Busting the ‘Princeling’? Demystifying the Effect of Corporate Depoliticization on Green Innovation: The Moderating Effect of Politician Turnover
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. The China’s Anticorruption Shocks and Corporate Depoliticization
2.2. Corporate Depoliticization and Green Innovation
2.3. The Moderating Effect of Politician Turnover
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Data Collection
3.2. Measurements
3.3. Econometric Specifications
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis
4.2. Baseline Regression Test
4.3. Robustness Test
4.4. PSM Test
4.5. Heckman Two-Stage Model Analysis
4.6. DID Model Analysis
4.7. Further Analysis
5. Conclusions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 green | 1 | ||||||||||||
2 depoliticization | 0.016 | 1 | |||||||||||
3 turnover | 0.016 | 0.006 | 1 | ||||||||||
4 uncertainty | 0.029 ** | 0.194 *** | 0.150 *** | 1 | |||||||||
5 top | −0.006 | −0.105 *** | 0.004 | −0.043 *** | 1 | ||||||||
6 duality | −0.009 | 0.186 *** | −0.002 | 0.040 *** | −0.042 *** | 1 | |||||||
7 independence | 0.033 ** | 0.009 | −0.008 | 0.011 | 0.042 *** | −0.072 *** | 1 | ||||||
8 size | 0.156 *** | 0.079 *** | 0.028* | 0.195 *** | 0.084 *** | 0.104 *** | −0.028 * | 1 | |||||
9 slack | −0.043 *** | −0.075 *** | 0.003 | −0.071 *** | 0.123 *** | −0.017 | −0.013 | −0.253 *** | 1 | ||||
10 roa | 0.011 | −0.064 *** | −0.005 | −0.032 ** | 0.147 *** | −0.002 | 0 | 0.038 *** | 0.104 *** | 1 | |||
11 competition | −0.01 | −0.029 ** | −0.018 | −0.111 *** | 0.097 *** | 0.041 *** | 0.002 | 0.036 ** | −0.048 *** | −0.048 *** | 1 | ||
12 listage | −0.028 * | 0.162 *** | −0.001 | 0.098 *** | −0.327 *** | 0.091 *** | 0.011 | 0.308 *** | −0.241 *** | −0.099 *** | −0.002 | 1 | |
13 region | 0.023 | −0.038 *** | 0.008 | 0.015 | 0.061 *** | −0.004 | 0.053 *** | −0.002 | 0.015 | 0.013 | 0.019 | −0.176 *** | 1 |
Mean | 1.343 | 0.358 | 0.31 | 229.196 | 48.346 | 0.551 | 0.377 | 21.767 | 3.03 | 0.043 | 0.432 | 6.966 | 0.714 |
SD | 8.423 | 0.479 | 0.462 | 104.955 | 15.4 | 0.497 | 0.056 | 1.188 | 3.785 | 0.089 | 0.19 | 6.281 | 0.452 |
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | |
uncertainty | −0.0005 *** | −0.0030 | −0.0002 | −3.00 | −0.0007 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0002 | −3.99 | −0.0007 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0007 *** | −4.24 |
top | −0.0038 | −0.2010 | −0.0030 | −1.28 | −0.00506 * | −0.0880 | −0.0030 | −1.71 | −0.0032 | −0.2860 | −0.0032 | −1.07 |
duality | 0.110 *** | −0.0080 | −0.0414 | −2.6700 | 0.0883 ** | −0.0340 | −0.0416 | −2.1200 | 0.0863 ** | −0.0390 | 0.0863 ** | −2.0700 |
independence | 3.074 *** | 0.0000 | −0.3160 | −9.7200 | 3.193 *** | 0.0000 | −0.3160 | −10.1000 | 3.391 *** | 0.0000 | 3.391 *** | −10.5900 |
size | 0.161 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0392 | −4.1100 | 0.180 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0394 | −4.5700 | 0.230 *** | 0.0000 | 0.230 *** | −5.7600 |
