1. Introduction
With rising global attention to the climate change, CO
2 emissions responsibility of countries has been discussed hotly. Russia, as a vital energy producer in the world, ranks as the fourth greatest emitter of CO
2 emissions. According to the statistics of BP (British Petroleum) [
1], Russia remained the second largest gas and the third greatest oil producer of the world in 2018, accounting for 17% and 12% of the global output, respectively. Russia’s oil exporters occupied 13% of the global market, and its gas exporters occupied 26%, in 2018; this means that Russia remain the world’s largest exporter of oil and natural gas.
As one of the leading energy producers and exporters in the world, Russia faces an upward pressure on CO
2 emissions. If a county is a significant exporter of many products, it might take CO
2 emissions responsibility for other countries [
2,
3]. Hence, Russia bears the burden of CO
2 emissions for other countries’ consumption through exporting substantial energy [
4,
5]. The energy intensity of Russia rose by 1.9%, while CO
2 emissions from energy consumption grew by 4.2% in 2018 [
1]. In contrast, Russia has the potential to reduce CO
2 emissions by importing a large number of agriculture and light industry products [
6,
7]. Free trade throughout the world causes carbon to transfer among industrial sectors of different countries [
8,
9]. In the context of trade globalization, this paper examines whether Russia has benefited or suffered from the international trade concerning for CO
2 emissions.
Our research conducts the decomposition of embodied CO
2 emissions in Russia. It analyzes embodied CO
2 emissions from production and consumption sides, as well as based on importing and exporting perspectives. Studying CO
2 emissions from production and consumption sides is an effective way to show the carbon flow from supply to demand [
10,
11]. The differences in exporting CO
2 emissions and importing CO
2 emissions will intuitively indicate the influence of the international trade on a country’s CO
2 emissions [
12,
13,
14]. With the development of trade globalization, Russia faces a continuous growth in energy production and exports. Research on the trading effect on CO
2 emissions is able to provide potential policy implications to Russia on its future energy development strategy, carbon reduction policy, and industrial upgrading planning.
Compared with the traditional approach that calculates direct CO
2 emissions from the production side, the improved approach estimates complete CO
2 emissions (embodied CO
2 emissions) from the whole life cycle. The latter takes carbon leakage among sectors and countries into account [
15,
16]. The embodied CO
2 emissions estimation concerns the carbon transferring in the intermediate processing. Hence, we adopt the non-competitive input–output tables of Russia from the WIOD (World Input–Output Database), which distinguish the importing intermediate inputs from the domestic intermediate inputs. Based on the accessible data in the WIOD, we use the SRIO (Single-Regional Input–Output) model to calculate embodied CO
2 emissions of Russia over the period from 1995 to 2014 and conduct the decomposition analysis.
Many research studies used the MRIO (Multi-Regional Input–Output) model and the SRIO model to estimate embodied CO
2 emissions in different countries [
15,
17,
18,
19,
20]. The MRIO model considers various emission intensities of different countries [
21]. By contrast, the SRIO model takes the EAI (Emissions Avoided by Imports) assumption [
22,
23]. That is, SRIO assumes that emission intensities of imported goods are in consistency with the local technology. In recent years, the MRIO model was widely used in the assessment of embodied CO
2 emissions of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in a scope of trade globalization. They found out that Russia was the main exporter of CO
2 emissions due to massive exports of energy products [
5,
24]. To the best of our knowledge, the existing research studies, which studied CO
2 emissions of Russia by the MRIO model, did not estimate CO
2 emissions embodied in the intermediate processing [
19,
25].
Different from the previous studies, our research has three novelties. Firstly, we distinguish the imported intermediate inputs from the domestic intermediate inputs. Based on the non-competitive input–output tables, we divide the imported goods according into different uses. The imported goods can be used to be the final demands consumed directly, the intermediate inputs consumed to produce the domestic final demands, and the intermediate inputs consumed to produce the exports. In this way, we are able to calculate CO2 emissions embodied in the intermediate processing from the whole supply–demand chain, which can provide a more comprehensive interpretation of the trading effect on CO2 emissions.
