1. Introduction
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has become a key issue of major concern for the community of international fisheries since the 1990s, particularly for the subject of sustainable utilization of marine fisheries resources [
1]. While no exact numbers and figures are revealed, it is globally recognized that IUU fishing has escalated in the past 20+ years, and its magnitude is considerable [
2]. To resolve this problem, the international community has adopted several international instruments that included effective management measures against IUU fishing, such as the 2001 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) and the 2005 Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (the Model Scheme). Later, the 2005 Model Scheme resulted in the adoption of the 2009 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (the PSM Agreement), a legally binding “treaty”.
Furthermore, the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) endorsed the Voluntary Guidelines for Flag State Performance (the Guidelines) at its 31st session in 2014. The Guidelines, a set of international standards and procedures that aims to hold flag states more accountable for fishing vessels under their registrations, set out a range of actions that each state can implement to ensure that fishing vessels registered under their flags do not engage in IUU fishing [
3], the consequences of which are the loss of short-term and long-run social justice, economic benefits and opportunities and huge negative impacts on environmental stability and food security [
4]. Interestingly, the IPOA-IUU and the Model Scheme, along with the Guidelines, are not legally binding (also called “soft laws”), as shown in
Table 1. Why the international community prefers soft laws (without legally binding force) rather than hard laws (with legally binding force) is thus a question that is worthy of further analysis.
In addition, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2015. The SDGs are designed to be a blueprint to achieve a better and sustainable future for all mankind [
5]. There are 17 SDGs included, among which SDG 14, “Life Below Water”, is mainly for the sustainable development of oceans and marine resources. Key issues concerned in SDG 14 include ocean acidification, deterioration of coastal waters, marine pollution (plastics), protection of marine biodiversity and resource management [
6]. Currently, SDG 14 has been incorporated into several international legal instruments, such as the Aichi Biodiversity Targets of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) [
7]. Thus, SDG 14 is now a very important guideline for ocean-related issues, including the sustainable development of marine resources.
As one of the distant-water fishing nations (DWFNs), Taiwan has to face relevant regulations incorporated in these instruments from other actors, even if these instruments are only soft laws. Despite the fact that the Fisheries Agency of Taiwan, the competent authority for fisheries management in Taiwan, has tried to enact conservation and management measures (CMMs) mostly according to those regulations, challenges such as international sanctions are still faced by Taiwan. The sanction from the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) in 2005, in which Taiwan, as a flag state, failed to effectively control fishing vessels registered to it to conduct illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing and illegal fish laundering [
8], and the “yellow card” issued in 2015 by the European Union are the best examples [
9]. Although the yellow card was lifted in 2019, the European Union may again give Taiwan a yellow card or even list Taiwan as a “noncooperating third country” (red card) and ban the importation of Taiwanese fish and fish products to the European Union if Taiwan’s efforts against IUU fishing are not satisfactory to the European Union in the future [
10].
The purpose of this article is to understand the development and key elements of these soft laws, their influence against IUU fishing and Taiwan’s response to these soft laws for its high-seas fisheries management. This paper firstly introduces the evolution of the international fisheries legal regime, particularly focusing on the development and contents of these two soft laws. Secondly, this paper analyzes the origin and details of the Guidelines. Thirdly, Taiwan’s recent actions in response to these soft laws against IUU fishing are discussed. Lastly, observations and conclusions based on the analysis of those efforts as policy recommendations for Taiwan are provided.
2. IUU Fishing and International Laws
IUU fishing is in fact not a new issue in marine capture fisheries. Although Erikstein and Swan (2014) stated that the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) “provides the overall framework for the international law of the sea, whose provisions subsequent instruments incorporate or elaborate upon as appropriate [
11]”, the term “IUU fishing” did not exist in the UNCLOS and its subsequent legal instruments, such as the 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the Compliance Agreement) and the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) [
12].
The first appearance of the term “IUU fishing” can be traced back to the 16th annual meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), held in Hobart, Tasmania, Australia in 1997 [
13]. At the opening of the meeting, the chair mentioned that “[t]he extent of illegal fishing had led to great concern and had visibly undermined the conservation policy of CCAMLR. The stocks…were under pressure because of illegal fishing [
8].” Furthermore, the chair urged that “the issue of illegal fishing—and measures to contain it—was a serious issue facing the Commission at this meeting, and central to this containment were measures of control and enforcement [
14]”.
