The Effect of ESG Activities on Financial Performance during the COVID-19 Pandemic—Evidence from Korea
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Background and Hypothesis
2.1. ESG Activities
2.2. ESG Activities and Corporate Performance
2.3. Hypothesis Development
3. Methodology
3.1. Measuring ESG Performance
3.2. Empirical Model
+ α6ROAi,t_1 + α7GRWi,t_1 + α8MBi,t_1 + α9Foreigni,t_1 + α10OWNi,t_1
+ α11AGEi,t + α12CASHRi,t_1 + α13LOSSi,t + ∑IND + εi,t,
ROAi,t | = | Financial performance is measured as net income divided by the opening total assets; |
ESGi,t | = | ESG ratings (as previously defined) at the beginning of the year; |
COVIDt | = | During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020; |
Control variables | = | Firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), firm performance (ROA), sales growth rate (GRW), market-to-book ratio (MB), foreign investors rate (Foreign), share of largest shareholders (OWN), firm age (AGE), cash holdings (CASHR), and loss firm (LOSS) (see Appendix A for the definitions of the variables). |
4. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
4.1. Sample Selection
4.2. Descriptive Statistics
5. Empirical Results and Robustness Checks
5.1. Main Results
5.2. Analyses Based on Individual Categories of ESG Ratings
5.3. Additional Tests
5.3.1. Earnings Volatility
5.3.2. Endogeneity Problem
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Variable | Definition |
---|---|
ROA | net income divided by total assets at the beginning of the year |
ROAVOL | standard deviation of ROA measured over years t through t-4 |
ESG_SCORE | ordinal variable that takes a value of 3 if a firm receives an A+ or higher ESG total grade provided by KCGS, 2 if a firm receives an A grade, 1 if a firm receives a B+ grade, and 0 otherwise |
ESG_FIRM | indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm has a B+ or higher grade, and 0 otherwise |
Escore | ordinal variable that takes a value of 3 if a firm receives an A+ or higher environmental grade provided by KCGS, 2 if a firm receives an A grade, 1 if a firm receives a B+ grade, and 0 otherwise |
Sscore | ordinal variable that takes a value of 3 if a firm receives an A+ or higher social grade provided by KCGS, 2 if a firm receives an A grade, 1 if a firm receives a B+ grade, and 0 otherwise |
Gscore | ordinal variable that takes a value of 5 if a firm receives an A+ or higher corporate governance grade provided by KCGS, 4 if a firm receives an A grade, 3 if a firm receives a B+ grade, 2 if a firm receives a B grade, one if a firm receives a C grade, and 0 otherwise |
COVID | indicator variable that is set as 1 if t is 2020 |
SIZE | natural logarithm of total assets |
LEV | total debt divided by equity |
GRW | growth rate of sales |
MB | the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity |
Foreign | the proportion of the common stock held by foreign investors |
OWN | the proportion of the common stock held by the largest shareholder |
AGE | firm age, defined as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of years since the firm was listed on the stock market |
CASHR | cash holdings, defined as cash and marketable securities divided by total assets at the beginning of the year |
LOSS | indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s net income is negative and 0 otherwise |
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Panel A: Sample Selection | |||
Sample Selection Criteria | Firm-Year | ||
