Impacts of Risk Allocation on Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior: The Moderating Effect of Trust and Control
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Risk Allocation
2.2. Trust
2.3. Control
2.4. Opportunistic Behaviors
3. Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development
3.1. Risk Allocation and Opportunistic Behaviors
3.2. Moderating Effect of Trust
3.3. Moderating Effect of Control
4. Methodology
4.1. Data Collection
4.2. Measurement
4.2.1. Independent Variable: Risk Allocation
4.2.2. Dependent Variable: Opportunistic Behaviors
4.2.3. Moderating Variables
Trust
Control
4.2.4. Control Variables
4.3. Measurement Validation
4.4. Path Inspection
4.4.1. Main Effect
4.4.2. Moderating Effect
5. Result and Discussion
5.1. Impact of Pro-Client Risk Allocation on Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior
5.2. Moderating Role of Trust between Pro-Client Risk Allocation and Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior
5.3. Moderating Role of Control Between Pro-Client Risk Allocation and Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior
6. Conclusions and Implications
6.1. Conclusions
6.2. Theoretical Implications
6.3. Managerial Implications
6.4. Limitations and Future Research
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Characteristic | Range | Number | Percentage (%) |
---|---|---|---|
Project type | Building construction | 246 | 71.9 |
Public utility | 57 | 16.7 | |
Port and waterway | 3 | 0.9 | |
Others | 36 | 10.5 | |
Project construction period (years) | <2 | 114 | 33.3 |
2–5 | 211 | 61.7 | |
6–10 | 15 | 4.4 | |
>10 | 2 | 0.6 | |
Contract price (million RMB) | <30 | 62 | 18.1 |
30–100 | 85 | 24.9 | |
100–1000 | 152 | 44.4 | |
1000–3000 | 21 | 6.1 | |
>3000 | 22 | 6.4 |
Construct and Measuring Items | SFL |
---|---|
RA (α = 0.876; AVE = 0.6401; CR = 0.8767) | |
RA1. Contractors bear most of the risk caused by defective design. | 0.783 |
RA2. Contractor bears most of the risk arising from accuracy of instructions or information. | 0.834 |
RA3. Contractor bears most of the risk arising from unforeseeable physical conditions. | 0.802 |
RA4. Contractor bears most of the risk arising from inflation of prices. | 0.780 |
SOB (α = 0.856; AVE = 0.6027; CR = 0.8574) | |
SOB1. Contractor has not acted in accordance with the text or agreement of the contract. | 0.692 |
SOB2. Contractor unilaterally suspends or terminates the performance of the contract. | 0.823 |
SOB3. Contractor commits fraud when sharing important information required by the contract. | 0.868 |
SOB4. Contractor shirks the responsibility that is not specified in the contract but is actually his to assume. | 0.708 |
WOB (α = 0.864; AVE = 0.6803; CR = 0.8645) | |
WOB1. Contractor does not disclose certain information to protect his own interests. | 0.830 |
WOB2. Contractor sometimes fails to perform work that is verbally promised. | 0.839 |
WOB3. Contractor will try to exploit loopholes in contracts for his own gain. | 0.805 |
T (α = 0.867; AVE = 0.6372; CR = 0.8734) | |
T1. Client believes that contractor is competent enough to perform his duties. | 0.875 |
T2. Client trusts that contractor will keep his promises in the course of the project. | 0.906 |
T3. Client trusts contractor to take his interests into account when making decisions. | 0.747 |
T4. Client understands that building good personal relationships can improve the working relationship between client and contractor. | 0.636 |
C (α = 0.895; AVE = 0.6859; CR = 0.8972) | |
C1. Client has established clear working procedures that must be strictly observed by contractor. | 0.806 |
C2. Client shall continuously supervise implementation of contractor’s plan and construction progress. | 0.822 |
C3. Client has set clear performance objectives for contractor. | 0.873 |
C4. Client will link contractor’s rewards and penalties to performance targets achieved. | 0.810 |