In addition, Agenda 5 of the meeting discussed “Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the Convention Area”. The European Union considered that CCAMLR was facing an unwanted challenge from the illegal fishing activities. The progress achieved by the organization over the last 15 years, however, “is consequently at risk, not only of being undermined, but irreparably damaged by these activities [
14].”Finally, most member states of the organization agreed that the evidence of large-scale IUU fishing in the Convention Area “has seriously undermined the work of CCAMLR on achieving of the Convention’s objective”, and the situation “calls for collective efforts within CCAMLR, measures by Flag States and Coastal States and steps vis-à-vis non-Contracting Parties to enhance enforcement and compliance with conservation measures regarding living resources in the Convention Area [
14]”.
To resolve these issues, the international community proposed all kinds of workable solutions and actions against IUU fishing [
15]. The first was the adoption of the FAO IPOA-IUU, the origin of which was relevant to the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) [
16]. Two years after the adoption of the CCRF, in 1997, member states of FAO determined that having some international instruments to address issues concerned for compliance with the CCRF was necessary [
17]. Later, the development of a global action plan to address all kinds of IUU fishing through cooperative efforts “among States, regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs), FAO, and other international organizations” was decided in the FAO Ministerial Meeting on Fisheries, 1999 [
18]. To this end, FAO, with the assistance of Australia, convened an expert consultation to discuss this action plan related to IUU fishing in Sydney, Australia in May 2000. To further negotiate details of the action plan, two subsequent FAO technical consultations were convened in Rome, Italy in October 2000 and February 2001, respectively [
19]. Finally, the IPOA-IUU was adopted in the COFI of FAO by consensus on 2 March 2001 and urged all members of the FAO to take the necessary actions to implement it [
18].
Although a “soft law”, the IPOA-IUU was the first specific international instrument adopted to combat IUU fishing [
20]. It contains seven parts, including “Introduction”, “Nature and Scope of IUU Fishing and the International Plan of Action”, “Objective and Principles”, “Implementation of Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing”, “Special Requirements of Developing Countries”, “Reporting” and “Role of FAO”. Particularly, the section on “Implementation of Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing” is the bulk of the IPOA-IUU, in which every subject under international fisheries laws, such as flag states, coastal states, port states, market states and RFMOs, are obligated to assume part of the duties and responsibilities in combating IUU fishing, and therefore, the adoption of the IPOA-IUU is to “provide all States with comprehensive, effective and transparent measures by which to act” [
4].
After the adoption of the IPOA-IUU, the Secretary-General of FAO held an expert consultation in 2002 in order to analyze “port State measures” as a means in combating IUU fishing with the International Maritime Organization (IMO), according to paragraph 90 of the IPOA-IUU, to promote the implementation of the IPOA-IUU. A draft paper named “Port State Control of Foreign Fishing Vessels” proposed by FAO was thoroughly discussed “for a harmonized system of port State measures” and “how such a comprehensive and transparent system might be achieved [
21].” A comprehensive analysis on “port State measures with respect to fishing vessels” was conducted, along with the identification of issues that can be incorporated in a regional memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding utilizing port state measures against IUU fishing [
21]. Finally, it was recommended to convene a conference discussing principles and guidelines for such a regional MOU [
21].
To this end, the Secretary-General of FAO convened a technical consultation meeting in 2004 to deal with practical issues relating to “the role of the port State in combating IUU fishing” and “principles and guidelines for the establishment of regional MOU on port States measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing” [
22]. Some states stated that they reserved their rights on adopting a regional MOU as a tool to implement the IPOA-IUU because “it would create a further bureaucratic layer and that its establishment would be a lengthy process [
22].” However, these states agreed that “there was a need for a suite of model provisions to implement port State measures” and this tool “did not exclude the need to prepare in the future an international instrument on the rights and obligations of port States [
22].” Finally, states agreed that the regional MOU should be titled “Model Scheme” as “a framework, a set of minimum requirements which States, RFMOs or others could use and consult when developing port State measures [
22]”, and it was officially adopted in the 26th COFI of FAO in 2005 [
23].
The Model Scheme, similar to the IPOA-IUU, is a “soft law” in nature [
24]. In addition to the “Introduction”, it includes five additional sections, namely “General”, “Inspections”, “Actions”, “Information” and “Others,” along with five annexes [
23]. Overall, the basic framework and implementation details of the port state measures have been established and listed in the document. The Model Scheme not only clearly provides definitions on the scope and subjects to which port state measures are applicable, such as the ports and fishing vessels, but also gives instructions to port states for their reference when they implement port state measures. Thus, it should be safe to say that port state measures, to a certain degree, have been recognized by many states as a workable measure against IUU fishing.