slack | 0.0454 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0104 | −4.3600 | 0.0460 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0105 | −4.4000 | 0.0445 *** | 0.0000 | 0.0445 *** | −4.2500 |
roa | −0.619 *** | −0.0070 | −0.2300 | −2.69 | −0.674 *** | −0.0050 | −0.2400 | −2.81 | −0.814 *** | −0.0010 | −0.814 *** | −3.27 |
competition | −0.946 *** | 0.0000 | −0.2680 | −3.53 | −0.956 *** | 0.0000 | −0.2670 | −3.58 | −0.749 *** | −0.0050 | −0.749 *** | −2.80 |
listage | 0.115 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0126 | −9.1000 | 0.0917 *** | 0.0000 | −0.0129 | −7.1100 | 0.0917 *** | 0.0000 | 0.0917 *** | −7.1100 |
region | 0.3510 | −0.1160 | −0.2230 | −1.5700 | 0.3050 | −0.1660 | −0.2200 | −1.3900 | 0.3140 | −0.1510 | 0.3140 | −1.4400 |
turnover | 0.0153 | −0.5830 | −0.0278 | −0.5500 | 0.0130 | −0.6410 | −0.0279 | −0.4700 | −0.0312 | −0.2780 | −0.0312 | −1.09 |
depoliticization | 0.259*** | 0.0000 | −0.0379 | −6.8400 | 0.230*** | 0.0000 | 0.230 *** | −6.0000 | ||||
depoliticization × turnover | 0.494 *** | 0.0000 | 0.494*** | −8.6200 | ||||||||
constant | −4.608 *** | 0.0000 | −4.907 *** | 0.0000 | −6.180 *** | 0.0000 | −6.180 *** | −6.66 | ||||
lnalpha | 2.197 *** | 0.0000 | 2.168 *** | 0.0000 | 2.148 *** | 0.0000 | 2.148 *** | −32.0000 | ||||
observations | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 |
Model 4 | Model 5 | Model 6 | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | |
uncertainty | −0.000455 ** | −0.013 | 0.000 | −2.480 | −0.000630 *** | −0.001 | 0.000 | −3.410 | −0.000709 *** | 0.000 | 0.000 | −3.830 |
top | −0.002 | −0.586 | −0.003 | −0.550 | −0.002 | −0.465 | −0.003 | −0.730 | 0.001 | −0.796 | −0.003 | −0.260 |
duality | 0.0824 * | −0.056 | −0.043 | −1.910 | 0.056 | −0.196 | −0.044 | −1.290 | 0.054 | −0.214 | −0.044 | −1.240 |
independence | 3.201 *** | 0.000 | −0.323 | −9.920 | 3.324 *** | 0.000 | −0.322 | −10.320 | 3.572 *** | 0.000 | −0.327 | −10.920 |
size | 0.117 *** | −0.003 | −0.040 | −2.960 | 0.137 *** | −0.001 | −0.040 | −3.430 | 0.190 *** | 0.000 | −0.041 | −4.710 |
slack | 0.0463 *** | 0.000 | −0.011 | −4.300 | 0.0465 *** | 0.000 | −0.011 | −4.300 | 0.0448 *** | 0.000 | −0.011 | −4.130 |
roa | −0.597 *** | −0.009 | −0.228 | −2.630 | −0.654 *** | −0.006 | −0.239 | −2.740 | −0.843 *** | −0.001 | −0.250 | −3.370 |
competition | −1.189 ** | −0.029 | −0.545 | −2.180 | −1.303 ** | −0.016 | −0.539 | −2.410 | −0.979 * | −0.069 | −0.539 | −1.820 |
listage | 0.132 *** | 0.000 | −0.013 | −10.230 | 0.108 *** | 0.000 | −0.013 | −8.180 | 0.108 *** | 0.000 | −0.013 | −8.180 |
region | 0.383 * | −0.092 | −0.227 | −1.680 | 0.324 | −0.148 | −0.224 | −1.450 | 0.327 | −0.140 | −0.222 | −1.470 |
turnover | 0.011 | −0.697 | −0.028 | −0.390 | 0.011 | −0.688 | −0.028 | −0.400 | −0.038 | −0.202 | −0.029 | −1.270 |
depoliticization | 0.267 *** | 0.000 | −0.039 | −6.940 | 0.237 *** | 0.000 | −0.039 | −6.110 | ||||
depoliticization × turnover | 0.517 *** | 0.000 | −0.058 | −8.890 | ||||||||