Secondly, this paper improves the model of Lin and Sun [
15] by decomposing embodied CO
2 emissions into seven components. Lin and Sun’s model overestimated CO
2 emissions embodied in the products that were manufactured domestically and consumed abroad because it ignored the reduced effects from the imported products that were exported after intermediate processing. The model in this paper considers the decomposition analysis of CO
2 emissions embodied in the international trade more precisely, and this is introduced specifically in the methodology section.
Thirdly, the study period witnessed how Russia’s economy was shocked by the Russian financial crisis in 1998 and then was gradually improved under the government of President Putin since 2000 [
26]. In addition, energy production and exports have been considerably increased since the Russian Energy Strategy was published in 2003. This research studies CO
2 emissions embodied in Russia’s international trade from both production and consumption side, as well as from both exporting and importing perspectives. The analysis can provide scientific references for the carbon flow among industrial sectors in Russia. Hence, this research on CO
2 emissions embodied in the international trade during such a crucial period can potentially offer Russia instructive implications on its future energy policy and industrial upgrading planning.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 introduces the data and methodology,
Section 3 analyzes the results,
Section 4 provides the further discussion,
Section 5 illustrates the research conclusion, and
Section 6 offers the policy implications.
3. Results
3.1. CO2 Emissions Embodied in Russia’s International Trade
During the study period, the total CO
2 emissions embodied in Russia’s international trade experienced a gentle fluctuation. From 1995 to 1999, the amount of embodied CO
2 emissions slightly decreased from 1412.34 to 1320.87 MTC. It was followed by a general growth to 1524.86 MTC in 2007. After that, the volume of Russia’s embodied CO
2 emissions declined to 1410.49 MTC in 2009 and increased again to 1604.72 MTC in 2011. The amount went down slightly to a similar level with 1995’s, namely 1484.25 MTC in 2014 (see
Figure 1).
Comparing embodied CO
2 emissions of three main industries in Russia, the primary industry accounted for an extremely small proportion of total CO
2 emissions while the secondary industry occupied the largest proportion. Embodied CO
2 emissions of the secondary industry accounted for over 50% of the total amount, and the variation trend was almost in consistency with total embodied CO
2 emissions over the years, as shown in
Figure 1. Embodied CO
2 emissions of Russia’s secondary industry reduced from 734.20 MTC in 1995 to 765.02 MTC in 1999, and then it rose to 848.64 MTC in 2007 and decreased to 735.31 MTC in 2009. Subsequently, embodied CO
2 emissions of the secondary industry in Russia went up to 880.45 MTC in 2011 and 811.05 MTC in 2014.
By contrast, CO2 emissions embodied in the primary industry were of a small volume in Russia. The amount of embodied CO2 emissions of the primary industry declined from 80.24 MTC in 1995 to 40.16 MTC in 2014. As for the tertiary industry, the volume of its embodied CO2 emissions increased from 597.90 MTC in 1995 to 633.04 MTC in 2014.
The sum of direct CO
2 emissions of three main industries was equivalent to the total quantity of embodied CO
2 emissions, as shown in
Table 4. However, the allocations of direct and embodied CO
2 emissions to three main industries were different. If an industry’s
is larger than its
(the result of
minus
is positive), then it indicates that the carbon is transferred from this industry to other industries. Otherwise, if an industry’s
is smaller than its
(the result of
minus
is negative), then it suggests that carbon is transferred from other industries to this industry.
The difference between and of the primary industry was −34.21 MTC in 1995 and −23.13 MTC in 2014. This difference of the tertiary industry was −444.41 MTC in 1995, and then its absolute value was lowest at −350.18 MTC in 1999 while followed by an increase to −454.90 MTC in 2011. By contrast, the disparity between and of the secondary industry was 478.62 MTC in 1995 and then decreased to 375.21 MTC in 1999. After that, it grew to 485.27 MTC in 2011. The differences between direct CO2 emissions and embodied CO2 emissions of three main industries imply that the carbon is transferred from the secondary industry to the primary industry and majorly to the tertiary industry in Russia.