As mentioned earlier, the adoption of the PSM Agreement resulted from the adoption of the Model Scheme [
25]. This is because the implementation of the Model Scheme highly depends upon port states’ political will. Therefore, the possibility of developing a legally binding agreement against IUU fishing based on port state measures remained concerned [
26]. This can be evidenced in the 61st UN General Assembly, in which states were encouraged to “initiate a process within FAO to developing, as appropriate, a legally binding instrument on minimum standards for port State measures, building on the Model Scheme and the IPOA-IUU” [
27].
The objective of the PSM Agreement is to “prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing through the implementation of effective port State measures, and thereby to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of living marine resources and marine ecosystems [
28].” It is worth noting that, after analyzing its provisions, most contents and relevant regulations of the PSM Agreement are highly similar to those contents of the IPOA-IUU and the Model Scheme, meaning that it is a legally binding instrument that includes existing regulations in other “soft laws [
29]”. It is expected that under its framework, port state measures will be implemented by contracting port states more effectively because these states will have their compulsory obligations under international law [
30].
4. Taiwan’s Actions against IUU Fishing
As one of the leading distant-water fishing nations in the world, Taiwan should play an important role against IUU fishing alongside other states. According to the Fisheries Agency of Taiwan, the development of Taiwan’s fisheries commenced significantly from the 1960s. According to the government, academia and relevant research institutes, the fisheries industry of Taiwan generates a total production of 1.2 million tons and a value of 95 billion New Taiwan dollars (NT
$, or approximately US
$3.2 billion) [
37]. As regards the distant-water fisheries, according to the 2018 FAO statistics of the world’s fisheries production published in 2020, Taiwan was the 22nd fisheries producer in the world, mainly in the tuna longline fishery, tuna purse-seine fishery, stick-held dipnet saury fishery and squid jigging fishery. The average annual production in recent years is around 730 thousand tons, with a value of NT
$40.2 billion (or approximately US
$1.36 billion). Currently, there are over 1100 Taiwanese fishing vessels operating in three oceans, including the high seas as well as EEZs of currently 22 coastal states [
37]. With such a huge fishing capacity, Taiwan will inevitably attract attention globally, including from RFMOs, conservation-oriented states (e.g., the United States and the European Union) and some environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace. This can be evidenced by the “yellow card” issued by the European Union mentioned earlier to request better management of the Taiwanese fishing fleet and the sanction to Taiwan adopted in Recommendation 05-02 by ICCAT in 2005, in which Taiwan’s quota of bigeye tuna was reduced from 16,500 tons to 3300 tons for IUU fishing and illegal fish laundering of Taiwanese fishing vessels [
8].
To comply with CMMs adopted by RFMOs, Taiwan has become more active in participating in the work of these organizations, which also fulfills the request of paragraph 83 of the IPOA-IUU. Due to the fact that Taiwan is not recognized by the United Nations and most states as a “state”, it is not able to participate in these RFMOs and obtain “contracting party” status. To circumvent this difficulty, Taiwan takes “fishing entity” defined in the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement as its capacity to participate in the work of RFMOs, but organizational status granted to it varies. For example, Taiwan is granted membership in some RFMOs such as the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) and the Inter-American Tropic Tuna Commission (IATTC). In other RFMOs, Taiwan is only granted cooperating noncontracting party (CNCP) status, such as in the ICCAT. Its obligation for combating IUU fishing, however, is no different from that of a state, no matter what organizational status is granted to Taiwan. Particularly, in order to effectively manage its distant-water fishing vessels operating in the three oceans so that they will not be sanctioned for further violations, in recent years, Taiwan has incorporated resolutions and decisions adopted by relevant RFMOs into its domestic legal system, including port state measures, attending regional observer programs (ROPs) and high-seas boarding and inspection schemes and the compulsory installation of vessel monitoring system (VMS) equipment on each of its distant fishing vessels, all of which aim to regulate and control its fishing fleet more effectively [
37].
