) | ||||
Wcontract | 0.016 (0.266) | 0.123 ** (0.091) | ||||
Upolicy | 0.308 (0.262) | 0.276 ** (0.120) | ||||
Expected | −0.119 (0.372) | 0.074 (0.182) | ||||
Control | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cons | 9.441 *** (2.108) | 10.58 *** (2.368) | 9.529 *** (2.119) | 9.593 *** (0.949) | 9.462 *** (1.021) | 9.379 *** (0.915) |
R2 | 0.154 | 0.121 | 0.118 | 0.049 | 0.058 | 0.054 |
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© 2024 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Luo, X.; Li, L.; Zhang, L.; Ning, C.; Liu, X. The Impact of Forestland Tenure Security on Rural Household Income: Analysis of Mediating Effects Based on Labor Migration. Forests 2024, 15, 1336. https://doi.org/10.3390/f15081336
Luo X, Li L, Zhang L, Ning C, Liu X. The Impact of Forestland Tenure Security on Rural Household Income: Analysis of Mediating Effects Based on Labor Migration. Forests. 2024; 15(8):1336. https://doi.org/10.3390/f15081336
Chicago/Turabian StyleLuo, Xin, Lishan Li, Ling Zhang, Caiwang Ning, and Xiaojin Liu. 2024. "The Impact of Forestland Tenure Security on Rural Household Income: Analysis of Mediating Effects Based on Labor Migration" Forests 15, no. 8: 1336. https://doi.org/10.3390/f15081336