IMO’s Marine Environmental Regulatory Governance and China’s Role: An Empirical Study of China’s Submissions

Abstract

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) plays a significant role in global marine environmental governance, providing a forum of regulatory oversight for member states. Member states are the main actors of the IMO and exert considerable influence on the process of lawmaking. Among these member states, China is unique due to its multiple identities. There are various factors influencing interests behind China’s multiple identities, which fully engage the country in various shipping and maritime trade activities. This article examines China’s role in the IMO marine environmental regulatory governance. It identifies the impact of China on global ocean governance and indicates the development and reforms in the global governance system. China enacted the China Ocean Agenda 21 for its strategy of ocean development. Thus, China is the object of study in this examination of empirical research that collects submissions from 2001 to 2020 related to marine environmental governance. The findings reveal that the extent to which China participates in such governance has considerably increased, and although the contribution of China’s submissions is still in development, its role in the IMO is no longer merely that of a follower, and the efforts of the country have had a positive influence on the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance, including its legal instruments.

1. Introduction

Shipping accounts for nearly 75% of international trade by volume [1]. The marine environment is deeply affected by shipping activities, in particular, vessel-source pollution [2]. Two types of vessel-source pollution affect the marine environment, voluntary and accidental. Dumping and discharging pollution, the most common source, constitutes voluntary pollution, while spilling is a source of involuntary or accidental pollution [3]. On 21 April 2021, the United Nations issued the Second World Ocean Assessment, a comprehensive evaluation of global oceans from an economic, societal, and environmental perspective. The report indicated that joint efforts by states and international organizations mitigated pollution from traditional vessel sources to a certain extent, including accidental spills and waste dumping. According to the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (2019), the average number of annual spills between 2009 and 2018 was 6.4, while that for the period of 1990 to 1999 was 35.8. In 2011, 0.6 million tons of sewage sludge was dumped, falling to only 0.00041 million tons in 2016. Organic and inorganic waste dumping also declined from 3.82248 million tons (2011) to 1.229620 million tons (2016) [4].

However, with the development of enhanced shipbuilding technology and increased shipping activity, new challenges are emerging in marine environmental governance. The first problem results from discharged ballast water and its harmful effect on biological ecosystems. Although ballast water is beneficial in stabilizing ships for safety, local aquatic species and pathogens inside the discharged water are transported to other areas, harming their ecosystems and diversity, resulting in grave socioeconomic consequences [5]. The second problem stems from climate change and air pollution triggered by the emission of sulfur and NOx. Carbon dioxide emissions from the global maritime industry rose by 8% between 2014 and 2019, per the latest analysis by Marine Benchmark [6]. Air pollution from ship emissions is a hot topic on an anvil in contemporary society. The burning of heavy fuel oil (HFO) emits black carbon, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and greenhouse gases (GHGs), thereby aggravating global warming [7]. Specifically, it results in enormous damage to the highly vulnerable Arctic environment ecosystems. Black carbon emissions and the introduction of alien species in the Arctic Ocean from ships threaten the Arctic environment and intensifies the necessity of environmental protection [8]. The next problem emanates from the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic. Because of the global pandemic, the number of port state control (PSC) inspections decreased dramatically. Meanwhile, the risk of ships violating applicable conventions increases, posing an environmental threat. These emerging issues demand enhanced global governance over the marine environment.

The International Maritime Organization is known as “the organization that has probably had the most substantial direct effect upon the law of the sea.” [9]. Its governance structure is composed of the assembly, the council, and five main technical committees. The IMO plays a significant role in governing the global marine environment. As a specialized agency of the United Nations, its purpose is to promote technical cooperation in shipping among the states, encourage shipping safety, enhance the efficiency of shipping navigation, and prevent marine vessels from polluting the oceans [10]. Regulatory governance is a way of governing by employing legal instruments. The role of the IMO in regulatory governance and the dimensions of marine regulatory governance concerning legislative, institutional, and executional aspects are profound [11]. Regulatory governance was featured using legal regulations and institutions, and the current regulatory governance of the IMO is based on international instruments, numerous codes, and guidelines [12]. To ensure the smooth implementation of these legal instruments, the IMO also plays a supervisory role in governing marine environmental regulations.

The Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) is one of the most important committees of the IMO, and it is responsible for protecting the marine environment. It is composed of all member states and convenes at least once a year. The MEPC is equipped to enact or enhance legal instruments concerning marine environmental protection and is heavily engaged in promoting the implementation of these instruments. In particular, some legal documents that the MEPC has developed are submitted to the council, including proposals, recommendations, guidelines, and reports [13]. At present, the IMO’s binding treaties related to the marine environment have come into effect, which effectively regulates vessel-source pollution. In addition, the MEPC and Marine Safety Committee (MSC) possess their own subcommittees to deal with specific matters. Several subcommittees are directly or indirectly associated with marine environmental governance, such as the Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response(PPR), the Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers(CCC), and the Sub-Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments(III). Member states present submissions to these subcommittees, and then the reports made by the subcommittees are referred to the MEPC or MSC for consideration.

The IMO primarily consists of 174 member states and three associated members (Hong Kong, Macau, and the Faroe Islands). In formulating legal instruments, the member states can put forward new submissions, revise existing laws, and discuss any issues related to international shipping before referral to the IMO, which makes further recommendations to the member states for the adoption of legal instruments. When it comes to the IMO implementing and enforcing these instruments, compliance of the flag state is essential to achieve effective regulatory governance, and PSC inspection provides a significant guarantee. The member states of the IMO are divided into coastal states, port states, and flag states, or they are divided into developed, developing, and least developed states based on different standards [14]. Some member states possess various kinds of status and also actively participate in various kinds of shipping and maritime activities, such as China. Due to its particularity, studying the role of China in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance is meaningful to indicate various factors behind China’s multiple identities. The study can also explain how the periodical change of China’s submissions influences the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance.

China has been fully engaged in various shipping and maritime activities according to the Review of maritime transport annually released by the United Nations Conferences on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). As a council member of IMO, classified A, China has the world’s second-largest economy. It is both a large flag state and a major port state in addition to being a coastal state with a long coastline of 18,000 km as well. Between 2006 and 2010, China ranked fourth in the world top ten countries’ (or regions’) scale of fleet. Then, China ranked third in the period between 2012 and 2017. In 2019, China had a fleet of 296.4 million deadweight tonnages, accounting for 15.1% of the world’s fleet, and was ranked second in the world. In terms of port transport, cargo throughput in China between 2005 and 2019 shows an increasing trend, which varies from 485388 ten thousand tons to 139.51 million tons, and container throughput in the same period was from 7564 ten thousand TEU to 2.61 million TEU (20 feet equivalent unit) [15]. The initiative of “the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative” by China indicates its emphasis on the international shipping economy, which possesses the potential for achieving broader and deeper shipping economic cooperation [16]. Recently, China has been active in the IMO practice of marine environmental lawmaking. China engages in regulating specific areas of the marine environment through the MEPC and relevant submissions, aiming at reducing GHG emissions, governing polar environments, and applying remote PSC during the pandemic.