3.2. Embodied CO2 Emissions from Production and Consumption Sides
The total production embodied CO
2 emissions were more than consumption embodied CO
2 emissions in Russia (see
Table 5). It means that Russia emitted more CO
2 in the production side than in the production side and burdened much CO
2 emissions for other countries’ consumption. The quantity of CO
2 emissions embodied in the production was 1412.34 MTC in 1995 and then went down to 1320.86 MTC in 1999. This amount was followed by a growth to 1524.86 MTC in 2007 and 1604.72 MTC in 2011. By contrast, the embodied CO
2 emissions from the consumption side were 1252.92 MTC in 1995 and then reduced to 905.28 MTC in 1999. This amount went through an obvious growth to 1305.31 MTC in 2007 and 1410.78 MTC in 2011. The ratio of
to
was 88.71% in 1995. It was followed by a notable decrease to 68.54% in 1999. After that, the ratio grew to 89.32% in 2013. The variation in the ratio of
to
indicates what the extent that Russia burdens CO
2 emissions for other countries’ consumption. For instance, 31.46% of Russia’s CO
2 emissions were generated for other countries’ consumption in 1999, while it was 10.68% in 2013.
As for the primary industry of Russia, CO
2 emissions embodied in the production were less than that in the consumption. It indicated that the primary industry of Russia was beneficial from the importing trade for CO
2 emissions reduction. For the secondary industry and the tertiary industry of Russia, their production CO
2 emissions were more than their corresponding consumption CO
2 emissions. The results implied that the secondary industry and the tertiary industry of Russia burdened more CO
2 emissions for other countries’ consumption by the exporting trade. In 1999, the difference between
and
of the secondary industry was 415.59 MTC, which was the greatest difference in the reported results of
Table 5 and caused the lowest ratio of total
(68.54%).
From the supply side, electricity, gas and water supply sector (C17), construction sector (C18) and mining and quarrying sector (C2) from the secondary industry played the significant role in the production CO2 emissions. Those three sectors accounted for more than 30% of the production CO2 emissions in Russia. Inland transport sector (C23), public admin and defense sector (C31) and wholesale trade and commission trade (C20) from the tertiary industry also ranked as the top emitters of the supply side, occupying more than 20% of the production CO2 emissions in Russia.
From the demand side, electricity, gas and water supply sector (C17), construction sector (C18) and food, beverage and tobacco sector (C3) were the three largest generators of the consumption CO2 emissions in the secondary industry, accounting for more than 30% of total consumption CO2 emissions in Russia. Public admin and defense sector (C31) and wholesale trade and commission trade (C20) from the tertiary industry were the two greatest emitters of the consumption CO2 emissions in the tertiary industry, occupying more than 10% of the total. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing sector (C1) of the primary industry was the significant CO2 emitter from both the supply side and the demand side in Russia during the study period. The great emitters from the supply side and the demand side in Russia were overlapped to a large extent. The results implied that carbon was transferred mainly among resource-intensive sectors and significantly from upstream resource sectors to downstream service sectors.
3.3. CO2 Emissions Embodied in the Exports and in the Imports
Figure 2 shows comparison between CO
2 emissions embodied in the exports and in the imports of three main industries in Russia from 1995 to 2014. The primary industry was a net importer of CO
2 emissions, while the secondary industry and the tertiary industry were net exporters in Russia. In general, Russia was a net exporter of CO
2 emissions during the study period.
The primary industry accounted for a small proportion in embodied CO2 emissions of Russia’s international trade. The deviation of importing embodied CO2 emissions from exporting in the primary industry was enlarged since 2003. The amount of CO2 emissions embodied in the primary industry’s exports decreased from 6.20 MTC in 2003 to 4.05 MTC in 2013 while that increased from 9.62 MTC to 22.24 MTC in terms of imports.
The tertiary industry occupied the second largest proportion in embodied CO2 emissions of Russia’s international trade. Importing embodied CO2 emissions of the tertiary industry rose gently from 19.83 MTC in 1995 to 29.23 MTC in 2013. Exporting embodied CO2 emissions of the tertiary industry were 113.08 MTC in 1995. It experienced a remarkable growth from 92.16 MTC in 1997 to 174.75 MTC in 2011. Then it was followed by a slight reduction to 151.70 MTC in 2013.
