Active Learning on Trust and Reciprocity for Undergraduates
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. A Modified Trust Game
2.2. Participants
2.3. Hypotheses
2.4. Learning Materials
2.4.1. Reading and Writing
2.4.2. Experiment
2.4.3. Discussion
3. Results
3.1. Experimental Results
3.2. Econometric Analysis
- Studies: It is a dummy variable taking value 0 for Tourism and value 1 for BA.
- Gender: It is a dummy variable taking value 0 for male and 1 for female.
- Employee: It is a dummy variable taking value 1 for students with a job.
- Home owner: It is a dummy variable taking value 1 for students living in their own home.
- Sharing a flat: It is a dummy variable taking value 1 for students living with flat-mates.
- Self-concept of trustiness: It is a general variable composed of four dummy variables: No Trust, Low Trust, Medium Trust, and High Trust.
- Self-concept about solidarity: It is a general variable composed of four dummy variables: selfish, fair, egalitarian, or altruistic.
- Empathy: It is a general variable composed of five dummy variables: (Sad), (Neutral), (Happy), (Upset), and (Machiavellian).
- Trust: It is defined as λ and measured as the percentage sent by the trustor (λ = x/50).
- Reciprocity: It is defined as r and measured as the return rate paid back by the trustee.
- Treatment: It is a dummy variable taking 0 for T0 (baseline) and 1 for T1 (treatment with information)
3.3. Students’ Reflections
4. Discussion and Further Extensions
Further Extensions
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A.
Author(s) | Title | Summary | Scope | Sustainability Goals Development |
---|---|---|---|---|
José Luis San Pedro (2009) [54] | Humanistic Economic | The book deals with ecology, development, economics and politics. | The need to humanize economics science. | G1. No Poverty G8. Decent work and economic growth G10. Reduce inequalities G13. Climate action |
Gunter Pauli (2010) [55] | Blue Economy | A proposal for an economic system where the best for health and the environment is cheapest and the necessities for life are free. | Proposing a local and environmentally respectful system of production and consumption that basically works with what you have. | G7. Affordable and clean energy G11. Sustainable cities and communities G12. Responsible production and consumption G13. Climate action |
James Robertson (1999) [56] | The new economics of sustainable development | The ‘new economics’ is based on the systematic development of individual responsibility, the preservation of resources and the environment, respect for qualitative values and respect for feminine values. | Reflection about the need to place ethics at the heart of economic life. | G5. Gender equality G8. Decent work and economic growth G13. Climate action G15. Life on land |
Mohamed Yunus (2008) [57] | Banker to the poor | The author presents the history of micro-credits and the challenges he and his colleagues faced in founding Grameen Bank. | To rethink the economic relationship between rich and poor people, and among economics, public policy, philanthropy, and business. | G1. No poverty G8. Decent work and economic growth G10. Reduce inequalities G11. Sustainable cities and communities |
Mohamed Yunus (2011) [58] | Building Social Business | The book introduces the concept of social business as an innovative business model which promotes the idea of doing business in order to address a social problem, and not to maximize profit. | Proposing a complement to traditional capitalism that may serve the most pressing needs of humanity especially poverty. | G1. No poverty G8. Decent work and economic growth G10. Reduce inequalities G11. Sustainable cities and communities |
John E. Stiglitz, Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi (2010) [59] | Mismeasuring our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t add up | The limits of GDP as a measurement of the well-being of societies—considering, for example, how GDP overlooks economic inequality or the environmental impacts into economic decisions. | Assessing how our economy is serving the needs of the society. Proposing new sustainable measures of economic welfare, to measure things that matter. | G8. Decent work and economic growth G10. Reduce inequalities G11. Sustainable cities and communities G13. Climate action |
Christian Felber (2015) [60] | Change Everything: Creating an Economy for the Common Good | A proposal for a new economic, social and political model for firms to be more solidary, egalitarian and ecological. The key to growth is that firms should work as a social tool rather than as money-making machines. | Proposing a different model based on sustainability, solidarity, cooperation and fair distribution of wealth in all sectors. | G8. Decent work and economic growth G11. Sustainable cities and communities G13. Climate action G16. Peace, justice and strong institutions |
Appendix B.
Appendix C. Questionnaire Post-Experiment
Name and surname: | ||
E-mail: | ||
Gender: | Age: | I live with my parents/flatmate(s): |
Number of siblings: | I am sibling number: | I am a student/I have a job/Grant: |
My hobbies: |
- How have you felt with your final outcome of the game? Please tick a box from the alternatives below.