Based on the introduction above, the key aim of the study is to investigate the role of China in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. Marine environmental protection is gaining more attention in the 21st century, and Agenda 21 was made by UNCTED for the better implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In order to keep up with Agenda 21, China enacted the China Ocean Agenda 21 for its strategy of ocean development [17]. Thus, the article selected the period between 2001 and 2020. To realize this research purpose, a case study of China is carried out to conduct an empirical analysis of the country’s submissions to the MEPC and some other subcommittees related to marine environment protection between 2001 and 2020, providing an answer to the question regarding whether the member states influence the lawmaking process of the IMO. In order to find out the answer to the foregoing question, it is necessary to conduct a literature review for summarizing relative previous research and adopting a proper methodology for credible research results. During the application of research methods, quantitative analysis helps explore the degree of China’s participation, while the qualitative analysis facilitates the study about the extent of submissions’ acceptance on the IMO forum. Therefore, the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is a literature review regarding research achievement related to essential issues, which provides the development of interactive relations among the IMO, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and states. Section 3 briefly introduces the research methodology regarding China’s submissions by way of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Section 4 scrutinizes China’s influence during different periods, considering background factors of policies and the economy, as well as actor-oriented factors of its changing role in global governance, various behaviors of presenting submissions and finalizes China’s implementation and consolidation of marine environmental regulatory control. Section 5 presents the conclusion.

2. Literature Review

This study focuses on the relationship between the states and the IMO in the aspect of marine environmental regulatory governance, particularly the states’ influence on regulation formulation, promotion, and enforcement of marine environmental governance on the platform of the IMO. After consulting the databases, including HeinOnlion, Wiley, Taylor & Francis, EBSCO, and ScienceDirect, the paper classified previous research into three topics: (1) global environmental governance and the international rule of law at sea, (2) the functions and methods of the IMO’s regulatory governance, and (3) states’ role (China as a case study) in regulatory governance by IMO.

2.1. The Role of the IMO on Global Marine Environmental Governance and the International Rule of Law at Sea

Our goal is to indicate the influence of the IMO on global marine governance and the international rule of law at sea in this process, especially the relationship between UNCLOS and the IMO. The essence of the current study is the interaction between global governance and the international rule of law. Therefore, the terms in title “global marine governance”, “international rule of law”, “law of the sea”, and “IMO and UNCLO” are selected as search objects thereof. After a thorough database search, the major research of articles was found to differ in different periods. In the early stages, the research focus shifts from “global marine governance” to the study on the “international rule of law at sea” and “IMO marine environmental governance.” Subsequently, with the formulation and promotion of UNCLOS, research interests include the formation and development of UNCLOS. In recent years, the relationship between UNCLOS and the IMO has been a major research focus. Among these studies, those conducted by Tanaka, Y. and Rothwell, R. D. are highly cited. Because of the high quote rate, their research studies underpin the future development of the IMO and UNCLOS. Considering the limited space of the article, the literature highly relevant to and representative of the research focus is selected. In order to comment on the literature, it is necessary to conduct an analysis of the relevant studies.

The international rule of law is an essential mechanism in global governance, where ocean governance plays a critical role. The law provides the “parameters or minimum thresholds” for governance and helps to achieve the acceptable and minimum goals [18]. Regarding the interplay of ocean and global governance, ocean governance defines the extent and nature of global governance, and global governance makes ocean governance more meaningful [19]. The IMO is the subject of global marine environmental governance. International organizations contribute to the ends that the law pursues, building order and promoting common interests [20]. As a competent international organization, the IMO serves as a forum for representatives of its member states and observers from international non-governmental organizations concerned with shipping and environmental protection [21]. It has developed from an organization that was utterly dominated by the interests of a few maritime states to a “proactive” organization with almost universal membership aimed at improving the safety of shipping and marine environment protection [22].

The international marine rule of law is an effective structure to govern global marine environments. Global marine environmental governance requires well-functioning organizations and legal frameworks for individual countries to enforce responsible and effective marine and maritime management [23]. A holistic approach also plays a critical role in ocean governance [24]. Moreover, the core of global ocean governance is the establishment of a comprehensive and unified legal system, and UNCLOS represents the most important legal milestone in global ocean governance reform [25].

As for the relationship of UNCLOS and the IMO, Article 211(1) emphasizes the “international rules and standards” established by “States acting through the competent international organization (IMO).” [26]. UNCLOS regulated vessel-source pollution in Article 211 for two main purposes: one is that it defines the IMO as a “competent international organization,” and the other is that it establishes a jurisdictional framework for IMO [27]. In terms of legal instruments’ enforcement, the key instruments for the regulation of vessel-source marine pollution are MARPOL and the UNCLOS, which provides three regimes (regulation by flag states, coastal states, and port states) for legal instruments’ enforcement. MARPOL regulates the concrete measures adopted by the IMO [28]. In brief, some of the IMO’s mandates originate from UNCLOS, and under the framework of UNCLOS, the IMO enacts treaties and other regulatory instruments [29].

Consequently, the international marine rule of law is one of the most effective ways of achieving global marine governance, and global marine regulatory control requires a comprehensive legal system. In summary, UNCLOS provides a legal framework for the IMO to exert its authority, and the IMO makes imperative supplements for UNCLOS through its authorities.

2.2. Research on the IMO Marine Environmental Regulatory Governance Regarding Its Functions of Lawmaking

Concerning the interaction between global governance and the international rule of law, as mentioned above, good law serves as a prerequisite for the realization of good governance. This subsection focuses on the lawmaking of international organizations. Thus, “global marine lawmaking of IMO”, “IMO legal instruments”, “the structure of IMO”, and “the enforcement of IMO” are selected as objects. After a thorough search of the databases, it was noted that the study of IMO lawmaking, IMO structure, and the role of the MEPC emerged early. Then, articles regarding legal instruments of the IMO appeared. With the enhancement of IMO legal instruments, the focus of the research shifted in that direction. The studies conducted by Chircop, A., Louise de La Fayette, and Harrison, J. are highly cited and lay the basic foundation for the research on the IMO’s functions, especially the function of lawmaking. Limited by the length of the article, only nine articles with a high quote rate and highly related to the IMO environmental governance are selected as materials for this part of the literature review.

The function of marine environmental regulatory governance by the IMO is to promote the formulation and revision of marine regulations and facilitate member states’ implementation and enforcement. The IMO is successful at its task as an international lawmaking forum, providing a proper legal framework for controlling marine pollution and monitoring member states’ compliance with regulations [30]. Furthermore, it can be considered a lawmaking institution to an extent because it can promulgate and promote generally accepted international shipping standards [31]. One of the most important UNCLOS functions of the IMO is the quasi-legislative power, which regulates maritime safety and environmental impacts from ships [32].