Firms trading on the Korean Stock Exchange from 2018 to 2020 | 2331 | ||
Delete baking firms and non-December fiscal years | (538) | ||
Delete firms with missing data for financial measures and ESG scores | (148) | ||
Final sample | 1645 | ||
Panel B: Sample distribution by year | |||
year | 2018. 1Q | 2019. 1Q | 2020. 1Q |
number | 533 | 546 | 566 |
Panel C: Sample distribution by industry | |||
2-digit code | Description | N | |
10 | Manufacture of food products | 71 | |
13 | Manufacture of textiles, except apparel | 37 | |
14 | Manufacture of wearing apparel, clothing accessories, and fur articles | 49 | |
17 | Manufacture of pulp, paper, and paper products | 66 | |
20 | Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products except pharmaceuticals and medicinal chemicals | 187 | |
21 | Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, and botanical products | 109 | |
22 | Manufacture of rubber and plastic products | 62 | |
23 | Manufacture of other nonmetallic mineral products | 69 | |
24 | Manufacture of basic metal products | 125 | |
25 | Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery, and furniture | 34 | |
26 | Manufacture of electronic components, computer, radio, television, and communication equipment and apparatuses | 115 | |
28 | Manufacture of electrical equipment | 55 | |
29 | Manufacture of other machinery and equipment | 77 | |
30 | Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semitrailers | 106 | |
31 | Manufacture of other transport equipment | 26 | |
35 | Electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply | 28 | |
41 | General construction | 86 | |
46 | Wholesale trade and commission trade, except motor vehicles and motorcycles | 111 | |
47 | Retail trade, except motor vehicles, and motorcycles | 31 | |
49 | Land transport, transport via pipelines | 30 | |
71 | Professional services | 171 | |
Total | 1645 |
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample | ||||||
Variable | N | Mean | Std. dev. | 25th | Median | 75th |
ESG_SCOREt−1 | 1645 | 0.311 | 0.625 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Escoret−1 | 1645 | 0.723 | 1.027 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 2.000 |
Secoret−1 | 1645 | 0.894 | 1.135 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 2.000 |
Gscoret−1 | 1645 | 3.028 | 0.951 | 2.000 | 3.000 | 4.000 |
COVIDt | 1645 | 0.344 | 0.475 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
ROAt | 1645 | 0.006 | 0.019 | −0.001 | 0.006 | 0.014 |
SIZEt−1 | 1645 | 20.569 | 1.577 | −19.442 | 20.374 | 21.501 |
LEVt−1 | 1645 | 1.580 | 6.829 | 0.499 | 0.965 | 1.616 |
ROAt−1 | 1645 | 0.009 | 0.023 | 0.001 | 0.007 | 0.015 |
GRWt−1 | 1645 | 0.110 | 1.559 | −0.051 | 0.028 | 0.122 |
MBt−1 | 1645 | 1.441 | 5.888 | 0.559 | 0.853 | 1.444 |
Foreignt−1 | 1645 | 0.117 | 0.130 | 0.024 | 0.067 | 0.163 |
OWNt−1 | 1645 | 0.435 | 0.160 | 0.317 | 0.438 | 0.543 |
AGEt | 1645 | 3.637 | 0.602 | 3.367 | 3.829 | 4.043 |
CASHRt−1 | 1645 | 0.085 | 0.079 | 0.034 | 0.063 | 0.108 |
LOSSt | 1645 | 0.272 | 0.445 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Panel B: Difference Tests of Variables (Pre and Post COVID-19 Pandemic) | ||||||
COVID = 0 (n = 1079) | COVID = 1 (n = 566) | t-Tests (p-Value) | Wilcoxon Tests (p-Value) | |||
Variables | Mean | Median | Mean | Median | ||
ESG_SCOREt−1 | 0.286 | 0.000 | 0.359 | 0.000 | 0.030 | 0.013 |
ROAt | 0.008 | 0.007 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.000 | 0.004 |
SIZEt−1 | 20.534 | 20.349 | 20.635 | 20.444 | 0.216 | 0.170 |
