Effects of CEO Overseas Experience on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theory and Hypothesis
2.1. Analysis of the Relationship between CEO Overseas Experience and CSR
2.2. Contextual Mechanism Analysis of the Relationship between CEO Overseas Experience and CSR
2.2.1. External Environmental Characteristics: The Moderating Effect of Market Competition Intensity
2.2.2. Organization Characteristics: The Moderating Effect of Slack Resources
3. Research and Design
3.1. Research Samples and Data Sources
3.2. Main Research Variables and Definitions
3.2.1. Dependent Variable
3.2.2. Independent Variable
3.2.3. Moderating Variables
- (1)
- Market Competition Intensity (MCI)
- (2)
- Slack Resources (SLACK)
3.2.4. Control Variables
3.3. Research Model Construction
3.4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
4. Regression Results and Discussion
4.1. CEO Overseas Experience and CSR
4.2. Analysis of the CEO Overseas Experience and the Moderating Mechanism of CSR
4.2.1. Characteristics of External Environment: The Moderating Effect of Market Competition Intensity
4.2.2. Organization Characteristics: The Moderating Effect of Slack Resources
4.3. Robustness Test
4.3.1. Endogeneity Issues
4.3.2. Other Robustness Tests
4.4. Further Analysis
4.4.1. Comparative Analysis of the Effects of Different Overseas Experiences on CSR
4.4.2. The Effect of Geographical Regions on the Relationship between CEO Overseas Experience and CSR
4.4.3. The Effect of Different Ownership Structure on the Relationship between CEO Overseas Experience and CSR
4.4.4. The Effect of CEO Concurrent Appointment on the Relationship between CEO Overseas Experience and CSR
4.4.5. The Effect of the Overseas Experience of CEOs of Different Genders on CSR
4.4.6. The Effect of the Overseas Experience of CEOs with Different Educational Levels on CSR
5. Conclusions and Discussion
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Four Evaluation Dimensions | Primary Indicators | Secondary Indicators | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Score | Weight | ||||
RKS MCTI Social Responsibility Report Rating System | Macrocosm (M) | 30 | 30% | Strategy | Information on overall responsibility strategy; Information on sustainable development adaptation and response; Information on the effective matching of responsibility strategy with business; Information on the consideration of social responsibility by business executives at the strategic level; Information on setting and achieving social responsibility goals |
Governance | Basic information about the company; Information about values, principles, and guidelines; Information about responsible management bodies; Information about decision-making processes and structures; Information about governance transparency; Information about risk management; Information about ethical business governance; Information about internal practices | ||||
Stakeholder | Stakeholder definition and identification information; Stakeholder communication information; Stakeholder opinion information | ||||
Content (C) | 45 | 45% | Economic Performance | Profit and return information; Year-over-year economic information; Basic information on major products or services | |
Labor and Human Right | Information on employment and employment relations; Information on the professional growth of employees; Information on occupational health and safety; Information on human rights protection; Information on working conditions and social security; Information on social dialogue and care; Information on responsible education | ||||
Environment | Overall environmental management information; Pollution prevention information; Sustainable resource use information; Climate change mitigation and adaptation information | ||||
Fair Operation | Anti-corruption management information; Promotion of social responsibility information in the sphere of influence | ||||
