Ownership by Mutual Funds and Corporate Reporting of Environmental Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from China 2007–2019
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Hypothesis Development
3. Research Design
3.1. Sample and Data Sources
3.2. Variable Definitions
3.3. Research Model
3.3.1. Model for Hypothesis 1
3.3.2. Model for Hypothesis 2
4. Empirical Results and Discussion
4.1. Descriptive Analysis
4.2. Correlation Analysis
4.3. Regression Analysis
4.4. Heterogeneity Test
4.4.1. Analyst Coverage
4.4.2. Ownership
4.4.3. New Environmental Protection Law
4.5. Robustness Test
4.5.1. Endogeneity Test
Reverse Causality
Propensity Score Matching
4.5.2. Substituting Variables
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variables | Variables Name | Variable Definitions |
---|---|---|
Dependent variable | PDERI | Public disclosure of environmental responsibility information takes 1, 0 for otherwise |
Independent variable | Total_FH | The sum of the proportions of shares held by all mutual fund companies of the listed company (decimal) |
Top_FH | Proportion of shares held by top mutual fund companies (top 10 in the industry) of listed company shares (decimal) | |
Controlled variable | Size | The natural logarithm of the current market value (10,000 RMB) of individual stocks in the listed company |
Lev | Long-term debt to equity ratio of listed companies in the current period | |
Roa | The ratio of the net profit of listed company to the total beginning assets in the current period | |
Loss | Loss for current period takes 1, 0 for otherwise | |
Growth | Revenue growth rate for current period | |
Dual | Dual CEO-chairman role takes 1, 0 for otherwise | |
Top1 | Shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder at the end of the period | |
Board | Natural logarithm of the number of board members plus 1 | |
Indep | Proportion of independent directors in the board of directors | |
Age | years of the listed company registered in the current financial period | |
Div | The ratio of the cumulative cash dividend per share of the current listed company to the stock price per share at the end of the period | |
Liquid | The ratio of the cumulative trading volume of the listed company in the current period to the market value of individual stocks | |
BTM | Book-to-market ratio in the current financial period |
Variable | N | Mean | p50 | Min | Max | sd |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
PDERI | 25,188 | 0.2600 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.4390 |
Total_FH | 25,188 | 0.0379 | 0.0096 | 0.0000 | 0.3090 | 0.0617 |
Top_FH | 25,188 | 0.0093 | 0.0006 | 0.0000 | 0.1050 | 0.0193 |