The IMO uses hard or soft legal instruments. It enacted a series of treaty-based legal norms and rules designed to protect marine environments from pollution and determine compensation liability in the event of pollution [33]. The IMO plays a significant role in marine environmental protection by issuing nonbinding recommendations and convening diplomatic conferences for states to adopt legally binding instruments. Its functional competence relies on the specific structure of five major committees to take charge of each area of work. In some areas, the IMO has exclusive competence, such as maintaining maritime safety and preventing vessel-source pollution. As one of the IMO’s committees, the MEPC has developed treaties, codes, and guidelines for the purpose of marine environment protection, which have made an essential and valuable contribution to the progressive development of international environmental law, as well as to the law of the sea [34].

The enforcement of IMO’s legal instruments requires coordination to be conducted by member states. The implementation of convention undergoes the process from treaty to law and then to compliance [35]. In developing international regulations, the IMO is already encouraging the enforcement and implementation of existing regulations [36]. The IMO assists flag states with implementing the IMO instruments and ensures that member states comply with regulations by developing soft law resolution guidelines that are not legally binding [37].

We conclude that as the central authority of global marine environmental governance, the IMO enacts hard or soft legal instruments in its mission of regulatory management and is devoted to promoting the enforcement of its legal instruments.

2.3. Research on the States’ Role in Marine Environmental Regulatory Governance on the IMO Forum

The establishment of international organizations is endowed by the member states, and member states exert significant influence on the regimes and institutions of international organizations. This subsection highlights the role of member states in the process of international organizations’ lawmaking and selects “IMO and states” and “IMO and China” as search terms in the study. In addition, “China and GHG emissions,” “China and Arctic shipping,” and “China and the International Convention on Harmful Anti-Fouling Substances 2001, the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM Convention)” regarding China’s practice in some concrete fields, were also selected as search objects. After a thorough database search, it was found that the research starts from “the effect of IMO on states,” and then research regarding the “states’ role in IMO” appears. In terms of the role of China in the IMO, the number of articles is small. Current research focuses on specific areas, such as GHG emissions and revision of the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code). The studies conducted by Mukherjee, P. and Blanco-Bazan, A. provide fundamental materials for studying China’s role in the IMO. Finally, the literature irrelevant to the study on the states’ governance role in IMO maritime rules is excluded, and ten articles are selected for the literature review.

Before carrying out the research on the states’ role in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance, it is important to understand the relationship between states and international organizations. According to the principal–agent (PA) theory, member states, as principals, are major actors of international organizations, and international organizations are regarded as agents to balance various interests [38]. The development of states and international organizations is in the process of mutual construction. Wendt’s constructivism theory holds the view that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas, representing a holistic approach [39].

To address issues emerging at the international level, international organizations provide efficient forums, strengthen the connection among states, and enhance policies and plans for global governance [40]. As for the relationship between the IMO and its member states, the IMO provides states a forum to participate in marine environmental regulatory governance. That is, the IMO is not merely a player in international marine lawmaking but also provides member states with a stage for discussion and negotiation [41].

Member states form one factor influencing the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. The influence of states depends on the issue involved rather than its size, and critical groups tend to be shipowner states in marine governance [41]. However, developing countries showed initiative at IMO. For example, developing countries play constructive roles in the process of formulating UNCLOS [42]. In addition, flag states and port states influenced the implementation and enforcement of IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. Flag states must ensure that their ships comply with international maritime standards. Moreover, PSC performance is a compelling criterion for any flag administration assessment [43].

In relation to the IMO, China’s role within marine environmental regulatory governance is still a work in progress. Regarding the prevention of vessel-source pollution, China has been attempting to facilitate the implementation of IMO instruments by legislation, but it needs to catch up and increase its procurement of ships and technology [44]. For the reduction in GHG emissions, China is making significant efforts to alleviate GHG emissions by adopting energy conservation and efficiency measures [45]. In the past, China acted in a similar manner to that of a developing country, pursuing the development of IMO conventions. However, China is increasingly active in the governance of Arctic shipping and influences the decisions of the Arctic council after gaining observer status [46]. In managing discarded ballast water, China is suggested to transfer BWM Convention into the domestic legal system by adopting a domestic regulation [47].

The results can be summarized as follows: the IMO provides states a forum for marine environmental regulatory governance. In turn, states receive a special status that allows them to participate in the IMO’s lawmaking. However, China’s role in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory management is at an immature stage and is still developing.

2.4. Insufficiency of Current Research and Theoretical Framework

Previous research plays a fundamental role in achieving the current study’s key aim and responding to China’s active participation in various shipping and maritime trade activities. Although it is enlightening and meaningful for the present research study, several problems in previous research must be addressed. First, it emphasized the relationship between the member states and the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. However, while it uncovered how states promoted the IMO’s regulatory governance progress, it did not analyze or research China’s submissions. Therefore, the primary issue remains unsolved. Second, the literature on China’s influence on the IMO’s regulatory governance needs updating. The view holds that China’s IMO regulatory governance function is still under development, but there are no articles concerning function enhancement. Third, China participates in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance through submissions and provides materials for the IMO’s lawmaking. In terms of methodology, the empirical study method has yet to be adopted, in neglect of quantitative and qualitative analysis of China’s submissions. Therefore, the current study examines China’s submissions related to marine environmental governance on the platform of the IMO during the period of 2001–2020. On the basis of these findings, our research focuses on the role of China in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance.

3. Methodology

This section primarily introduces the research methodology, including quantitative and qualitative data analysis, and it also provides the analytical mechanism for the study of China’s submissions.

3.1. Quantitative Data Analysis

The extent to which China participates in the IMO’s marine environmental governance is reflected in the quantitative data analysis. The first method is to conduct a quantitative data analysis by describing the number and type of China’s submissions.

Collecting sufficient data is an essential step in conducting quantitative data analysis. In order to study China’s role in the IMO, the authors collected China’s submissions related to marine environmental governance between 2001 and 2020. China submitted proposals to the MEPC and several subcommittees. The data collected in full came from the official website of the IMO (docs.imo.org). The data collection scope is a significant factor in data generation. Proposals on various areas are submitted to different committees or relevant subcommittees, given that several special committees within the IMO are assisted by subcommittees. Therefore, if we want to carry out a credible empirical analysis of China’s submissions, it is crucial to identify the proposal related to the marine environment and the subcommittees that are involved in its governance.

In 2013, the IMO carried out the reconstruction of sub-committees, whose quantity is down from nine to seven. Among these sub-committees in

Table 1. Reconstruction and development of sub-committees of the International Maritime Organization.

Sub-committees of the International Maritime Organization
Current	CCC	HTW	III	NCSR	PPR	SDC	SSE
Former	DSC	STW	FSI	COMSAR/NAV	BLG	DE/FP/SLF	DE/FP/SLF

, the function of CCC and the Sub-Committee on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargos and Containers (DSC) is to regulate cargoes and containers, which may cause potential pollution. The sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (FSI), which is the predecessor of III, and III facilitate the implementation and enforcement of IMO instruments by flag states. The Sub-Committee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping relates to the elements of human, which is the predecessor of the Sub-Committee on Human Element, Training and Watchkeeping (HTW). The Sub-Committee on Radiocommunications and Search and Rescue(COMSAR) and the Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV) are both predecessors of the Sub-Committee on Navigation, Communications and Search and Rescue(NCSR) that regulates navigation for safety.