Variable | M | SD | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Strong opportunistic behavior | 2.62 | 0.85 | 0.776 | ||||
Weak opportunistic behavior | 3.08 | 0.96 | 0.446 ** | 0.825 | |||
Risk allocation | 3.13 | 0.85 | 0.170 * | 0.135 * | 0.800 | ||
Trust | 3.74 | 0.74 | −0.169 ** | −0.089 | 0.105 | 0.798 | |
Control | 3.68 | 0.82 | −0.138 * | −0.131 * | 0.101 | 0.614 *** | 0.828 |
Panel A | Strong Opportunistic Behaviors (SOBs) | |||||||
Model A1 | Model A2 | Model A3 | Model A4 | |||||
β | VIF | β | VIF | β | VIF | β | VIF | |
Control variables | ||||||||
Project type | 0.084 | 1.022 | 0.076 | 1.024 | 0.064 | 1.028 | 0.055 | 1.032 |
Project construction period | 0.038 | 1.234 | 0.041 | 1.234 | 0.03 | 1.242 | 0.033 | 1.245 |
Contract price | 0.025 | 1.209 | 0.029 | 1.210 | 0.021 | 1.213 | 0.015 | 1.213 |
Independent variables | ||||||||
Risk allocation(RA) | 0.172 *** | 1.011 | 0.22 *** | 1.044 | 0.198 *** | 1.025 | ||
Moderating variables | ||||||||
Trust(T) | −0.202 *** | 1.016 | ||||||
Control(CO) | −0.152 *** | 1.024 | ||||||
Interaction | ||||||||
RA × T | −0.186 *** | 1.042 | ||||||
RA × CO | −0.184 *** | 1.025 | ||||||
F | 0.761 | 2.356 ** | 5.163 *** | 4.509 *** | ||||
ΔF | 0.761 | 10.223 ** | 12.423 *** | 12.183 *** | ||||
R2 | 0.011 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 0.98 | ||||
ΔR2 | 0.011 | 0.029 | 0.033 | 0.033 | ||||
Panel B | Weak Opportunistic Behaviors (WOBs) | |||||||
Model B1 | Model B2 | Model B3 | Model B4 | |||||
β | VIF | β | VIF | β | VIF | β | VIF | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Control variables | ||||||||
Project type | 0.113 | 1.022 | 0.07 | 1.024 | 0.062 | 1.028 | 0.06 | 1.032 |
Project construction period | 0.076 | 1.234 | 0.087 | 1.234 | 0.079 | 1.242 | 0.089 | 1.245 |
Contract price | 0.075 | 1.209 | 0.07 | 1.21 | 0.064 | 1.213 | 0.062 | 1.213 |
Independent variables | ||||||||
Risk allocation (RA) | 0.145 *** | 1.011 | 0.174 *** | 1.044 | 0.162 *** | 1.025 | ||
Moderating variables | ||||||||
Trust (T) | −0.118 ** | 1.016 | ||||||
Control (CO) | −0.139 *** | 1.024 | ||||||
Interaction | ||||||||
RA × T | −0.118 ** | 1.042 | ||||||
RA × CO | −0.057 | 1.025 | ||||||
F | 4.51 *** | 4.337 *** | 4.510 *** | 4.576 *** | ||||
ΔF | 4.51 *** | 7.459 *** | 4.947 ** | 0.128 | ||||
R2 | 0.63 | 0.072 | 0.098 | 0.120 | ||||
ΔR2 | 0.063 | 0.021 | 0.013 | 0.000 |
Hypothesis | Path of Hypothesis | β | p | Correlation | Results |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
H1 | Risk allocation→Strong opportunistic behaviors | 0.172 | 0.002 | positive | S |
H2 | Risk allocation→Weak opportunistic behaviors | 0.145 | 0.007 | positive | S |
H3a | Risk allocation × Trust→Strong opportunistic behaviors | −0.186 | 0.000 | negative | S |
H3b | Risk allocation × Trust→Weak opportunistic behaviors | −0.118 | 0.027 | negative | S |
H4a | Risk allocation × Control→Strong opportunistic behaviors | −0.184 | 0.001 | negative | S |
H4b | Risk allocation × Control→Weak opportunistic behaviors | −0.057 | 0.285 | uncorrelated | NS |
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Yin, Y.; Lin, Q.; Xiao, W.; Yin, H. Impacts of Risk Allocation on Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior: The Moderating Effect of Trust and Control. Sustainability 2020, 12, 9604. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12229604
Yin Y, Lin Q, Xiao W, Yin H. Impacts of Risk Allocation on Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior: The Moderating Effect of Trust and Control. Sustainability. 2020; 12(22):9604. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12229604
Chicago/Turabian StyleYin, Yilin, Qing Lin, Wanyi Xiao, and Hang Yin. 2020. "Impacts of Risk Allocation on Contractors’ Opportunistic Behavior: The Moderating Effect of Trust and Control" Sustainability 12, no. 22: 9604. https://doi.org/10.3390/su12229604