The secondary industry was the greatest contributor to CO2 emissions embodied in international trade of Russia. Importing embodied CO2 emissions of the secondary industry went through a gentle growth from 289.68 MTC in 1995 to 374.07 MTC in 2013. Exporting embodied CO2 emissions of the secondary industry were 357.54 MTC in 1995. This amount rose substantially from 316.45 MTC in 1997 to 549.87 MTC in 1999. After that, it went down to 431.71 MTC in 2013.
CO2 emissions embodied in the total international trade of Russia show similar dynamic trend with that in the secondary industry. CO2 emissions embodied in the imports of Russia experienced a slight increase from 317.47 MTC in 1995 to 425.54 MTC in 2013. CO2 emissions embodied in the exports were 476.89 MTC in 1995. It increased dramatically from 413.36 MTC in 1997 to 737.46 MTC in 1999. Subsequently, this amount declined to 516.21 MTC in 2009 and 586.91 MTC in 2013. Denote , which is the difference of embodied CO2 emissions between the exports and the imports. The was 159.41 MTC in 1995. It grew dramatically from 147.40 MTC in 1997 to 415.59 MTC in 1999, and then it declined to 161.38 MTC in 2013. Positive intuitively indicated that Russia was a net exporter in embodied CO2 emissions during the study period. In other words, Russia was suffering much more CO2 emissions due to the free trade throughout the world.
As the methodology section mentioned, the difference of embodied CO
2 emissions between production and consumption sides equaled to that between exporting and importing perspectives in a national scope (see
Table 6). However, the allocation of the difference to three main industries was various. Denote
as
and
as
. It can be seen that the
and
were negative of the primary industry while positive of the secondary industry and the tertiary industry. The results confirmed that Russia was a net importer in the primary industry while a net exporter in the secondary industry and the tertiary industry. The secondary industry’s
was larger than its corresponding
. The tertiary industry’s
was smaller than its
. It indicated that carbon was mainly transferred from the secondary industry to the tertiary industry during the domestic supply–demand chain, and the secondary industry of Russia involved actively in the global value chain via the international trade.
3.4. Carbon Intensity of Embodied CO2 Emissions
The GDP was calculated by the added values based on the input–output tables from the WIOD. The GDP of Russia in 1995 was 315.03 billion USD. It reduced from 382.61 billion USD in 1997 to 176.79 billion USD in 1999. However, Russia’s economy was recovered gradually since 2000 [
31,
32] and experienced a notable growth to 1428.38 billion USD in 2008. The global financial crisis of 2008 shocked Russia’s economy in the following year when its GDP fell to 1081.38 billion USD in 2009. Russia’s economy was continuously recovered by a growth in its GDP to 1783.96 billion USD in 2013. By contrast, the carbon intensity of GDP in Russia increased significantly from 3.39 kg/USD in 1997 to 7.47 kg/USD in 1999, and then it was followed by a substantial reduction to 0.85 kg/USD in 2013 (see
Figure 3).
The dynamic trend of the exports was generally in consistency with that of the GDP during the study period. The export value of Russia was minimum at 77.61 billion USD in 1999 and then was going through an upward trend to 425.57 billion USD in 2008. After that, the export value of Russia was almost doubled from 286.69 billion USD in 2009 to 586.91 billion USD in 2013. The carbon intensity of the exports varied quite widely. The carbon intensity of the exports peaked at 10.02 kg/USD in 1999 and then decreased dramatically to 1.13 kg/USD in 2013. The import value of Russia was only 40.97 billion USD in 1999, but it grew to 425.54 billion USD in 2013. The carbon intensity of the imports was maximum at 7.86 kg/USD in 1999 and then declined to 1.03 kg/USD in 2013. In general, the significant decrease in the carbon intensity after 2003 explained why the embodied CO2 emissions of the exports did not grow that much when the GDP and the exports were improved substantially.