Consumer | Provide information on quality assurance of products or services; Consumer (customer) management information; Protection of consumer safety and health information; Consumer (customer) service information; Protection of consumer (customer) data and privacy information; Consumer education information | ||||
Community Engagement and Development | Information on public donation; Information on volunteerism; Information on political participation; Information on entrepreneurship and employment; Information on scientific and technological development; Information on wealth creation and income; Information on health promotion; Information on social investment | ||||
Technique (T) | 15 | 15% | Content Balance | Completeness; Pertinence | |
Comparable Information | Consistency; Dataability | ||||
Report Innovation | Innovativeness; Innovation effectiveness | ||||
Credibility and Transparency | The degree of disclosure of stakeholders’ opinions; The degree of third-party validation (comprehensiveness, depth, principle, none); The authority of the third-party validation institution, The effectiveness of the feedback mechanism of the report readers’ opinions and suggestions | ||||
Industry (I) | 10 | 10% | Sub-Industry Characteristics Indicators | Except for the general industry and other manufacturing industries |
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Variable | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Max | Median | Observations |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CSR | 37.940 | 10.940 | 19.950 | 70.940 | 35.710 | 3009 |
COE | 0.077 | 0.267 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3009 |
COEJOB | 0.052 | 0.222 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3009 |
COEEDU | 0.036 | 0.186 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3009 |
FS | 22.850 | 1.324 | 19.540 | 27.390 | 22.700 | 3009 |
FL | 2.771 | 0.327 | 1.609 | 3.434 | 2.833 | 3009 |
CS | 0.463 | 0.191 | 0.062 | 0.868 | 0.476 | 3009 |
MS | 0.014 | 0.053 | 3.40 × 10−6 | 0.360 | 7.73 × 10−5 | 3009 |
ROE | 0.076 | 0.110 | −0.474 | 0.387 | 0.075 | 3009 |
FG | 0.135 | 0.266 | −0.399 | 1.250 | 0.104 | 3009 |
OS | 0.576 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3009 |
CC | 0.197 | 0.398 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3009 |
CG | 0.939 | 0.240 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3009 |
CA | 49.970 | 6.179 | 30 | 81 | 50 | 3009 |
CE | 3.607 | 0.829 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3009 |
CT | 0.084 | 0.278 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3009 |
MCI | 0.217 | 0.187 | 0.052 | 1 | 0.172 | 3009 |
SLACK | 1.168 | 1.008 | 0.060 | 5.980 | 0.903 | 3009 |
Variable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
CSR | 1 | ||||||||
COE | 0.051 *** | 1 | |||||||
COEJOB | 0.053 *** | 0.807 *** | 1 | ||||||
COEEDU | 0.024 | 0.666 *** | 0.205 *** | 1 | |||||
FS | 0.411 *** | 0.003 | 0.001 | –0.005 | 1 | ||||
FL | 0.155 *** | –0.036 ** | –0.013 | –0.032 * | 0.131 *** | 1 | |||
CS | 0.093 *** | 0.011 | 0.022 | –0.012 | 0.517 *** | 0.061 *** | 1 | ||
MS | –0.067 *** | –0.016 | –0.027 | 0.003 | 0.250 *** | –0.195 *** | 0.176 *** | 1 | |
ROE | 0.023 | 0.007 | 0.031 * | –0.006 | 0.090 *** | –0.064 *** | –0.212 *** | 0.113 *** | 1 |
FG | 0.007 | 0.022 | 0.038 ** | –0.003 | 0.055 *** | –0.070 *** | 0.011 | 0.141 *** | 0.301 *** |
CC | 0.02 | 0.056 *** | 0.072 *** | –0.015 | –0.033 * | –0.004 | –0.089 *** | –0.039 ** | 0.061 *** |
OS | 0.073 *** | –0.098 *** | –0.084 *** | –0.084 *** | 0.264 *** | 0.083 *** | 0.234 *** | 0.120 *** | –0.134 *** |
CG | –0.073 *** | 0.017 | 0.060 *** | –0.033 * | –0.004 | –0.014 | 0.047 *** | 0.033 * | –0.068 *** |
CA | 0.143 *** | 0.015 | 0.095 *** | –0.078 *** | 0.177 *** | 0.150 *** | 0.051 *** | –0.032 * | 0.018 |
CE | 0.135 *** | 0.146 *** | 0.125 *** | 0.124 *** | 0.191 *** | –0.036 * | 0.080 *** | 0.086 *** | –0.011 |