Size | 25,188 | 12.9900 | 12.9100 | 10.5800 | 16.4500 | 1.1450 |
Lev | 25,188 | 0.2290 | 0.0672 | 0.0000 | 2.1430 | 0.3830 |
Roa | 25,188 | 0.0561 | 0.0417 | −0.0827 | 0.3450 | 0.0619 |
Loss | 25,188 | 0.0413 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.1990 |
Growth | 25,188 | 0.2330 | 0.1230 | −0.5280 | 4.3700 | 0.5870 |
Dual | 25,188 | 0.2250 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 1.0000 | 0.4180 |
Top1 | 25,188 | 0.3530 | 0.3330 | 0.0877 | 0.7500 | 0.1520 |
Board | 25,188 | 2.2720 | 2.3030 | 1.7920 | 2.7730 | 0.1850 |
Indep | 25,188 | 0.3720 | 0.3330 | 0.3080 | 0.5710 | 0.0529 |
Age | 25,188 | 16.5100 | 16.3000 | 4.1480 | 31.0200 | 5.7170 |
Div | 25,188 | 0.0087 | 0.0048 | 0.0000 | 0.0577 | 0.0114 |
Liquid | 25,188 | 6.0120 | 4.8040 | 0.4750 | 24.2000 | 4.5490 |
BTM | 25,188 | 0.4090 | 0.3450 | 0.0480 | 1.3930 | 0.2700 |
PDERI | PDERI | Top_FH | Size | Lev | Roa | Loss | Growth | |
PDERI | 1.0000 | |||||||
Total_FH | 0.0875 *** | 1.0000 | ||||||
Top_FH | 0.0650 *** | 0.8028 *** | 1.0000 | |||||
Size | 0.4348 *** | 0.2976 *** | 0.2086 *** | 1.0000 | ||||
Lev | 0.1707 *** | −0.0390 *** | −0.0275 *** | 0.2236 *** | 1.0000 | |||
Roa | −0.0089 | 0.2946 *** | 0.2278 *** | 0.0838 *** | −0.1982 *** | 1.0000 | ||
Loss | −0.0161 ** | −0.0709 *** | −0.0607 *** | −0.0321 *** | 0.0514 *** | −0.3357 *** | 1.0000 | |
Growth | −0.0471 *** | 0.0484 *** | 0.0330 *** | −0.0048 | 0.0328 *** | 0.3712 *** | −0.0926 *** | 1.0000 |
Dual | −0.0883 *** | −0.0044 | −0.0099 | −0.1136 *** | −0.1048 *** | 0.0547 *** | 0.0046 | 0.0102 * |
Top1 | 0.0738 *** | −0.0632 *** | −0.0386 *** | 0.0682 *** | 0.0722 *** | 0.0947 *** | −0.0335 *** | 0.0204 *** |
Board | 0.1576 *** | 0.0720 *** | 0.0709 *** | 0.2148 *** | 0.1615 *** | −0.0287 *** | −0.0231 *** | −0.0282 *** |
Indep | 0.0336 *** | −0.0197 *** | −0.0212 *** | 0.0524 *** | 0.0021 | −0.0112 * | 0.0123 * | 0.0075 |
Age | 0.1241 *** | −0.1173 *** | −0.1119 *** | 0.2396 *** | 0.1653 *** | −0.1094 *** | 0.0172 *** | −0.0096 |
Div | 0.2191 *** | 0.0278 *** | 0.0240 *** | 0.2323 *** | 0.0795 *** | 0.2000 *** | −0.1328 *** | −0.0457 *** |
Liquid | −0.2212 *** | −0.1793 *** | −0.1374 *** | −0.4203 *** | −0.1392 *** | −0.0279 *** | 0.0433 *** | −0.0029 |
BTM | 0.2190 *** | −0.2151 *** | −0.1710 *** | 0.0854 *** | 0.2343 *** | −0.2537 *** | 0.0402 *** | −0.1013 *** |
Dual | Top1 | Board | Indep | Age | Div | Liquid | BTM | |
Dual | 1.0000 | |||||||
Top1 | −0.0594 *** | 1.0000 | ||||||
Board | −0.1794 *** | 0.0084 | 1.0000 | |||||
Indep | 0.1016 *** | 0.0442 *** | −0.4660 *** | 1.0000 | ||||
Age | −0.0728 *** | −0.1328 *** | 0.0068 | 0.0043 | 1.0000 | |||
Div | −0.0436 *** | 0.1666 *** | 0.1657 *** | −0.0238 *** | 0.0534 *** | 1.0000 | ||