constant | −4.172 *** | 0.000 | −0.917 | −4.550 | −4.518 *** | 0.000 | −0.918 | −4.920 | −5.874 *** | 0.000 | −0.932 | −6.310 |
lnalpha | 2.221 *** | 0.000 | −0.067 | −33.000 | 2.190 *** | 0.000 | −0.068 | −32.360 | 2.170 *** | 0.000 | −0.068 | −32.110 |
observations | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 | 4539 |
Depoliticization | Coef. | SE | Z | p > z | [95% Conf. | Interval] |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
turnover | −0.1002 | 0.0693 | −1.4500 | 0.1480 | −0.2361 | 0.0356 |
uncertainty | 0.0037 | 0.0003 | 11.7700 | 0.0000 | 0.0031 | 0.0043 |
top | −0.0069 | 0.0023 | −3.0500 | 0.0020 | −0.0113 | −0.0025 |
duality | 0.7792 | 0.0655 | 11.9000 | 0.0000 | 0.6508 | 0.9075 |
independence | 0.8540 | 0.5682 | 1.5000 | 0.1330 | −0.2597 | 1.9677 |
size | −0.0112 | 0.0294 | −0.3800 | 0.7040 | −0.0689 | 0.0465 |
slack | −0.0227 | 0.0107 | −2.1300 | 0.0330 | −0.0436 | −0.0018 |
roa | −1.0173 | 0.4149 | −2.4500 | 0.0140 | −1.8305 | −0.2041 |
competition | −0.2059 | 0.1705 | −1.2100 | 0.2270 | −0.5400 | 0.1282 |
listage | 0.0345 | 0.0057 | 6.0400 | 0.0000 | 0.0233 | 0.0457 |
region | −0.0976 | 0.0708 | −1.3800 | 0.1680 | −0.2363 | 0.0411 |
_cons | −1.5980 | 0.6599 | −2.4200 | 0.0150 | −2.8914 | −0.3047 |
Log likelihood | −2899.3662 | |||||
Number of obs | 4796.0000 | |||||
LR chi2(11) | 457.7700 | |||||
Prob > chi2 | 0.0000 | |||||
Pseudo R2 | 0.0732 |
Variable | Unmatched | Mean | %Reduct | t-Test | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Matched | Treated | Control | %Bias | Bias | t | p > t | |
turnover | U | 0.31552 | 0.31229 | 0.7 | 0.21 | 0.835 | |
M | 0.31552 | 0.31314 | 0.5 | 26.5 | 0.15 | 0.883 | |
uncertainty | U | 251.35 | 233.73 | 16.8 | 5.02 | 0 | |
M | 251.35 | 257.85 | −6.2 | 63.1 | −1.77 | 0.077 | |
top | U | 46.624 | 47.952 | −8.8 | −2.61 | 0.009 | |
M | 46.624 | 46.101 | 3.4 | 60.6 | 0.99 | 0.32 | |
duality | U | 0.65871 | 0.58003 | 16.3 | 4.85 | 0 | |
M | 0.65871 | 0.67463 | −3.3 | 79.8 | −0.97 | 0.332 | |
independence | U | 0.37783 | 0.37862 | −1.4 | −0.41 | 0.678 | |
M | 0.37783 | 0.3794 | −2.8 | −99.7 | −0.79 | 0.427 | |
size | U | 21.868 | 21.792 | 6.3 | 1.88 | 0.061 | |
M | 21.868 | 21.901 | −2.7 | 56.7 | −0.72 | 0.472 | |
slack | U | 2.6862 | 2.79 | −3.5 | −1.05 | 0.293 | |
M | 2.6862 | 2.5596 | 4.3 | −22 | 1.32 | 0.186 | |
roa | U | 0.03568 | 0.0425 | −9.7 | −2.91 | 0.004 | |
M | 0.03568 | 0.03833 | −3.7 | 61.2 | −1.09 | 0.274 | |
competition | U | 0.42898 | 0.42982 | −0.4 | −0.13 | 0.893 | |
M | 0.42898 | 0.42272 | 3.4 | −647.8 | 0.97 | 0.33 | |
listage | U | 8.1728 | 7.0548 | 17.7 | 5.28 | 0 | |
M | 8.1728 | 8.1629 | 0.2 | 99.1 | 0.04 | 0.965 | |
region | U | 0.69642 | 0.7161 | −4.3 | −1.29 | 0.196 | |
M | 0.69642 | 0.69229 | 0.9 | 79 | 0.26 | 0.797 |
Model 7 | Model 8 | Model 9 | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | |
uncertainty | −0.00138 *** | 0.000 | 0.000 | −5.800 | −0.00128 *** | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | −0.00130 *** | 0.000 | −5.410 | −5.510 |
top | −0.00339 | −0.344 | −0.00358 | −0.95 | −0.00323 | −0.363 | −0.00355 | −0.00356 | −0.00199 | −0.576 | −0.91 | −0.56 |