Several subcommittees assist MEPC, including the Sub-Committee on Bulk Liquids and Gases (BLG) and the Sub-Committee on Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR). BLG is the predecessor of the PPR. Member states present submissions directly connected with marine environmental governance to the MEPC, PPR, or BLG.

The function of the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment (DE) regarding ship design transformed to the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Construction (SDC). The function of DE regarding ship equipment, the Sub-Committee on fire protection (FP), the Sub-Committee on stability and load lines and on fishing vessels safety(SLF) transferred to the Sub-Committee on Ship Systems and Equipment (SSE).

From the chart of IMO’s subcommittees and its notes, it can be observed that proposals from member states to the DSC, CCC, FSL, III, or SLF are indirectly related to marine environmental governance.

After researching submissions, it was noted that there are five procedures for the quantitative analysis of the periodical change in China’s participation. In this process, the quantitative data analysis firstly identifies “the number of submissions” as a single variable and draws a histogram to demonstrate trends between year and number, which is a relatively generic reflection. According to the general trend illustrated by a histogram, the change in submission number can be divided into several periods, and the subsequent research is on the basis of different stages.

Second, it is necessary to illustrate the proportion of the number of submissions presented by China in regards to the overall number of submissions presented by states with the same category on the IMO platform. The analysis selects member states in Category A to make a parallel comparison. There is one common characteristic of member states in Category A; that is, they possess the largest interest in providing international shipping services. The parallel comparison between China and other member states in Category A using pie charts reflects the number change in China’s submissions and demonstrates China’s contribution by way of submissions in different periods.

In this paper, we conduct a descriptive analysis of China’s submissions using SPSS, including central tendency, dispersion, and nominal level measurement, in order to indicate the extent and level of China’s participation. Maximum, minimum, mean, variance, and standard deviation are used for the descriptive analysis. Among these variations, the mean represents the overall condition of the statistics level, signifying a central tendency of the data. Variance and standard deviation represent the concentration and dispersion of statistics. The descriptive analysis shows the upward trend of the number of submissions by vertical comparison between the above variations.

Specifically, in order to predict the trend of the number of submissions in the future, the analysis draws a histogram with a tendency line to reflect the extent of China’s participation in various stages. The histogram contains the average number of submissions in each stage because the average number of submissions can objectively demonstrate the condition of China’s participation in each stage. Meanwhile, there is an automatically generated tendency line in the histogram. The tendency line represents index analysis, which can predict the trend of the number of submissions.

Finally, nominal level measurement is also a method of descriptive analysis, which describes each variable categorized by different attributes [48]. There are various types of submissions, such as proposals, comments, information, and mixed proposals, which can be determined via the nominal level measurement. The percentage of each type of submission in different periods is presented in pie charts. A comment is a type of submission that is a comment on other submissions and legal instruments. Information is a submission that provides information about the implementation and enforcement of IMO instruments. Mixed submissions consist of more than one type of content. Proposals are instructive suggestions made to solve issues by states’ engagement in negotiating regarding the substance or procedural issues of legal instruments [49]. Thus, proposals have the most far-reaching impact among the submissions. The percentage of the number of proposals demonstrates the extent of China’s participation.

In general, it is helpful to present China’s initiative in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance by these five procedures of quantitative data analysis.

3.2. Qualitative Data Analysis

The extent of China’s participation in the IMO’s marine environmental governance can be revealed by the quantitative analysis shown above. However, the descriptive analysis of a single variable cannot reflect the relationship between China’s submissions and China’s role in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. To determine the adoption of China’s submissions and its impact on the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory management, the qualitative analysis of China’s adopted submissions is carried out in four procedures.

First, it is a prerequisite to analyze the condition of submission adoption, which is an important indicator that can be used to explicitly reflect China’s role in the IMO’s marine environmental governance. The whole situation of submissions’ adoption is presented in a table. The table contains the type of submission adoption and its number. China’s submissions have been adopted in four main ways: (1) agree, (2) review of the draft with consideration, (3) considered or noted, and (4) further consideration. Additionally, there is also a “refuse” option for China’s submissions. Among these types, “agree” of a submission means the submission will exert substantial influence on the lawmaking of the IMO and promote the formulation or enhancement of a resolution. The periodical number of each type generally indicates the influence of China’s submissions.

Second, the analysis presents the rate of submissions’ adoption using a line chart and compares the rates of adoption in different periods. The information in the line chart not only contains the increasing number of adopted submissions but also includes the increasing number of overall submissions. The line chart can demonstrate to what extent the number of adopted submissions occupies the whole number. A comparison made via a line chart can precisely indicate the role or limitations of China’s submissions comprehensively rather than a single variable.

China’s role in the IMO’s marine environmental governance can be identified by observing its joint submissions. It is particularly important to analyze joint proposals, as they reflect objective common interests in marine environmental management. In order to clearly present the number and contents of joint submissions, different types of charts are used in the analyses. The conditions of joint submissions for the MEPC are denoted by a diagram, and those for sub-committees are shown in the table.

Finally, the analysis uses concept mapping to identify the condition of regulations promoted by submissions, which can reflect China’s efforts and progress in the process of the IMO’s lawmaking. Concept mapping is a measurement of qualitative data analysis to consider relationships among conceptions in graphical format. A table displaying the relationships between China’s submissions and the formulation of regulations can denote whether the effect of China’s submissions on the IMO’s regulatory governance is positive.

In summary, China’s initiative and influence on the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance can be manifested by these four procedures of qualitative data analysis.

4. Results

4.1. The Periodical Change of China’s Participation in Degree

The data in Figure 1 is depicted as the number of submissions made by China in relation to marine environmental governance between 2001 and 2020. The histogram in the figure directly displays the relation between year and number and the trend in proposals. It shows that the number of submissions by China presents a periodical tendency with four phases. From 2001 to 2005, there were only a few submissions, and the annual quantitative change was stable. The number of proposals increased dramatically between 2006 and 2010; however, its overall quantity was still small. Between 2011 and 2015, the number of submissions rose further. Then, between 2016 and 2020, the number of proposals remained high, peaking in 2016.

Figure 2 presents the percentage of China’s submissions submitted to the MEPC in the overall submissions of Category A member states between 2001 and 2020. The analysis divides the whole period into four stages, and the proportion of China’s submissions in each stage is gradually increasing. Between 2001 and 2005, the proportion accounted for merely 1%. Then during the period of 2006–2010, the proportion of China’s submissions rose to 5%, ranked seventh among the overall submissions in Category A. In the following five years, the proportion was 12%, and the ranking rose to fifth among these member states. In the period of 2011–2015, the proportion increased to 16%, ranking third. The rate of rising is steady and progressive.

In terms of quantity, the change shows that the extent of China’s participation has been considerably deepened, and its in-depth participation further indicates China’s increasing willingness to contribute to the IMO’s regulatory governance.

Table 2. Descriptive analysis of changes in submission numbers over time.