Liquid | 0.0977 *** | −0.0964 *** | −0.1190 *** | −0.0030 | −0.1755 *** | −0.2150 *** | 1.0000 | |
BTM | −0.0991 *** | 0.0581 *** | 0.1435 *** | 0.0189 *** | 0.1824 *** | 0.3699 *** | −0.2491 *** | 1.0000 |
(1) | (2) | |
PDERI | PDERI | |
Total_FH | 0.7726 ** | |
(2.3323) | ||
Top_FH | 2.2155 ** | |
(2.2848) | ||
Size | 1.0420 *** | 1.0471 *** |
(42.2848) | (43.4433) | |
Lev | 0.2312 *** | 0.2327 *** |
(4.5033) | (4.5355) | |
Roa | −0.5042 | −0.4409 |
(−1.2997) | (−1.1514) | |
Loss | −0.0322 | −0.0292 |
(−0.3528) | (−0.3198) | |
Growth | −0.1455 *** | −0.1465 *** |
(−3.8764) | (−3.9084) | |
Dual | −0.1600 *** | −0.1600 *** |
(−3.5865) | (−3.5865) | |
Top1 | 0.3033 ** | 0.2878 ** |
(2.4332) | (2.3257) | |
Board | 0.7329 *** | 0.7309 *** |
(6.2422) | (6.2259) | |
Indep | 1.4279 *** | 1.4200 *** |
(3.8801) | (3.8589) | |
Age | 0.0115 *** | 0.0112 *** |
(3.1381) | (3.0671) | |
Div | 10.0869 *** | 10.0453 *** |
(5.8582) | (5.8372) | |
Liquid | 0.0135 *** | 0.0131 ** |
(2.5886) | (2.5171) | |
BTM | 1.2406 *** | 1.2338 *** |
(14.6102) | (14.5938) | |
Year | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes |
cut1_cons | −18.8264 *** | −18.8585 *** |
(−35.0928) | (−35.2374) | |
N | 25,188 | 25,188 |
pseudo R2 | 0.232 | 0.232 |
chi2 | 6.5 × 103 | 6.5 × 103 |
Analyst = 0 | Analyst = 1 | |||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
PDERI | PDERI | PDERI | PDERI | |
Total_FH | 6.6271 *** | 0.2562 | ||
(2.9575) | (0.7351) | |||
Top_FH | 7.2811 | 1.0495 | ||
(1.2463) | (1.0386) | |||
Size | 0.9581 *** | 0.9933 *** | 1.0421 *** | 1.0419 *** |
(12.3052) | (12.9165) | (38.5222) | (39.1857) | |
Lev | 0.2050 * | 0.2068 * | 0.2359 *** | 0.2366 *** |
(1.8531) | (1.8688) | (3.9896) | (4.0014) | |
Roa | −0.0671 | −0.1002 | −0.5459 | −0.5433 |
(−0.0599) | (−0.0897) | (−1.2930) | (−1.3011) | |
Loss | 0.1617 | 0.1621 | −0.0779 | −0.0773 |
(0.8876) | (0.8907) | (−0.7208) | (−0.7155) | |
Growth | −0.0333 | −0.0334 | −0.1823 *** | −0.1825 *** |
(−0.4118) | (−0.4139) | (−4.2349) | (−4.2411) | |
Dual | −0.4665 *** | −0.4729 *** | −0.1207 ** | −0.1212 ** |
(−3.7071) | (−3.7605) | (−2.4885) | (−2.4984) | |
Top1 | 0.7443 ** | 0.7217 ** | 0.1700 | 0.1700 |
(2.4152) | (2.3447) | (1.2273) | (1.2392) | |
Board | 0.7358 ** | 0.7288 ** | 0.6886 *** | 0.6882 *** |
(2.2848) | (2.2677) | (5.3676) | (5.3650) | |
Indep | −0.5328 | −0.5718 | 1.7142 *** | 1.7131 *** |
(−0.5225) | (−0.5616) | (4.2710) | (4.2686) | |
Age | 0.0081 | 0.0080 | 0.0151 *** | 0.0150 *** |
(0.8470) | (0.8365) | (3.7411) | (3.7297) | |
Div | 10.5895 ** | 10.7282 ** | 9.3369 *** | 9.3477 *** |
(2.0449) | (2.0748) | (4.9975) | (5.0078) | |
Liquid | 0.0040 | 0.0044 | 0.0124 ** | 0.0124 ** |