In addition to requirements from RFMOs, Taiwan has endeavored to fulfill other requirements/requests listed in international legal instruments or from other states. For example, paragraph 25 of the IPOA-IUU requests that states should develop and implement their national plans of action (NPOAs) no later than three years after the adoption of the IPOA-IUU. To this end, Taiwan voluntarily adopted its NPOA against IUU fishing (NPOA-IUU) in 2013, despite the fact that Taiwan was not even a member state of FAO. Taiwan’s NPOA-IUU was developed mostly in line with the provisions of the IPOA-IUU. The contents of Taiwan’s NPOA against IUU fishing include “all States responsibilities”, “flag States responsibilities”, “coastal States measures”, “port States measures”, “internationally agreed market-related measures”, “research”, “adoption of CMMs within the framework of regional fisheries management organizations” and “supportive of the special requirements of developing countries,” most of which are identical with those of the IPOA-IUU. Through the adoption of this NPOA, it reflects the willingness of Taiwan to implement the IPOA-IUU, a nonlegally binding instrument, in conserving and managing marine fisheries resources as well as their sustainable utilization [
38]. The implementation of the NPOA also fulfills Taiwan’s responsibilities as a flag state under the Guidelines and demonstrates Taiwan’s willingness to voluntarily comply with the Guidelines as well.
Next, in order to remove the yellow card from the European Union, Taiwan has adopted a new law titled “Act for Distant Water Fisheries” in 2016 to ensure its capability for the conservation of marine fisheries resources, strengthen management of its distant-water fisheries, curb IUU fishing and improve traceability of catches and fisheries products, all of which is to guarantee the sustainable development of its distant-water fisheries through effectively fulfilling its international obligation as a flag state [
39]. Particularly, sanctions and fines for violations have been significantly increased in the act, from originally NT
$300,000 (or approximately US
$10,000) maximum to at least NT
$2 million (or approximately US
$65,000) or even up to NT
$60 million (or approximately US
$2 million) [
39]. Meanwhile, the “Fisheries Act” and the “Act to Govern Investment in the Operation of Foreign Flag Fishing Vessels” were amended in accordance with the “Act for Distant Water Fisheries” (the so-called “Three Fisheries Laws”), and 15 bylaws to strengthen the management of its fishing fleet were adopted [
40]. Furthermore, in 2016, the Fisheries Agency of Taiwan also adopted the “Strategy Plan for Auditing Industry Related to Distant Water Fisheries” to improve the traceability of fisheries products, audit its distant-water fishing industry on an irregular basis and ensure their catches or fisheries products to be traded legally and not engaging in IUU fishing activities. All of these aim to fulfill the requirements from the European Union, primarily to fulfill Taiwan’s responsibilities as a flag state, in order to remove the yellow card. In addition, Taiwan has conducted bilateral cooperation with the United States, Japan, Pacific island states to which Taiwan has signed bilateral fisheries agreements and port states to which the catch of Taiwanese distant fleets will be landed to further strengthen the effectiveness of its management measures [
41].
In addition to IUU fishing, Taiwan also commits itself for the conservation and management of species associated with its distant-water fisheries, particularly sharks. Taiwan has long been putting tremendous efforts in conducting scientific research and adopting a series of CMMs for sharks, such as the 2007 “Regulations on the Prohibition on Catching, Possessing and Selling of Whale Shark”; the 2012 “Regulations on Shark’s Fins Naturally Attached to Bodies”, which aims to eliminate and deter shark finning; the 2013 “Regulations on the Catching of Great White Shark, Basking Shark and Megamouth Shark”; and the 2016 “Regulations on Manta Ray Catch”, which establish a mechanism for “reporting and collecting biological information on rare large shark species.” The Fisheries Agency of Taiwan clearly declared that violations of any kind will be investigated and sanctioned accordingly to demonstrate its determination on shark conservation [
42]. The protection of sharks also meets the requests in the International Plan of Action for Conservation and Management of Sharks (IPOA-Sharks), another soft law adopted by FAO.
5. Discussion
IUU fishing was not officially concerned by the international community as a key factor in jeopardizing the sustainable utilization of marine fisheries resources until the end of the last century. In order to combat IUU fishing, several international and voluntary instruments, including both hard and soft laws, have been adopted to this end.
Although the IPOA-IUU includes many subjects under international law to combat IUU fishing, the endeavors of FAO and states primarily focused on the port state measures after its adoption. As Swan stated, “[t]he FAO Model Scheme could be regarded as a stepping-stone; a broader process, involving a full complement of players, could build on, and as appropriate, expand the current standards [
43].” The soft law Model Scheme was first adopted by FAO to guide states on how to “voluntarily” implement port state measures, followed by the hard law PSM Agreement. After these achievements, the international community then again turned their attention to the performance of flag states. This is because IUU fishing is primarily caused by flag states who do not effectively regulate and control fishing activities conducted by fishing vessels flying their flags.