From 1995 to 2003, the net export value of Russia was comparably lower at the level below 50 billion USD. However, the net export value of Russia was augmented to 123.24 billion USD in 2011. The carbon intensity of the net export was at a higher level compared with that of the GDP, the exports and the imports respectively. The carbon intensity of net exports in Russia was 12.73 kg/USD in 1999 and then decreased to only 1.57 kg/USD in 2011, which experienced a great reduction.
Overall, the period after 2003 witnessed a remarkable reduction in the carbon intensities of the GDP, the exports, the imports and the net exports in Russia. It was majorly due to the transformation of the energy structure in Russia. The coal made up more than 20% of the total energy consumption in 1990, but its share reduced to below 15% in 2009. By contrast, the proportion of natural gas rose by nearly 4% from 1990 to 2009. Moreover, nuclear power accounted for 6.6% and hydropower occupied 2.3% of the energy consumption by 2009 in Russia [
33], which were of great potential to improve the energy efficiency and reduce CO
2 emissions.
5. Conclusions
The quantity of embodied CO
2 emissions in Russia could be affected by the economic context. In general, economy depression could result in relatively lower production and less CO
2 emissions [
38]. It could be observed from the comparably low level of CO
2 emissions of Russia around 1999 due to the economy recession, which was resulted from the 1998 financial crisis. Furthermore, the transformation of the energy structure could reduce embodied CO
2 emissions by lowering the carbon intensity. The carbon intensities of the GDP, the exports, the imports, and the net exports in Russia were continuously declining after 2003, when the Russia’s government published the Energy Strategy to 2020. In 2009, it republished the target: a 56% energy intensity reduction before 2030 (compared with 2005) [
39,
40]. This policy attempted to enhance the energy production and improve the energy efficiency by coordinating the energy structure to be cleaner. From 1995 to 2015, consumption of coal decreased by 26% in Russia, while natural gas increased by 7%. Nuclear energy was nearly doubled, and renewable energy grew almost eight times over this period [
41].
The comparison between direct and embodied CO2 emissions showed that carbon was transferred massively from the secondary industry to the primary industry and the tertiary industry in Russia. Learning from CO2 emissions embodied in the production and the consumption, carbon was transferred from the upstream resource sectors to the downstream manufacturing sectors and service sectors in Russia. Moreover, CO2 emissions embodied in the production were more than that in the consumption, which indicated that Russia took the responsibility of CO2 emissions for other countries’ consumption. The ratio of consumption CO2 emissions to production CO2 emissions implied the extent that Russia was burdened by CO2 emissions for other countries’ consumption. The results showed that 31.46% of Russia’s CO2 emissions were generated for other countries’ consumption in 1999, while it was 10.68% in 2013.
Generally, exporting CO2 emissions were more than importing CO2 emissions from 1995 to 2014. That means Russia was a net exporter of CO2 emissions during the study period. The primary industry was a net importer of CO2 emissions, while the secondary industry and the tertiary industry were net exporters. Basic resource sectors, such as mining and quarrying sector (C2), basic metals and fabricated metal sector (C12), and coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel sector (C8), were the significant emitters of exporting CO2 emissions in Russia. That is because Russia exported substantial resources and energy to the world.
In contrast, sectors from the traditional manufacturing industries were notable contributors to CO2 emissions from the import perspective, such as the food, beverages, and tobacco sector (C3) and the textiles and textile products sector (C4). Modern technical industries like the machinery sector (C13), electrical and optical equipment sector (C14), and transport equipment sector (C15) also played an important role in importing embodied CO2 emissions of Russia. Moreover, the trading effect of those technical industries on importing embodied CO2 emissions was increasing.
is the difference between exporting CO2 emissions and importing CO2 emissions. Positive indicates a net exporter of CO2 emissions, while negative suggests a net importer of CO2 emissions. The top positive sectors showed that Russia was an essential exporter of the carbon-intensive sectors, such as the mining and quarrying sector (C2), basic metals and fabricated metal sector (C12), coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel sector (C8), and electricity, gas, and water supply sector (C17). Modern technical industries, like the transport equipment sector (C15) and electrical and optical equipment sector (C14), and traditional manufacturing industries, like textiles and textile products sector (C4), leather, leather and footwear sector (C5) and food, beverages and tobacco sector (C3), were key negative sectors in Russia. The chemicals and chemical products sector (C9) and machinery sector (C13) were important emitters from both importing and exporting perspectives, while their s were turned to be negative. It implied that the chemicals and chemical products sector (C9) and machinery sector (C13) in Russia participated deeply in the global value chain via the international trade.