(0.3520) | (0.3842) | (2.0607) | (2.0731) | |
BTM | 0.8337 *** | 0.8272 *** | 1.3345 *** | 1.3354 *** |
(4.4350) | (4.4040) | (13.5799) | (13.6746) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cut1_cons | −16.0138 *** | −16.4235 *** | −19.0553 *** | −19.0465 *** |
(−11.1623) | (−11.5051) | (−31.8035) | (−31.8220) | |
N | 5675 | 5675 | 19,513 | 19,513 |
pseudo R2 | 0.171 | 0.170 | 0.237 | 0.237 |
chi2 | 742.8164 | 736.0970 | 5.5 × 103 | 5.5 × 103 |
SOE = 0 | SOE = 1 | |||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
PDERI | PDERI | PDERI | PDERI | |
Total_FH | −0.3985 | 1.5973 *** | ||
(−0.8349) | (3.2409) | |||
Top_FH | −0.5883 | 4.3899 *** | ||
(−0.4248) | (3.0280) | |||
Size | 1.0389 *** | 1.0326 *** | 1.0342 *** | 1.0456 *** |
(28.6756) | (29.2763) | (27.5594) | (28.3800) | |
Lev | 0.3007 *** | 0.3005 *** | 0.1266 ** | 0.1298 ** |
(3.1543) | (3.1512) | (1.9847) | (2.0356) | |
Roa | 1.1299 ** | 1.0676 ** | −1.6344 ** | −1.5049 ** |
(2.2775) | (2.1818) | (−2.4550) | (−2.2808) | |
Loss | 0.1060 | 0.1029 | −0.0340 | −0.0279 |
(0.7764) | (0.7541) | (−0.2595) | (−0.2128) | |
Growth | −0.1400 *** | −0.1392 *** | −0.1027 * | −0.1056 * |
(−2.7376) | (−2.7195) | (−1.8238) | (−1.8780) | |
Dual | −0.0626 | −0.0630 | −0.0269 | −0.0241 |
(−1.1174) | (−1.1247) | (−0.3135) | (−0.2812) | |
Top1 | −0.3761 ** | −0.3605 * | 0.2581 | 0.2256 |
(−1.9700) | (−1.8993) | (1.3617) | (1.1986) | |
Board | 0.7706 *** | 0.7721 *** | 0.4532 *** | 0.4521 *** |
(4.0734) | (4.0806) | (2.8097) | (2.8017) | |
Indep | 2.6050 *** | 2.6066 *** | 0.0952 | 0.0574 |
(4.5160) | (4.5188) | (0.1852) | (0.1117) | |
Age | 0.0127 ** | 0.0130 ** | −0.0206 *** | −0.0209 *** |
(2.4708) | (2.5323) | (−3.3947) | (−3.4395) | |
Div | 17.3645 *** | 17.4452 *** | 6.2034 ** | 6.2107 ** |
(7.2564) | (7.2971) | (2.3529) | (2.3543) | |
Liquid | 0.0195 *** | 0.0200 *** | 0.0028 | 0.0019 |
(2.7753) | (2.8596) | (0.3318) | (0.2238) | |
BTM | 1.1484 *** | 1.1601 *** | 1.1052 *** | 1.0949 *** |
(8.8516) | (9.0051) | (9.0530) | (8.9904) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cut1_cons | −18.3015 *** | −18.2519 *** | −17.3640 *** | −17.4520 *** |
(−22.1490) | (−22.1308) | (−22.4889) | (−22.6563) | |
N | 14,081 | 14,081 | 11,107 | 11,107 |
pseudo R2 | 0.205 | 0.205 | 0.252 | 0.252 |
chi2 | 2.7 × 103 | 2.7 × 103 | 3.4 × 103 | 3.4 × 103 |
New = 0 | New = 1 | |||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
PDERI | PDERI | PDERI | PDERI | |
Total_FH | 0.5991 ** | −0.4807 | ||
(2.5431) | (−1.2750) | |||
Top_FH | 2.9477 ** | −2.1111 | ||
(2.5610) | (−0.9726) | |||
Size | 1.0188 *** | 1.0285 *** | 1.1332 *** | 1.1262 *** |
(28.8525) | (29.5706) | (31.2243) | (32.0159) | |