duality | 0.143 *** | −0.007 | −0.0535 | −2.68 | 0.150 *** | −0.005 | −0.0537 | −0.0541 | 0.136 ** | −0.012 | −2.8 | −2.52 |
independence | 2.424 *** | 0.000 | −0.343 | −7.06 | 2.836 *** | 0.000 | −0.35 | −0.357 | 3.152 *** | 0.000 | −8.1 | −8.82 |
size | 0.134 *** | −0.004 | −0.0465 | −2.88 | 0.147 *** | −0.002 | −0.0471 | −0.0473 | 0.183 *** | 0.000 | −3.13 | −3.87 |
slack | 0.0397 ** | −0.014 | −0.0162 | −2.45 | 0.0400 ** | −0.015 | −0.0164 | −0.0164 | 0.0383 ** | −0.019 | −2.44 | −2.34 |
roa | −0.630 ** | −0.025 | −0.281 | −2.24 | −0.604 ** | −0.037 | −0.29 | −0.304 | −0.772 ** | −0.011 | −2.08 | −2.54 |
competition | −0.694 ** | −0.047 | −0.349 | −1.99 | −0.731 ** | −0.034 | −0.345 | −0.345 | −0.606 * | −0.079 | −2.12 | −1.76 |
listage | 0.135 *** | 0.000 | −0.0151 | −8.95 | 0.102 *** | 0.000 | −0.0155 | −0.0154 | 0.100 *** | 0.000 | −6.6 | −6.5 |
region | 0.339 | −0.164 | −0.244 | −1.39 | 0.257 | −0.280 | −0.238 | −0.235 | 0.264 | −0.262 | −1.08 | −1.12 |
turnover | 0.121 *** | 0.000 | −0.0344 | −3.51 | 0.113 *** | −0.001 | −0.0343 | −0.0386 | 0.002 | −0.959 | −3.29 | −0.05 |
depoliticization | 0.352 *** | 0.000 | −0.0486 | −0.0487 | 0.342 *** | 0.000 | −7.24 | −7.01 | ||||
depoliticization × turnover | −0.0702 | 0.473 *** | 0.000 | −6.74 | ||||||||
constant | −3.719 *** | 0.000 | −1.068 | −3.48 | −4.166 *** | 0.000 | −1.075 | −1.08 | −5.034 *** | 0.000 | −3.88 | −4.66 |
lnalpha | 2.296 *** | 0.000 | −0.0723 | −31.76 | 2.247 *** | 0.000 | −0.0729 | −0.0728 | 2.227 *** | 0.000 | −30.85 | −30.6 |
observations | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 | 3634 |
DV = CER Dummy | Duality | Independence | Size | Growth | Roa | Listage | Cons |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef. | 0.0686 | −0.4128 | 0.3009 | −0.0425 | −0.3451 | −0.0626 | −6.8796 |
Std. Err. | 0.0435 | 0.3933 | 0.0217 | 0.0199 | 0.3128 | 0.0045 | 0.4900 |
Z | 1.58 | −1.05 | 13.82 | −2.13 | −1.1 | −13.82 | −14.04 |
p > z | 0.115 | 0.294 | 0 | 0.033 | 0.27 | 0 | 0 |
Model 11 | Model 12 | Model 13 | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | |
uncertainty | −0.000583 *** | −0.001 | −0.000183 | −3.18 | −0.000781 *** | 0.000 | −0.000185 | −4.22 | −0.000825 *** | 0.000 | −0.000185 | −4.45 |
top | −0.00363 | −0.223 | −0.00297 | −1.22 | −0.00485 | −0.102 | −0.00296 | −1.64 | −0.003 | −0.314 | −0.00298 | −1.01 |
duality | 0.0201 | −0.715 | −0.0549 | −0.37 | −0.0247 | −0.663 | −0.0568 | −0.44 | −0.0201 | −0.726 | −0.0572 | −0.35 |
independence | 3.578 *** | 0.000 | −0.375 | −9.53 | 3.827 *** | 0.000 | −0.384 | −9.97 | 3.992 *** | 0.000 | −0.39 | −10.25 |
size | −0.209 | −0.171 | −0.153 | −1.37 | −0.282 * | −0.083 | −0.162 | −1.73 | −0.204 | −0.213 | −0.164 | −1.25 |
slack | 0.0445 *** | 0.000 | −0.0104 | −4.26 | 0.0449 *** | 0.000 | −0.0105 | −4.28 | 0.0434 *** | 0.000 | −0.0105 | −4.13 |
roa | −0.104 | −0.735 | −0.307 | −0.34 | −0.0372 | −0.908 | −0.322 | −0.12 | −0.217 | −0.511 | −0.33 | −0.66 |