The research reveals that Russia’s CO2 emissions largely depend on its energy structure and industrial structure. How the industrial linkages of Russia involved in the global value chain affect CO2 emissions will be worth studying, especially since Russia remains one of the world’s greatest energy producers and exporters in the future.
6. Policy Implications
Based on the decomposition analysis of CO2 emissions embodied in the international trade, we come up with some policy implications.
Firstly, countries that are net exporters of CO
2 emissions are encouraged to participate effectively in the global climate negotiation. Allocation of the CO
2 emission responsibility to different countries is argued heatedly for the global climate mitigation action. Setting up a CO
2 emission reduction target for a country should consider its burdening CO
2 emissions for other countries. Taking Russia as an example, according to the statistics from the evolving transition scenario of BP [
42], Russia will remain the world’s largest primary energy exporter by 2040. Its carbon intensity continues to be reduced, but it is expected to be the most carbon-intensive economy among the researched countries in the BP program [
42]. To a certain extent, countries that consume energy and products embodying massive CO
2 emissions from the exports of Russia, especially the developed countries, should be responsible for CO
2 emissions. With this perspective, a new framework to allocate the responsibility of CO
2 emissions should be founded in the climate negotiation, and the CO
2 emissions reduction target can be established in the form of the carbon intensity for CO
2 emission net exporters.
Secondly, CO2 emissions embodied in exports and imports largely depend on the industrial structure in the international trade. The decomposition analysis of CO2 emissions embodied in the international trade can provide a country with an overview of the sectors’ CO2 emission structures. In Russia, exporting CO2 emissions are principally from basic resource and energy sectors, while importing CO2 emissions are majorly from traditional manufacturing sectors and technical manufacturing sectors in Russia. Moreover, the trading effect of technical manufacturing sectors on importing CO2 emission is increasing in Russia. Taking the relationship between CO2 emissions and industrial structure into consideration is potentially beneficial for Russia’s future energy policy. Advancement in the trade globalization deepens the international specialization, which leads to more multiplex carbon transfer between industrial sectors. Therefore, countries that participate actively in the international trade are supposed to coordinate environmental costs and economic benefits better for the global sustainable development, particularly for the future industrial upgrading of developing net CO2 exporters.
Thirdly, the energy structure is a key factor affecting CO
2 emissions embodied in the international trade. From 1995 to 2015, consumption of coal decreased by 26% in Russia, while natural gas increased by 7%. Nuclear energy was nearly double, and renewable energy grew almost eight times over this period [
41]. By contrast, the carbon intensities of the GDP and the exports of Russia decreased by almost 80% during the study period from 1995 to 2014, which indicates that the carbon intensity can be reduced by adjusting the energy structure. The development of renewable energy sources is an important target in European strategic plans [
43,
44]. For the long run, enhancing the development of renewable energy to make the energy structure cleaner is necessary for global-scale energy sustainability. Furthermore, improving the technical level of intermediate processing to achieve more energy efficiency is important for CO
2 emission reduction.
Fourthly, the responsibility of embodied CO
2 emissions can be internalized in the future international cooperation. For the significant energy and resource exporters (like Russia), the duty of embodied CO
2 emissions can be internalized via energy pricing. For the notable manufacturing exporters (like China [
45]), the environmental costs of CO
2 emissions can be internalized via product pricing. In other words, the responsibility of embodied CO
2 emissions can be transferred directly to the consumption side by internalizing carbon costs via products and services pricing in the international trade. Additionally, the cooperation can be extended to the technology exchange. Advanced technology from those consumption countries that are more developed can be imported to exchange the exports from less-developed countries.