Lev | 0.3306 *** | 0.3343 *** | 0.1143 | 0.1138 |
(4.4094) | (4.4614) | (1.5421) | (1.5342) | |
Roa | 0.5084 | 0.6412 | −1.8122 *** | −1.8851 *** |
(0.9506) | (1.2154) | (−3.1181) | (−3.2783) | |
Loss | 0.0327 | 0.0371 | −0.1405 | −0.1445 |
(0.2241) | (0.2542) | (−1.1714) | (−1.2052) | |
Growth | −0.1044 * | −0.1063 * | −0.1686 *** | −0.1675 *** |
(−1.9078) | (−1.9467) | (−3.2273) | (−3.2037) | |
Dual | −0.1521 ** | −0.1507 ** | −0.1545 ** | −0.1547 ** |
(−2.2862) | (−2.2666) | (−2.5346) | (−2.5384) | |
Top1 | 0.1127 | 0.0786 | 0.4172 ** | 0.4335 ** |
(0.6458) | (0.4540) | (2.2842) | (2.3905) | |
Board | 0.5796 *** | 0.5798 *** | 0.9054 *** | 0.9088 *** |
(3.5515) | (3.5516) | (5.2037) | (5.2239) | |
Indep | 0.9757 * | 0.9684 * | 1.8873 *** | 1.9008 *** |
(1.9005) | (1.8865) | (3.4815) | (3.5074) | |
Age | 0.0037 | 0.0032 | 0.0187 *** | 0.0190 *** |
(0.6925) | (0.5950) | (3.6913) | (3.7532) | |
Div | 13.6890 *** | 13.5731 *** | 6.3698 *** | 6.4251 *** |
(5.3855) | (5.3445) | (2.6684) | (2.6932) | |
Liquid | 0.0197 ** | 0.0182 ** | 0.0115 * | 0.0117 * |
(2.4384) | (2.2657) | (1.6556) | (1.6926) | |
BTM | 1.4041 *** | 1.3844 *** | 1.0389 *** | 1.0455 *** |
(10.2194) | (10.1285) | (9.2688) | (9.3650) | |
Year | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
cut1_cons | −17.6201 *** | −17.6841 *** | −20.6911 *** | −20.6258 *** |
(−24.0359) | (−24.1452) | (−25.4993) | (−25.5429) | |
N | 13,932 | 13,932 | 11,256 | 11,256 |
pseudo R2 | 0.235 | 0.235 | 0.235 | 0.235 |
chi2 | 3.3 × 103 | 3.3 × 103 | 3.2 × 103 | 3.2 × 103 |
(1) | (2) | |
PDERI | PDERI | |
Total_FH | 1.5611 *** | |
(4.9879) | ||
Top_FH | 4.6146 *** | |
(4.9668) | ||
Size | 1.0419 *** | 1.0519 *** |
(39.0967) | (40.1689) | |
Lev | 0.1970 *** | 0.2007 *** |
(3.5118) | (3.5797) | |
Roa | −1.3229 *** | −1.1857 *** |
(−3.0075) | (−2.7309) | |
Loss | −0.0751 | −0.0666 |
(−0.7861) | (−0.6980) | |
Growth | −0.1863 *** | −0.1876 *** |
(−4.1844) | (−4.2229) | |
Dual | −0.1624 *** | −0.1629 *** |
(−3.3723) | (−3.3826) | |
Top1 | 0.2280 * | 0.1969 |
(1.6955) | (1.4739) | |
Board | 0.7063 *** | 0.7027 *** |
(5.6445) | (5.6141) | |
Indep | 1.6052 *** | 1.5913 *** |
(4.1067) | (4.0704) | |
Age | 0.0167 *** | 0.0162 *** |
(4.2280) | (4.1043) | |
Div | 10.9605 *** | 10.9025 *** |
(5.9773) | (5.9472) | |
Liquid | 0.0070 | 0.0070 |
(1.1580) | (1.1672) | |
BTM | 1.2057 *** | 1.1988 *** |
(13.2949) | (13.2339) | |
Year | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes |
cut1_cons | −18.9268 *** | −18.9658 *** |
(−33.0391) | (−33.1299) | |
N | 20,167 | 20,167 |
pseudo R2 | 0.232 | 0.232 |
chi2 | 5.7 × 103 | 5.7 × 103 |
(1) | (2) | |
PDERI | PDERI | |
Total_FH | 0.9269 *** | |
(2.8417) | ||
Top_FH | 3.1145 *** | |