competition | −0.894 *** | −0.001 | −0.27 | −3.31 | −0.891 *** | −0.001 | −0.269 | −3.31 | −0.689 ** | −0.011 | −0.27 | −2.55 |
listage | 0.197 *** | 0.000 | −0.0353 | −5.58 | 0.194 *** | 0.000 | −0.0373 | −5.21 | 0.188 *** | 0.000 | −0.0376 | −5 |
region | 0.369 | −0.100 | −0.224 | −1.64 | 0.322 | −0.146 | −0.221 | −1.46 | 0.324 | −0.139 | −0.219 | −1.48 |
mills | −1.622 ** | −0.012 | −0.648 | −2.5 | −2.022 *** | −0.003 | −0.691 | −2.93 | −1.899 *** | −0.006 | −0.698 | −2.72 |
turnover | 0.0165 | −0.553 | −0.0279 | −0.59 | 0.0145 | −0.603 | −0.0279 | −0.52 | −0.0295 | −0.305 | −0.0288 | −1.03 |
depoliticization | 0.269 *** | 0.000 | −0.0381 | −7.06 | 0.239 *** | 0.000 | −0.0384 | −6.22 | ||||
depoliticization × turnover | 0.489 *** | 0.000 | −0.0573 | −8.54 | ||||||||
constant | 5.078 | −0.201 | −3.974 | −1.28 | 7.169 * | −0.090 | −4.222 | −1.7 | 5.184 | −0.225 | −4.269 | −1.21 |
lnalpha | 2.204 *** | 0.000 | −0.0671 | −32.85 | 2.176 *** | 0.000 | −0.0674 | −32.27 | 2.155 *** | 0.000 | −0.0673 | −32.01 |
observations | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 |
Model 14 | Model 15 | Model 16 | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | |
uncertainty | −0.000549 *** | −0.003 | −0.000183 | (−3.00) | −0.000851 *** | 0.000 | −0.000188 | (−4.53) | −0.000870 *** | 0.000 | −0.000188 | (−4.62) |
top | −0.0038 | −0.201 | −0.00297 | (−1.28) | −0.00465 | −0.116 | −0.00296 | (−1.57) | −0.00283 | −0.343 | −0.00298 | (−0.95) |
duality | 0.110 *** | −0.008 | −0.0414 | −2.67 | 0.0848 ** | −0.041 | −0.0415 | −2.04 | 0.0893 ** | −0.032 | −0.0415 | −2.15 |
independence | 3.074 *** | 0.000 | −0.316 | −9.72 | 3.170 *** | 0.000 | −0.315 | −10.06 | 3.226 *** | 0.000 | −0.318 | −10.14 |
size | 0.161 *** | 0.000 | −0.0392 | −4.11 | 0.174 *** | 0.000 | −0.0394 | −4.42 | 0.219 *** | 0.000 | −0.0399 | −5.48 |
slack | 0.0454 *** | 0.000 | −0.0104 | −4.36 | 0.0452 *** | 0.000 | −0.0104 | −4.34 | 0.0436 *** | 0.000 | −0.0104 | −4.19 |
roa | −0.619 *** | −0.007 | −0.23 | (−2.69) | −0.678 *** | −0.005 | −0.241 | (−2.81) | −0.798 *** | −0.001 | −0.248 | (−3.22) |
competition | −0.946 *** | 0.000 | −0.268 | (−3.53) | −0.988 *** | 0.000 | −0.267 | (−3.70) | −0.830 *** | −0.002 | −0.268 | (−3.10) |
listage | 0.115 *** | 0.000 | −0.0126 | −9.1 | 0.105 *** | 0.000 | −0.0126 | −8.35 | 0.102 *** | 0.000 | −0.0126 | −8.13 |
region | 0.351 | −0.116 | −0.223 | −1.57 | 0.309 | −0.166 | −0.223 | −1.39 | 0.312 | −0.158 | −0.22 | −1.41 |
turnover | 0.0153 | −0.583 | −0.0278 | −0.55 | 0.0136 | −0.626 | −0.0279 | −0.49 | −0.0406 | −0.166 | −0.0293 | (−1.39) |
depoliticization × 2013_post | 0.263 *** | 0.000 | −0.0389 | −6.76 | 0.239 *** | 0.000 | −0.0393 | −6.1 | ||||
depoliticization × 2013_post × turnover | 0.444 *** | 0.000 | −0.0623 | −7.13 | ||||||||
constant | −4.608 *** | 0.000 | −0.915 | (−5.04) | −4.698 *** | 0.000 | −0.917 | (−5.12) | −5.872 *** | 0.000 | −0.93 | (−6.32) |
lnalpha | 2.197 *** | 0.000 | −0.0669 | −32.84 | 2.187 *** | 0.000 | −0.0669 | −32.69 | 2.165 *** | 0.000 | −0.0669 | −32.35 |