LEVt−1 | 1.554 | 0.945 | 1.630 | 0.986 | 0.826 | 0.199 |
ROAt−1 | 0.009 | 0.007 | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.019 | 0.048 |
GRWt−1 | 0.127 | 0.034 | 0.078 | 0.018 | 0.427 | 0.049 |
MBt−1 | 1.546 | 0.896 | 1.242 | 0.784 | 0.183 | 0.001 |
Foreignt−1 | 0.117 | 0.067 | 0.115 | 0.067 | 0.730 | 0.802 |
OWNt−1 | 0.435 | 0.436 | 0.435 | 0.449 | 0.953 | 0.864 |
AGEt | 3.641 | 3.829 | 3.629 | 3.850 | 0.714 | 0.594 |
CASHRt−1 | 0.084 | 0.064 | 0.087 | 0.060 | 0.501 | 0.681 |
LOSSt | 0.245 | 0.000 | 0.323 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
Panel C: Difference Tests of Variables of ESG and nonESG Firms | ||||||
ESG_FIRM = 0 (n = 1265) | ESG_FIRM = 1 (n = 380) | t-Tests (p-Value) | Wilcoxon Tests (p-Value) | |||
Variables | Mean | Median | Mean | Median | ||
ESG_SCOREt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.347 | 1.000 | 0.000 | <0.0001 |
ROAt | 0.005 | 0.006 | 0.009 | 0.008 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
SIZEt−1 | 20.089 | 20.028 | 22.169 | 22.120 | 0.000 | <0.0001 |
LEVt−1 | 1.614 | 0.880 | 1.466 | 1.118 | 0.522 | <0.0001 |
ROAt−1 | 0.008 | 0.006 | 0.011 | 0.009 | 0.008 | <0.0001 |
GRWt−1 | 0.128 | 0.028 | 0.050 | 0.029 | 0.123 | 0.658 |
MBt−1 | 1.474 | 0.842 | 1.331 | 0.897 | 0.474 | 0.020 |
Foreignt−1 | 0.090 | 0.046 | 0.203 | 0.168 | 0.000 | <0.0001 |
OWNt−1 | 0.445 | 0.461 | 0.400 | 0.388 | 0.000 | <0.0001 |
AGEt | 3.664 | 3.850 | 3.549 | 3.784 | 0.003 | 0.008 |
CASHRt−1 | 0.088 | 0.063 | 0.075 | 0.061 | 0.001 | 0.432 |
LOSSt | 0.285 | 0.000 | 0.229 | 0.000 | 0.027 | 0.033 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) ESG_SCOREt−1 | 1.000 | ||||||||||||
(2) COVIDt | 0.222 | 1.000 | |||||||||||
0.395 | |||||||||||||
(3) ROAt | 0.060 | −0.094 | 1.000 | ||||||||||
0.015 | 0.000 | ||||||||||||
(4) SIZEt−1 | 0.577 | 0.030 | 0.113 | 1.000 | |||||||||
<0.0001 | 0.223 | <0.0001 | |||||||||||
(5) LEVt−1 | −0.013 | 0.005 | −0.017 | 0.061 | 1.000 | ||||||||
0.598 | 0.834 | 0.487 | 0.013 | ||||||||||
(6) ROAt−1 | 0.044 | −0.051 | 0.339 | 0.115 | −0.017 | 1.000 | |||||||
0.076 | 0.039 | <0.0001 | <0.0001 | 0.503 | |||||||||
(7) GRWt−1 | −0.019 | −0.015 | 0.018 | 0.025 | −0.021 | 0.037 | 1.000 | ||||||
0.439 | 0.537 | 0.455 | 0.311 | 0.391 | 0.139 | ||||||||
(8) MBt−1 | −0.014 | −0.024 | 0.027 | −0.020 | 0.819 | 0.017 | −0.019 | 1.000 | |||||
0.561 | 0.329 | 0.268 | 0.426 | <0.0001 | 0.482 | 0.435 | |||||||
(9) Foreignt−1 | 0.376 | −0.009 | 0.173 | 0.521 | −0.024 | 0.152 | 0.010 | 0.037 | 1.000 | ||||
<0.0001 | 0.731 | <0.0001 | <0.0001 | 0.327 | <0.0001 | 0.672 | 0.136 | ||||||
(10) OWNt−1 | −0.110 | 0.002 | 0.050 | 0.028 | 0.009 | 0.065 | 0.035 | −0.018 | −0.192 | 1.000 | |||
<0.0001 | 0.933 | 0.043 | 0.250 | 0.729 | 0.009 | 0.155 | 0.469 | <0.0001 | |||||
(11) AGEt | −0.095 | −0.010 | −0.024 | −0.016 | 0.020 | −0.064 | 0.026 | −0.011 | −0.077 | −0.039 | 1.000 | ||
0.000 | 0.686 | 0.334 | 0.505 | 0.422 | 0.009 | 0.302 | 0.654 | 0.002 | 0.114 | ||||
(12) CASHRt−1 | −0.064 | 0.019 | 0.012 | −0.111 | −0.047 | 0.057 | 0.018 | 0.026 | 0.094 | −0.151 | −0.091 | 1.000 | |
0.010 | 0.443 | 0.618 | <0.0001 | 0.055 | 0.021 | 0.469 | 0.289 | 0.000 | <0.0001 | 0.000 | |||
(13) LOSSt | −0.054 | 0.083 | −0.609 | −0.159 | 0.017 | −0.264 | −0.025 | −0.014 | −0.189 | −0.124 | 0.022 | 0.036 | 1.000 |
0.029 | 0.001 | <0.0001 | <0.0001 | 0.491 | <0.0001 | 0.319 | 0.579 | <0.0001 | <0.0001 | 0.381 | 0.140 |
Dependent Variable: ROAi,t | ||
---|---|---|