- Could you please guess your partner feelings about the outcome of the game? Please tick a box from the alternatives below.
- What do you think is the moral of the game?
- Find an example from real life related with the game’s core.
- Which role did you play in the game? What was your outcome?
- Would you have played the same way if your partner in the game were a friend? Can you explain why?
- Would you have played the same way if the outcome was paid in cash at the end of the session? Can you explain why?
- How would you have behaved if playing the opposite role?
- What have you learned about yourself during the game?
- What have you learned about your partners?
- Do you think there was a ‘best strategy’ for each role in this game?
- Have a look at the picture bellow. Tell us which adjective describes you better: selfish, egalitarian, fair, solidary or altruistic.
- Which of the following sentences best fits with your personality?
- ⬜
- Everybody seeks their own interest; therefore, we must trust nobody.
- ⬜
- I only trust people that I already know.
- ⬜
- I trust everyone only in certain circumstances, namely when I do not have much to lose.
- ⬜
- In general, I trust people unless they show me that they do not deserve my trust.
- What do you think is the most effective strategy for achieving your personal, professional and social goals, an individualistic strategy or a cooperative one? Why? Point out pros and cons of each of the two alternatives.
- What values are important to you? Write them in order of priority.
- Was there something you especially disliked about the game?
- Was there something you especially liked about the game?
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Original TG | MTG |
---|---|
Economic experiment | Classroom experiment |
Hand and pencil experiment | Computerized experiment |
From 60 to 90 min | 90 min |
2 experimenters, 2 monitors, and 1 recorder | 2 instructors, 1 assistant |
Undergraduate students | Undergraduate students |
Any degree | BA and Tourism degrees |
Monetary incentives | Class credit incentives |
One-shot game | Repeated game for 10 rounds |
Two treatments | Two treatments |
No history/Social history | No information/Other’s earnings information |
Two type players: A and B | Two type players: A and B |
Random matching | Random re-matching |
Each player type was located in a different room | Each player sat at individual PC’s in the lab |
Initial endowment = $10 | Initial endowment = ExCU 50 |
The amount x sent by player A is multiplied by 3. With x ∈ {0, 1, 2, …, 10}. | The amount x sent by player type A is multiplied by 3. With x ∈ {0, 10, 20, …, 50}. |
The amount y returned by player B is within the set {0, 1, 2, …, 30}. | The amount y returned by player B is within the set {0, 10, 20, …, 200} |
Decision/Level Treatment | Trust | No Trust | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Low | Moderate | High | All | All | |
Baseline (T0) | 16 | 27 | 31 | 74 | 16 |
% | 21.62 | 36.49 | 41.89 | 82 | 18 |
Information (T1) | 45 | 60 | 34 | 139 | 21 |
% | 32.37 | 43.17 | 24.46 | 87 | 13 |
Information Effect | 10.75% | 6.68% | −17.43% | 5% | −5% |
Decision/Level Treatment | Selfish | Egalitarian | Altruistic | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Low | Medium | High | Total | Unique | Low | Medium | High | Total | |
Baseline (T0) | 8 | 18 | 24 | 50 | 14 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 10 |
% | 10.81 | 24.32 | 32.43 | 67.57 | 18.92 | 0 | 6.76 | 6.76 | 13.51 |
Information (T1) | 9 | 37 | 57 | 103 | 15 | 0 | 13 | 8 | 21 |
% | 6.47 | 26.62 | 41.01 | 74.10 | 10.79 | 0 | 9.35 | 5.76 | 15.11 |
Information Effect | −4.34% | 2.29% | 8.57% | 6.53% | −8.13% | 0% | 2.60% | −1% | 1.59% |
Treatment | Baseline (T0) | Information (T1) | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Gap | Equality | Equality | Positive Inequality | Negative Inequality | Total | |||||