Some observations can be drawn from the analysis of the Guidelines. Firstly, the Guidelines are a “soft law” in nature, not yet a “hard law” similar to the PSM Agreement. Hard law provides a powerful cooperation framework to ensure parties fulfill their legal obligations, but it may require longer reaching final agreements among parties. Therefore, hard law is often unsuitable for dealing with urgent issues. On the other hand, soft law offers a more flexible and faster way to address urgent issues, easier ways to achieve final agreements than hard law and more effective ways to address uncertainty [
44]. Thus, a soft law can act as “a first or provisional step to bring all parties together due to the nature of soft law” mentioned above, followed by a legally binding instrument as a subsequent step to ensure parties fulfill their obligations [
45]. The best example is the subsequent adoption of the Model Scheme and the PSA Agreement against IUU fishing. Thus, despite the fact that no clear evidence has been observed, it is still reasonable for us to expect that the Guidelines should only be the first step [
46], and a legally binding instrument that ensures flag states fulfill their obligations would be likely adopted later in the future [
47].
Secondly, the geographical scope of the Guidelines primarily applies to areas beyond national jurisdiction or high seas. Although the Guidelines might also apply to the territorial seas and EEZ of a flag state or a coastal state, it needs the consent of the state if the Guidelines are to be applied in its territorial seas and EEZs. In other words, states remain within their rights to decide what measures and actions are to be applied for flag state performance assessment in their territorial seas and EEZs. This could result in a possibility that criteria for flag state performance could be inconsistent beyond and within national jurisdiction. A possible explanation is that international legal instruments usually do not involve a state’s internal affairs to prevent jeopardizing a state’s sovereignty and sovereignty rights. Furthermore, most states may not be ready to accept the Guidelines to be applied, whether voluntarily or compulsorily, in their territorial seas and EEZs yet [
48].
Thirdly, a variety of measures and actions of performance assessment criteria have been provided in the two “Performance Assessment Criteria” sections. These could be simply categorized into several groups: (1) criteria for people related to fisheries, including owners, operators and beneficial owners/operators; (2) criteria for vessels, including vessel data, registration procedures and the record of fishing vessels; (3) actions that states should implement, such as cooperating with other flag states and ensuring “their fishing vessels do not engage in activities that undermine the effectiveness of relevant measures”; and (4) establishment of administrative and legal structures for fisheries management, including government agencies, laws and regulations and a regime for authorizing fishing activities. On the other hand, however, there are only principles rather than detailed steps provided in the sections on “Procedure for Carrying out Assessment” and “Encouraging Compliance and Deterring Non-Compliance by Flag States”. In other words, flag states seem flexible to accept what measures and actions they should implement listed in the Guidelines but are reluctant to list detailed steps on how to implement these measures and actions. A possible explanation is that having performance assessment is the right and internal affairs of a flag state, on which international law usually is reluctant to “cross the boundary”. In addition, doing so could be misinterpreted that flag states have reached consensus on these implementation steps and agreed to be bound by them [
49].
Lastly, despite the adoption of the Guidelines, further endeavors against IUU fishing are still likely. In addition to the adoption of a legally binding instrument for flag state performance, measures related to market states and RFMOs, the last two subjects under international law included in the IPOA-IUU, could be the subsequent possible directions for the international community against IUU fishing. As long as the obligations and measures taken for each subject in the IPOA-IUU are well-defined and implemented, it is reasonable to believe that impacts from IUU fishing would be significantly reduced, or eventually eliminated, in the foreseeable future.
As regards Taiwan’s efforts against IUU fishing, it is obvious that Taiwan has adopted many domestic laws, provisions and CMMs to demonstrate its determination and willingness in this regard; all of these are to fulfill Taiwan’s international obligation as a flag state under the regime of international fisheries. In fact, Taiwan’s regulations and CMMs are highly relevant and greatly consistent with those requests in the Guidelines, such as criteria for people, vessels and actions a State should implement, despite the fact that the Guidelines provide only principles rather than details in some issues. However, pressures from RFMOs and many other States still exist for Taiwan, particularly on the implementation of these regulations and sanctions to violators. For example, the European Union strongly expressed its concern regarding Taiwan’s enforcement on its nationals who illegally invest in foreign fishing vessels, the amendment of Taiwan’s domestic laws and regulations against the importation of IUU fish products and landing inspections in foreign ports [
50]. In addition, Greenpeace also accused some Taiwanese flagged vessels of conducting illegal transshipments, having employment contracts that violate the “Regulations on the Authorization and Management of Overseas Employment of Foreign Crew Members” and possibly having forced labor situations onboard [
51]. Thus, how these rules are to be implemented effectively and how enforcement and sanctions are to be ensured are still the main challenges that the Fisheries Agency of Taiwan has to face in the near future.