CT | 0.042 ** | –0.021 | –0.017 | –0.013 | 0.053 *** | 0.097 *** | 0.031 * | –0.054 *** | –0.109 *** |
MCI | 0.077 *** | 0.043 ** | 0.022 | 0.02 | –0.043 ** | –0.045 ** | 0.113 *** | 0.107 *** | –0.043 ** |
SLACK | 0.057 *** | –0.008 | 0.007 | –0.028 | 0.429 *** | 0.038 ** | 0.864 *** | 0.159 *** | –0.278 *** |
Variable | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
CSR | |||||||||
COE | |||||||||
COEJOB | |||||||||
COEEDU | |||||||||
FS | |||||||||
FL | |||||||||
CS | |||||||||
MS | |||||||||
ROE | |||||||||
FG | 1 | ||||||||
CC | 0.036 ** | 1 | |||||||
OS | –0.061 *** | –0.236 *** | 1 | ||||||
CG | –0.022 | –0.009 | 0.106 *** | 1 | |||||
CA | –0.031 * | 0.225 *** | 0.156 *** | 0.077 *** | 1 | ||||
CE | 0.005 | 0.053 *** | 0.185 *** | 0.031 * | –0.020 | 1 | |||
CT | 0.003 | 0.015 | 0.074 *** | 0.037 ** | 0.074 *** | 0.045 ** | 1 | ||
MCI | –0.008 | –0.007 | 0.016 | –0.009 | –0.056 *** | –0.037 ** | 0.001 | 1 | |
SLACK | –0.030 * | –0.095 *** | 0.229 *** | 0.040 ** | 0.068 *** | 0.053 *** | 0.025 | 0.114 *** | 1 |
Variable | Moderating Effect | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) | |
Benchmark Model | Main Effect | Market Competition | Slack Resources | Full Model | |
COE | 1.113 ** | 0.278 | 1.053 ** | 1.921 *** | |
(0.363) | (0.354) | (0.3863) | (0.422) | ||
MCI | 2.425 ** | 2.603 ** | |||
(0.962) | (1.013) | ||||
COE × MCI | 3.551 *** | 3.409 *** | |||
(0.236) | (0.374) | ||||
SLACK | 0.328 *** | 0.289 ** | |||
(0.070) | (0.096) | ||||
COE × SLACK | 1.892 *** | 1.960 *** | |||
(0.544) | (0.563) | ||||
FS | 1.509 *** | 1.529 *** | 1.453 *** | 1.478 *** | 1.400 ** |
(0.413) | (0.409) | (0.402) | (0.417) | (0.431) | |
FL | –4.371 *** | –4.644 *** | –4.441 *** | –4.939 *** | –4.768 *** |
(1.199) | (1.086) | (1.109) | (0.929) | (1.003) | |
CS | –0.350 | –0.433 | –0.354 | −2.660 | –2.408 |
(1.756) | (1.744) | (1.730) | (1.606) | (1.646) | |
MS | –21.554 *** | –21.510 *** | –20.956 *** | –21.933 *** | –21.344 *** |
(1.612) | (1.603) | (1.457) | (1.540) | (1.462) | |
ROE | 0.322 | 0.387 | 0.414 | 0.689 | 0.690 |
(0.682) | (0.644) | (0.606) | (0.584) | (0.565) | |
FG | –0.325 | –0.354 | –0.431 | –0.345 | –0.422 |
(0.332) | (0.326) | (0.307) | (0.333) | (0.331) | |
OS | –0.649 * | –0.661 * | –0.738 ** | –0.665 ** | –0.746 ** |
(0.303) | (0.300) | (0.309) | (0.282) | (0.309) | |
CC | 1.718 *** | 1.834 *** | 1.658 *** | 1.948 *** | 1.781 *** |
(0.405) | (0.413) | (0.412) | (0.414) | (0.435) | |
CG | –0.494 | –0.480 | –0.476 | –0.555 | –0.544 |
(0.799) | (0.806) | (0.796) | (0.808) | (0.840) | |
CA | 0.044 * | 0.044 ** | 0.048 ** | 0.047 ** | 0.051 ** |
(0.020) | (0.019) | (0.018) | (0.021) | (0.021) | |
CE | 0.493 *** | 0.422 ** | 0.444 ** | 0.387 ** | 0.410 ** |
(0.147) | (0.155) | (0.162) | (0.142) | (0.157) | |
CT | –0.491 * | –0.475 * | –0.483 * | –0.456 * | –0.466 * |
(0.252) | (0.250) | (0.250) | (0.239) | (0.252) | |
Constant term | 1.782 | 2.138 | 2.362 | 4.639 | 4.889 |
(8.565) | (8.698) | (8.509) | (8.580) | (8.811) | |
YR | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
IT | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3009 | 3009 | 3009 | 3009 | 3009 |
R2 | 0.441 | 0.442 | 0.443 | 0.445 | 0.473 |
Variable | Moderating Effect | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | |
Main Effect | Market Competition | Slack Resources | Full Model | |
COE | 2.896 *** | 2.995 * | 5.817 *** | 5.667 ** |
(0.901) | (1.541) | (2.113) | (2.547) | |
MCI | 0.408 * | 0.275 | ||
(1.331) | (1.205) | |||
COE × MCI | 1.470 *** | 1.452 ** | ||
(1.897) | (1.850) | |||
SLACK | 0.772 ** | 0.786 ** | ||
(0.384) | (0.384) | |||
COE × SLACK | 2.300 ** | 1.997 ** | ||
(1.324) | (1.304) | |||
Constant term | –62.185 *** | –62.185 *** | –63.326 *** | –63.367 *** |
(4.373) | (4.429) | (4.391) | (4.452) | |
CN | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
YR | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