Statistics | λ | r | λ | r | λ | r | λ | r | λ | r |
Average | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.46 | 0.41 | 0.35 | 0.50 | 0.43 | 0.31 | 0.43 | 0.32 |
Median | 0.40 | 0.13 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.00 |
St.D. | 0.35 | 1.12 | 0.25 | 1.12 | 0.10 | 1.22 | 0.32 | 1.46 | 0.31 | 1.40 |
Min. | 0.00 | −1.00 | 0.20 | −0.67 | 0.20 | −0.50 | 0.00 | −1.00 | 0.00 | −1.00 |
Max. | 1.00 | 4.00 | 1.00 | 3.00 | 0.40 | 2.00 | 1.00 | 6.00 | 1.00 | 6.00 |
Quartile 1 | 0.20 | −0.40 | 0.20 | −0.33 | 0.30 | −0.50 | 0.20 | −0.67 | 0.20 | −0.67 |
Quartile 3 | 0.80 | 1.00 | 0.60 | 1.00 | 0.40 | 1.50 | 0.60 | 0.75 | 0.60 | 1.00 |
Obs. | 90 | 74 | 18 | 18 | 4 | 4 | 138 | 117 | 160 | 139 |
Independent Variables | Model 1 |
---|---|
Studies | 0.22 * [0.0492, 0.3907] |
Gender | 0.44 *** [0.2707, 0.6092] |
Employee | −0.7 *** [−0.8515, −0.5484] |
Low trustiness | −0.28 * [−0.5186, −0.0414] |
Medium trustiness | 0.64 *** [0.3600, 0.9199] |
High trustiness | 0.16 [−0.1105, 0.4305] |
Treatment | −0.38 *** [−0.5586, −0.2013] |
Constant | 0.5 *** [0.2751, 0.7248] |
N | 250 |
R2 | 0.3632 |
F | 17.88 *** |
AIC (full model: 84.24679) | 82.71658 |
BIC (full model: 173.0654) | 168.1191 |
Independent Variables | Model 1 | Model 2 |
---|---|---|
Own pay-off | 0.0006 [−0.0000, 0.0011] | 0.0006 [−0.0000, 0.0011] |
Studies | −2.6963 *** [−4.2586, −1.1339] | |
Home owner | 3.1409 *** [1.5467, 4.7350] | |
Sharing a flat | 0.6086 * [0.1086, 1.1086] | |
Machiavellian | −0.8552 * [−1.5125, −0.1978] | |
Happy | 1.1827 *** [.7578, 1.6076] | |
Egalitarian | 3.1067 *** [2.4664, 3.7469] | |
Fair | 2.8601 *** [1.9125, 3.8077] | |
Solidarity | 3.5118 *** [2.6105, 4.4130] | |
Altruistic | 1.5055 *** [0.7485, 2.2625] | |
Treatment | −3.4912 *** [−4.1007, −2.8816] | −2.63599 *** [0.7485, 2.2625] |
Constant | 2.4283 *** [1.9207, 2.9538] | −0.6784 ** [−3.4300, −1.8419] |
R2 | 0.4337 | 0.4337 |
F | 29.87 *** | 29.87 *** |
N | 188 | 188 |
AIC (full model: 589.8584) | 589.8584 | 589.8584 |
BIC (full model: 674.0059) | 674.0059 | 674.0059 |
What Do You Think Is the Game’s Core? | Give an Example Related with the Exercise | What Do You Think Is the Best Strategy? |
---|---|---|
Maximising profits Making investment decisions Distributing resources equally Observing generous and selfish behaviour Taking decisions based on others’ decisions | When one shares with others one can find both grateful and ungrateful people Workers take part in benefits The stock market Cooperative enterprises | 30% “I don’t know” 56% “Collaborative strategy” 14% “Competitive strategy” |
What Topic Do the Readings Have in Common? | What Is the Link between the Game and the Readings? |
---|---|
Economics from a humanistic point of view A social and egalitarian economy A supportive model of economics based on cooperation and common development | “Everybody gets benefits when resources are shared” “Searching for the common interest” “Trust and reciprocity” “Cooperation and trust for achieving a proper wealth distribution” |
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Rodrigo-González, A.; Caballer-Tarazona, M.; García-Gallego, A. Active Learning on Trust and Reciprocity for Undergraduates. Sustainability 2019, 11, 4399. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11164399
Rodrigo-González A, Caballer-Tarazona M, García-Gallego A. Active Learning on Trust and Reciprocity for Undergraduates. Sustainability. 2019; 11(16):4399. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11164399
Chicago/Turabian StyleRodrigo-González, Amalia, María Caballer-Tarazona, and Aurora García-Gallego. 2019. "Active Learning on Trust and Reciprocity for Undergraduates" Sustainability 11, no. 16: 4399. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11164399