	Amount	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	Variance
2001–2005	5	0	2	1	0.707	0.476
2006–2010	25	1	12	5.00	4.359	19.000
2011–2015	76	10	20	15.20	4.438	19.700
2016–2020	117	18	29	24.60	4.336	18.800

shows the descriptive statistics denoting the central tendency and dispersion. When compared with previous stages, each “mean” statistic became higher, and the number of China’s submissions achieves steady growth. “Variance” and “Std. Deviation” represent the concentration and dispersion of statistics. In the early stage, the variance and standard deviation are low. The statistics are stable because the number of submissions is small. Later, due to the increased number of submissions and their randomness, the maximum and minimum of each stage are higher than those at the previous level.

The data in Figure 3 shows the tendency of submissions to change periodically. The tendency line in Figure 3 predicts the trend in the future using an index. According to the automatically generated tendency line, the figure shows an upward trend in submissions over time.

After summarizing China’s submissions to the MEPC and seven subcommittees (the PPR, BLG, CCC, DSC, FSI, III, and SLF) from 2001 to 2020, the submission types can be classified as proposals, comments, information, and mixed submissions, as shown in Figure 4. It includes the number and proportion of each type of submission. The data in Figure 4 indicate that submission type increasingly varies with time. Mixed submissions appeared during the period of 2011–2015. The proportion of proposals is the largest among the submissions in each stage, and the quantity continually grows, indicating the great extent of China’s participation in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance.

4.2. China’s Efforts and Progress in the Process of IMO’s Lawmaking

The data in

Table 3. Adoption of China’s submissions.

	Agree	Further Consideration	Considered or Noted	Review/Draft with Consideration	Refuse
2001–2005	1	2	1	0	0
2006–2010	7	8	0	4	1
2011–2015	13	7	28	14	3
2016–2020	14	33	23	24	5

also show the number of cases in which China’s submissions were adopted. Thirty-five proposals related to marine environmental governance were supported and adopted. As the final reports made by the CCC and III were not available on the IMO official website until 16 June 2020, and the statistics of submissions’ adoption were incomplete, the existing number of adoption (“agree”) is lower than it ought to be.

The trend of submission adoption is visible in the line chart in Figure 5. The line chart shows that the number of “agree” is rising steadily, and there is a significant increase in “further consideration” and “review or draft with consideration.” The number in “refuse” continuously maintains a relatively low level. The orange line means the tendency of the number of China’s submissions.

Table 3 and Figure 5 illustrate the importance of China’s submissions to the IMO. Due to the increasing number of adopted submissions, China plays an active role in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. However, the increasing rate of the number of submissions is much higher than the rate of the number of adopted submissions. Thus, the influence of China’s submissions is still in the elementary stage.

Joint proposals submitted by China and other states or organizations appeared in 1999 and were submitted by Hong Kong, China, and Australia. The number of joint submissions is steadily increasing since the first submission by mainland China and India in 2010.

The primary concerns of the joint submissions submitted to the MEPC are shown in the bar diagram in Figure 6. Between 2001 and 2020, there were nine joint submissions on air pollution and energy efficiency and nine on reducing GHG emissions from ships. There were two joint proposals on cargo hold discharge of bilge water and one joint submission for the draft of Polar Code, the form of International Ballast Water Management Certificate (IBWMC), and the prevention of air pollution from ships, respectively.

Among the 25 joint proposals submitted to the MEPC between 2010 and 2020, most were centered on air pollution, energy efficiency, and preventing air pollution from ships. Reducing GHG emissions and energy efficiency have been the focus issue for a few decades.

Table 4. Number of China’s joint submissions to the IMO subcommittees.

	2015	2016	2018	2019
PPR	none	none	None	Rules and Guidance on the Discharge of Liquid Effluents from EGCs into waters (one submission)
III	none	2009 Guidelines for port state control under the revised MARPOL Annex VI (one submission)	exemption of UNSP barges under the MARPOL Convention (three submissions)	none
CCC	Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements (two submissions)	Amendments to the IMSBC Code and supplements (one submission)	None	none

details joint submissions related to marine environmental governance submitted to several IMO sub-committees, including the PPP, III, and CCC.

In 2015, two joint submissions were submitted to the CCC by Australia, Brazil, China, Malaysia, the Marshall Islands, and the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) on evaluating Bauxite properties in Amendments to the IMSBC Code and Supplements. In 2016, a joint submission in regard to the revision of existing individual schedules for Seed Cake and Grain Screening Pellets was submitted to CCC by Australia, Canada, China, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the BIMCO. In the same year, China, the Republic of Korea, and the Tokyo MoU submitted and proposed amendments to the 2009 Guidelines for PSC. Three proposals were submitted to the III in 2018 concerning drafting guidelines for exempting unmanned non-self-propelled (UNSP) barges from the survey and certification requirements under the MARPOL Convention. In 2019, China, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates submitted some information to the PPR about factors requiring consideration when assessing the impact of wastewater discharge from exhaust gas cleaning systems (EGCS) operating in ports and coastal areas.

Briefly, the number and content of joint submissions are summarized in Table 4, demonstrating the major current concerns of marine environmental governance by the international society. China’s significant efforts to realize common interests reflect the formulation and promotion of joint submissions.

Table 5. The status quo of regulations promoted by submissions.

	Submission Name	Submission Content	Final Resolution or Regulation
Separate submissions	MEPC 70/3/2	Draft amendments to MARPOL Annex VI	Resolution MEPC.278 (70)—Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Data Collection System for Fuel Oil Consumption of Ships)
	MEPC 70/5/4	Air pollution and energy efficiency-EEDI calculation method for ships using gas fuel as non-primary fuel	Resolution MEPC. 281 (70)—Amendments to the 2014 Guidelines of the Method of Calculation of the Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships (Resolution MEPC.245 (66), as amended by Resolution MEPC.263 (68))
	MEPC 71/4/15	Amendments to section E of the BWM Convention related to endorsements of additional surveys on the International Ballast Water Management Certificate	Draft Amendments to Regulations E-1 and E-5 of the BWM Convention (Survey and Certification Requirements for Ballast Water Management)
Joint submissions	MEPC 62/7/3 (Hong Kong, China, and IACS)	Interpretations of, and amendments to, MARPOL and related instruments, the scope of application of regulation 12 of MARPOL Annex I as amended by resolution MEPC 189 (59)	Draft Amendments to MARPOL Annex I, II, IV, V, and VI on Regional Arrangements for Port Receptions Facilities
	MEPC 65/24 Annex 5		Statements by the Chairman of the Committee and Delegations of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Japan, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela on Resolution MEPC. 229 (65) on the Promotion of Technical Cooperation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships
	MEPC 68/6/4 (China and Republic of Korea)	Draft International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)	Resolution MEPC. 264 (68)—International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code)

illustrates the role of China’s submissions role in promoting the formulation of regulations. Some separate submissions contributed to the revision and perfection of regulations. The submissions’ content regards the field of BWM Convention, MARPOL 73/78, and the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), especially regarding China’s response to the potential environmental impact caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The MEPC instructed the working group to consider the proposed draft amendments to the 2014 EEDI Calculation Guidelines using document MEPC 70/5/4 as the basis of the calculation method for the EEDI of ships with dual-fuel engines that use gas as the non-primary fuel at the 70th session of the MEPC. Given the calculation’s complexity, another constructive and more simplified approach was proposed to consolidate different scenarios of ships fully and partially equipped with dual/gas fuel engines. Therefore, the f_DFgas formula was incorporated in the proposal. To facilitate the understanding, each parameter, especially the parameter of V_gas, was defined below in the f_DFgas calculation [50]. Subsequently, the working group revised paragraph 2.1 in the 2014 EEDI Calculation Guidelines, which incorporated the f_DFgas formula and its parameter as follows: “Meanwhile, gas fuel shall be identified as to whether it is regarded as the “primary fuel” in accordance with the formula below.” [51].