(3.2505) | ||
Size | 1.0808 *** | 1.0836 *** |
(40.2290) | (41.0692) | |
Lev | 0.2288 *** | 0.2310 *** |
(4.0784) | (4.1183) | |
Roa | 0.4341 | 0.4802 |
(1.0899) | (1.2190) | |
Loss | 0.0473 | 0.0515 |
(0.4341) | (0.4722) | |
Growth | −0.1082 *** | −0.1096 *** |
(−2.8593) | (−2.8980) | |
Dual | −0.1467 *** | −0.1466 *** |
(−3.0503) | (−3.0475) | |
Top1 | 0.3376 ** | 0.3258 ** |
(2.5450) | (2.4729) | |
Board | 0.6729 *** | 0.6722 *** |
(5.4098) | (5.4033) | |
Indep | 1.3778 *** | 1.3732 *** |
(3.4924) | (3.4807) | |
Age | 0.0132 *** | 0.0129 *** |
(3.3272) | (3.2581) | |
Div | 11.3255 *** | 11.3122 *** |
(5.9383) | (5.9332) | |
Liquid | 0.0200 *** | 0.0196 *** |
(3.5751) | (3.5116) | |
BTM | 1.1449 *** | 1.1414 *** |
(11.5682) | (11.5869) | |
Year | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes |
cut1_cons | −19.7978 *** | −19.7971 *** |
(−33.8051) | (−33.8258) | |
N | 20,167 | 20,167 |
pseudo R2 | 0.236 | 0.236 |
chi2 | 5.8 × 103 | 5.8 × 103 |
Panel A | Dummy_Total_FH = 1 | Dummy_Total_FH = 0 | MeanDiff | ||
G2(1) | Mean2 | G1(0) | Mean1 | ||
PDERI | 5793 | 0.2270 | 5793 | 0.2130 | 0.0140 * |
Size | 5793 | 12.7700 | 5793 | 12.8000 | −0.0300 |
Lev | 5793 | 0.2210 | 5793 | 0.2230 | −0.0020 |
Roa | 5793 | 0.0490 | 5793 | 0.0510 | −0.0020 |
Loss | 5793 | 0.0490 | 5793 | 0.0480 | 0.0010 |
Growth | 5793 | 0.2250 | 5793 | 0.2300 | −0.0050 |
Dual | 5793 | 0.2320 | 5793 | 0.2310 | 0.0010 |
Top1 | 5793 | 0.3500 | 5793 | 0.3530 | −0.0030 |
Board | 5793 | 2.2620 | 5793 | 2.2650 | −0.0030 |
Indep | 5793 | 0.3720 | 5793 | 0.3710 | 0.0010 |
Age | 5793 | 16.5000 | 5793 | 16.5700 | −0.0700 |
Div | 5793 | 0.0080 | 5793 | 0.0080 | 0.0000 |
Liquid | 5793 | 6.4560 | 5793 | 6.4360 | 0.0200 |
BTM | 5793 | 0.4070 | 5793 | 0.4100 | −0.0030 |
Panel B | Dummy_Top_FH = 1 | Dummy_Top_FH = 0 | MeanDiff | ||
G2(1) | Mean2 | G1(0) | Mean1 | ||
PDERI | 5818 | 0.2180 | 5818 | 0.1990 | 0.0190 *** |
Size | 5818 | 12.7400 | 5818 | 12.7700 | −0.0300 |
Lev | 5818 | 0.2130 | 5818 | 0.2170 | −0.0040 |
Roa | 5818 | 0.0500 | 5818 | 0.0510 | −0.0010 |
Loss | 5818 | 0.0470 | 5818 | 0.0470 | 0.0000 |
Growth | 5818 | 0.2220 | 5818 | 0.2280 | −0.0060 |
Dual | 5818 | 0.2330 | 5818 | 0.2300 | 0.0030 |
Top1 | 5818 | 0.3510 | 5818 | 0.3510 | 0.0000 |
Board | 5818 | 2.2580 | 5818 | 2.2600 | −0.0020 |
Indep | 5818 | 0.3720 | 5818 | 0.3710 | 0.0010 |
Age | 5818 | 16.4500 | 5818 | 16.4100 | 0.0400 |
Div | 5818 | 0.0080 | 5818 | 0.0080 | 0.0000 |
Liquid | 5818 | 6.5010 | 5818 | 6.4690 | 0.0320 |
BTM | 5818 | 0.4020 | 5818 | 0.4010 | 0.0010 |
(1) | (2) | |
PDERI | PDERI | |
Total_FH | 1.7585 *** | |
(3.1897) | ||
Top_FH | 2.7595 * | |
(1.6687) | ||
Size | 0.9677 *** | 0.9888 *** |