observations | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 |
Model 17 | Model 18 | Model 19 | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | Coef | p | SE | Z | |
uncertainty | −0.000386 ** | −0.035 | −0.000183 | −2.11 | −0.000578 *** | −0.002 | −0.000184 | −3.41 | −0.000630 *** | −0.001 | −0.000185 | −3.41 |
top | −0.00321 | −0.285 | −0.003 | −1.07 | −0.00446 | −0.136 | −0.00299 | −0.88 | −0.00266 | −0.378 | −0.00301 | −0.88 |
duality | 0.118 *** | −0.004 | −0.0416 | −2.84 | 0.0955 ** | −0.023 | −0.0419 | −2.13 | 0.0895 ** | −0.033 | −0.042 | −2.13 |
independence | 2.876 *** | 0.000 | −0.322 | −8.92 | 3.009 *** | 0.000 | −0.322 | −9.87 | 3.217 *** | 0.000 | −0.326 | −9.87 |
size | 0.165 *** | 0.000 | −0.0394 | −4.19 | 0.183 *** | 0.000 | −0.0396 | −5.79 | 0.232 *** | 0.000 | −0.0401 | −5.79 |
slack | 0.0500 *** | 0.000 | −0.0107 | −4.69 | 0.0510 *** | 0.000 | −0.0107 | −4.6 | 0.0496*** | 0.000 | −0.0108 | −4.6 |
roa | −0.564 ** | −0.013 | −0.227 | −2.48 | −0.615 *** | −0.009 | −0.236 | −3.06 | −0.751 *** | −0.002 | −0.245 | −3.06 |
competition | −0.987 *** | 0.000 | −0.273 | −3.61 | −0.981 *** | 0.000 | −0.272 | −2.85 | −0.776 *** | −0.004 | −0.273 | −2.85 |
listage | 0.0881 *** | 0.000 | −0.0129 | −6.83 | 0.0659 *** | 0.000 | −0.0131 | −5.07 | 0.0661 *** | 0.000 | −0.013 | −5.07 |
region | 0.34 | −0.120 | −0.219 | −1.55 | 0.296 | −0.170 | −0.216 | −1.43 | 0.306 | −0.153 | −0.214 | −1.43 |
regulation | −0.332 *** | 0.000 | −0.0508 | −6.54 | −0.333 *** | 0.000 | −0.0504 | −6.61 | −0.332 *** | 0.000 | −0.0502 | −6.61 |
turnover | 0.0184 | −0.509 | −0.0278 | −0.66 | 0.016 | −0.564 | −0.0278 | −0.97 | −0.028 | −0.331 | −0.0288 | −0.97 |
depoliticization | 0.261 *** | 0.000 | −0.0378 | −6.05 | 0.231 *** | 0.000 | −0.0382 | −6.05 | ||||
depoliticization × turnover | −8.63 | 0.494 *** | 0.000 | −0.0572 | −8.63 | |||||||
constant | −4.586 *** | 0.000 | −0.914 | −5.02 | −4.871 *** | 0.000 | −0.914 | −6.62 | −6.129 *** | 0.000 | −0.926 | −6.62 |
lnalpha | 2.146 *** | 0.000 | −0.0674 | −31.83 | 2.120 *** | 0.000 | −0.0675 | −31.11 | 2.099 *** | 0.000 | −0.0675 | −31.11 |
observations | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 | 4576 |
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Tang, F. Busting the ‘Princeling’? Demystifying the Effect of Corporate Depoliticization on Green Innovation: The Moderating Effect of Politician Turnover. Sustainability 2021, 13, 9756. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13179756
Tang F. Busting the ‘Princeling’? Demystifying the Effect of Corporate Depoliticization on Green Innovation: The Moderating Effect of Politician Turnover. Sustainability. 2021; 13(17):9756. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13179756
Chicago/Turabian StyleTang, Fei. 2021. "Busting the ‘Princeling’? Demystifying the Effect of Corporate Depoliticization on Green Innovation: The Moderating Effect of Politician Turnover" Sustainability 13, no. 17: 9756. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13179756