China’s submissions (MEPC66 6/11) attained critical agreement at the 66th session of the MEPC in the revision of MARPOL 73/78. The comments on Document MEPC 66/6/3 seek clarification on “hybrid propulsion” and provide proposals to amendments to MARPOL Annex VI. Different understandings of hybrid propulsion led to inconsistency in the EEDI calculations and industry confusion. Therefore, it was necessary to clarify “hybrid propulsion” to eliminate the inconsistency. Based on industry practice, China identified possible combinations of different propulsion systems and made unified interpretations with respect to MARPOL Annex VI to ensure smooth and efficient energy implementation requirements [52]. The MEPC agreed to replace the words “a ship” in the first sentence of regulation 5.4.2 of MARPOL Annex VI with the words “a new ship,” and agreed to clarify “hybrid propulsion” used in the definition of “non-conventional propulsion,” which invited Member Governments and international organizations to submit relevant comments and proposals to MEPC 67 for detailed consideration [53]. At the 70th session of the MEPC, China’s submission commenting on the draft amendments to MARPOL Annex VI related to a data collection system for fuel consumption also received majority agreement [54]. Because of the inaccurate estimation of transport work, had the proxy of distance traveled through water been applied, the effectiveness of weather routing would have been significantly distorted. Thus, the “distance traveled from berth to berth” listed in Appendix IX of MARPOL Annex VI was interpreted as “overground” rather than “through the water,” and Footnote 5 was removed to develop a concrete definition in the SEEMP Guidelines [55]. Finally, the footnote of “distance traveled” was deleted from Appendix IX of MARPOL Annex VI—Information to be submitted to the IMO Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Database.

The Ballast Water Review Group (BWRG) was established and instructed to revise section E of the BWM Convention using the text set out in Annex 1 of document MEPC 71/4/15 as its basis [56]. This document seeks clarification on survey and certification requirements for ballast water management in section E of the BWM Convention and proposes relevant amendments. Due to the inconsistencies between the survey requirements and certification in section E on the IBWMC, it was inconvenient for some flag state administrations to conduct surveys and issue certifications to ships in advance based on the consideration of the date of coming into force. China believes that survey and certification requirements for the IBWMC should be consistent with either the International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) Certificate or International Air Pollution Prevention (IAPP) Certificate under the MARPOL Convention. Therefore, it is unnecessary to require an additional survey of an endorsement on the IBWMC [57]. After consideration, E-1.1.5 and E-5.9.1 of the BWM Convention were deleted by the committee [58].

For the sake of decreasing the risk to the marine environment as posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, China submitted information on remote PSC inspections during the crisis to the III. The IMO issued a series of circulars to provide guidance on pandemic prevention, health protection, and impact reduction. China actively conducted studies on remote PSC inspections, identifying ships suitable for such inspections on the basis of the principles of ship selection, and made remote contact with ships using real-time communication, video recording, or photography to check the technical and safety management status of the ships and determine whether they conform to applicable conventions without boarding them [59]. Annex 1 of the document introduces the experience of China’s application on remote PSC inspections.

According to the foregoing analysis, China’s submissions influence the IMO’s environmental regulatory governance in a positive way. Upon comparing the content of these submissions with that of original legal instruments of the IMO, it can be seen that China’s submissions provide constructive approaches, enhance procedural regulations, and make legal instruments more precise. Document MEPC 70/5/4 provided a constructive and more simplified approach for the EEDI calculation method pertaining to ships with dual-fuel engines. Document MEPC 66/6/3 clarified “hybrid propulsion” and made unified interpretations to eliminate the inconsistency in MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI. Document MEPC 70/3/2 also made a contribution to the revision of MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI to ensure the accurate estimate of transport work. Document MEPC 71/4/15 enhanced consistencies between the survey requirements and certification in Section E of the IBWMC. Thus, the contents of China’s submissions boost and benefit the IMO’s environmental regulatory governance.

In recent years, joint submissions have been adopted by the IMO. The paradigm in the law of the sea has been changing from divided oceans to our common oceans, which highlights common values and interests. Accordingly, the concerns regarding common interests will influence the development of the law of the sea. Joint submission is a type of submission submitted by several states jointly, which can effectively reflect joint interests.

Joint proposal issues mainly involve common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), the reduction of GHG emissions, and the revision of the IBWMC form and content. In CBDR, China and India submitted a proposal regarding the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping to the 58th session of MEPC [60]. In this session, China made a statement on the principle or policy concerning the GHG issue and stated that the IMO is obliged to address GHG emission reduction from international shipping under the legal basis of the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol. China also stated the inappropriateness of enacting unanimity of treatment [61]. This statement gained favor with many developing countries, including United Arab Emirates, Argentina, North Korea, Peru, Egypt, Belgium, Ghana, Chile, Namibia, Uruguay, Bolivia, Indonesia, and Colombia. The issue got postponed to the 59th session of the MEPC and was then discussed at the 60th session of the MEPC, where China highlighted the principle of CBDR. It is the fundamental political and legal principle guiding the international community on climate change. China also took a positive and constructive attitude toward participating in the discussion and consideration of all agenda items and supported the consideration of the IMO/MEPC on technical issues to achieve a consensus. [62] At the 61st session of the MEPC, China stated the IMO is a technical organization rather than a political organization and that GHG emission is a political agenda item attracting significant attention from all counties rather than a sheer technical or environmental issue. Moreover, China is against including EEDI, EEOI, and SEEMP into Annex VI of MARPOL for mandatory application. China suggested that if these measures are to be compulsory in the future, a new treaty or a new MARPOL protocol be developed to solve the CO₂ issue, which sets clear provisions on developed countries’ responsibility to provide financial, technical, and capacity-building support to developing countries. This position also received the support of developing countries [63]. At the 65th session of MEPC, Resolution MEPC.229(65) was included in the MEPC report with statements by the Chairman of the Committee and Delegations from Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Japan, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela. Resolution MEPC.229(65) was on the Promotion of Technical Cooperation and Transfer of Technology relating to the Improvement of Energy Efficiency of Ships. The resolution recognized the principle of CBDR into the IMO and provided the IMO with a solid foundation for further discussions on reducing GHG emissions from international shipping [64]. The cooperation and transfer of technology to developing countries in improving the energy efficiency of ships will reduce GHG emissions gradually and effectively.