(24.6396) | (24.8465) | |
Lev | 0.2654 *** | 0.2637 *** |
(3.5639) | (3.4576) | |
Roa | −1.0216 * | −0.8738 |
(−1.6851) | (−1.3871) | |
Loss | −0.1305 | −0.0315 |
(−1.0125) | (−0.2440) | |
Growth | −0.0318 | −0.1288 ** |
(−0.6312) | (−2.3615) | |
Dual | −0.1571 ** | −0.2259 *** |
(−2.3289) | (−3.2974) | |
Top1 | 0.5454 *** | 0.2985 |
(2.9356) | (1.6081) | |
Board | 0.6506 *** | 0.4369 ** |
(3.5882) | (2.4110) | |
Indep | 0.9135 | 0.6796 |
(1.5997) | (1.1856) | |
Age | 0.0085 | 0.0088 |
(1.5461) | (1.6032) | |
Div | 9.3108 *** | 11.6488 *** |
(3.3954) | (4.3059) | |
Liquid | 0.0030 | −0.0017 |
(0.3991) | (−0.2156) | |
BTM | 1.1545 *** | 1.1869 *** |
(9.2466) | (9.2921) | |
Year | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes |
cut1_cons | −17.6300 *** | −16.7071 *** |
(−20.1609) | (−20.0024) | |
N | 11,586 | 11,636 |
pseudo R2 | 0.195 | 0.183 |
chi2 | 2.3 × 103 | 2.1 × 103 |
(1) | (2) | |
N_PDERI | N_PDERI | |
Total_FH | 0.7215 ** | |
(2.3813) | ||
Top_FH | 1.8050 ** | |
(2.0289) | ||
Size | 0.1441 *** | 0.1503 *** |
(6.3969) | (6.8322) | |
Lev | 0.0340 | 0.0354 |
(0.6566) | (0.6822) | |
Roa | −0.8782 *** | −0.8143 ** |
(−2.5853) | (−2.4205) | |
Loss | −0.0009 | 0.0020 |
(−0.0103) | (0.0218) | |
Growth | 0.0096 | 0.0079 |
(0.3214) | (0.2671) | |
Dual | 0.0034 | 0.0042 |
(0.0852) | (0.1034) | |
Top1 | 0.4127 *** | 0.3973 *** |
(3.5642) | (3.4488) | |
Board | 0.0478 | 0.0471 |
(0.4301) | (0.4237) | |
Indep | −0.5197 | −0.5259 |
(−1.4665) | (−1.4841) | |
Age | −0.0024 | −0.0027 |
(−0.6911) | (−0.7943) | |
Div | −1.2208 | −1.2551 |
(−0.6787) | (−0.6978) | |
Liquid | 0.0098 ** | 0.0094 ** |
(2.2494) | (2.1517) | |
BTM | 0.2549 *** | 0.2441 *** |
(2.7988) | (2.6920) | |
Year | Yes | Yes |
Industry | Yes | Yes |
cut1_cons | 0.0971 | 0.0491 |
(0.2047) | (0.1039) | |
N | 25,188 | 25,188 |
pseudo R2 | 0.161 | 0.160 |
chi2 | 4.5 × 103 | 4.5 × 103 |
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Luo, Y.; Lu, L.; Lin, S. Ownership by Mutual Funds and Corporate Reporting of Environmental Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from China 2007–2019. Sustainability 2021, 13, 11527. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011527
Luo Y, Lu L, Lin S. Ownership by Mutual Funds and Corporate Reporting of Environmental Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from China 2007–2019. Sustainability. 2021; 13(20):11527. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011527
Chicago/Turabian StyleLuo, Yi, Lijun Lu, and Shu Lin. 2021. "Ownership by Mutual Funds and Corporate Reporting of Environmental Responsibility: Empirical Evidence from China 2007–2019" Sustainability 13, no. 20: 11527. https://doi.org/10.3390/su132011527