IT | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 2417 | 2417 | 2417 | 2417 |
R2 | 0.226 | 0.226 | 0.226 | 0.226 |
Variable | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) |
---|---|---|---|
Overseas Experience | Overseas Work Experience | Overseas Study Experience | |
COE | 1.113 ** | ||
(0.363) | |||
COEJOB | 0.942 * | ||
(0.440) | |||
COEEDU | 1.291 ** | ||
(0.441) | |||
Constant term | 2.138 | 2.223 | 1.164 |
(8.698) | (8.820) | (8.394) | |
CN | Yes | Yes | Yes |
YR | Yes | Yes | Yes |
IT | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3009 | 3009 | 3009 |
R2 | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 |
Variable | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) |
---|---|---|---|
Full Sample | EuropUS Group | Non-EuropUS Group | |
COE | 1.113 ** | ||
(0.363) | |||
COEEUS | 1.248 *** | ||
(0.355) | |||
COENOEUS | 1.273 | ||
(1.104) | |||
Constant term | 2.138 | 1.654 | 2.127 |
(8.698) | (8.537) | (8.767) | |
CN | Yes | Yes | Yes |
YR | Yes | Yes | Yes |
IT | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3009 | 3009 | 3009 |
R2 | 0.442 | 0.442 | 0.442 |
Variable | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) |
---|---|---|---|
Full Sample | State-Owned Enterprise Group | Non-State Enterprise Group | |
COE | 1.113 ** | 1.400 *** | 0.955 |
(0.363) | (0.268) | (0.572) | |
Constant term | 2.138 | –5.999 | 16.263 ** |
(8.698) | (10.590) | (5.447) | |
CN | Yes | Yes | Yes |
YR | Yes | Yes | Yes |
IT | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3009 | 1732 | 1277 |
R2 | 0.442 | 0.433 | 0.455 |
Variable | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) |
---|---|---|---|
Full Sample | CEO’s Concurrent Chairmanship Group | CEO’s Non-Concurrent Chairmanship Group | |
COE | 1.113 ** | 2.417 | 1.285 *** |
(0.363) | (1.395) | (0.289) | |
Constant term | 2.138 | –22.246 | 3.578 |
(8.698) | (15.529) | (6.449) | |
CN | Yes | Yes | Yes |
YR | Yes | Yes | Yes |
IT | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3009 | 594 | 2415 |
R2 | 0.442 | 0.439 | 0.440 |
Variable | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) |
---|---|---|---|
Full Sample | CEO for Male Group | CEO for Women Group | |
COE | 1.113 ** | 0.987 * | 1.856 *** |
(0.363) | (0.466) | (0.483) | |
Constant term | 2.138 | 2.799 | 65.597 ** |
(8.698) | (9.543) | (28.109) | |
CN | Yes | Yes | Yes |
YR | Yes | Yes | Yes |
IT | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3009 | 2825 | 184 |
R2 | 0.442 | 0.320 | 0.364 |
Variable | Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) |
---|---|---|---|
Full Sample | Master’s Degree or Above Group | Below Master’s Degree Group | |
COE | 1.113 ** | 1.334 *** | 0.281 |
(0.363) | (0.383) | (0.205) | |
Constant term | 2.138 | –10.471 | –1.728 |
(8.698) | (6.198) | (10.753) | |
CN | Yes | Yes | Yes |
YR | Yes | Yes | Yes |
IT | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 3009 | 1770 | 1239 |
R2 | 0.442 | 0.438 | 0.403 |
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Xu, Z.; Hou, J. Effects of CEO Overseas Experience on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies. Sustainability 2021, 13, 5335. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13105335
Xu Z, Hou J. Effects of CEO Overseas Experience on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies. Sustainability. 2021; 13(10):5335. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13105335
Chicago/Turabian StyleXu, Zhaocheng, and Jingchuan Hou. 2021. "Effects of CEO Overseas Experience on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies" Sustainability 13, no. 10: 5335. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13105335
APA StyleXu, Z., & Hou, J. (2021). Effects of CEO Overseas Experience on Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Listed Companies. Sustainability, 13(10), 5335. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13105335