In the revision of MARPOL 73/78, the committee agreed with the proposal submitted by Hong Kong, China, and the IACS (MEPC 62/7/3) [65]. First, Regulation 12.2.2 of MARPOL Annex I should not be retroactively applied to ships delivered before 1 January 2014. Second, they added a new Unified Interpretation to “Sludge tank discharge piping” in Regulation 12.2.2 [66]. As for drafting the Polar Code, the committee considered the submission (MEPC 68/6/4) made by China and the Republic of Korea. This document provides comments on Document MEPC 68/6/2 regarding the requirements of oil cargo tank protection in regulation 1.2.2 of Chapter 1 of the Polar Code draft, part II-A and proposes modifications to Regulation 1.2.2 [67]. After consideration, the committee agreed in principle with the proposed alterations to regulations 1.2.2 and instructed the drafting group to modify the text according to the submission text: “For category A and B, ships other than oil tankers constructed on or after 1 January 2017, all cargo tanks constructed and utilized to carry oil shall be separated from the outer shell by a distance of not less than 0.76 m.” [68]. China’s efforts and progress in joint submissions show its concerns for shared values and interests.

Notably, the adoption of proposals in lawmaking is also influenced by the organization’s rules of the procedure [69]. In addition to the submission itself, other factors might be influencing the acceptance of China’s submissions, such as the precise size and composition of the Chinese delegation to the IMO. According to the principal–agent (PA) theory, PA relationships involve more than one principal and a single agent in international politics. Member states are major actors of international organizations, and they play an essential role in the process of rule-making [70]. Moreover, the size and composition of a country’s delegation in an international organization also reflects their countries’ influence on the IMO’s regulatory governance to some extent. However, these factors only play a secondary role in the acceptance of submissions. The primary consideration of submission acceptance still relies on the content of proposals that pursue the shared interests of member states, which are also embodied as the theme orientation of the international organizations.

In conclusion, both separate and joint submissions contribute to the formulation of marine environment regulations. Indeed, China’s submissions play an increasingly important role in the IMO’s progress on marine environmental regulatory governance.

5. Discussion

This section divides the critical concerns into two secondary issues: China’s influence on time in the IMO’s marine environmental governance and China’s practice to strengthen its regulatory management. First, we summarize China’s functions and its characteristics regarding marine environmental regulatory management following the quantitative analysis of the periodical change in China’s submissions presented in Section 3. Then, we analyze the background and actor-oriented factors of China’s changing functions regarding the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. Finally, we demonstrate China’s efforts to strengthen IMO’s marine environmental regulatory management.

5.1. Periodic Changes in China’s Role in IMO’s Marine Environmental Regulatory Governance

China’s role in the IMO changed over time. Its evolution divides into four periods: 2001–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2015, and 2016–2020. The influence and characteristics for each period are adequately reflected by submission quantity, type, and content.

During 2001–2005, the number of submissions by China was low, and there were only five proposals, concerning a few topics, such as preventing vessel air pollution. Only one was adopted but did not promote the formulation of concrete regulations. Thus, during this period, China was relatively passive in the IMO’s Marine environmental regulatory governance, and its function was still in a gestational stage.

In 2006–2010, the number of submissions increased. Proposal topics began to diversify regarding the prevention of vessel air pollution, management of ballast water, and CBDR application in shipping GHG emissions. Technical proposals appeared during this period. In 2008, China’s submissions of MEPC 58/4/33 and MEPC 58/4/3 comments were of a technical nature (Design and Operational CO₂ Indices and baselines) and proposed suggestions. Although the submission of the CBDR application raised heated discussion, it failed to go into practice. In summary, China initiated a grander role in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance.

In 2011–2015, there was a significant increase in submission numbers, particularly joint submissions. The submissions became varied, and mixed submissions appeared for the first time. Technical topics increased, focusing on ship energy efficiency. Thirteen submissions were adopted, three of which contributed to the enactment of legal instruments. In this period, China’s participation in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance gradually became more prominent. China paid a considerable amount of attention to the reflection and expression of common interests by joint submissions.

During 2016–2020, the number of submissions remained relatively high. China also responded to emerging issues regarding remote PSC inspections caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. It presented a stable trend of adopted submissions. Fourteen submissions were adopted by the IMO, and three separate submissions promoted regulation formulation. In this period, China strengthened its influence by facilitating resolution enactment and enhancing specific regulation revisions to substantively contribute to marine environmental regulatory governance.

It is an obvious argument for China to participate in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. In this process, China’s participation started from the gestational stage and gradually increased. Currently, China plays a positive role in marine environmental protection.

5.2. Influential Factors in China’s Growing Role in the IMO’s Marine Environmental Regulatory Governance

The core issues of discussion are the factors influencing the periodical change of China’s submissions. Generally, there are two main factors that affect the behaviors of member states when they participate in international organizations, namely, background factors and actor-oriented factors [71]. With regard to the role of member states in the international scene, actors’ objectives can be analyzed by two approaches—one stresses internal factors, while the other emphasizes the external factors of goal formulation [72]. The following subsection discusses different periods of China’s characteristics and functions in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance by analyzing background factors and actor-oriented factors.

5.2.1. Background Factors

The analysis of background factors adopted the internal factors approach. The background factors affecting the behaviors of member states rely on the states’ inherent characteristics, such as their economy and politics.

The adoption of domestic policy is one of the factors influencing China’s functions in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. The full name of the “Five-Year Plan” is “The Five-Year Plan for the economy and social development of the People’s Republic of China”, which is a critical part of China’s long-term economic plan. During the period of the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), China’s ocean governance highlighted national interests concerning the areas of resource management, protection, and technical development. The plan required strengthening marine investigation, exploitation, and control to safeguard national ocean rights and interests [73]. At that time, China stressed economic development but did not pay a lot of attention to the engagement in global marine environmental governance. Thus, the number of submissions was low during this period, and China’s marine environmental governance was in its gestational stage.

During the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), China initiated efforts to protect the marine environment. The length of marine governance requirements in the plan was magnified, where the general requirement was to strengthen marine awareness, safeguard rights and interests, and protect the marine ecosystem [74]. The number of adopted submissions was higher than it was in the previous period.

During the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), domestic marine environmental protection was emphasized. China actively participated in global climate governance under the principle of CBDR and required international negotiations to be enhanced and promoted the establishment of equitable international systems for climate governance [75]. The number of proposals increased further, and submission content focused on ways to reduce shipping GHG emissions. China played an active role in marine environmental regulatory governance at this time.

During the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), China fully participated in global climate governance and contributed toward responding to climate change [76]. In 2016, China’s submissions peaked, and during 2016–2020, some proposals promoting legal instruments were enacted. China made substantial contributions to the marine environmental regulatory governance during this period.