ESG= | ESG_SCORE | ESG = ESG_FIRM |
Intercept | 0.020 ** | 0.021 ** |
(t-value) | (2.39) | (2.52) |
ESGt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.03) | (0.44) | |
COVIDt | −0.003 *** | −0.003 *** |
(−2.66) | (−2.65) | |
ESGt−1 × COVIDt | 0.002 ** | 0.004 ** |
(2.26) | (2.51) | |
SIZEt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−0.61) | (−0.78) | |
LEVt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−0.47) | (−0.47) | |
ROAt−1 | 0.140 ** | 0.139 ** |
(2.60) | (2.60) | |
GRWt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−1.01) | (−0.94) | |
MBt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.47) | (0.47) | |
Foreignt−1 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
(1.17) | (1.17) | |
OWNt−1 | −0.002 | −0.002 |
(−0.66) | (−0.56) | |
AGEt | 0.001 | 0.001 |
(0.79) | (0.82) | |
CASHRt−1 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
(0.34) | (0.33) | |
LOSSt | −0.024 *** | −0.024 *** |
(−18.51) | (−18.50) | |
Industry Fixed effect | Yes | Yes |
N | 1645 | 1645 |
Adj R2 | 0.434 | 0.435 |
Dependent Variable: ROAi,t | |||
---|---|---|---|
ESG= | (1) Escore | (2) Sscore | (3) Gscore |
Intercept | 0.018 ** | 0.020 ** | 0.017 ** |
(t-value) | (2.04) | (2.37) | (2.29) |
ESGt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−0.29) | (0.25) | (−0.50) | |
COVIDt | −0.002 ** | −0.003 ** | −0.006 * |
(−2.32) | (−2.33) | (−1.93) | |
ESGt−1 × COVIDt | 0.001 | 0.001 * | 0.001 * |
(1.48) | (1.65) | (1.66) | |
SIZEt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−0.21) | (−0.59) | (−0.42) | |
LEVt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−0.65) | (−0.57) | (−0.01) | |
ROAt−1 | 0.140 ** | 0.140 ** | 0.210 *** |
(2.60) | (2.60) | (4.23) | |
GRWt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−1.01) | (−0.95) | (−1.60) | |
MBt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(0.60) | (0.55) | (0.08) | |
Foreignt−1 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.004 |
(1.18) | (1.18) | (0.95) | |
OWNt−1 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.003 |
(−0.68) | (−0.70) | (−0.92) | |
AGEt | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 |
(0.65) | (0.70) | (0.76) | |
CASHRt−1 | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.004 |
(0.32) | (0.36) | (0.53) | |
LOSSt | −0.023 *** | −0.024 *** | −0.023 *** |
(−18.49) | (−18.41) | (−17.83) | |
Industry Fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 1645 | 1645 | 1645 |
Adj R2 | 0.433 | 0.434 | 0.444 |
Dependent Variable: ROAVOLi,t | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
ESG= | (1) ESG_SCORE | (2) ESG_FIRM | (3) Esocore | (4) Sscore | (5) Gscore |
Intercept | 0.001 | 0.003 | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.007 |
(t-value) | (0.14) | (0.40) | (0.32) | (0.44) | (1.34) |
ESGt−1 | 0.000 | −0.001 | 0.000 | 0.000 | −0.001 ** |
(−0.75) | (−0.68) | (−0.40) | (0.29) | (−2.23) | |
COVIDt | 0.006 *** | 0.005 *** | 0.005 *** | 0.006 *** | 0.006 *** |
(7.55) | (11.73) | (9.02) | (6.28) | (5.60) | |
ESGt−1 × COVIDt | −0.001 ** | −0.002 ** | −0.001 | −0.001 * | −0.001 * |
(−2.16) | (−2.53) | (−1.33) | (−1.89) | (−1.89) | |
SIZEt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−0.02) | (−0.35) | (−0.29) | (−0.48) | (−0.95) | |
LEVt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 * | 0.000 * | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(1.53) | (1.69) | (1.82) | (1.86) | (1.04) | |
ROAt−1 | 0.058 | 0.058 | 0.057 | 0.058 | 0.110 * |
(1.03) | (1.04) | (1.01) | (1.03) | (1.82) | |
GRWt−1 | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 * |
(2.90) | (2.76) | (2.90) | (2.89) | (1.75) | |
MBt−1 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
(−0.15) | (−0.25) | (−0.29) | (−0.31) | (0.06) | |
Foreignt−1 | −0.003 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.004 | −0.004 * |
(−1.31) | (−1.35) | (−1.02) | (−1.37) | (−1.71) | |
OWNt−1 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 | −0.001 |
(0.49) | (0.49) | (0.50) | (0.53) | (−0.28) | |
AGEt | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | 0.000 |
(−1.01) | (−0.99) | (−0.92) | (−0.91) | (−0.84) | |
CASHRt−1 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.011 | 0.016 ** |
(1.58) | (1.61) | (1.57) | (1.58) | (2.58) | |
LOSSt | 0.004 *** | 0.004 *** | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** | 0.003 *** |
(2.62) | (2.63) | (2.60) | (2.57) | (3.48) | |
Industry Fixed effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
N | 1645 | 1645 | 1645 | 1645 | 1645 |
Adj R2 | 0.078 | 0.077 | 0.078 | 0.078 | 0.142 |
Panel A: Difference Tests of ESG and nonESG Firms Variables | ||||||
ESG_FIRM = 0 (n = 216) | ESG_FIRM = 1 (n = 216) | t-Tests (p-Value) | Wilcoxon Tests (p-Value) | |||
Variables | Mean | Median | Mean | Median | ||
LEVt | 1.512 | 1.110 | 1.578 | 1.148 | 0.910 | 0.942 |
SIZEt | 21.343 | 21.347 | 21.387 | 21.338 | 0.608 | 0.635 |
ROAt | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.007 | 0.006 | 0.500 | 0.464 |
CASHRt | 0.082 | 0.067 | 0.080 | 0.062 | 0.648 | 0.927 |
LOSSt | 0.378 | 0.000 | 0.402 | 0.000 | 0.942 | 0.942 |
Foreignt | 0.124 | 0.089 | 0.130 | 0.100 | 0.567 | 0.105 |
AGEt | 3.487 | 3.829 | 3.505 | 3.761 | 0.792 | 0.680 |
Panel B: Results Based on the Matched Sample | ||||||
Variables | Dependent Variable: ROAi,t | |||||
Intercept | 0.043 ** | |||||
(t-value) | (2.96) | |||||
ESG_FIRMt−1 | −0.002 | |||||
(−1.25) | ||||||
COVIDt | −0.004 ** | |||||
(−2.41) | ||||||
ESG_ FIRMt t−1 × COVIDt | 0.005 ** | |||||
(2.44) | ||||||
SIZEt−1 | −0.001 | |||||
(−1.26) | ||||||
LEVt−1 | 0.000 | |||||
(−0.54) | ||||||
ROAt−1 | 0.091 | |||||
(1.00) | ||||||
GRWt−1 | −0.000 | |||||
(−1.28) | ||||||
MBt−1 | 0.000 | |||||
(0.59) | ||||||
Foreignt−1 | 0.010 | |||||
(1.53) | ||||||
OWNt−1 | −0.008 * | |||||
(−1.83) | ||||||
AGEt | 0.000 | |||||
(−0.14) | ||||||
CASHRt−1 | −0.012 | |||||
(−1.41) | ||||||
LOSSt | −0.019 *** | |||||
(−13.75) | ||||||
Industry Fixed effect | Yes | |||||
N | 432 | |||||
Adj R2 | 0.551 |
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Hwang, J.; Kim, H.; Jung, D. The Effect of ESG Activities on Financial Performance during the COVID-19 Pandemic—Evidence from Korea. Sustainability 2021, 13, 11362. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011362
Hwang J, Kim H, Jung D. The Effect of ESG Activities on Financial Performance during the COVID-19 Pandemic—Evidence from Korea. Sustainability. 2021; 13(20):11362. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011362
Chicago/Turabian StyleHwang, Juhee, Hyuna Kim, and Dongjin Jung. 2021. "The Effect of ESG Activities on Financial Performance during the COVID-19 Pandemic—Evidence from Korea" Sustainability 13, no. 20: 11362. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011362
APA StyleHwang, J., Kim, H., & Jung, D. (2021). The Effect of ESG Activities on Financial Performance during the COVID-19 Pandemic—Evidence from Korea. Sustainability, 13(20), 11362. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011362