The growth in the shipping economy created a solid foundation for China’s engagement in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. Due to its emphasis on an improved shipping economy, the level of shipping power increased over the past ten years. In 2019, the total number of container throughput in China’s major ports reached 230.92 million TEU, increasing by 84.96 million TEU when compared with 2011 numbers [77]. With the enhancement of its shipping economy, China gradually realized the importance of developing marine sustainability. The goal of marine economic development is to pursue quality instead of quantity to achieve sustainable development and protect the marine ecological environment [78]. China is projected to become a significant player in green shipping [79]. In August 2017, China’s Ministry of transport issued guidelines regarding green shipping development in the Yangtze River Economic Belt, aiming at facilitating its pilot project [80]. To this end, the Ministry of Transport drafted an Action Plan for Further Promoting Green Port Construction (2018–2022) (draft for opinions) designed to improve the construction of green ports [81]. These actions benefit China’s role in marine environmental regulatory governance and promote the idea of marine governance on a global scale.

During the 1990s–2000s, China carried out sustainable development strategies and proposed marine ecological restoration projects, such as the clean Bohai sea action plan on marine pollution [82]. The submission topics concentrated on the traditional field of vessel source pollution. Along with the proposal titled “A Community with Shared Future for Humankind”, China proposed the notion of ocean governance by creatively putting forward “a maritime community with a shared future”. To realize the sustainable development of humankind and the oceans, the establishment of a maritime community with a shared future requires that the international society should be based on shared interests and jointly assume the responsibility of global marine governance [83]. From 2011 to 2020, joint submissions have continued to grow, and the content focused on the emerging field of vessel source pollution, such as ballast water management. Three joint proposals promoted the enactment of IMO’s legal instruments.

Above all, these factors were a catalyst for the increase in China’s engagement while optimizing domestic marine environmental governance.

5.2.2. Actor-Oriented Factors

The discussion regarding actor-oriented factors adopted the external factors approach. States’ behaviors are also affected by actor-oriented factors. These factors refer to states’ preferences and perceptions, attitudes, and reflections when they face changes and challenges from an external environment [84].

A crucial element for China to engage in the IMO’s marine environmental governance is the shared interest in humankind. There is an increasingly close relationship between China and the rest of the world, and China aspires both for a better world and to be seen as a benevolent country. Building a community with a shared future that benefits humankind reflects the willingness of China to contribute toward a better world [85]. It is of utmost importance for international cooperation to be concerned about humankind’s shared interests, and China’s investment in humankind’s common interests is imperative for international cooperation with marine environmental governance.

The changing role of China in global governance is one of the external factors influencing China’s marine environmental regulatory management. In the development of IMO conventions, China was formerly a follower rather than an active initiator. Currently, emerging countries are moving gradually from the periphery to the center stage in global governance. They are becoming great forces in politics and world economies [86]. China plays an essential role in this new, multipolar world [87]. Given China’s role in global governance, it needs to be an active participant and promoter rather than being a passive recipient and follower [88].

China’s submissions to international organizations also affect the functions of China’s marine environmental governance. With China’s increasing level of engagement in the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance, the number of adopted submissions is increasing, especially joint proposals with common interests. The increase in adopted proposals indicates the enhancement of submission contents, and the rise in joint proposals is evidence of a stronger perception of shared identity. However, after comparing the increasing number of adopted submissions and overall submissions, it is clear that China’s capability of agenda-setting still needs to be strengthened, and China’s influence on the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance remains in the primary stage.

Thus, the aforementioned factors enable China to sufficiently exert its function of governing the marine environment. China made a substantial contribution to the enactment of IMO’s legal instruments by setting proposals in collaboration with other states.

5.3. China’s Practice Regarding Consolidating the Function of Marine Environmental Regulatory Governance

The IMO’s effectiveness is reflected by the implementation and enforcement of the IMO’s legal instruments related to the marine environment. Apart from boosting the enactment of IMO’s marine environmental regulations, China takes the initiative to adopt and comply with these regulations. China is one of the major flag states and shipping nations in the world [89]. Its practice of compliance consolidates the IMO’s function regarding marine environmental regulatory governance.

To solve the long-standing problem of vessel source pollution, a variety of laws and regulations regarding marine environmental protection have been enacted by China, including the prevention of pollution sources from land construction, land manufacturing, vessels, waste dumping, offshore oil, and gas development [90]. China adopted several legal regulations for implementing UNCLOS and the IMO’s conventions to prevent vessel-source pollution, such as the Regulation on the Prevention and Control of Marine Pollution from Vessels (2010). Under the framework of the 2010 Regulation, the Ministry of Transport adopted a set of detailed rules for implementation between 2010 and 2012. Furthermore, China accelerated the process of enacting and revising basic laws for adapting to the new requirements of marine ecological environment protection. Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amendment 2017) came into effect on 5 November 2017 [91]. To address the issue of vessel source pollution, China approved the BWM Convention, which came into force on 22 January 2019. Its purpose was to prevent biological invasion and protect the global marine ecological environment.

China is playing an active role in addressing the issue regarding GHG emissions from vessels and energy efficiency. GHG emissions as a result of international shipping are currently a hot topic. Regarding technical and operational measures, the IMO’s adoption of energy efficiency measures represents a significant process [92]. To advance domestic green shipping, China is keeping in line with international standards on shipping emission reduction. In 2012, China issued Fuel Consumption Limits and Validation Methods for Operating Ships and Limits and Verification Methods for CO₂ Emission from Operating Ships with reference to IMO’s adoption of EEDI. Considered the policy of Emission Control Area (ECA) under MARPOL 73/78, in 2015, China began to set up ECAs in coastal waters, according to the Atmospheric Pollution Prevention and Control Law and continually increased the sphere of waters that limit sulfur controls for fuel oil consumed by ships since 2017 [93].

6. Conclusions

There is an interaction between the IMO and member states in the marine environmental regulatory governance. The IMO provides a forum for states to interact and negotiate in relation to shared interests of protecting the marine environment and states exert their roles in IMO’s lawmaking through the process of submissions, adoption, formulation, and compliance with legal instruments. To assess the degree of impact exerted by these states, this paper examines China as a case study. As the second-largest economy, China is playing an increasingly significant role in IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. This paper summarized China’s growing role and impact over time on the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance and its background and actor-oriented factors by analyzing the changes and adoption of China’s submissions. Regarding the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance, our study concluded that: (1) based on China’s increased level of participation in global marine governance, China transitioned from a follower to a critical participator and contributor, and it can be predicted that in this progress, China will further strengthen the capability of agenda setting for marine environmental protection; (2) although the influence of China’s submissions is still at the elementary stage, China has shown great efforts and made progress in the process of IMO’s lawmaking, which can be reflected by the periodical changes in submission numbers and gradual increase in adoption numbers; (3) considering that several of China’s submissions promote the formulation of regulations regarding marine environmental protection, China actually has some influence on the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance through continuous efforts; (4) China’s role is not merely directed by background factors, including its policies, shipping economy development, and the idea of marine governance, but it is also influenced by actor-oriented factors and concerns about shared interests, a shifting role in global governance, and an increased submission practice; and (5) China is executing a serious compliance practice, which strengthens the effectiveness of the IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance. In sum, China is actively taking part in marine environmental governance, which positively impacts IMO’s marine environmental regulatory governance mission.